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To my Wife 
Foreword 
I 
T HOSE who prior to World War II knew the chief legal personalities of Europe recognized the outstand-ing position held by Ernst Rabel, the author of the 
present treatise. 
Born in 1874 in Austria, as a young man he studied law 
in his own country, in Germany, and in France. His university 
career has been most distinguished; he taught Roman and 
modern civil law in Switzerland and Germany, the many in-
vitations he received leading to celebrated professorates, nota-
bly at Munich and ultimately at Berlin, where he occupied 
an influential position. His contributions to comparative legal 
history have been noteworthy; he first introduced the com-
parative study of Egyptian papyri with the medieval docu-
ments; he is a leader in the efforts, through the modern search 
for interpolations, to reconstruct the original Roman private 
law; his services as editor of various research publications in 
the field of legal history are well known. These broad interests 
were complemented by extensive comparative work on the 
modern Swiss, French, and German laws, later including the 
Common Law as well;· his contributions in the preparation of 
international drafts of unified law, especially that on sales of 
goods, are widely recognized. 
In Rabel, outstanding legal scholarship has been enriched 
by wide and unusual practical experience. He practiced law in 
Vienna and served as judge in the appellate courts of Basle 
and Munich. Shortly after the First World War, he became 
a member of the German-Italian arbitral tribunal. As a judge 
of the Court of International Justice (World Court) at the 
Hague, between 1925 and 1928, he took part in German and 
vii 
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Polish suits. He was president of the International Associ-
ation of Comparative Law and a member of the Council and 
Executive Committee of the Institute for Unification of pri-
vate Law in Rome. He received diverse honors in Italy, 
Greece, Poland, Spain, and Norway. 
The central interests and achievements of the author have 
been in the deyelopment of comparative legal research. In 
the course of the First World War, he recognized the danger 
of a narrow legal nationalism and in I 9 I 6 founded and be-
came Director of the Institute of Comparative Law in Munich, 
the world's first research institute for comparative law. In 
I 926, being appointed Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm In-
stitute of Foreign and International Private Law in Berlin, 
he was entrusted with the task of organizing and conducting 
a much larger enterprise. This Institute, parallel to the Insti-
tute of Foreign Public Law and the Law of Nations, directed 
by the late Viktor Bruns, was devoted to research as well as 
to the giving of practical information and advice to the Foreign 
Office in Germany, legislative authorities, courts, lawyers, and 
business firms. Under Rabel's guidance, the Institute trained 
a staff of experts in the various legal systems of the world, 
some of whom are now in this country as law teachers or mem-
bers of the legal profession, and, in conjunction with the sis-
ter organization, established the most comprehensive law 
library in Europe. The opinions delivered by the Institute 
under Professor Rabel's responsibility in matters of legisla-
tion, conflict of laws, international trade and international law, 
numbered about a thousand. The Institute exercised a pro-
found influence in the legal thought and methods not only 
of Germany but also of those numerous other countries whose 
scholars availed themselves of its facilities. 
After the completion of the Restatement of the Law of Con-
flict of Laws in I934, the American L~w Institute had under 
consideration a plan to supplement the Restatement by a 
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parallel work presenting to the American public the rules, 
principles, and doctrines of the leading foreign countries. But, 
until in I937 the Nazi insanity removed from the director-
ship of the world's then principal organization devoted to the 
study of comparative law the director whose foresight and 
leadership conceived and conducted it, it had seemed all but 
impossible to find the right man for a task requiring so wide 
and mature a background of learning and experience. The 
opportunity thus offered to bring Doctor Rabel to this country 
to do much to break down our isolationist legal attitudes was 
unique. Doctor Rabel knows the private law systems of Ger-
man and Latin-American countries. He knows much of the 
common law of the English-speaking peoples. Furthermore, 
he has not only the law professor's knowledge of legal theory, 
but the practical knowledge of the similarities and differences 
in the application of the legal principles of different systems 
to the solution of concrete legal problems. 
Accordingly, in the spring of I939, the American Law 
Institute took steps to bring Dr. Rabel to the United States 
with the guarantee of two years' employment. He arrived in 
this country in September, I 9 3 9, and at once began work pre-
paratory to the preparation of this treatise, of which the first 
volume is now published. In the spring of I 942, his arrange-
ment with the Institute having been fulfilled, the Law School 
of the University of Michigan gave him a position, which has 
now enabled him to complete the first of the volumes con-
templated. His work in Michigan has been done under the 
most fortunate surroundings, as he has had the active advice 
and assistance from the point of view of a leading American 
specialist in international law, Professor Hessel E. Y ntema. 
The present treatise is the confirmation of Doctor Rabel's 
life work. Its primary purpose is to make a comparison of the 
significant legal systems of conflict of laws with reference to 
the specific problems arising in each topic. The first volume, 
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besides containing a most interesting and comprehensive in-
troduction dealing with the literature, theories, and sources 
of the subject, is devoted to a study of the problems of what 
may be described as family relations, such as the personal law 
of individuals, marriage, divorce and annulment, and parental 
relations. It is a field presenting a variety of interesting and 
difficult conflicts problems. The second volume now well under 
way will deal principally with Foreign Corporations, Torts, 
and the General Problems of Contracts. It is hoped that there 
may be further volumes, covering the other legal topics treated 
in the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of 
Conflict of Laws. 
In the ~ourse of its preparation and completion, the plan 
of the work has undergone substantial change. 
The original plan was that of a work which, in arrange-
ment, should exactly parallel the sections of the Restatement 
of Conflict of Laws. This plan has turned out to be imprac-
ticable. The differences between the European and American 
systems are too great to allow such minute comparison, section 
by section. The major subdivisions, however, present suffi-
cient analogy to those of the Restatement to draw attention 
to the significant distinctions and similarities. Comparison be-
tween the foreign and American law has been emphasized 
throughout. The book does not simply constitute a presenta-
tion of foreign law, but a painstaking and comprehensive com-
parison of the solutions accorded to the particular problems of 
family law, botli here and abroad. It is this feature that gives 
the work its special value and attractiveness. 
The author conceives that comparison of laws requires study 
in the legal systems compared of the solutions reached on par-
ticular practical problems rather than the review of general 
theories. In thus emphasizing the comparative solutions of 
concrete problems, he is in accord with our common law habit 
, of thought. Consistently carried out in the present treatise, 
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it greatly increases the value of the work in the English-
speaking countries. The method does not ignore the neces-
sary consideration of theories but obviously gives them less 
significance than is usually found in most European literature. 
The work offers not only comprehensive assistance to the 
practicing lawyer or the judge who is concerned to know the 
answers in other countries to a conflict of laws problem, but 
will also furnish the English-speaking reader with foreign 
law concepts of the rules of conflicts of laws and their appli-
cation in a form easily comprehended by those whose legal 
training is largely confined to our common law and statutes. 
In all the topics treated, the author enables us to appreciate 
the "other fellow's" point of view and compare its practical 
results with our own. This is not an insignificant service to a 
people just awakening from a self-centered legal sleep to an 
appreciation of the fact that we must hereafter go forward in 
a world which is increasingly one. 
WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, Director 
The American Law Institute 
II 
I T is appropriate to add a few remarks from the viewpoint of the University of Michigan. The foregoing statement by the director of the American Law Institute outlines 
the distinguished career of the author of the present work and 
indicates the circumstances under which he was invited by the 
Institute to undertake a comparative survey of the existing 
systems of conflicts law. As therefrom appears, while the in-
spiration to bring to this country an internationally recognized 
jurist with. unique qualifications for the task-an extraordi-
nary opportunity afforded only by the malign policy that has 
betrayed Germany and crucified millions in this generation-
is to be credited to the Institute and more particularly to the 
generous wisdom of the director, the studies reflected in the 
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present volume have been substantially accomplished at Ann 
Arbor, in large part with the aid of funds and further assistance 
provided by the University of Michigan. 
This co-operation, illustrating an appropriate function, as 
once suggested by the writer, for a nondenominational Insti-
tute in the world of academic rivalries, deserves a word of 
commendation. On the part of the University, it has been 
motivated not only by the liberal disposition of the Faculty 
of Law to promote worth-while research and their long-
standing interest in comparative legal studies, but more es-
pecially by the significance of the enterprise. This is no mere 
tabula ex naufragio, thus rescued from the maelstrom in which 
contemporary European culture is engulfed. The survey un-
dertaken is essential at the present time for the proper de-
velopment of a branch of law of special interest for interstate 
and international trade, arising, as Story states, "from the con-
flict of the laws of different nations, in their actual applica-
tion to modern commerce and intercourse." More generally, 
it exemplifies a fundamental mode of legal investigation, 
which each day becomes more nearly indispensable in the 
modern world. 
The latter consideration, the need in these times for com-
parative legal research, does not call for extensive comment. 
The present conflict, multiplying contacts among the most dis-
tant peoples and through untold suffering and sacrifice uniting 
them to vindicate the common values of humanity, like the 
Napoleonic wars and the War· of I 9 I 4, again emphasizes that 
no one is unconditionally immune from influences operative 
within the effective orbit of international intercourse. In a 
, universe progressively interrelated by the miracles of modern 
communication, therefore, it is neither prudent nor even longer 
possible for any nation to pursue a policy of self-sufficient iso-
lation. In such a universe, the notion that the corresponding 
legal order is compartmentalized exclusively within political 
frontiers is inadequate. 
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For legal science, so pervasively indoctrinated these hun-
dred years by the preconceptions of sovereignty and national-
ism, this spells the necessity of comparative reorientation, of 
ampler realization that justice both comprehends and tran-
scends local interests. If the price of peace and liberty is con-
stant vigilance in an integrated world, it is expedient to know 
what transpires abroad as well as at home. While legal science 
in each country will and· should continue to cultivate first its 
peculiar institutions and traditions, these can no longer be ac-
cepted as the horizon of legal knowledge. The practical, 
specialized study of indigenous techniques, legislative, judi-
cial, and administrative, must be complemented by scientific 
comparison with other legal systems-to ascertain their mani-
fold bearings on domestic interests; to prepare the reforms 
that may be desired from time t~ time to bring the municipal 
laws into harmony with advancing conceptions of justice and 
the requirements of the international community; to share in 
efforts to provide appropriate uniform legislation for the com-
merce of the world; in fine, to establish a more objective scien-
tific basis for the consideration of legal problems. To attain 
these ends, indeed even to appreciate the special genius of 
each legal system, the comparative method, necessarily sup-
posing intensive historical and functional investigation of par-
ticular institutions, is indicated. Without this perspective, as 
Ihering pointed out long ago, there is no legal science worthy 
of the name. Blind without history, jurisprudence without 
comparative understanding can scarcely rise above the level of 
provincial casuistry and empirical craft. 
Obviously, such understanding of the existing legal systems 
is most immediately needed in those branches of law that are 
concerned with international relations. Of these, the law of 
conflict of laws, devoted to the principles governing assump-
tion of jurisdiction and resort to the proper law in the solu-
tion of private disputes of an international complexion, is in 
a parlous state, permitted presumably by the fact that it is 
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almost wholly administered in the ordinary courts in the 
positivistic atmosphere of municipal law. For, in this subject 
matter concerned with determining the application of the di-
verse legal provisions that may be involved in any such dis-
pute, in consonance with, or at least without violating, 
common standards of justice, emphasis is rampant upon terri-
torialism and nationality, upon the dominant pretensions of 
lex fori or ordre public, in other words, upon ideas that ob-
scure, limit, or frustrate the very purpose in view. 
This, it is worth recalling, was not always the emphasis. 
More than a hundred years ago, Story founded the modern 
law of conflict of laws on a broad, comparative basis, that 
looked, despite uncertainty and diversity in the then existing 
doctrines, "towards the establishment of a general system of 
international jurisprudence, which shall elevate the policy, 
subserve the interests, and promote the common convenience 
of all nations." Fifteen years after Story penned these words, 
in the preface to the eighth volume of the monumental System 
des heutigen Romischen Rechts, Savigny voiced two interest-
ing prognostications in like vein. Adverting to the variety of 
opinions among both writers and courts respecting conflicts 
of laws, he nevertheless conceived that, from the exceptional 
and active common concern in the problems of this field of 
law, there would develop a universal, existent community of 
legal understanding and legal life. The further suggestion 
that the principle of nationality, then coming into prominence, 
would not make itself felt in a subject, the nature of which 
involves the resolution of conflicts of national laws within a 
recognized community of the various nations, equally reflects 
Savigny's international point of view. 
How soon and how far these anticipations were to be dis-
appointed is writ at large in the illuminating introduction that 
forms Part One of the present volume. 
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Aetas parentum, peior avis, tulit 
Nos nequiores, mox daturos 
Progeniem vitiosiorem. 
XV 
But two years after Savigny wrote, the doctrine of nationality, 
which in its exaggeration has so much contributed to inter-
national disorder during the past century, was proclaimed by 
Mancini as the fundamental principle of the law of nations 
and shortly became the distinctive basis of legislation in Con-
tinental Europe. Consequently, to borrow the author's ex-
pression, the international community, as contemplated by 
Story and Savigny, disintegrated. Story's broad understand-
ing of the conflicts of law doctrines current in his time 
eventually shrank in the United States to the dimensions of 
the introverted treatment of the subject by Wharton and later 
by Beale: in England, Westlake bridged the way to Dicey's 
Anglican positivism; on the Continent, Savigny and his 
international-minded successors were duly eclipsed by the in-
transigent, if despairing, nationalism of Bartin and Kahn. 
Thus, by 1900, the dominant supposition was a caricature of 
the truism that international private law is not international 
but private law; absorbed in domestic legislation and prece-
dents, the doctrine reflected the prevailing provincial 
dogmatisms of legal science generally. Apparently, justified 
recognition of the circumstance that, under existing conditions, 
national courts-typically administer conflicts rules as a branch 
of municipal law, was thought to warrant indifference to their 
international raison d'etre. Consequently, legal theory in this 
field in recent years, having lost sight of the underlying pur-
pose to be had in view, has devoted itself with aprioristic 
methods to unreal issues and become something of a logical 
mystery. Essentially, it faces the problem of how to square 
in terms of national interest or tradition a circle of inter-
nationally superior needs. 
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In this country, the current isolationism of conflicts of law 
doctrine has been accentuated by certain contributing factors: 
first, by a quite natural preoccupation on the part of specialists 
in the subject with the relatively frequent internal conflicts 
of jurisdiction and law arising within the federal structure of 
the United States; and second, by the extensive influence of 
the theories expounded by Beale, including the belief that 
reference in this field to civil law authorities is not one that 
tends "to preserve the correctness and purity of the common 
law." It deserves repeating-even after almost twenty years 
-that this is a conceit, strange and for the United States in-
expedient. Strange, since it disavows the considerable in-
debtedness of common law doctrines respecting conflicts of 
laws to the civil law; inexpedient, since a great commercial 
nation cannot afford to remain in ignorance, particularly in 
this subject matter, of the laws of foreign countries with which 
it trades. In consequence of these influences, despite the 
pioneer work of Lorenzen ~nd more recent contributions by 
Kuhn, Nussbaum, and others, inadequate attention has been 
given in this country to the relations between the doctrines of 
conflicts law as here evolved and those of foreign countries 
other than England. It affords little consolation that the con-
dition is paralleled elsewhere. But it does serve to explain 
why no systematic effort has been made hitherto to provide a 
comprehensive, critical comparison of the existing systems of 
private international law. 
Had it not been for this background, the preparation of the 
Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, initiated in I 923 
and promulgated in 1934, might well have been the occasion 
for such a survey. This, however, was not to be-it was pre-
cluded by the prepossessions of the reporter, by the curious 
determination, deviating from the original plan, to restate 
"the law as it is," and still more effectually by unfamiliarity 
with comparable foreign doctrines on the part of those invited 
FOREWORD xvii 
to participate as advisers (except fora time Lorenzen). Hence, 
the failure in this monumental codification of the Common 
Law to take account of other systems was not merely an effect 
of, but has become a cause to perpetuate an inappropriate view 
of international private law, which no longer befits the United 
States. On this count alone and apart from other limitations 
duly noted by critics, we repeat, the Restatement needs to be 
restated. But the preceding observations will suggest that it 
is still more important to provide the indispensable basis for 
such revision, including the comparative information without 
which inbred doctrines remain unquestioned and their ob-
jective, scientific consideration in terms of international needs 
is excluded a limine. 
To supply this need, as the author justly observes in the 
preface, is a large task. The requisite survey of the existing 
systems of conflicts law involves critical examination and com-
parison of the significant rules on specific problems with refer-
ence to their evolution and purposes, as exemplified in these 
systems, and in the light of the pertinent literature and juris-
prudence for each country, preferably accompanied by cor-
responding suggestions for improvement. Moreover, as con-
flicts rules look to reciprocal recognition and understanding of 
the respective specific institutions of local law, it is necessary 
that any such survey should be made on the background, how-
ever succinctly adumbrated, of the historical development and 
contemporary nature, significance, and interrelations of these 
institutions, considered in the context of the legislations of 
which they form part. The present volume is a first and sub-
stantial contribution to this undertaking; in addition to a 
magistral review of the literature, sources, doctrinal develop-
ment, and general theories of the subject, it provides a com-
parative conspectus of the rules applicable to conflicts in the 
extensive field of family law. It is more than an annotation to 
the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, as was at first 
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contemplated. It is the first comprehensive comparative'legal 
·study that has been published in English for many moons, 
certainly the first in any language to take adequate account 
of the laws of the Americas as well as of Europe. It is, in sum, 
a pioneer, intensive exploration of a substantial part of the 
labyrinth of the laws of conflicts from the indicated inter-
national point of view, a contribution not only essential for 
progress in this field but also of general interest as an exemplar 
of the comparative method in law. 
In pursuance of its undertaking to support this enterprise, 
the University has made substantial provision to maintain and 
implement the author's individual researches, including, 
among other things, accommodations in the Legal Research 
Library, ministerial assistance as required from time to time, 
and editorial collaboration, especially in adapting the author's 
incisive expressions to the idiosyncrasies of English style, the 
independent verification of all citations, and the preparation 
of the various tables (except for the index, which was made up 
by the author). In arranging this assistance, the responsibility 
for which was cast upon the editor as a condition of the adop-
tion of the undertaking for a time by the University, various 
obligations have been incurred, which deserve to be acknowl-
edged: 
To the University authorities, to the Faculty of Law and 
Dean Stason in particular, for their constant and generous sup-
port in the effective prosecution of the work. To all those who, 
as members of the research staff, were engaged in one way or 
another in preparing, editing, and seeing the manuscript 
through the press, an exacting task in which the comparative 
use of legal materials from many countries has presented an 
unusual variety of questions, for their indispensable, respective 
contributions, efficiently rendered. To Eldon R. James, 
Law Librarian, Library of Congress, and Arthur C. Pulling, 
Director of the Harvard Law Library, for the appreciated as-
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sistance of their respective staffs, which has made it possible 
to verify all save perhaps a dozen of the limited number of 
references to works not available in the Legal Research 
Library. To Hobart R. Coffey, to whom the editor is indebted 
equally with the author for expert relief unstintingly given in 
the revision of the manuscript. And, not least, to the author 
himself for unfailing co-operation and courageous devotion 
to a complex task under disturbed conditions. 
Yet this is to be added. However indispensable the assist-
ance provided by the University has been for the prosecution 
of the work, the product is in substance exclusively the 
author's; he alone collected the materials, and the views ex-
pressed herein are his. It is fortunate that a jurist of the 
author's attainments and scholarly sagacity has addressed him-
self to the task, which, it is hoped, may be extended in addi-
tional volumes to other significant branehes of conflicts law. 
HESSEL E. y NTEMA 
Preface 
FULL application of comparative methods to the law of conflicts requires a working plan of some magnitude. We ought to take stock of the conflicts rules existing 
in the different countries of the world, state their similarities 
or dissimilarities, and investigate their purposes and effects. 
The solutions thus ascertained should moreover be subjected 
to an estimation of their usefulness, by the standards appro-
priate to their natural objective. Conflicts rules have to place 
private life and business relations upon the legal background 
suitable to satisfactory intercourse among states and nations. 
They are valuable to the extent that their practical function-
ing, rather than their legal appearance, serves this purpose. 
To meet the challenge of this program with limited forces 
is a risky undertaking. Nevertheless it has to be attempted. 
The conditions of the law of conflicts are deplorable. It may 
be said, to the reader's and my own consolation, that the stag-
gering provincialism apparent in the international family law 
presented in this volume is not equaled in other parts. But if 
conflicts problems have been cultivated by men of the highest 
erudition, idealism, and endeavor, they have also been the ob-
ject of prejudice and dogmatism. Suggestions of almost all 
needed ideas may be found, but little agreement on a sound 
choice. The courts of this country dealing with a wealth of 
interstate cases have prevailingly shown sincere respect for 
foreign legislation and applied an accomplished method of 
comparative research. But this admirable attitude, which is 
the most outstanding model for the practice of private inter-
national law, suffers exceptions, and in the field of international 
relations throughout the world, despite enormous efforts, the 
simple truth that harmony presupposes mutual understanding 
xxi 
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and tolerance, has not prevailed in conflicts law more than in 
foreign affairs. 
All considered, the further we extend our comparative sur-
vey, the less doubt can subsist about the need for a total recon-
sideration of the international purpose and the undeveloped 
resources of this branch of law. The time has passed when we 
may rest satisfied to state a rule and to regret it. Not that the 
premature legislation or halfhearted treaty making, familiar 
to the last decades, should be advocated. What this book is 
intended to suggest is a patient and concerted world-wide dis-
cussion determined to relieve the present chaos. I am con-
vinced that large results must not be deferred to a remote 
future. The legal profession has great power and deserves 
great confidence. If it decided to consider conflicts law as a 
matter of general interest and gave it its unbiased attention, 
much might be obtained that now seems Utopian. I am par-
ticularly hopeful of the lawyers in the United States. 
According to the program, I have regarded my foremost 
task to be the collection and grouping of the significant rules, 
theories, critical views, and proposals, and the cases animated 
by them. This task is comprehensive and worth-while enough 
to dictate sacrifices. It has not been possible to spare the reader 
and myself tedious enumerations and many a mosaic of in-
coherent pieces, and I have had to renounce historical and 
theoretical developments. Neither is there space to describe 
at length the institutions of private law that are the subject 
matter of the conflicts rules. This compulsory limitation is the 
more regrettable, as common law lawyers have not been in-
troduced to the concepts of civil law as European lawyers 
were informed of Anglo-American institutions during the 
period between the two wars. 
I have also restricted my own critical appraisals, and I have 
doubted whether any recommendations for the future should 
be added. Yet, in view of the personal encouragement that I 
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have received from such scholars as Elliott E. Cheatham, 
Max Rheinstein, and Hessel E. Y ntema, and recently in 
Ernest Lorenzen's great review of the last period of American 
conflicts law, it seems to be the writer's duty not entirely to 
conceal his impressions regarding the desirable path that the 
evolution may take. Theoretical conclusions of more general 
scope as well as specified proposals for elaborating the rules 
may be expected, when comparative research in this singular 
and disturbed field has become broader and bolder. I hope 
the survey itself will almost automatically arouse the wish for 
certain reforms. 
Because of the war time, European rules and cases are 
stated, in principle, as they were in 1939 at the beginning of 
the war. This is a rather convenient date for a view back, while 
a new epoch is starting. More recent materials coming through 
have, of course, been registered. 
The Legal Research Library of the University of Michi-
gan in Ann Arbor has afforded me a hospitable haven and 
ample facilities for work. Its farsighted policy has enabled me, 
for the first time in a work of this kind, to include a substan-
tial amount of Latin-American doctrine. My satisfaction in 
this regard is somewhat impaired by the fear that my efforts 
of analysis have not been entirely successful in regard to cer-
tain Latin-American formulations. As these countries possess 
outstanding scholars in this field who are the natural inter-
mediaries between common law and civil law, it is to be hoped 
that they will participate in carrying on the work here begun 
and supply the details not yet mentioned in the literature but 
with which the courts must deal. 
To the American Law Institute, the Dean and Faculty of 
the Law School, University of Michigan, and the Research 
Department of the W. W. Cook Foundation directed by 
Professor Lewis M. Simes, I owe deepest gratitude. 
Dean Emeritus William Draper Lewis, the eminent and be-
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loved dire.ctor of the American Law Institute, has rescued me 
from the cataclysm of Europe; he has been the original sponsor 
of this enterprise and has not ceased to manifest his friendly 
interest in it. Professor Hessel E. Y ntema, since I 940, has ful-
filled his task as editor with an unprecedented sacrifice of time 
and labor. He has generously provided me with informations 
and suggestions, constantly supervised during all these years 
the comprehensive ministerial aid furnished by the research 
staff of the Faculty, and devoted his command of English style 
to an extremely delicate and exacting revision of the language 
of my manuscript. Professor Hobart R. Coffey has liberally 
shared in this burden, and to him, as Law Librarian, as well 
as to his entire staff, who have been most kind, I am grateful. 
I feel cordially obligated also for the devoted services of 
Mrs. Lilly Melchior Roberts, who, with the assistance of 
Miss Dorothy Karl, has been especially helpful in checking the 
documentation, to Dr. Vladimir Gsovski, Chief of the Foreign 
Laws Section, Law Library of the Library of Congress, and 
to those whose contributions Mr. Y ntema has deservedly ac-
knowledged. 
Finally, it is my privilege to thank publicly Professor 
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Literature and Sources of Conflicts Law 
I. ScoPE oF CoNFLICTS LAw 
IN the American literature, the law of conflicts includes both choice of law, which contemplates the determination of the particular state law applicable to specific cases 
typically within the sphere of private law, and jurisdiction 
of courts, regarded by some writers as an aspect of legislative 
jurisdiction. In following this pattern, we shall observe the 
limitations of private law more strictly than is usual and 
only to the extent necessary explore the implications of con-
stitutional, administrative, procedural, criminal, and public 
law generally. Thus, the rules of judicial jurisdiction will 
be considered in connection with those matters which are 
governed in this country by the domestic or internal law of 
the jurisdiction (the lex fori) and consequently depend upon 
choice of court rather than on choice of law. 
According to the French doctrine, "private international 
law" combines choice of law, the law of nationality, and the 
legal status of foreigners. This last subject, concerned with 
the rules granting or refusing foreigners equal treatment 
with nationals, in theory is thoroughly different from con-
flicts law conceived primarily as choice of law. It presupposes 
that the law applicable to aliens has been selected and found to 
be the internal law of the state. For this reason, it is not 
regarded in Germany as part of private internationallaw.1 
In this country, likewise, rules relative to "foreign" 
individuals-aliens and non-residents-typically do not ap-
pear in the treatises on conflicts law. The explanation given is 
1 See I ZITELMANN zs6; KAHN, I Abhandi. z6J ff. 
3 
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that citizens and non-citizens are not differentiated 2 in respect 
to private law; this seems to contemplate exclusively relations 
between the American sister states. Nevertheless, the rules 
concerning foreign corporations, pertaining for the most part 
to internal law and in fact. presenting many special features 
in the United States and to some degree in Germany, are 
included in the usual orbit of conflicts discussion. This practi-
cal method will be followed, although the regulation of 
foreign corporations is different from choice of law and in 
general forms part of administrative law. 
Similar considerations make it desirable to give some atten-
tion to substantive provisions concerned with property situ-
ated or contracts performed or acts done in another state, or 
that otherwise involve foreign elements. Such provisions often 
appear as purely internal rules, but they may include genuine 
conflicts rules. For instance, a rule stating that a money debt 
expressed in foreign currency may be paid, at the option of 
the debtor, in domestic currency at the exchange of a certain 
date, is substantive merely. But the principle, enunciated in 
certain American statutes and judicial decisions/ that statu-
tory formalities prescribed for insurance contracts apply only 
to contracts executed within the state, is not merely a rule of 
municipal law territorially limited; it contains two rules, the 
one substantive, imposing formalities, the other, a conflicts 
rule, however delicate the borderline may be.4 There are also 
scattered throughout the national legislations numerous 
provisions that are not intended or are unsuitable for appli-
z 1 BEALE 8. On the rules, see MooRE, 4 Digest of International Law (1906) 
ch. XIII. . 
3 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen (1900) 179 U.S. 262; Johnson v. Mutual 
Life Ins. Co. (1901-1902) 180 Mass. 407, 62 N. E. 733 (on Mass. Stat. 1894, 
c. 522 § 73, now Mass. General Laws (1932) c. 175 § 131); New York 
Life Ins. Co. v. Long (1917) 177 Ky. 445, 197 S. W. 948 (on Ky. Stat. 
§ 679, now Ky. Rev. Stats. (1942) § 299.13o), 
'In fact, the provision cited in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Long (supra n. 3) 
has been characterized as a "spatially limited" internal rule by NuSSBAUM, 
Principles 7 o. 
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cation by foreign courts, as for instance, the peculiar English 
provisions imposing upon certain persons the burden of sup-
port of indigents. 5 All such internal regulations, with potential 
international significance, deserve systematic examination in 
connection with the laws of the particular countries. In the 
present survey, it will be possible only to make occasional 
reference to such problems. On the other hand, in view of 
their preponderant influence, internal rules embodying so-
~alled stringent public policies, and hence superseding the 
operation of general conflicts rules, must be taken into account. 
The observations in the present introduction are not 
intended to serve as a general analysis of conflicts law. 
Modern writers in this field have begun to develop a body of 
generalized theories, 6 but most of the topics they deal with are 
beyond present purposes. Certain problems, such as the at-
titude of the courts in the different countries with regard to 
public policy or the methods of considering foreign law in 
lawsuits, involve positive formulations of law, which ought 
to be reported in a comparative survey and will be referred 
to in their appropriate connections. Other long-standing 
problems of deep scientific interest, such as the exact classifica-
tion of conflicts law in the legal system, do not need more 
international discussion. Others, including the dubious role 
of the "preliminary question,m have not matured sufficiently 
to warrant general observations. 
Finally, there are problems regarding the structure and 
application of conflicts rules that are of interest from the view-
point of method and have attracted wide and vivid attention 
6 See infra pp. 325, 6I I, n. 8, 6:u, n. 63. 
6 A penetrating analysis has been made by MAURY in his Hague lecture, 
"Regles generales des conflits de lois," 57 Recueil I936 III 32.5. Other lectures 
under the same title by Aco, 58 Recueil I936 IV 2.47; DAVIES, an English 
author, 62. Recueil I937 IV 427; and H. LEWALD, published separately, 
Basel, I94I, (an elegant theoretical study). See, moreover, I. HENRI HUMANS 
Algemeene Problemen van Internationaal Privaatrecht (I 9 3 7). ' 
7 See CORMACK, "Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary 
Question in the Conflict of Laws," I4 So. Cal. L. Rev. (I94I) 22.1, 2.43, 
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during recent years. The purpose of this introduction is to 
summarize the writer's view on these questions. This view 
premises that each case should be considered on its merits; 
therefore it does not presuppose the determination of indi-
vidual problems by general dogmas. 
II. LITERATURE 8 
1. The International Historical Background 9 
In its generally accepted sense, the law of conflicts or 
private international law dates from the medieval school of 
the postglossators (also named legists or commentators), who 
in the late thirteenth century succeeded the glossators in 
the universities of northern Italy and southern France.10 Like 
8 The titles of many of the works cited by authors' names in the following 
brief survey are to be found in the bibliographical list on page 66I. The ac-
companying dates indicate the years in which the first considerable publications 
of the respective authors occurred. • 
9 On the history of conflicts law: Outlines in English: 3 BEALE I 88o-I 97 5; 
CHESHIRE 68; and RHEINSTEIN, "Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in 
Germany," z U. of Chi. L. Rev. (I935) 232-269. 
Standard works: CATELLANI, 11 diritto internazionale privato e i suoi recenti 
progressi, z vols. (I895, I9o2); LAINE, Introduction au droit international 
prive, 2 vols. (I888, I892); NEUMEYER, Die gemeinrechtliche Entwickelung 
des internationalen Privat- und Strafrechts bis Bartolus, 2 vols. (I90I, I916); 
idem, "Zur Geschichte des internationalen Privatrechts in Frankreich und den 
Niederlanden," in 2 Zeitschrift fiir Volkerrecht ( I92o) I9o; MEIJERS, Bijdrage 
tot de geschiedenis van bet internationaal privaat- en strafrecht in Frankrijk en 
de Nederlanden, (I9I4); idem, "~ieuwe bijdrage tot bet ontstaan van bet 
beginsel der realiteit," 3 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis (1922) 61; idem, 
"L'histoire des principes fondamentanx du droit international prive a partir du 
Moyen-Age, specialement dans !'Europe occidentale," 49 Recueil 1934 III 
5431 GUTZWILLER, "Le developpement historique du droit international prive," 
29 Recueil 1929 IV 287 (with full list of literature 395-397). 
Historical summaries are given in almost every handbook; particularly recom-
mendable are those by WErss, 3 Traite 8-n9, IJO-I49; GUTZWILLER, Inter-
nationalprivatrecht ISZI-I534; ESPINOLA, 7 Tratado II5-JIJ. 
10 The last and most authoritative member of the school of glossators, Ac-
CURSIUS, instigated the query by his brief annotation (A. D. 1228) to the first 
Imperial decree of the Justinian Codex (C. J. I, I, I ) , the Constitutio ''Cunc-
tos populos." The postglossators developed the treatment of the conflict of 
statutes (i. e., those of the upper Italian cities) as glosses to this Constitution. 
The most outstanding postglossators were also the main authorities for conflicts 
law: BARTOLUS DE SAXOFERRATO (1314-1357) and BALDUS DE UBALDIS (IJ2.7-
JfOO). 
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the Roman law into which it was artificially incorporated, 
this branch of law was regarded as universally binding. The 
territoriai realm of the doctrines of the postglossators exceeded 
even the boundaries within which the canon and Roman laws 
were received as "written reason," representing the law of 
all Christendom. These doctrines, as accepted and t:rans-
formed by eminent scholars in France 11 and Holland 12 dur-
ing the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, gained recogni-
tion in England and in the United States. 
The law of conflicts thus became one field, in which the 
common and civil laws had a common doctrinal basis and 
which could be thought of as a truly international law. This 
conception of a world community was still prevalent when 
in I 8 34 the great American, Joseph Story, merged the Dutch 
doctrine with the Anglo-American cases. His treatise acquired 
authority in both hemispheres and contributed to the continua-
tion, in renewed form, of an internationally-minded school 
on the European Continent. In particular, Germany's 
greatest jurist, Friedrich Carl von Savigny (I 849) using 
Story's materials and rational method, 13 established the 
fundaments of modern conflicts law. It was significant that 
his treatment of this subject formed the last part of the 
celebrated System of Modern Roman Law; for him, there 
was no doubt about the suprastate nature of the subject matter. 
This work of the leader of the historical school became the 
prin~ipal authority in all Europe and Latin America during 
most of the nineteenth century and is still highly regarded 
11 The most famous scholars were MoLINAEUS (CHARLES DuMOULIN) ( 1 50o-
1566), and ARGENTRAEUS (BERTRAND D'ARGENTRE) (15I9-I59o). On these 
see also MElLI, "Argentraeus und Monilaeus und ihre Bedeutung im inter-
nationalen Prviat- und Strafrecht," 5 Z.int.R. (1895) 363, 4p, 554· For what 
is now Belgium, NICOLAUS BURCUNDUS (rs86-r649), and for Holland, CHillS. 
TIAAN RODENBURCH (r6r8-I668), may be mentioned. 
12 
"Dutch school," main representatives: PAULUS VOET (r6I9-1677); Uuu-
cus HuBER (1636-I694); JoHANNES VoET (t6I7-I7IJ). See LORENZEN, 
"Huber's De Confiictu Legum" in Celebration Legal Essays (in honor of John H. 
Wigmore, 1919) 199. 
13 See SAVIGNY iv (tr. Guthrie 44); GuTZWILLER, 29 Recueil 1929 IV at J41. 
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in certain countries. The international conception of "inter-
national private law" was adopted by Foelix (1843) in 
France, a professed follower of Story, by the Belgian Laurent 
(188o), the Italian Fiore (1869),14 the Swiss Bracher 
(I 8 7 I) / 5 and by almost all outstanding authors until ap-
proximately 1890.16 These authors wrote on conflicts law in 
a common atmosphere, among brethren of the same creed, 
envisaging its application in all countries. So did also the 
scholars who with the eminent German, Ludwig von Bar 
(I 8 62), 17 protested against being classified among the inter-
nationalists 18 but who nevertheless thought that special 
studies, restricted to the positive laws of particular legal 
systems, unaided by general theory, narrow in perspective, 
·are prone to choose improper premises or to misconceive the 
sphere of individual principles in the "organism" of inter-
national private law.19 
In time, the international community disintegrated. The 
common law lawyers, segregated from the civil law back-
ground, instinctively receded from na'ive cosmopolitan atti-
tudes. Absorbed in the judicial decisions of their countries, 
they gave slight attention to developments elsewhere. In the 
civil law countries on the other hand, from the end of the 
eighteenth century, there appeared an increasing number of 
14 PASQUALE FIORE, Elementi di diritto internazionale privata (Firenze, 
I869). 
15 CHARLES BROCHER, "Theorie du droit international prive," Revue I 87 r, 
411, 540, Revue 1872, I89, Revue I873, I37> 390. 
16 NussBAUM, D. IPR. II, and in an extensive paper, "The Rise and Decline 
of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws," 42 Col. L. Rev. 
( I942) 189, I 94, accounts for the prevalence of universalism or aprioristic 
thought from I87o to I930, on divers assumptions which the present writer 
does not share. See also GuTZWILLER, review of NussBAUM'S D. IPR., 8 Z. 
ausl.PR. (I934) 652, and see the list of "nationalists" by KAHN, I Abhandl. 
3 n. 2 and 270 n. 29. 
17 BAR, Das internationale Privat- und Strafrecht (Hannover, I862). 
18 BAR, "Neue Prinzipien und Methoden des internationalen Privatrechts," 
IS Archiv des offentlichen Rechts ( 1900) 1 at 11, 45· 
19 Preface to the second edition of BAR, I Theorie und Praxis des inter-
nationalen Privatrechts vii { tr. Gillespie viii). 
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national codifications of private law, which divided the 
European Continent into separate units, secluding them behind 
progressively higher barriers of national legislation. Rela-
tively late, the impact of this process reached the conflicts 
law. The specialists in this branch of law, which seems pre-
destined always to lag behind the currents of general juris-
prudence, were tardily and rudely awakened by the discovery 
that the supposed international source of law did not exist. 20 
Former universalist conceptions gave way to the knowledge 
that conflicts rules no less than other rules of law must have 
their roots in the soil of some state and that international 
rules in the proper sense flow only from international custom 
or treaties, and at that in a very thin stream. Thus, the long-
established international community of conflicts studies was 
dissolved, and the national conflicts rules succumbed to the 
same spirit of isolationism that permeated other fields of law. 
Against this background, the meager achievements of the 
Hague Conventions of I 902 and I 90 5 appeared like a little 
island of blossoming internationalism. 
Although the doctrine of "national" or "positive" origin 
of conflicts rules has been definitely established long since, a 
few ingenious thinkers have resented its dismal consequences. 
They have tried to revive universal rules by new ideas. With 
this in view, Pillet (I 894) 21 distinguished two classes of 
municipal law, viz., necessarily territorial general rules and 
"permanent" rules of extraterritorial application, the distinc-
tive criterion being the "social purpose" of the rules.22 The 
German professor Zitelmann (I897), in a work full of sug-
gestive ideas, conceived the possibility of creating a vast 
20 The scientific formulation of .the "positivistic" approach was given by 
NIEMEYER, Zur Methodik des internationalen Privatrechtes ( 1894) 26. 
21 PILLET, "Le droit international prive. Essai d'un systeme general de 
solution des confiits de lois," Clunet 1894, 417, 711, Clunet 1895, 241, 5oo, 929, 
Clunet 1896, 5· 
22 Cf. GAUDEMET, "La theorie des confiits de lois dans l'oeuvre d' Antoine 
Pillet et Ia doctrine de Savigny," 1 MELANGES PILLET (1929) 89. 
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system of conflicts law upon the basis of the law of nations. 23 
Belatedly, Frankenstein (I 926) has spun a whole web of 
conflicts rules from the premise that the only "scientific" 
choice of law is primarily predicated upon the dominance 
of each state over its citizens and over things in its territory.24 
Such deductive systems have been commonly rejected. 
A third movement was initiated by the Italian patriot, 
Mancini (I 8 5 I). 25 His vigorous emphasis on the function of 
the nation produced a wave of emotional nationalism in the 
field of international law. When Mancini advised the draft-
ing of the preliminary provisions of the Italian Civil Code of 
I 86 5, his postulates were transferred from international 
public law to conflicts law, as expressed in the principle that 
all persons should be governed by the law of the state whose 
citizens. they are, which by an eventful transition of ideas be-
came identified as the national law. This principle was adopted 
in all Central and Southern Europe, as well as in Brazil, 
Japan, and China. It was advocated by internationalists such 
as Laurent, Andre Weiss, and Bartin and appears in the 
German, Swedish, Polish, and many other legislations, 
clearly embodying the doctrine of positivism. No other 
doctrine has found more fervent adherents; none has more 
estranged the civil and common laws from each other. 
These three schools, the aprioristic internationalists, the 
faithful expositors of fragmentary statutes and cases, the 
23 See GuTZWILLER, "Zitelmann's volkerrechtliche Theorie des International-
privatrechts," in Festgabe, 16 Archiv fiir Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 
(r923) 468. A pious apology for Zitelmann's doctrine was written by BETTI, 
"Ernst Zitelmann e il problema del diritto internazionale privato," 1 7 Rivista 
(r925) 33, continued at r88. 
24 See the criticism by YNTEMA, Book Review, 40 Harv. L. Rev. {1927) 
794; YNTEMA, Book Review, 42 Harv. L. Rev. (1929) ro92; LoRENZEN, 
Book Review, 36 Yal.: L. J. (1927) 1030; LoRENZEN, Book Re-
view, 39 Yale L. }. (1930) 921; NEUMEYER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 26o; 
LEWALD, 2 Blatter f. JPR. (1927) 65; GUTZWILLER 1534; PACCHIONI 65; 
complete bibliography by GHIRON, 27 Rivista (1935) us. 
25 
"Della nazionalita come fondamento del diritto delle genti," inaugural 
address at the University of Turin. 
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propagandists of nationality as the standard of personal rights 
and duties, have had their time, and their time is over. A new 
epoch began about 1925. Previously, a few far-seeing scholars, 
Bar,26 Kahn, Anzilotti, Niemeyer,27 perceived that conflicts 
rules, though derived from a national source like other 
ordinary legal rules, have special functions and purposes 
requiring a method of international scope. Kahn, one of the 
most acute advocates of positivism, went so far as to postulate 
that both the international and the positivistic methods should 
be integrated through the comparative method and so super-
seded.28 
2. Modern Treatises 
The following are the most significant works on conflict of 
laws of the nineteenth century and of the first quarter of the 
twentieth. 
Engla~d.29 The English courts were slow and reluctant to 
adjust themselves to the application of foreign law. Until 
recently, the literature was sparse.30 In the nineteenth cen-
tury Westlake alone wrote a treatise (I 8 58) purporting to 
establish a system of conflicts. With this exception, the English 
writers refrained from criticism of the courts and left the law 
in the incoherent state represented in the cases. The often re-
edited treatise of Dicey ( 1 896) illustrates this descriptive 
method with its finest and its less desirable characteristics. 
26 I5 Archiv des offentlichen Rechts (I900) I, supt·a n. IS. 
27 KAHN, I Abhandl. 3 I I, 3 I 5, 3 2.2, 3 26; ANZILOTTI, 11 diritto internazionale 
nei giudizi interni (I9o5) I5I (see his earlier Studi critici di diritto inter-
nazionale privato ( 1 898) I 30 V), declared the conflicts rules national in form 
(source) and suprastatal in substance: this formula served as a basis of a 
peculiar theory which was followed by numerous Italian and French writers. 
Cf. AGo, Teorilj. 83 n. 2; MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III at 366; NIEMEYER, 
Das IPR. des BGB. so. 
28 I Abhandl. 502 (written in I 900). 
29 Treatises by WESTLAKE, FOOTE, DICEY, HIBBERT, BURGE. 
30 See HARRISON, On Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws (I878, 1879, 
reprinted and annotated by LEFROY, 1919) 12I. The fi~st writers were JABEZ 
HENRY (1823) and BURGE (1838) according to HARRISON, Clunet I88o, 429; 
see also GUTZWILLER, 29 Recueil 1929 IV at 338. 
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The intercourse within the parts of the British common-
wealth occasioned a certain interest in their different legisla-
tions. The early work of Burge on colonial law, including 
private international law, is being published in a revised, 
monumental, though unsystematic, edition. 
United States.31 Succeeding Chancellor Kent's influential 
Commentaries (I826-I8Jo),32 Joseph Story's work (1834) 
was of immense importance.33 Admittedly, Story, who em-
ployed an eclectic method to choose among the various 
doctrines of his predecessors, the statutists, in substantial 
measure preserved their conceptions and solutions, but his 
touch modernized the wealth of casuistic practice that lay im-
mersed in the literature of half a millenium. These materials 
he enriched with the English and American case law, and he 
was the first to master the huge subject with the wisdom of a 
great judge. 
Thereafter, only two notable treatises appeared during 
many decades: Wharton's valuable and richly documented 
two volumes (I 8 72), which recognized legislative action, 
instead of "moral duty" or "comity" as assumed by the 
Dutch writers and Story, as the source of conflicts rules; and 
the instructive compendium of Minor (I90I), providing a 
doctrinal analysis of the cases as of the turn of the century. 
A radical change came with the extraordinary achievements 
of Beale. In an admirable effort, he collected and sifted the 
case materials, which had piled up to a gigantic height, and, 
31 KUHN, "La conception du droit international prive d'apres la doctrine et 
la pratique aux Etats-Unis," 2I Recueil I928 I I93· 
Treatises: KENT, STORY, WHARTON, MINOR, GOODRICH. 
Casebooks: BEALE, LORENZEN, HARPER and TAINTOR, and by CHEATHAM, 
DowLING, GooDRICH and GRISWOLD. 
For lists of Anglo-American articles in the field of conflict of laws see 
CHEATHAM, DOWLING, GOODRICH and GRISWOLD, Cases and Other Materials 
on Conflict of Laws (I 94I) p. xlix, and LORENZEN, Cases and Materials on the 
Conflict of Laws (I9J7) p. xxi. 
32 J. KENT, Commentaries on American Law (4 vols., ed. I, New York, 
1826-1830). 
33 See the praise by HARRISON, supra n. 30, at I 19; 3 BEALE 1912. 
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after many special studies, undertook to reconstruct the 
American conflicts law into a unified system. His life work 
culminated in the Restatement of the Law of Conflicts of 
Laws,S4 inspired and primarily prepared by Beale, which has 
been promulgated (1934) by the American Law Institute, 
and in his Treatise ( 1935) which presents an authoritative 
commentary on the Restatement. One might compare the 
historic role of Beale's work in American conflicts law with 
that of the Glossa Magistralis of Accursius in the late Middle 
Ages. More than a century of Anglo-American case law was 
condensed under the leadership of a strong methodical mind. 
V~lues buried in the vast mass of decisions were brought to 
light and preserved for the future. In various subjects, court 
practice gained increased certainty, and theoretical thinking 
received decisive impulses; indeed, a new literature grew up. 
Goodrich, footing on Beale's theories but adding his own 
experience and sense for social policy, has written an excellent 
leading textbook. 
Most American writers, however, though grateful for 
Beale's work, have turned against his doctrines. Beale was the 
last eminent advocate of the theory of territorialism that 
dominated the Dutch statutists. In its proper sense, the· 
territorial nature of law predicates exclusive control by 
domestic law in each jurisdiction. This theory, however en-
feebled by gradual concessions, is the exact antipode of private 
international law. This foundation of Beale's system was 
entirely destroyed by Lorenzen and Cook. The revived theory 
of vested rights by which Beale tried to maintain the doomed 
principle of territorialism was successfully attacked by Y ntema, 
Cook, Lorenzen, Heilmann, and, on the Continent, by 
34 Abroad the Restatement was much noticed. See particularly HARPER, "Das 
'Restatement of Conflict of Laws' des Amerikanischen 'Law Institute,'" 9 Z. 
ausl.PR. ( 19 35) 8 21 ; MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, "The American Restate-
ment," 21 Grotius Soc. 19 35, 161 ; BARBEY, "L'oeuvre du Professeur Beale, de 
Harvard," Revue Crit. 1936, 86; NoLDE, "La codification du droit inter-
national prive aux Etats-Unis d'Amerique," Nouv. Revue 1936, 7• 
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Arminjon, Wigny, and others who simultaneously were par-
ticularly interested in combatting Pillet's kindred philoso-
phy.35 In addition, many particular points peculiar to the 
Restatement were the object of special critical studies. Thus, 
a new school has arisen, paralleling German efforts and prom-
ising further improvements. 
France and Belgium.36 The French masters of statutist 
doctrine in the sixteenth century, d' Argentre and Dumoulin, 
and their many disciples in the two succeeding centuries 37 
established a tradition that has continued until recently, just 
as the method of the postglossators in private law survived 
after the Napoleonic codes for a considerable period into the 
nineteenth century. This heritage, it would seem, included 
various traits-a certain conservatism in method, an inclina-
tion toward a priori assumptions, an alert interest in the 
problems presented in the courts, and comprehensive elabora-
tion of the arguments involved in particular issues. Con-
currently, the influence of Story and Savigny added new 
elements. A large number of talented authors assured the 
French literature a leading role, more completely justified 
in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first 
quarter of the twentieth than in the sixteenth or the eighteenth. 
Richly documented treatises by Laurent, Boucher, and Rolin 
were followed by the original systems of Vareilles-Sommieres 
(r897), Bartin (Etudes 189·7, 1899), and Pillet (Principes 
1903, Traite 1923-1924). Andre Weiss (Traite r 892-1905) 
consolidated theory and practice in a comprehensive work, in 
which the nationality principle was brought to its climax. 
Numerous periodicals, headed by the Journal de droit inter-
35 See infra pp. 2 3ff. 
36 Treatises of FoELIX, BOUCHER, V AREILLES-SOMMIERES, BAR TIN, PILLET, 
WEISS, AUDINET, DESPAGNET, VALERY, SURVILLE, NIBOYET, LEREBOURS-
PIGEONNLERE, ARMINJON (the last three now leading). 
Belgium: LAURENT, ROLIN, POULLET (the last now leading). 
37 Most famous: FRoLAND (published 1729, died 1746); BouLLENOIS (r6&o-
I]6z); BouHIER (r673-1746). 
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national of Clunet (I 874-) and the Revue de droit inter-
national published by Darras (I 90s-)' in addition to 
the Dictionnaire de droit international prive published by 
Vincent and Penaud in I 888,38 collected so many French and 
foreign decisions that, as early as 1905, H. Donnedieu de 
Vabres was able to describe the "evolution" 39 of the French 
practice in a monograph. 
Bartin, Niboyet, Pillet's outstanding disciple, and 
Arminjon, a critically-minded former judge at the Egyptian 
Mixed Tribunals, continued this brilliant literature. These 
and other modern writers have constantly studied the judicial 
decisions and meditated on general problems such as public 
policy, formalities of legal acts, capacity, matrimonial prop-
erty law, etc., while the courts have been interested in the 
theoretical as well as the practical aspects of the cases. The 
Revue has been continued in two rival periodicals edited, 
respectively, by Niboyet and La Pradelle, who formerly had 
jointly published the useful Repertoire de droit international 
prive in ten volumes. 
The French manner of conceiving conflicts problems con-
tains a two-fold weakness. The tradition deriving from 
d'Argentre, the French predecessor of Ulricus Huber, has 
laid an extraordinary emphasis upon the national interest. 
The following chapters dealing with the law of persons will 
show the devastating effect of innumerable open or concealed 
considerations of French "ordre public." For decades, writers 
sharply criticized the tendency of the courts to apply French 
law despite the ordinary principles of conflicts law, but, more 
recently, the Traite of Niboyet (I938) and the Precis of 
Lerebours-Pigeonniere (I 928 ), undoubtedly the two lead-
ing French works, testify to a violent struggle between the 
88 R. VINCENT et E. PENAUD, Dictionnaire de droit international prive (Paris, 
r888-r889). 
89 H. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES, L'cvolution de la jurisprudence fran!>aise en 
matiere de conflits des lois (Paris, 190 s). 
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nationality principle, expounded by Andre Weiss and his 
followers, and the fears and wishes of an apprehensive, 
ambitious territorialism, represented by a movement, reflecting 
the interests of an immigration country, that accentuates the 
peculiarities of French legislation. On the other hand, the 
individualism and independent judgment characterizing 
French judges and jurists, which produce an abundance of 
ideas within the limits of their methods, have resulted in a 
curious instability. In many topics of conflicts law, every 
conceivable opinion has its advocate. Neither writers nor 
courts feel bound by precedent. Consequently, French con-
flicts law as a whole presents a great wealth of inspiring con-
ceptions, attended by a degree of uncertainty, if not chaos, 
that is scarcely compatible with the very purpose of this 
branch of law. 
ltaly.40 Dionisio Anzilotti, eminent scholar of international 
public law, has devoted a part of his work to conflicts law and 
is to be regarded in both fields as the founder of an important 
school, which also includes Cavaglieri, Salvioli/1 and Udina. 
At a relatively early date, Diena published monographs on 
international commercial law (1900-1905) and the principles 
of private international law (1908-I910). In the 1930's, a 
succinct manual by Pacchioni (I 930) and a perspicacious 
treatise by Fedozzi (1935), accompanied under his leader-
ship by works of other writers on ecclesiastical, commercial 
and procedural conflicts, continued the Italian tradition. This 
tradition has been characterized by refined abstract theory, 
nourished by intimate knowledge of the French and German 
developments. While Anzilotti possessed a high sense of 
practicality, his successors have more and more yielded to the 
scholastic passion for formulae and dialectic argument. 
40 Treatises: FIORE, DIENA, GABBA, ANZILOTTI, CAVAGLIERI, UDINA, PAC-
CHIONI, FEDOZZI1 Aco, GEMMA, Bosco, SCERNI, 41 G. SALVIOLr, Storia del diritto italiano (Torino, 1930). 
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Italian writers have been the last in Europe to consider court 
decisions. Fortunately, the light has recently been seen by 
the younger authors noted below. 
The distinguished periodical founded by Anzilotti in I 906, 
the Rivista di diritto internaz.ionale, includes important con-
tributions to conflicts law, but only few selected decisions. 
Fedozzi founded a promising Rivista italiana di diritto inter-
naz.ionale privata e processuale (I 9 3 I-I 9 3 2), which was 
ended by his lamented death. 
0 ther Latin countries. Numerous meritorious compendiums 
related to the French, Belgian and Italian literature on con-
flicts law have been published in Argentina (Zeballos, 
Calandrelli, Alcorta, Romero del Prado and, now leading, 
Vi co), Brazil (Clovis Bevilaqua, Rodrigo Octavia, Pontes de 
Miranda, Eduardo Espinola and his son), Colombia (Res-
trepo-Hernandez), Cuba (De Bustamante), Guatemala 
(Matos), Rum.ania (Antonescu), and Spain (Lasala Llanas, 
Trias de Bes). 
The Netherlands. During this period, three outstanding 
works appeared, namely, those of Asser (I 8 So), Jitta (I 9 I 6), 
and Kosters ( I9I 7 ). 
Germany. In Germany there was a less known statutist 
school from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century/2 when 
Waechter destroyed the entire doctrine (I 842). 43 The 
modern development was brilliantly inaugurated by Savigny 
in I 849.44 His theories were accepted both by Roman law 
scholars such as Seuffert, Keller, Holzschuher,. Unger, 
-1.2 Thorough survey and criticism by WAECHTER, 2.4 Arch. Civ. Prax. (1841) 
2.30 ff., and BAR § 19 ff.; see for the names also GUTZWILLER, 2.9 Recueil 
192.9 IV 32-9-331. 
43 WAECHTER's series of articles entitled "Ueber die Collision' der Privat-
rechtsgesetze verschiedener Staaten," appeared in 2.4 Arch. Civ. Prax. (1841) 
2.30 ff., 2.5 Arch. Civ. Prax. (1842.) 1 ff., 161 ff., 361 ff. 
44 On SAVIGNY'S work and effect: GUTZWILLER, Der Einfluss Savignys auf 
die Entwicklung des lnternationalprivatrechts (192.3), and same, in 2.9 Recueil 
192.9 IV at 353· ' 
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Windscheid, and Regelsberger and by students of German 
legal history like Walter, Gerber, Beseler, Roth, and Gierke. 45 
Although an admirer of Savigny, Bar (I862), in his works, 
especially in the second edition of his treatise, entitled Theory 
and Practice (I 8 8 9), took a distinct position, joining 
theoretical conception with profound study of civil and com-
mon law cases and presenting, for the first time since Story, 
a comprehensive comparative law of conflicts. Zitelmann's 
highly refined system and the penetrating analytical studies 
of Franz Kahn, as well as the historical works of Neumeyer, 
characterized the high level of scientific treatment in Germany 
at the turn of the century. Leading decisions were reproduced 
in the Zeitschrift fur Internationales Recht of Bohm, later 
Niemeyer. Gebhard's drafts of the Law of I 896 46 and the 
commentaries thereon by Niemeyer, Habicht and Niedner 
are noteworthy. 
Nevertheless, this literature was sporadic and hetero-
geneous, without definite working plan and method. The 
courts struggled for principles; their decisions, although by 
no means negligible, were not conveniently digested and, 
consequently, were for the most part unknown. The German 
courts, otherwise meticulous, often ignored the conflicts 
problems hidden in cases. 
In striking contrast to the richness of the French literature, 
for many years there was no textbook on conflicts law in 
Germany, and a good Austrian handbook by Walker was used 
in repeated editions by the few interested students. 
Switzerland. 47 In the nineteenth century, only the legisla-
tion of Zurich aroused more than local interest from the view-
point of conflicts law. At the beginning of the present century, 
the work of Meili, succeeding Bracher, was well known. It 
45 For details see GUTZWILLER, Der Einfluss Savignys auf die Entwicklung 
des lnternationalprivatrechts so, s6. 
46 Einfiihrungsgesetz of August x8, 1896. 
'
7 Treatises of BROCHER, MElLI, STAUFFER, BEcK, ScHNITZER. 
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has been followed more recently by the booklet of Stauffer, 
by Beck's extensive commentary on the Swiss enactments, and 
finally by treatises on private and commercial laws by 
Schnitzer. 
Greece.48 Greek legal science has exhibited much devotion 
to private international law. There are excellent contributions 
of recent date by G. Streit and Maridakis. 
3· New Orientation 
Roughly speaking, it may be contended that, until about 
192 5, in the Anglo-American orbit, the theoretical approach 
and, in the Continental literature, the practical understanding, 
left very much to be desired. Had minds such as those of 
Story and Bar continued to illuminate the way, grave mistakes 
and defects would have been avoided. The deplorable state 
of this branch of law was worse than the experts would 
acknowledge. A few overrated controversies were endlessly 
discussed. Other problems, often involving the simplest ques-
tions of daily occurrence, were neglected. Few things were 
certain, and there were more incongruities than in any other 
field of law. It needed the unspoilt mind of a newcomer to 
conflicts law to be appalled at the maze of confusion and 
injustice. Mancini's outburst at the absurd, deplorable 
anarchy in the conflicts rules is famous. In I 8 79 Frederick 
Harrison stated: 
"There is a department of Law, the first principles of which 
have been furiously disputed by lawyers; the canons of 
which are hesitating and contradictory; the sources of which 
are themselves a matter of argument; having an authority 
which is most differently interpreted by doctors and judges; 
and a sphere which is understood in various ways;-and 
yet this branch of Law is attaining in our day continual 
development and fresh importance from a variety of causes, 
and in a manner often unobserved." 49 
48 Treatises of KALLIGAS, CEKONOMIDES, KRASSAS, STREIT, MARIDAKIS. 
49 HARRISON, Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws 98. 
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Each word of this indictment, despite all efforts, remained 
true for half a century thereafter. Recently, Cook has described 
the American cases as "hopelessly contradictory and chaotic," 
even on the simplest questions. 50 This situation, bad enough 
in each particular country, is worse in a world in which con-
flicts laws are inconsist~nt. A marriage may be valid in one 
jurisdiction, invalid in another, previously valid but dissolved 
in a third. Such is the state of the contractual relation, regarded 
as the most solemn and sacred, whose existence or failure 
involves the most vital interests of the spouses, their issue, 
and their relatives. The reaction bf the business world to the 
desperate plight of national conflicts laws-in the words of 
a terrified corporation lawyer, a veritable labyrinth,51-
superimposed upon the divergent national commercial laws, 
has resulted in a striking phenomenon; international com-
merce has devised an elaborate network of arbitration and 
standard forms to eradicate these conflicts laws so far as 
feasible. 
It is reassuring that a thorough revision now appears in the 
offing. On the one hand, the technical revolution of the means 
of communication reducing distances and destroying isolation 
and, on the other, the political and economic upheaval caused 
by the first World War, have made it clear that international 
life needs a better order. The peace and postwar treaties and 
the numerous international tribunals created after the war 
brought little improvement, but they did exhibit appreciation 
of this need and at the same time added a great many new 
problems. 
In Germany/2 depressed and struggling for life, the situa-
tion was most acute, and the interest in foreign and inter-
5° CooK, Legal Bases 136. 
61 R. FRANKEL, "Der Irrgarten des internationalen Privatrechts," 4 Z.ausl. 
PR. (1930) 239,241. 
52 Treatises: see text. Monographs and papers: DuDEN, ECKSTEIN, H. LE-
WALD, NEUNER, RAAPE, RABEL, RAISER, WAHL, WENGLER. 
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national law became painfully alive. While, before the war, 
the otherwise richest juridical literature of the world had 
left comparative law and conflicts rules to very few scholars 
and no funds seemed available in the prosperous prewar 
times for research in these subjects, the distress of the war and 
postwar years reversed this attitude. The change of views 
was distinctively reflected in the creation of two comprehen-
sively planned and broadly conceived institutes in Berlin, 
devoted respectively to foreign and international private law 
and to foreign public and international law (1924-1925).53 
In these institutes, facts and legal phenomena were to be col-
lected, current problems defined, and the functions and pur-
poses of legal institutions clarified by comparative research. 
With respect to conflicts of laws, the German cases had first 
of all to be collected. This undertaking was greatly facilitated 
by the works of Lewald and Melchior, who each for his own 
handbook assembled the materials, both the older and more 
recent. In 1926, the Institute of Foreign and International 
Private Law initiated a yearbook of German decisions 54 and 
commenced in its Review 55 to provide surveys of the foreign 
cases. To signalize this modified outlook, the Review 
celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the Reichsgericht (I 929) 
in a series of articles constructing special doctrines on the 
basis of judgments of this, the supreme court of Germany, 
comparable to the American style of treatment and entirely 
dissimilar to the usual European literature. It was one of the 
tasks of the Institute to answer inquiries of German courts, 
attorneys, and administrative authorities; in many hundreds 
53 "lnstitut fiir ausllindisches und internationales Privatrecht" and "lnstitut 
fiir auslandisches Recht und Volkerrecht." For history and organization see 
RHEINSTEIN, "Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in Germany," :1. U. of 
Chi. L. Rev. (1935) zp, :z4o. 
54 Die Deutsche Rechtsprechung auf dem Gebiete des internationalen Pri-
vatrechts in den Jahren 1926 und 19:1.7 {Berlin, 19:1.8-). 
56 Zeitschrift fiir ausHindisches und internationales Privatrecht (Berlin, 1926-). 
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of opinions, information on conflicts matters was given, ex-
tending knowledge and intelligent use of the applicable rules 
so that the gulf between theory and practice, which had existed 
since the end of the statutist period, was almost closed. 
German lawyers were amazed at the number and quality 
of the newly discovered precedents, which were soon given 
attention by several handbooks.· Lewald (I 930-I 93 I) was 
the first to renovate the German conflicts law (excepting com-
mercial matters) on the basis of decided cases, with well-
considered conclusions. Melchior (I 9 3 2), following the form 
of Dicey's treatise, regarded the decisions as a true source of 
law, supplementary to the Code; in this belief, he inquired 
primarily into the ideas underlying the cases and formulated 
rules of impressive originality. All other German writers 
deny the binding force of case law. Nevertheless, Nussbaum 
(I 9 3 2) in his treatise devoted primary attention to cases and 
procedure and preferred a practical treatment to theoretical 
analysis. Raape (I 9 3 I) provided a profuse exegesis of the 
provisions in the Introductory Law of I 896; because of its 
explicitness, this book will be most frequently cited in our 
survey as representing the German doctrines. Finally, Martin 
Wolff (I933) masterfully condensed the subject matter in a 
textbook, small in size but rich in content. More recently, 
Raape, the only one of these writers still in Germany, pub-
lished a commendable introduction to the present German 
conflicts law (I 93 8-I 939 ). 
Thus, the long-standing scarcity of production was re-
placed during a few years by a vigorous stream of literature. 
As deductive considerations gave way to practical studies, 
many values were modified. However, it is not in the nature 
of German students to sacrifice entirely systematic thinking 
to empirical considerations. 56 In addition to the treatises 
56 This seems to be disapproved by NussBAUM, Book Review, 40 Col. L. Rev. 
(1940) 1461, 1470, who condemns what he calls the new "logistic school." 
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mentioned, the learned outlines by Gutzwiller (I 9 3 r ) and 
a number of monographs (Neuner, Raiser, Wengler, etc.) 
contain good science. But for the time being too much had 
and still has to be corrected to allow much generalization. 
This new German school quickly influenced other European 
countries. In conservative England, the pitiful state of con-
flicts law was suddenly subjected to refreshing criticism by 
Foster 57 and Beckett; 58 a new handbook by Cheshire chal-
lenged Dicey's leading treatise, the second edition appearing 
shortly after and extending the reforms suggested in the first. 
An admirable collaborative undertaking was initiated in Italy. 
Through the endeavors of Salvatore Galgano, commencing 
in I 9 2 7, several comprehensive periodicals were inaugurated, 
covering and annotating foreign decisions; of these, the 
Giurisprudenza comparata di diritto internazionale privata 
continued after the outbreak of the present war. Authors such 
as Babinski and Przybylowski in Poland, 59 and younger 
scholars, including Vittorio Tedeschi and Balladore-Pallieri 
in Italy, Fragistas, Vallindas and Zepos in Greece, von 
Steiger and Niederer in Switzerland, participate in this 
practical international co-operation. 
A little later than in Europe, a corollary reform began in 
the United States and Canada.60 Here, the enormous case 
material had been assembled by Beale as the basis of the 
Restatement. Immediately, new studies, criticizing antiquated 
doctrines and correcting inaccurate terminology, appeared 
by such eminent scholars as Lorenzen, Cook, Yntema, 
57 J. G. FoSTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," 
r6 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84. 
58 BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private In-
ternational Law," r ~Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I 934) 46. 
59 LEON BABINSKI, Zarys Wykladu prawa miedzynarodowego prywatnego 
(Outlines of Private International Law) Vol. r, 1935; KAZIMIERZ PRZYBYLOW-
SKI1 Prawo Prywatne Miedzynarodowe (Private International Law) Vol. r, 
I9H· 
80 See Cheatham, Cases, he, x. 
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Cheatham, Falconbridge in Canada, Harper, Griswold and 
Stumberg, who also published a realistic handbook. Another 
modern treatise was devoted to the conflicts law of one par-
ticular state, Arkansas, by Leflar. The methodological 
postulates of this reform have recently been stated in Cook's 
magistral Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 
(I 942). Numerous' law review articles and a monograph or 
two, such as Hancock's book on torts, 61 are promising for the 
future development of this branch of law. 
The American literature has attracted much attention in 
France and Belgium, where its importance has been stressed 
by Barbey, Lepretre, Wigny, and Batiffol, the last being the 
best informed French expert on foreign conflicts law and inter-
national needs. 
A common feature of all these new attempts is the decided 
turning from deductive methods to considerations "of policy. 
There are many other points of agreement, but also many 
controversies as respects method. Private international law 
has again become a young science, and children do have 
diseases. 
It remains to summarize what has recently been done for 
research in foreign conflicts law. In the first place, foreign 
cases, enactments, and literature have been reproduced or 
reviewed on a large scale in the publications of the above-
mentioned institutes in Berlin and Rome,62 as well as in other 
61 MoFFATT HANCOCK, Torts in the Conflict of "Laws, Michigan Legal 
Studies (Ann Arbor, Chicago, 1942). 
62 Institute of Berlin: Zeitschrift fiir auslandisches und internationales Privat-
recht (since I926/27), containing continuous reviews of conflicts law in Austria, 
Belgium, France, Italy, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, selected 
decisions involving conflicts law in the United States, Scandinavian cases, and 
reports from many other countries; Deutsche Rechtsprechung auf dem Gebiete 
des internationalen Privatrechts (I928-); Beitrage zum ausHindischen und 
internationalen Privatrecht (I 928-). Rome Institute for Legislative 
Studies (Instituto italiano di studi legislativi), editor GALGANO: Annuario di 
diritto comparato (I 9 2 7-) ; Giurisprudenza comparata di diritto inter-
nazionale privato (I932-) (among seven periodicals). 
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periodicals 63 and books of reference. 64 For an excellent col-
lection of the enacted conflicts rules in force throughout the 
world, as of 1929-an indispensable work-we have to thank 
A. N. Makarov.65 Under the auspices of the Hague Academy 
of International Law, many competent lecturers have 
treated the laws of particular countries as well as special 
problems of comparative interest. 66 
In addition, Niboyet and La Pradelle, generously aided by 
foreign contributors, have published the Repertoire de 
droit international, which includes reports on the conflicts laws 
of many countries, some not previously examined, as well as 
articles on related topics in French law accompanied by com-
parative observations. Much information is given in the 
Rechtsvergleichendes Handworterbuch of Schlegelberger, 
in which the conflicts laws of the world were, for the first 
time, described in an excellent, though sketchy, synthetic 
review (I 9 3 3). 67 The treatise on Greek Private International 
Law (1937) of the distinguished Greek diplomat and 
scholar, G. Streit, and his valiant disciple, Vallindas, admirably 
indicates the literary doctrines of all countries. In the United 
States, Lorenzen 68 deserves commendation for attracting the 
63 Especially for Eastern Europe the periodicals of the Institute in Breslau 
(Osteuropa Institut): Zeitschrift fur osteuropaisches Recht (19z5-192.7), later 
merged with Ostrecht into Zeitschrift fiir Ostrecht (192.7-1934) and finally 
again, Zeitschrift fiir osteuropaisches Recht (Neue Folge, 1934-). 
· Internationales Jahrbuch fiir Schiedsgerichtswesen, edited by ARTHUR Nuss-
BAUM (Berlin, 19z6-). American edition: International Year Book on 
Civil and Commercial Arbitration (New York, 192.8-). 
64 BERGMANN, Internationales Ehe- und Kindschaftsrecht (z vols., ed. z, Berlin, 
1938-1940), 
65 MAKARov, Das internationale Privatrecht der europaischen und ausser-
europaischen Staaten. Erster Teil: Die Quellen des internationalen Privat-
rechts (Berlin, 19z9). 
66 Published in Recueil des cours de 1' Acadcmie de droit international de Ia 
Haye (192.5-). 
67 Internationales Privatrecht, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. (1933) 32.o-542.. 
66 See in particular LoRENZEN, "The French Rules of the Conflict of Laws," 
36 Yale L. J. (192.7) 731; 37 ibid. (192.8) 849; 38 ibid. (192.8) 165. !d., "The 
Conflict of Laws of Germany," 39 Yale L. J. (1930) 8o4; 40 ibid. (1931) 401. 
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attention of the scholarly world to foreign conflicts laws. 
Finally, Arthur K. Kuhn has coordinated on broad lines 
American and European institutions of private international 
law (I937) and Nussbaum has published a volume of com-
parative observations on the general doctrines of common 
law and civil law (I943).69 
III. SouRCES 
1. Codifications 
The first considerable codification of conflicts rules was pro-
vided in articles 7 to 3 I, inclusive, of the Introductory Law 
that accompanied-the German Civil Code of I 896. This body 
of rules had been elaborated carefully by Gebhard but, for 
somewhat obscure reasons, allegedly political, was reduced by 
Bismarck and the upper House so as to cover in its final form 
only a part of the subject matter. Contracts are left out en-
tirely, and most rules are limited to cases in which the applica-
tion of German law is required (so-called unilateral rules). 
What is more, these provisions lack the elaborate detail work 
for which the Code is famous. Nevertheless, the task was 
novel, and the skill and precision employed were high enough 
to impress contemporaries. Subsequently, this part of the 
German law served as a model for a slightly more extensive 
Japanese Law of June I 5, I 8 9 8, and for a similar Chinese Law 
of August 5, I9I8. The Hague Conventions of I902 and 
I 90 5 on divers matters of conflicts law were based on the same 
principles, and they were in turn closely followed by the 
Swedish statutes of July 8, I904, amended by later laws, and 
of June I, I9I2. Also, the excellent Austrian draft of I9I3 
of an international private law was conceived on the same 
69 Unfortunately I do not know more than the title of LEVY ULLMANN, Cours 
generalt de droit international prive selon la methode historique, jurispruden-
tielle et comparative (annee universitaire I9JI-I9J2) stenographic publiee par 
"Les cours de droit" (licence, 3 • annee). 
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lines; it served as the basis of the important Polish. Law of 
August 2, I 926 (whose principal author Zoll had been a mem-
ber of the Vienna draft committee), as well as for the fre-
quently cited Czechoslovak draft of I924 and I93I. Indi-
rectly, the German law has influenced all more recent 
legislative projects in Europe. 
The Code Napoleon of 1 804 devoted to the problem of its 
territorial application only one article of the preliminary title 
and a few other dispersed provisions, and in European France 
there was no subsequent codification. Likewise, the Austrian 
Civil Code (I 8 I I), which is still in force in some regions, 
was satisfied with a few superficial rules(§§ 4, 34-37, 300), 
in contrast to the Prussian Landrecht (1794), which incorpo-
rated more comprehensive provisions, partly based on statutist 
doctrine (see e.g., Introduction,§§ 27-49) and partly repre-
senting original ideas. The European and Latin American 
civil codes of the French type have retained the custom of 
touching on conflicts in a preliminary title, or law, but with 
gradual additions, for instance, Italy (I 8 6 5, and enlarged in 
I938 and I942), the Netherlands (I829), Quebec (I866), 
Brazil (I942). 
Recently, such preliminary provisions have taken the shape 
of short codifications in the civil codes of Greece (I 940), 
Rumania (1939),70 and Peru (I936). 
Moreover, the statutory regulations of French Morocco 
(I 9 I 3) and Spanish Morocco (I 9 I 4), concerning relations 
between subjects and foreigners, include a number of modern 
conflicts rules based on the French doctrines. In the absence 
of codifications in the motherlands, these provisions are often 
cited. Suggestions for legislation have been made by learned 
70 The Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure appeared in the Monitorul Of. 
on November 8, 1939, and were ratified by the Constituent Assembly by law 
of December 21, 1939, but the effective date was delayed to September 15, 1940. 
We are not informed whether these codes and the new Commercial Code, similarly 
deferred, are in force. 
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societies. In particular, a draft of the Society for Legislative 
Studies, concerning the status of foreigners in France and of 
Frenchmen in foreign countries, 71 deserves attention. Bartin 
considers this project as the legislation of tomorrow/2 but it 
is a singular document of overstressed nationalism. 
A separate position has been taken by Switzerland. The 
statute of June 25, I 89I, was mainly a regulation of the inter-
state conflicts between the Swiss cantons having at that time 
full legislative power over private law. A few additional 
provisions incidentally considered Swiss citizens abroad (arts. 
2 8-3 I) and foreigners in Switzerland (arts. 3 2-34). · In 
I9I2, when the Federal Civil Code of I907 became effective, 
the significance of the statute of I 89 I was limited to cases of 
the latter type; thus, international private law was left largely 
dependent upon these not too well-drafted sections and cer-
tain additions (C. C., final title, art. 59). What the Federal 
Tribunal has been able to do with this precarious legislation 
is noteworthy. 
The most extensive national codification of conflicts law has 
been undertaken in the tiny principality of Liechtenstein; pro-
visions dealing with conflicts have been inserted in the various 
chapters of a recent civil code, which has been partially promul-· 
gated. This codification is a curious mixture of clauses invit-
ing big finance and reflecting inordinate nationalism. 73 
2. Special Legislation 
Conflicts rules on special matters exist, of course, in many 
countries. In numerous states of the United States, various 
uniform laws and other statutes deal with the conflicts aspects 
of marriage and wills; also provisions on immovable prop-
71 Deliberations and Project have been published in Bulletin de la Societe 
d'etudes legislatives; see the tentative draft in 24 ibid. (1928) 399; discussion 
26 ibid. (1930) 76; and definitive text in 26 ibid. (1930) 175· BARTIN was 
president and NIBOYET reporter of the draft committee. · 
72 BAR TIN, 2 Principes 201. 
73 See the reviewby WAHLE, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 134. 
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erty, contracts and capacity are frequent. 74 There is but one 
exceptional Federal enactment,711 although Congress appar-
ently has legislative power on the subject. 711 
3· Multilateral Treaties 
(a) Montevideo Treaties. The treaties on international 
law of Montevideo of February I z, I 8 89, are a worthy object 
of pride for the five countries that have ratified them, viz., 
Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.77 The 
first international agreements of their kind, they achieved an 
extensive unification, remarkable despite the close relation-
ship of the legislations involved, facilitating cooperation. Of 
this unification, the treaties concerned with "international 
civil law" and "international commercial law," in particular, 
will be considered in the appropriate connections in the present 
book. To celebrate the fifty years' anniversary of the treaties, 
a conference wa~ held in Montevideo in I 9 3 9 and r 940, which 
adopted considerable modernizations of the old rules. 78 How-
74 An attempt to collect these and certain other statutory provisions has been 
made by MAKAROV, Quellen 24-2-266. 
7S U.S. C. tit. 22 § p, see infra p. 238, n. 161. 
76 CHEATHAM, "Sources of Rules for Conflicts of Laws," 89 U. of Pa. L. 
Rev. (1941) 430, 441, 442. 
77 Texts: Official (Spanish) text in ERNESTO RESTELLI, Aetas y tratados 
del Congreso sudamericano de derecho internacional privado, Montevideo I888-
r889 (1928). 
French: MARTENS, r8 Recueil general de trartes, 2. serie, 424-453; German: 
HECK in I Z.int.R. (1891) 339-340, 477-482; MEru, Die Kodifikation des 
internationalen Civil- und Handelsrechts (1891) 103-138. 
History: Aetas de las sesiones del Congreso sudamericano de derecho inter-
nacional privado, Buenos Aires, r8 89. 
Li~rature: PRADrER-FoDERE, "Le congres de droit international sud-
americain et les traites de Montevideo," in 21 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1889) 
217-2.37> 561-577; SEGOVIA, El derecho internacional privado y el Congreso 
sudamericano de Montevideo (Buenos Aires, 1889); HECK, "Der Kongress 
von Montevideo und das internationale Vertragsrecht der siidamerikanischen 
Staaten," r Z.int.R. (1891) 339-346, 4-77-4-83, 592-6oo; BEWEs, "The 
Treaties of Montevideo, Text of r889,'' 6 Grotius Soc. 1920, 59· 
78 Segundo Congreso sudamericano de derecho internacional privado de Mon-
tevideo, 1 9 3 9-194o, published by Facultad de derecho y ciencias sociales, Insti-
tuto argentino de derecho internacional. For a first view of the contents, see 
RABEL, "The Revision of the Treaties of Montevideo on the Law of Conflicts,'' 
in 39 Mich. L. Rev (t941) 517· English translation by J. IRRIZARRY y PUENTE 
and G. L. WILLIAMS in 37 Am. ]. Int. Law, number 3, July, 1943. 
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ever, the new texts have not yet been ratified. For the most 
part, conflicts rules are contained in the treaties respectively 
concerning international "civil" law, the law of land com-
merce, and the law of maritime commerce. In the present 
volume, the first of these treaties is of special interest and will 
be referred to as the treaty of Montevideo. 
(b) Hague Conventions. Widely praised but much less 
comprehensive, the Hague Conventions of I 902 and I 90 5 
were concluded only after arduous efforts. 79 Their provisions 
cover but a few selected questions, and these they answer with 
many reservations on the part of the reluctant member states. 
With the exception of the relatively popular procedural 
79 Conventions of The Hague of I9o2 and I905. Official (French) text in 
MARTENS, 31 Recueil general de traites, 2° serie, 706-7I5; 6 ibid. 3° serie, 
48D-489. 
English translation by ARTHUR H. KUHN, in F. MElLI, International Civil 
and Commerical Law (I905) 532; German translation in German Reichs-
gesetzblatt I9041 22I H.; RGBl. I909, 409 H., RGBl. I9I2; 453 H.; reproduced 
in MAKAROV, Die Quellen des internationalen Privatrechts (I929) 336 H., 342 
H.; Italian translation in AMEDEO GIANNINI, Le convenzoni dell'Aja di diritto 
internazionale privata (Roma, I925). 
On the history of the Hague Conventions see Actes de !a Conference de !a 
Haye, chargee de reglementer diverses matieres de droit international prive 
(13-27 septembre 1893) (2 vols. in I1 LaHaye, I893); Actes de la Deuxieme 
Conference de la Haye chargee etc. (25 juin-13 juillet I 894) (LaHaye, I 894); 
Actes de la Troisieme Conference de la Haye pour le droit international prive 
(z9 mai-18 juin I9oo) (LaHaye, I9oo); Actes et documents de la Quatrieme 
Conference de !a Haye pour le droit international prive (I6 mai-I7 juin I904) 
(La Haye, I 904). Provisions of national law and cases relating to the Conven-
tions: J. KosTERS and F. BELLEMANS, Les conventions de !a Haye de I9oz et 
190 5 sur le droit international prive (La Haye, I 9 2 I), continued by surveys in 
6 Bulletin de l'Institut intermediaire international (I 9 2 2 ff.), since I 9 3 3 under 
title of Bulletin de l'Institut j uridique international. Literature: F. KAHN, Die 
Dritte Haager Staatenkonferenz fiir internationales Privatrecht, in Griinhut's 
Z. vols. u, I31 and I5 (I90J1 1905), also in KAHN, z Abhandl. 37-178, JOJ-
444· BuZZATI, Trattato di diritto internazionale priv~lto secondo le convenzioni 
dell'Aja (Milano, 1907); also French by F. REY (Paris, 19II). MElLI and 
MAMELOK, Das internationale Privat- und Civilptozessrecht auf Grund der 
Haager Konventionen (Zurich, 19I I); LEWALD, "Haager Konventionen zum 
internationalen Privatrecht," in STRUPP, 1 \Vorterbuch des Volkerrechts und der 
Diplomatic 454-48I; HEINSHEIMER, "Haager Zivilprozessabkommen," ibid. 
487. M. TRAVERS, La Convention de la Haye relative au mariage (z vols., Paris, 
I91Z); TRAVERS, La Convention de la Haye relative au divorce et a la sepa-
ration de corps (Paris, 1909); TRAVERS, "La Convention de la Haye relative 
a la tutelle des mineurs et les accords anterieurs passes par la France," Revue 
1912, 641· 
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treaty, they were ratified by only a few, though important, 
states and later partially deserted even by some of these. 
In I9J8, the conventions were binding upon the following 
states: 
(i) Convention to regulate the conflict of laws in regard 
to Marriage, of June I2, I902. 
Danzig, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania (old terri-
tory), Sweden, Switzerland. 
(ii) Convention to regulate the conflict of laws and juris-
dictions in regard to Divorce and Separation, of June 12, 
1902. 
Danzig, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Rumania (old territory). 
(iii) Convention to regulate the Guardianship of Minors, 
of June I2, I902. 
Belgium, Danzig, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxem-
burg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania (old 
territory), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. 
(iv) Convention concerning the conflict of laws relating to 
the Effects of Marriage on the rights and duties of the 
spouses in their personal relations and on the property 
of the spouses, of July I 7, I 90 5. 
Danzig, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Rumania (old territory), Sweden. 
( v) Convention concerning Interdiction and similar Meas-
ures of Protection, of July I 7, I 90 5. (Interdiction means 
the deprivation of an adult's competency to act legally.) 
Austria, Danzig, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania (old territory), 
Sweden. 
(vi) Convention concerning Civil Procedure, of July 17, 
I 90 5 (treats only the participation of foreigners in law-
suits). 
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Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Danzig, 
Esthonia, Finland, France (as to the signatories of the 
protocol of ratification of July 4, 1924), Germany, Hun-
gary, Italy, Latvia, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Rumania (old territory), Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia. 
During the first World War, it was disputed whether the 
conventions were suspended as between the two belligerent 
groups. Italian courts negatived the question,80 but it may 
be reopened in the present war. 
A very important step has been taken by the Protocol signed 
at The Hague, March 2 7, I 9 3 I, recognizing the competence 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice to interpret 
the Hague conventions on private internationallaw,81 acceded 
to by Belgium, Estonia, the Netherlands, and Portugal. 
(c) C6digo Bustamante. This is a complete codification 
in 43 7 sections, including the entire international private law 
in 29 5 sections and in the remainder criminal and procedural 
conflicts law. Drafted by the Cuban jurist, Antonio Sanchez 
de Bustamante y Sirven, this Code of International Private 
Law was adopted at the Sixth Pan-American Conference in 
Havana on February 20, 1928,82 and has been ratified by 
80 Especially App. Venezia (Oct. 9, I9I7) Giur. Ital. I9I7, I, 2, 440; also 
KosTERS-BELLEMANS 493· For other opinions, see the survey by ROHLAND, 32 
Z.int.R. (I924) 74, 78. 
81 Came into force April 12, I936. I67 League of Nations Treaty Series 
(1936) 341. 
82 Spanish text with Portuguese, French and English translations in 86 League 
of Nations Treaty Series ( 1929) 7 I I ; English and French in HUDSON, 4 Int. 
Legislation 2279 No. I86, 2283 No. I86a; French by PAUL GouLi~ in NIBOYET 
et GOULE, 2 Recueil de textes usuels de droit international (1929) so8. Also 
in BusTAMANTE y SIRVEN, Le Code de droit international prive et la Sixieme 
Conference panamericaine (1929) 150. In German, books I and II by MAKAROV 
and REUPKE, in MAKAROV 397-418. 
On the history of' the Code, see ANTONIO SANCHEZ DE BusTAMANTE y SIRVEN, 
La Comision de jurisconsultos de Rio de Janeiro y el derecho internacional 
(Habana, 1927), translated by GoULE: La Commission des jurisconsultes de 
Rio de Janeiro et le droit international (Paris, 1928); El Codigo de Dere~ho 
Internacional Privado y Ia VI. Conferencia pana~ericana (Habana, 1929), 
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fifteen Latin American states, viz., 88 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. 
Bolivia and Peru, having adhered to both the Montevideo 
Treaties and the Havana Treaty, have authoritatively de-
clared the former to prevail in their relations with each 
other.84 
(d) Scandinavian Treaty. Extensive legislative coopera-
tion among the Scandinavian countries, 85 fostered by their 
historic affinity, has found significant expression with respect 
to conflicts law in a convention concluded in Stockholm on 
February 6, 1931, by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
and Sweden, containing "provisions of private international 
translated by GOULE: Le Code de droit international prive et la vr Con-
ference panamericaine (Paris, 1929). 
Literature: See primarily the works of the author of the Code, ANTONIO 
SANCHEZ de BusTAMANTE y SIRVEN (cited in the list of abbreviations), in-
cluding his discussion of the application of the Code to Cuba in his Manual de 
derecho internacional privado (Habana, 1939). AUDINET, "Un projet de Code 
de droit international prive," Revue 1927, 'r; FRAGA, "Die Kodi:fikation des 
internationalen Privatrechts in Amerika," 1 Z.ausl.PR. (1927) 563; KuHN, 
Book Review, 20 Am.]. Int. Law (1926) 631; 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 480. 
83 For ratification and accessions to this and the subsequently mentioned treaties, 
see League of Nations, Official No. A.6.t939· Annex I. V. 
84 In signing the C6digo Bustamante, Bolivia reserved its obligations under 
the Montevideo Treaties. This has been held decisive for the relations between 
Bolivia and Peru by the Supreme Court of the lat!er country. Decision of 
Gonzalez, Dec. 7, 1935, 2 Tratados, convenciones y acuerdos vigentes entre el 
Peru y otros Estados (19J6) sr6; Lurs G. ALVARADO, Apuntes de derecho in-
ternacional ( 1940) 6o. · 
85 Relatively uniform legislation on marriage, adoption and guardianship was 
introduced in Sweden, Denmark and Norway from 1917 to 1927, and Finland 
approximated its laws to this convention in 1925 and 1929. Conventions, in-
cluding Iceland, followed on: Collection of Maintenance Allowances, of Feb-
ruary ro, 1931 (English and French translations in 126 League of Nations 
Treaty Series (1932) 51; HuDsoN, 5 Int. Legislation 885 No. 282); on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, of March r6, 1932 (139 League 
of Nations Treaty Series (1934) 181; HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 6 No. 305); 
on Bankruptcy, of November 7, 1933 ( 15 ~ League of Nations Treaty Series 
(1935) 133; HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 496 No. 351); and on Inheritance and 
Succession, of November 19, 1934 (164 League of Nations Treaty Series (1935) 
279; HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 947 No. 397, 953 No. 397a). C/. UDDGREN, 9 
Z.ausl.PR. (1935) 513; MARKS VON WURTEMBERG, to Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 
711· 
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law in the field of marriage, adoption, and guardianship," in 
force from January I, I 9 3 2. 86 · 
(e) Conventions on Negotiable Instruments. Substantial 
success was attained in the two 9eneva conventions of I930 
and I 9 3 I, providing a Uniform Law of Bills of Exchange and 
a Uniform Law of Checks: 87 
(i) Convention for the settlement of certain conflicts of 
laws in connection with Bills of Exchange and Promis-
sory Notes, of June 7, I930, in force from January I, 
I934· 
Austria, Belgium, Danzig, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Monaco, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal (without colonies), 
Sweden, Switzerland. 
(ii) Convention for the settlement of certain conflicts of 
laws in connection with Checks, of March I 9, I 9 3 I, in 
force from January I, I934· 
Danzig, Denmark (except Greenland), Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Monaco, the Nether-
lands, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal (without 
colonies), Sweden, Switzerland. 
86 English and French translations in I :z6 League of Nations Treaty Series 
(I93I) I4I; HUDSON, 5 Int. Legislation 877 No. :z8I, 884 No. 281a; German 
translation and comment by BLOCH in 8 Z.ausl.PR. (I934-) 627; VIGGO BENT-
ZEN-HAMMERICH, "La recente Union scandinave de droit international prive," 
Revue I934-, 855. 
87 Official French and English texts in I43 League of Nations Treaty Series 
(1934) 3I7, 332,409, 424; HuDSoN, 5 Int. Legislation 550 No. 2.59, 558 No. 
259a, and 9I5 No. 284,92.4 No. :z84a. 
Comments: HUDSON and FELLER, "The International Unification of Laws 
Concerning Bills of Exchange," 44 Harv. L. Rev. (I93I) 333 at 370; FELLER, 
"The International Unification of Laws Concerning Checks," 45 Harv. L. Rev. 
(I932) 668 at 692.; ARMINJON et CARRY, La lettre de change et le billet a 
ordre (Paris, I 9 3 8) ; LEscoT, La nouvelle legislation de la lettre de change 
(Paris, I937); PERCEROU et BoUTERON, La nouvelle legislation fran<;aise et 
internationale de la lettre de change, du billet a ordre et du cheque (Paris, 
I 9 3 7) ; XAVIER ]ANNE, "L'unification internationale des lois sur les effets de com-
merce," 56 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I9:z9) sz, 1 SYMMIKTA STREIT 
(1939) 477-483; LENHOFF, Einfiihrung in das einheitliche Wechselrecht, 
(Wien, Berlin, 1933); QuASSOWSKI, "Die Genfer Abkommen iiber die Ver-
einheitlichung des Wechselrechts," 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) no; DE SEMO, 
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In Yugoslavia, a law has approved all six Geneva conven-
tions but no ratification seems to have occurred. 
(f) Other multilateral efforts. On the fringe of our sub-
ject matter, recent important conventions have been concluded 
on the following topics: 88 
(i) Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, opened for signature 
at Geneva, September 24, 1923.89 
Alabama, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Great Britain (and 
many parts of the British commonwealth), Czechoslo-
vakia, Denmark, Danzig, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Monaco, Neth-
erlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand. 
(ii). Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, opened for signature at Geneva, Sep-
tember 26, 1927.90 
Austria, Belgium, Great Britain (and parts of the British 
commonwealth), Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Danzig, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lux-
emburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand. 
(iii) Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to 
. the Conflict of Nationality Laws, opened for signature 
at The Hague, April 12, 1930, in force from July I, 
1937·91 
Ratifications or accessions until August 28, 1939, by 
Belgium, Brazil, Great Britain (all territories), Canada, 
"L'unificazione internazionale del diritto cambiario," 7 Annuario Dir. Comp. 
(1932) 220, 
88 See list of ratifications and accessions League of Nations, Official No. 
A.6.1939. Annex I.V. 
89 27 League of Nations Treaty Series (1924) 157; MARTENS, 19 Nouveau 
recueil general de traites 3 e serie, I 56; HUDSON, 2 Int. Legislation I 062 No. 98. 
90 92 League of Nations Treaty Series (1929) 301; HunsoN, 3 Int. Legis-
lation 2153 No. 183. 
91 Text from League of Nations Document, C.224.M.tii,I9Jo.V; HuDSON, 
5 Int. Legislation 359 No. 249· 
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Australia, India, China, Monaco, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Poland, Sweden. 
(iv) Simultaneously with the Convention under (iii), a 
"Protocol relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness" and 
a "Special Protocol concerning Statelessness" have been 
concluded, 92 the first of which is in force from July I, 
I 93 7 in Brazil, Great Britain (with all territories), 
Australia, South Africa, India, Chile, China, the Nether-
lands, Poland, El Salvador. 
More conflicts rules have been established in multipartite 
conventions providing uniform treatment of such matters as 
communication and transportation, with respect to problems 
that proved inaccessible to unification. 93 
(g) Drafts. The tireless efforts of the Dutch Government 
in promoting the Hague Conferences on conflicts law were 
continued in I925 and I 928,94 and resulted in elaborate treaty 
drafts regarding the law of succession on death ( 192 5 and 
I928) and bankruptcy (1902 and 1928), which were not rati-
fied. Moreover, certain provisions supplementary to the 
earlier conventions, referring in particular to persons without 
nationality or having more than one nationality, were adopted 
and, although not ratified, apparently have had some influ-
ence. Attempts to unify the conflicts rules on sales of goods, 
however, did not succeed. 95 Both political contrasts and doc-
trinal controversies contributed to all these failures. 
92 League of Nations Document, C.226.M.IIJ.193o.V; League of Nations 
Document, (:.227.M.114.1930.V., HUDSON, 5 Int. Legislation 381 No. 251 and 
387 No. 252. 
93 For example, see the rules concerning aviation, enumerated by HuDSON, 4 
Int. Legislation 2354. 
9
' Conference de la Haye de droit international prive. Actes de la Cinquieme 
Session tenue du 12 octobre au 7 novcmbre 1925 (LaHaye, 1926). Documents 
relatifs a la Cinquieme Session (La Haye, 19 2 6). Actes de la Sixieme Session 
tenue du 5 au 28 janvier 1928 (LaHaye, 1928). Documents relatifs ala Sixieme 
Session tenue du 5 au 28 janvier I928 (LaHaye, 1928). See accounts. by Kos-
TERsinRevueDr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I926) I56, 245; (I928) 813; (I929) 308, 
79r; TRAVERS, Revue I926, 220; VoLKMAR, JW. 19261 307; I928, 857; 
]ULLIOT DE LA MoRANDJ:ERE, Clunet I928, 28I. 
95 The remarkable last draft, by a Special Committee of June 21 I 9 3 I has been 
published in 7 Z.ausl.PR. (I933) 957· 
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4· Bilateral Treaties 
In addition to the multilateral treaties concluded under the 
auspices of the League of Nations, the postwar period of the 
1920's and early 1930's produced numerous bilateraltreaties, 
containing clauses promoting international intercourse. The 
subjects treated include status of foreign persons, both indi-
viduals and business organizations, judicial assistance, enforce-
ment of foreign judgments, and the like, with occasional true 
conflicts rules interspersed. In this way, more progress was 
achieved than in any other, and for the first time Great Britain 
participated. 
5· Case Law 
It has already been noted that even in civil law countries 
conflicts rules to a large extent are judge-made. French and 
Belgian courts have to operate almost without any written 
rules. The manner in which German courts, from early times, 
have treated the problems in this field and have done so since 
I 900 in the absence of provision by the Introductory Law, has 
some similarity to Anglo-American practice. 96 The same is 
true of Switzerland, whose statute is insufficient, and in many 
other countries. 
Consequently, the rules are flexible and incomplete, and 
very far from being frozen or petrified as certain theorists 
imagine. Precedents are reversed, when shown to be unrea-
sonable. 
· In the United States, it is problematical whether conflict of 
laws is subject to general federal law, in addition to common 
law as coined in the different jurisdictions. It seems now 
settled that no such source of law is available to the federal 
courts in diversity of citizenship cases. 97 Except in such cases, 
96 See GUTZWILLER, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932.) 75· 
97 Klaxon Company v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc. (1941) 313 U. S. 
487; Griffin, Administrator v. McCoach, Trustee (1941) 313 U.S. 498. 
INTRODUCTION 
the question is open 98 but has so far remained without practi-
cal importance. Federal courts may perhaps still subject con-
flicts rules regarded as procedural to an approach different 
than in state courts. 99 
However, as may be noted by foreign readers, this question 
has nothing to do with the influence of the Federal Constitu-
tion, as developed by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
on the application of the conflicts rules. As the cases, in their 
overwhelming majority, involve the relations between two 
sister states of the Union rather than international intercourse 
with a foreign country, constitutional requirements respecting 
due process of law, interstate commerce, privileges and im-
munities of citizens, full faith and credit of acts, documents 
and judicial proceedings, or impairment of obligations, exer-
cise a more or less intensive effect by unifying and controlling 
the solution of conflicts in the separate jurisdictions.100 
6. International Custom 
Apart from treaties, is there any international conflicts law 
established by custom within the international community of 
states? According to an opinion universally obtaining, each 
member of this community is bound to have some sort of con-
flicts law, in order to leave to other states the power of adjudi-
cating situations, persons or things, exclusively belonging to 
98 CooK, Legal Bases 1o8, 143. 
99 Note: "After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins: Some Problems in 'Substance' 
and 'Procedure,"' 38 Col. L. Rev. (1938) 1472; Note: "Congress, the Tomp-
kins Case and the Conflict of Laws," 52 Harv. L. Rev. (1939) 1ooz;. NussBAUM, 
Principles 62 ff. 
100 See the explanations to foreign readers by YNTEMA, "lnternational-pri-
vatrechtliche Entscheidurtgen in den Vereinigten Staaten im Jahre 1926," in 
2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 856; and LoRENZEN, "The Federal Constitution of the 
United States of America as a Source of Private International Law," 3 Recueil 
d'Etudes sur les sources du droit, en l'honneur de Fran~ois Geny (1934) 437-
465. 
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their respective domains.101 What does this maxim practi-
cally mean, however, after Zitelmann's failure to derive the 
conflicts law from the requirements imposed by the law of 
nations upon states? Probably no tangible derivation can be 
found. 102 Of course, outside of the domain of conflicts law, 
public' international law has important aspects for the treat-
ment of foreigners 103 and assumption of jurisdiction.104 
There are, finally, certain rules of almost universal force, 
such as the rules that the law of the situs governs immovable 
property, that a tort is governed by the law of the place where 
the allegedly tortious act transpires, or that the formalities of 
legal acts are determinable by the law of the place where they 
occur. These rules were established by statutist doctrines at 
a time when state borders did not exist as today. But now 
these uniform rules are national. The law of nations never 
was their source. They are simply customary law of a great 
majority of states, though as such important. International 
courts have been glad to avail themselves of such rudiments 
of trans-national rules. The common law countries possess 
in common numerous additional rules of customary origin, 
which because of their significance are known as principles of 
conflict. 105 No conflicts rule, however, has attained, on the 
basis of international usage, a universal standing without ex-
101 Since SAVIGNY § 348, a constant principle. See for literature Aco, Teoria 
70 n. I, 82 n. I, I 26 n. I, and for analysis BAR TIN, I Principes I I z. 
102 MELCHIOR (skeptical), 36; RuNDSTEIN, "La structure du droit inter-
national prive et ses rapports avec le droit des gens," Revue I936, 3I4, 5I2 at 
536; FEDOZZI II6. Contra: CAVAGLIERI 49> so; ]ITTA, La methode du droit 
international prive (LaHaye, I89o) 69; MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III 325, 
355· CHEATHAM, "Sources of Rules for Conflict of Laws," 89 Univ. of Pa. L. 
Rev. (I94I) 430 at 434 ff., mentions three cases of diplomatic intervention 
without result. 
103 See M. WoLFF, IPR. 8. 
104 See CHEATHAM, 89 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. (194I) 430 ff., supra n. 102. 
105 BURGE, 2 Colonial and Foreign Law 29-36 (Statement of Principles); I 
WHARTON I ("preliminary principles") ; DICEY (Table of Principles and 
Rules) LXV-CXXXIV. 
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ception, equivalent to that of the general principles of the jus 
gentium. 
7. Conclusion 
It is notable that of the enacted or restated conflicts rules 
existing today in the world, only the two Latin American 
multipartite treaties and the Restatement, the latter not a law 
but purporting to reproduce the law, are comparable in com-
prehensiveness and elaborateness to codifications of private 
law as known to lawyers in most countries. The remaining 
efforts, rudimentary if not poor, contrast strikingly with the 
usual fondness of civil law countries for statutes and codes 106 
and even with the recent increase of legislation in Anglo-
American jurisdictions. Niboyet once tried to justify the com-
plete absence of French legislation on conflicts ,law by the elu-
sive nature of the subject.107 But the chaotic brilliance of the 
French literature and practice suggests rather that the prepara-
tion for crystallizing the law has been insufficient. The Ger-
man enactment as a whole is so unsatisfactory that, as early as 
1927, a movement for a new codification appeared.108 
However, the two copious formulations of conflicts law 
achieved in the Western hemisphere have remarkably analo-
gous defects, despite their very different history, function, and 
character. The American Restatement has been accepted in 
the courts and, it seems, in the literature, to the extent that it 
reflects the actual cases or clarifies controversial issues. Its 
doctrinal background has been repudiated almost unanimously. 
Hence, many rules asserted in the Restatement as flowing 
from principles are devoid of authority. The Havana Code 
introduced a great wealth of refined provisions in the laws of 
106 For the predilection of civil law countries for statutes, attention may be 
recalled to SPERL, "Case Law and the European Codified Law," 19 Ill. L. 
Rev. (19z5) 505. 
107 NJBOYET, z6 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. (1930) 77· 
108 Mitt. Deutsche Ges. f. Volkerrecht, Dresden Meeting 1927. 
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the participant 'states 1 09 and is admired throughout Latin 
America. But, as the Code largely rests on a selection among 
literary opinions, mostly of French writers, its practical useful-
ness has yet to be tried in the fire of litigation. Of such con-
firmation, nothing is known so far. As all doctrinal studies of 
the Code evidently suggest, there are certain difficulties in 
analyzing its rules. 
Once more, the immaturity of this branch of law appears 
and its need of intensive, prolonged cultivation. 
109 Occasionally, the thesis has been adopted that the code represents the gen-
eral law of the country. Thus, the Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal, senten<;a 
estrangeira no. 993 (July 17, 1940) 58 Arch. Jud. 83 has applied its juris-
dictional rules in relation to Po1·tugal. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Peru 
(July 2, 1929) 2.5 Anales Jud. (192.9) 78 has termed the Montevideo Treaty 
"the law of the land" in relation to Japan. 
CHAPTER 2 
Structure of Conflicts Rules 
I. THE PARTS OF THE RuLE 
I NTELLIGENT application or development of conflicts rules requires full awareness of the two parts of which these rules are necessarily composed. Thus, although it 
need not exactly conform to the example, a typical conflicts 
rule runs as, for instance, section 295 of the Restatement: 
(I) The validity of a trust of movables created by a will 
( 2) is determined by the law of the testator's domicil at the 
time of his death. (Numbers added.) 
The first part of the rule defines its object, that is, certain 
operative facts, 1 the legal consequences of which are deter-
mined in the second part. From another point of view the 
first part raises, and the second part answers, a legal question. 
In comparison with ordinary legal rules, there is one, a funda-
mental, difference. The legal effects of an ordinary rule of 
law are fully indicated; the question raised is immediately 
solved by commanding or prohibiting or authorizing certain 
conduct. ("Material," "substantive," "internal" rules, in 
German, Sachnormen.) In contrast, conflicts rules decide only 
which state shall give such immediate solution. The specific 
quality of these rules resides therefore in the second part that 
declares the municipal law to which the question should be 
referred or "connected" (in German, angekniipft) or, in other 
words, precribes the legislative domain in which the question 
should be "localized." (There is no point in arguing which 
mode of thinking represented by these expressions is prefer-
1 German: "Tatbestand," translated by LEA MERIGGI, Revue I 9 3 3, zo I at 
zo 5, n. I, into Latin: "substratum" (subject matter) ; Italian: "presupposto" 
(premise). 
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able.) 'An essential element of conflicts rules, therefore, is the 
indication of a "connecting factor" or "point of contact" 
(A nknitpfungspunkt, point de rattachement) 2-the testator's 
domicil as of the time of death in the case above, or in other 
cases the situs -of property, the place where a contract was con-
cluded or where it is to be performed, etc. In this line of 
thought, the facts localized by the connecting factor appear 
separately as the "thing connected." In the example above, 
these facts form the first part of the rule, while the con-
necting factor appears in the second part. For the sake of 
simplicity, we shall continue to conceive of the rule in the 
manner stated, although, in some conflicts rules, the localizing 
elements or some of them, are inserted in the first part. 
Strangely enough, the misfortunes of the doctrine taken 
over from the nineteenth century have been caused largely by 
insufficient attention to-this nature of the conflicts rules. As 
will be seen hereafter, the parallelism of the first part with 
substantive rules was overlooked, and the basic peculiarity in 
the second part was not consistently appreciated. 
Part of the confusion lay in the traditional notion of "the 
law of the forum." Lex fori once meant the entire set of legal 
rules in force at the place of suit. In a system of pure terri-
torialism, every tribunal either applies its own law as a whole 
or dismisses a case found to belong to a foreign jurisdiction. 
There is no choice of law, no application of foreign law in such 
a system-a system which was observed in England with 
more consistency than anywhere else and is still represented 
in many conceptions of Anglo-American law. If the entire 
"law of the forum" be considered a unit, conflicts rules are in 
effect integrated with the internal law. But when assumption 
2 Term introduced by KAHN, cf. NEUMEYER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (192.9) 2.61, 
translated as point of contact by LORENZEN, and as connecting factor by F AL-
CONBRIDGE. For recent discussion, see FALCONBRIDGE, "Characterization in the 
Conflict of Laws," 53 Law Q. Rev. (1937) 2.351 537 at 549· CORMACK, "Renvoi, 
Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in Confiict of Laws," 
14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) at 2.41 1 "localization." 
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of jurisdiction no longer implies application of the domestic 
rules and there exist choice of law rules, the latter must live 
apart from the internal set of rules. At this stage of develop-
ment, appropriate language can designate as law of the forum 
only the pure internal law, strictly excluding conflicts rules. 
Likewise, the extensive recent discussion, under the French 
catchword of "qualification," 3 of the nature and function of 
the law of conflicts has been a source of difficulty. Bartin, the 
author of this expression, assumed that conflicts rules are an 
inseparable part of the law of the forum 4 and that, a'C-
cordingly, the legal terms used in a conflicts rule must by 
logical necessity be explained ("qualified") in terms of the 
peculiar concepts of the lex fori. Had it not been for this 
theory, characterization would never have attained the role 
it occupies in the present literature. In fact, as that theory has 
suffered increasing exceptions and modifications, the term 
qualification has become uncertain. The writers argue which 
characterization problems are genuine and which false and 
even :whether characterization is of immense or minimal sig-
nificance. Such terminological disputes should be ended. 
The real subject of the basic debate about conflicts law is 
the interpretation of the rules of conflicts. This is essentially 
broader than commenting on expressions. Moreover, it 
furnishes a clearer objective than does reference to some sub-
stantive law, for evidently conflicts rules have to be inter-
preted by exploring their own meaning rather than the mean-
ing of something else, e.g., an internal rule. Emphasis should 
be shifted from "characterization" to "interpretation." 
3 While KAHN spoke of "latent conflicts of law," BARTIN's term "qualifica-
tion" became usual in Europe. BECKETT and CHESHIRE translate it by "clas-
sification," FALCONBRIDGE proposed "characterization" and is generally followed. 
See FALCONBRIDGE, 53 Law Q. Rev. (1937) 2.35 at :1.39, supra n. 2. For another 
survey, see VAN PRAAG, "Bijdrage tot de leer der kwalifikaties in het internationaal 
privaatrecht," Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis 1939, 525· 
4 See infra n. 9· 
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If nevertheless characterization is to retain a technical 
meaning, it may be used to denote the problem whether or 
not a certain expression in a conflicts rule has the same con-
notation as a similar word employed by domestic law or in a 
foreign system. 5 Characterization of facts as such is not sig-
nificant of conflicts law. 
The most important objective in interpreting a conflicts 
rule is to determine its scope. The borderline, for instance, de-
limiting the cases for which the conflicts rule on contracts 
prescribes the applicable law from those subject to the con-
flicts rule concerning torts, must be marked in every conflicts 
system. This process may be termed classification in the 
proper sense. 
II. THE FIRST PART: THE OBJECT OF THE RuLE 
The statutist doctrine classified each substantive rule of 
positive law in one of three categories, territorial law (statuta 
realia), extraterritorial law (stat uta personalia), and "mixed 
statutes" (statuta mixta ), the last-named category being as-
similated to the first by the late French and the Dutch school. 
Thus, in the statutist conception, the object of conflicts law is 
the substantive rule of law. The substitution for this of the 
legal relations between persons or of persons to things by 
Savigny constitutes the chief advance from this to the modern 
conception. Savigny and his followers, who apparently are 
still numerous, therefore deemed it to be the characteristic 
task of conflicts law to connect each single "legal relation" 
with a certain country. 
This conception, despite its advantages, still was not quite 
correct. Its consequences, as later deduced by Franz Kahn, 
demonstrate that the mistake was not harmless. The starting 
point of analysis, as should be obvious, ought not to be the 
5 RABEL, 5 Z.ausl. PR. (1931) 253. 
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legal relation, e.g., an obligation, a property right, the rela-
tion between spouses. Any such relation must be based on a 
determinate legal system. Which system, when the applicable 
law is not even yet contemplated? At this stage, there is 
nothing but a factual or ((social" situation. 6 If two persons of 
Greek Orthodox faith go through a marriage ceremony before 
a Greek Orthodox priest in Paris, is this a marriage? The 
answer depends on what law we apply: the law of the forum, 
the French law, the Greek law, or perchance some other law. 
No court except in Greece, however, would actually apply its 
own internal law to the question. Nevertheless, Kahn and the 
many who share his view assume that the legal relationship of 
marriage as constituted under the domestic law of the .forum is 
exclusively the object of the conflicts rule. This makes no sense; 
it is simply a way out of embarrassment in order to find some 
legislation containing the allegedly necessary definition of 
such object. Evidently, conflicts rules must operate as do all 
other rules, directly on the facts of life, not on a legally pred-
icated, abstract subject matter. They refer to merely factual 
events, such as the marriage ceremony before the Greek priest, 
a document concerning the sale of a movable, a declaration 
by a married woman, purporting to transfer property, the 
death of an individual leaving no will, et cetera. 
This statement is of cardinal significance; it ends all specu-
lation about the necessary dependence of conflicts rules on 
some legal system, whether the law of the forum or the 
6 RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) at 243; reproduced in Revue 1933,1 at 5 if., 
followed by NEUNER, Der Sinn (1932); M. WOLFF, IPR. 1; DE CASTRO, "La 
cuestion de las calificaciones en el derecho internacional privado," 20 Revista 
Der. Priv. (1933) 2.17 at 2.40, 2.65 at 2.8o, 2.82.; VALLINDAS, Book Review, 1 
Archeion Idiotikou Dikaiou ( 1934) 1 76; MEZGER, Decision Note, Revue Crit. 
1935, 447; I STREIT-VALLINDAS (1937) 2.43; FALCONBRIDGE1 53 Law Q. 
Rev. (1937) 235 at 242, supra n. 2.; RoBERTSON, Characterization 63; HussERL, 
"Foreign Fact Element in Conflict of Laws," part II, 26 Va. L. Rev. (1940) 
453 at 471. More precisely, the object has been described as a factual situation 
taken in abstracto; see MERIGGI, Revue 19331 2.05, or as the facts underlying 
the relation which is mentioned by the conflicts rule and taken in abstracto, see 
NEUNER, "Die Ankniipfung im internationalen Privatrecht," 8 Z.ausl.PR. 
(1934) 81, 85. (Erroneous criticism by DE CASTRO, 20 Revista Der. Priv .. 
(1933) 2391 2.41, supra this note.) 
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lex causae. This supposition was engendered by the short 
manner in which conflicts rules have been generally framed, 
as for example: 
Immovables, even those possessed by foreigners, are gov-
erned by French law. The laws concerning the status 
and capacity of persons govern a Frenchman, even rest-
dent abroad. (French C.C. art. 3.) 
Or, when the rules became more detailed: 
The capacity of a person is to be determined according to 
the laws to which the person belongs. Personal relations be-
tween German spouses, even though domiciled abroad, are 
governed by the German laws. (German EG. art. 7 par. I, 
art. I4 par. 1.) 
Broad stretches of subject matter have thus customarily been 
indicated by abbreviated terms, seemingly corresponding to 
the captions of large chapters of private law, such as capacity, 
relation between spouses, inheritance, et cetera. But this is 
merely the technique of shorthand expression. 
III. INTERPRETATION AND CHARACTERIZATION 
No doubt such legal terms ordinarily have been taken 
from the headings used in the civil code or accepted legal 
classification of the forum. But was that always so, must it so 
remain; is the interpretation of such a term bound to its 
specific significance in the internal law? 
I. Lex Fori 
Franz Kahn/ in his elaborate earlier opinion, which to a 
vaguely defined extent he later revoked,8 and Bartin,9 who 
7 KAHN, Gesetzeskollisionen: ein Beitrag zur Lehre des internationalen Pri-
vatrechts ( I89I) I Abhandl. I, especially "Latente Gesetzeskollisionen" at 92. 
8 KAHN, Ober Inhalt, Natur und Methode des internationalen Privatrechts 
( I899), I Abhandl. 2 55 at 3 1.2. 
$ BARTIN, "De l'impossibilite d'arriver a la suppression definitive des con-
flits de lois," Clunet I897, 22.5, 466, 72.0, reprinted in BARTIN, Etudes (I899) 
I; BARTIN, I Principes (I93o) 22I; BARTIN, "La doctrine des qualifications 
et ses rapports avec le caractere national des regles du conflit des lois," 31 
Recueili93o I 565. 
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first sponsored the theory, considered it a matter of course 
that when a conflicts rule speaks of domicil or marriage set-
tlement or tort, it meant exactly what such expression signifies 
in the corresponding domestic law. This theory has had an 
immense following 10 and has been adopted in the Restate-
ment 11 and the C6digo Bustamante.12 Logical as well as so-
called practical arguments have been adduced in quantity to 
prove this assertion; 13 they may now also be found repro-
duced in English 14 and need no repetition. 
2. Lex Causae 
Another opinion went in the opposite direction; the terms 
or concepts of the conflicts rule should be understood according 
to the foreign internal law referred to by the conflicts rule 
itself. Originated by the French Despagnet, and recently re-
vived by Pacchioni and M. Wolff/5 this theory has been 
1° For lists see MELCHIOR rro § 78; MAURY, "Regles generales des conflits 
de lois," 57 Recueil I936 III 325 at 467. To mention the most significant 
names, in France: ARMINJON, H. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES, LEREBOURS-PIGEON-
NIERE, NIBOYET, SURVILLE, WEISS; in Belgium: PouLLET, DEVos; in Germany: 
GUTZWILLER, LEWALD, MELCHIOR, NEUMEYER, NUSSBAUM, RAAPE, ZITEL-
MANN; in Italy: ANZILOTTI, Aco, BUZATTI, CAVAGLIERI, FEDOZZI, PERASSI, 
SALVIOLI, UDINA; in the Netherlands: KoSTERS, MuLDER. 
More recently in Britain and the United States: CHESHIRE; LoRENZEN, "The 
Theory of Qualification," 20 Col. L. Rev. (1920) 247; LORENZEN, "The 
Qualification, Classifica,tion, or Characterization Problem in the Conflict of 
Laws," so Yale L. J. (I941) 743; FALCONBRIDGE, 53 Law Q. Rev. (1937) 
24 s, supra n. 2; cf. "Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights," r 7 Can. 
Bar Rev. (1939) at 373; RoBERTSON, Characterization 24; CoRMACK, Renvoi, 
14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 221 at 223, supra n. 2 .. 
11 Restatement § 7. 
12 Codigo Bustamante art. 6. Also the Rumanian Draft of 1 9 3 3, art. 6 6; 
cf. ANTONESco, Revue 19331 I 55 at I7I· 
13 See especially NIBOYET no. 4I6. 
14 See BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private 
International Law," IS Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1934) 46, esp. 53 .ff.; 
ROBERTSON, Characterization 59· 
~~ DESPAGNET, "Des conflits de lois relatifs a la qualification des rapports 
juridiques," Clunet 1898, 253; DESPAGNET et DE BoECK, Cours de droit inter-
national public (ed. 41 19Ia) no. Io6 bis; M. WoLFF, IPR. 34 ff.; PACCHIONI, 
Elementi I 67; partly also NEUNER, Der Sinn, and FRANKENSTEIN, "Tendances 
nouvelles du droit international prive," 33 Recueil1930 III 245 at 313· 
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generally rejected.16 In the present writer's opinion, which is 
not here elaborated, the solutions sought by Vvolff are ac-
ceptable in special circumstances, but not in principle.17 
3· Comparative Method 
A third opinion, which, in opposition to both these dogmas, 
advocates a method rather than a doctrine,18 was expounded by 
the present writer in 1929 and 1931.19 In this view, the 
factual situation, which is the true premise of any conflicts 
16 For a resume of the almost general rejection, see MAURY, "Regles ge-
nerales des conftits de lois," 57 Recueil 1936 III 325 at 484. 
17 See infra p. 6o. 
18 Rightly MAURY, 57 Recueil I936 III 325 at 477· 
19 RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 752 at 755; RABEL, "Das Problem der 
Qualifikation," 5 Z.ausl. PR. (I93I) 24I, (in Italian) 2 Rivista ltaliana (I9J2) 
97, (in French) Revue I933> I. 
In the same sense: in Belgium: WrGNY, Revue Crit. I936, 392; England: 
BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private Inter-
national Law," IS Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I934) 46; France: J. DoNNEDIEU 
DE VABRES 765; Germany: NEUNER, Der Sinn (1932); SILBERSCHMIDT, 48 
Z.int.R. ( r 9 3 3-34) 3 I 3 at 3 34 and 54 Zentralblatt (I 9 3 6) at I 7; Italy: 
MERIGGI, "Saggio critico sulle qualificazioni," 2 Rivista Italiana ( 19 3 2) 1 89, 
(in French) Revue 1933, 201, (in English) 14 B.U.L. Rev. (1934) 319; 
ZANCLA, Sede di fatto del rapporto, Atti dell'Accad. Pelorit. (I936) 18; 
Spain: DE CASTRO, 20 Revista Der. Priv. ( 1933) 2.40 at 2.45, supra n. 6 (in part 
divergent) ; Switzerland: WERNER N lEDERER, Die Frage der Qualifikation als 
Grundproblem des internationalen Privatrechts, in Zurcher Studien z. internat. 
Recht, no. I (Ziirich, 1940); VON STEIGER, Die Bestimmung der Rechtsfrage im 
internationalen Privatrecht, Abhandlungen zum Schweizerischen Recht, 12.9 
Heft, (Bern, 19 3 7). (The Federal Tribunal has left the decision open; see 
BG. (Feb. 2.4, 1939) 65 BGE. II 66, 71; BG. (Oct. 30, 194o) 30 Praxis 63 no. 
I, at 64). NEUNER and MERIGGI, however, add essential propositions of their 
own. Practical application of this method to particular problems has been made 
by WERNER VON SIMSON, Die materiellen Wirkungen des rechtskraftigen 
Urteils im internationalen Privatrecht (Thesis, Freiburg i.Br., I935); H. P. 
ZscHoKKE, Die Rechtsstellung internationaler Kartelle, Schweizerische Verein-
igung fiir Internationales Recht, Druckschrift no. 35 (1936); HANS H. RIE-
MANN, Die Schuldvertrage im internationalen Privatrecht (Dresden, 1939) v 
and 9· 
United States: CHEATHAM, "Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of 
Laws," 21 Cornell L. Q. (1935) 570, warns against "two closely related prac-
tices" (p. 5 89), viz., (I) "the uncritical transfer to Conflict of Laws of the 
meaning given to a term in internal law," and (z) "the use of a distinction 
worked out in internal law as decision of an issue in Conflict of Laws without 
adequate consideration of whether the internal law distinction is appropriate to 
the other issue." 
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rule, must be referable indifferently to foreign as well as 
to domestic substantive law. Hence, if legal terms are used 
to describe this factual situation, they must be susceptible of 
interpretation with reference to foreign institutions, even those 
unknown to the le:x: fori. This operation includes comparative 
research. Thoughtful courts have always employed this 
method, but systematic efforts are needed gradually to free 
national conflicts rules from undue dependence on internal 
conceptions. 
For example, the first theory above was resorted to in the 
English case, Lerouxv. Brown,20 in which the parties in France 
made a contract satisfying every condition of validity under 
French law. However, the action failed on the ground that 
the statute of frauds imposes a rule of procedure, which as 
such must be observed by all litigants in England. Con-
sequently, the conflicts rule on "formalities" was deemed in-
applicable. This decision has been severely criticized. 21 
Although the case conforms to the lex fori doctrine domi-
nant in the United States, it has been generally disapproved 
by American courts and writers. 22 Moreover, it appears that 
in this country foreign statutes of frauds are deemed to pre-
scribe formalities as defined by the conflicts rule relating to 
formalities, though such statutes may be otherwise interpreted 
in the various jurisdictions for other purposes. This construc-
tion agrees with the third theory above. 
The reason for this solution is obvious. It offends justice 23 
2o (x8s2) I2 C. B. 8oi. 
21 See BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private 
International Law," IS Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I934) at 69 § x8; CHESHIRE 
248 and 636; FALCONBRIDGE, "Confiict of Laws: Examples of Characteriza-
tion," IS Can. Bar Rev. (I937) 2201 2241 is doubtful, however. 
22 Straesser Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Refining Co. (1925) 8 F. (2d) 6oi; 
Ohlendiek v. Schuler (1929) 30 F. (2d) s; WILLISTON, 2 Contracts§ 6oo. 
23 See Lams et ux. v. F. H. Smith Co. (I935) 36 Del. 4771 I78 Atl. 65I 1 
Clunet 19371 8731 LORENZEN, Cases (ed. 4, I937) 458; CHEATHAM, Cases (ed.21 
I94I) 549; LORENZEN, "The Statute of Frauds and the Confiict of Laws," 32 
Yale L. J. (1923) 3 u, 320; GooDRICH 207; 3 BEALE § 6o2.1. 
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to deny enforcement of an oral contract complying with local 
requirements of form, for the mere reason that the domestic 
law requires a memorandum in writing. Conversely, a con-
tract unenforceable where executed, may be deemed to depend 
on such other contacts as the conflicts rule of the forum admits; 
thus, by the applicable conflicts rule, a contract may be con-
sidered valid under the law of the place of performance. But, 
if under the conflicts rule the transaction has no connection 
with the forum, it cannot be validated by the municipal law 
of the forum. The object of the conflicts rule on formality 
thus may include foreign statutes of frauds and exclude the 
domestic statute, irrespective of domestic classifications. 
The prescriptions of the domestic statute of frauds indeed 
may be considered to relate to procedure in a court for the 
purpose of their application ex officio, irrespective of formal 
demand by a party, or to determine whether failure to observe 
the statute constitutes reviewable error, as well as to decide 
whether amendments thereof have retroactive effect. The 
purposes of conflicts law are different. In fact, the English 
writers seem to regret Leroux v. Brown only because of its 
implications for conflicts law. French 24 and German 25 courts 
classify provisions concerning oral agreements as formalities 
in all respects, and certainly not as procedure, the only doubt 
being whether they do not affect the substantive requisites of 
consent to a contract. 
In consequence, an American, French, etc., court has to 
apply the English statute of frauds, or the special provision 
of section 4 of the British Sales of Goods Act, respectively, 
to an English transaction, in particular to an agreement to 
24 Cass. (req.) (Apri118, 1865) S.t&65.I.317; Cass. (civ.) (June 29, 19:u) 
D.1922.I.l27, 8.192.3.1.249· 
25 Unanimous. For a foreign provision prescribing written contracts, see KG. 
(Oct. 25, 1927) ]W.1929, 448, IPRspr. 1929, no. 7· See also the definition of 
formalities in art. 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1930 for the settlement of 
certain conflicts of law in connection· with Bills of Exchange and Promissory 
Notes. 
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sell concluded in England. (That this is true, although the 
English courts reach the same result on procedural lines, in 
the case of English transactions, needs some comment in our 
later discussion.) 26 
There is very little doubt, in fact, that conflicts law has its 
own denotation of formality, independent of either the lex fori 
or the lex causae.21 
Without resuming all arguments of the vivid controversy 
that went on during the last decade, it may be stated that 
the lex fori theory has visibly shrunk under the weight of 
the attacks to which it has been subjected. In the first place, 
there seems today little support for the once-pretended logical 
necessity of resorting to domestic notions, Niboyet's argument 
de necessite. There still are die-hards,28 it is true. While even 
Bartin conceded two "exceptions" to the principle of character-
ization according to the domestic ideas, some of his followers 
have insisted on its pure application. In particular, Bartin saw 
that the question whether foreign-situated property is movable 
or immovable, is almost universally decided according to the 
law of the situs and not to the lex fori. 29 This is clearly a sound 
rule and, thanks to its adoption throughout the world, an oasis 
of uniformity; but important writers have protested. 3° Franz 
Kahn diluted his own axiom even more; he states that a rule 
referring "parental power" or "tort" to some foreign law does 
not mean exclusively what the civil code of the forum means 
by such terms, but also includes "the corresponding and similar 
foreign notions." Only the "nucleus of the foreign institu-
28 /nfra p. 66. 
27 This problem will be treated in connection with the requirements for con-
tracts. 
28 A climax was reached by RUNDSTEIN, "La structure du droit international 
prive et ses rapports avec le droit des gens," Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1936) 
314, 51 z, who declares any separate development of contl.icts law "logically" 
impossible. Contra: BALOGH, 1 Symmikta Streit (1939) 88. · 
29 This is now for BAR.TIN the "only true exception," 1 Principes 2.36. 
30 NIBOYET no. 418 and :z. Repert. 4II no. z7; KAHN, 1 Abhandl. 76; and 
others. 
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tion" must be similar, not the "technical envelope." 31 For 
this acute thinker, a half-century since, the lex fori was not 
an infallible guide, but rather a signpost showing vaguely a 
direction. 
At present, the advocates of the lex fori theory, conscious 
that the theory must be justified by convenience rather than 
logical necessity/2 are entangled in difficult efforts to avoid 
absurd results. They feel, for instance, free to concede that 
a concept such as contract or tort may have a much broader 
scope in conflicts law than in private law.33 Again, the German 
conflicts rule (EG. art. 2 r) concerning the right of an unwed 
mother to claim support from the illegitimate father of her 
child, is strictly predicated upon a rule of the German Civil 
Code specifically granting such right; Raape recognizes this 
connection but nevertheless suggests the application of the 
rule to an essentially different claim under Norwegian law 
and to certain even more remote types of actions for damages 
under other laws. 34 For such analysis of the compass of con-
flicts rules, he employs comparative methods as a matter of 
course. Nussbaum, who on the contrary is a decided foe of 
comparative methods in the subject, yet applies the conflicts 
rules regarding wrongs to liabilities without fault, irrespective 
of the treatment in internal law, construes terms such as "com-
pany" or "corporation" "in the freest manner," and particu-
31 KAHN, 1 Abhandl. 11 z ( 1891), generally followed up to 19 31, although 
KAHN himself sensed the futility of this escape in I 899, see I Abhandl. 3 I I ; cj. 
RABEL, Revue 1933, zo, 1.4. 
32 RoBERTSON, Characterization 74; LEWALD, Regles generales des confiits de 
lois 77· 
33 AGo, "Regles generales des confiits de lois," 58 Recuei11936 IV z47 at 337; 
MAURY, "Regles generales des conflits de lois," 57 Recueil I936 III 31.5 at 494; 
FEDOZZI 186. See also the criticism by PACCHIONI, Elementi I8I. GUTZWIL-
LER, also a follower of the lex fori theory, has seen that the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunals have applied numerous general legal concepts of the civilized world, 
or of the civil law countries (see "Das Internationalprivatrecht der durch die 
Friedens\.ertriige eingesetzten Gemischten Schiedsgerichtshofe," 3 Int. Jahrbuch 
f. Schiedsgerichtswesen (I9JI) UJ at 149 ff.). 
34 RAAPE, so Recueil I934 IV 401 at 45z, SZ+· 
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larly recommends "flexible methods" and "broad" interpre-
tation. 35 Maury 36 ends his apology for the lex fori with the 
following recipe: 
One starts from the lex fori, from its concepts. But these 
concepts are adapted first to their international function and 
then enlarged by a comparison with those of the foreign laws. 
We approach the viewpoint of Mr. Rabel, but we do it rather 
modestly. 
This' dictum has been adopted by Robertson 37 with a quali-
fication. He avows that 
"some categories (of conflicts law) will be quite different from 
any category of the internal law, because designed to make 
provision for institutions of the foreign law not known to the 
internal law of the forum." 
Such independent categories, he confesses, 
"are already known to have been developed for most types 
of cases that are likely to arise, such as contract, tort, succession, 
administration, matrimonial property, marriage, divorce, 
legitimacy, adoption, and so on." 
These writers clearly and consciously draw on comparative 
law, although Robertson 38 disapproves of "international prin-
ciples of comparati-ve law determining disputed characteri-
zations." 
It will be interesting to see what remains of the Bartin-Kahn 
theory after dealing with particular problems in the course 
of this book. 
However, the "logical" argument has been overturned in 
a striking manner, thanks to the special refutations by 
Neuner 39 and, more recently, by Cook,40 both pointing out 
as Nussl!AUM, D. IPR. 48, 194, 288; NussBAUM, Principles 73· 
36 MAURY, 57 Recueil1936 III 325 at 504. 
37 ROBERTSON, Characterization 91, 
38 RoBERTSON, Characterization 31, 189. 
39 NEUNER, Der Sinn, esp. 13 2; also "Policy Considerations in the Conflict 
of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. (1942) 479 at 484. 
<lO CooK, Legal Bases, esp. 214. 
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the mistake of seeking in internal law the concepts needed 
in conflicts law. The nai've argument they criticize attributes 
an absolute character to juridical concepts, irrespective of their 
purposes; it presupposes that the concepts of domicil, contract, 
capacity are identical in the laws of property, family, juris-
diction, taxation-and conflicts! Only the ancient "realism of 
concepts," which had some force in Greco-Roman philosophy 
and a disputed role in Roman jurisprudence/1 and the Be-
griff sjurisprudenz of the nineteenth century, ridiculed in Jher-
ing's "Heaven of Concepts," present equal errors. The relativ-
ity of legal concepts is a mere commonplace in all other de-
partments of law. 
The chief reason why the present writer started the attack 
against that theory and here stresses its utter unsoundness, is 
illuminated by the very title of Bartin's paper, "On the im-
possibility of arriving at a definitive suppression of the con-
flicts of law." Naturally, if each conflicts law is nothing but 
an annex to the corresponding internal law and receives its 
sense and meaning only from this national and local source, 
uniformity cannot be achieved, even though all conflicts laws 
should be unified, without simultaneous unification of all 
municipal laws. The temporarily complete victory of this 
idea has weighed heavily on hopes and endeavors to reform 
and unify the national bodies of private international law. 
Black pessimism resulted, and it is no wonder that the excesses 
of nationalism in our field were particularly serious in the 
writingS of the many students who followed Kahn and Bartin. 
This gloomy outlook, unfortunately, is still shared by certain 
present writers. 
As things now stand, few points respecting the writer's 
opinion still seem to call for explanation. The most significant 
is the objection on a priori grounds that this comparative-
41 SoKOLOWSKr, Die Philosophie im Privatrecht (z vols., Halle, 190Z-I907), 
and for criticism, RABEL, Vierteljahrsschrift fiir Wissenschaftliche Philo-
sophie und Soziologie, 1904, 108. 
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analytical method, though representative of the future, is use-
less for existing law.42 
It has never been denied that the actual conflicts rules of the 
European codifications or those usually applied by Anglo-
American courts originally had linguistic connections. The 
question is merely that of "freeing," "emancipating," these 
rules from their domestic background. Is this illicit? A few 
Italian writers say so; in their opinion, rules must be in-
terpreted within the perspective of the legislator. But, even if 
this were true, do we have to assume that draftsmen of con-
flicts rules have been ignorant that foreign laws may differ 
in many respects from their own conceptions? In laying down 
the rule that wrongs are governed by the law of the place of 
wrong, do legislators not consider the possibility that an injury 
done abroad may constitute a wrong where committed, though 
not in the forum? Or are conflicts rules not supposed to be 
applied indifferently as respects all laws of civilized peoples? 
In fact, their compass is generally world-wide, and, in the 
absence of a universal language, they necessarily employ the 
"word-symbols" of the domestic vocabulary. 
Again, whether rigid limitations on the interpretation of 
legal rules be inferred from the alleged intention of the legis-
lator, as the Italian school seems to postulate, or from the 
principle of strict construction of statutory texts, often fol-
lowed at common law, such restrictions are inconsistent with 
the methods of creative interpretation recognized in modern 
legal practice. Formalism is particularly misplaced in con-
struing conflicts rules, the overwhelming majority of which 
are in an unsettled and formative stage throughout the world. 
Most are unwrittert, and many of the written rules are vaguely 
«<PACCHIONI, Elementi 18:z; FEDOZZI 190; DE CASTRO, :zo Revista Der. 
Priv. (1933) 240 at 247; FALCONBRIDGE, "Characterization in the Conflict 
of Laws," 53 Law Q. Rev. (1937) 235 at 245, followed by DAVIES, "Regles 
generales des conflits de lois," 6:z Recueil 1937 IV 497; MAURY, 57 Recueil 
1936 III 325 (definitely milder). 
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drafted and defecti~ely constructed. As a matter of fact, the 
art of interpretation, a versatile and fecundating implement of 
modern private law, is not used with entire efficiency in our 
field. Clumsy constructions and half-hearted attempts at ad-
justing antiquated maxims or correcting inexact texts abound. 
Should progressive development from case to case and through 
systematic effort be barred, this stepchild of jurisprudence 
would be an orphan indeed. 
Yet, in the case of many writers, one hand does not seem to 
know what the other is doing. While Ago is the most intransi-
gent adversary of-analytical comparison, he has selected from 
a hundred cases discussed in the literature, one, the simplest, 
to demonstrate with what perfect safety the lex fori theory 
operates. 43 This is the case. Under German and other laws, 
spouses may by settlement institute heirs to either of them. 
The Italian legislation does not expressly allow such ap-
, pointment by contract of a successor upon death. How should 
an Italian judge consider such a settlement by German 
spouses? Ago agrees that the question is covered by the Italian 
conflicts rule concerning intestate succession and wills, al-
though these two grounds of succession do not include settle-
ments. German law therefore governs. But Ago declines to 
accept any extensive interpretation based on comparison of 
the three grounds of inheritance involved. He takes the ap-
plication of the conflicts rule respecting inheritance for granted, 
because the Italian inheritance law, tacitly excluding settle-
ments respecting succession at death, implicitly classifies them 
as grounds of succession. By chance, the question came up in 
the French Court of Cassation. 44 A prenuptial settlement con-
cluded in France by Italian nationals contained a stipulation 
by the wife, leaving at death the unrestricted portion of her 
43 Aco, 58 Recueil 1936 IV 247 at 333· 
""Cass. (req.) (May 7, 1924) Revue 1924, 406, Clunet 1925, u6. The 
French law of the situs was likewise applied to a settlement of Spanish spouses, 
Cass. (civ.) (April z, 1 884) Clunet 1885, 76. 
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estate, including a French immovable, to the husband. It was 
pleaded that the settlement was void under Italian law, since 
it contemplated a donation of future acquisitions. The court 
held the gift valid under the lex situs, viz., the French pro-
vision allowing devise by prenuptial settlement, thus empha-
sizing the contractual aspects of the transaction. Niboyet ap-
parently conceives that, while the French court proceeded on 
the basis of the law of succession, an Italian court would have 
held the gift invalid specifically on the ground of the conflicts 
rule concerning matrimonial property/5 However all this 
may be, since the Italian Code does not recognize such agree-
ments either in the chapter on matrimonial property or in 
defining grounds of succession, the characterization cannot be 
inferred from these chapters. Unconsciously, Ago did assimi-
late the foreign institution within the titles mortis causa on 
the basis of a comparison of legislations. 
The process required for such interpretations, in fact, is 
necessarily of a comparative nature and has always been so 
recognized by thoughtful scholars.46 Assuredly, the com-
parison has not always been comprehensive, systematic, and 
fully documented. But today, at least in civil law countries, it 
is no excuse to neglect comparative studies on the ground of 
unavailability of information. So much has been done in mak-
ing the sources and literature accessible even in distant 
countries that the existence of gaps should be an incentive 
rather than a deterrent for scholars able to collaborate. So 
far as interstate conflicts go, the studies in this country are 
the most prominent example of continuous consideration of 
some fifty internal laws. Never has comparative law been more 
thoroughly utilized than in this country, and never so much 
uniformity achieved. 
fliSee NIBOYET 503 no. 417. 
46 See for instance KAHN, 1 Abhandl. 31 s, 49 q :t Abhandl. 1 8. 
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It has been objected, nevertheless, that a scientific approach 
to conflicts law by comparative critique is precluded by the 
defective conditions of comparative research and that con-
clusions will be arbitrarily subjective. Such an assertion indi-
cates lack of personal experience in such work. The common 
law is a living refutation. In civil law countries, no serious 
student of conflicts law has failed to consider neighboring legis-
lations. Moreover, comparisons between the common law and 
the civil law were undertaken by Story in America in I 8 34 and 
by Bar in Europe in I 862 with patent success. To bridge the 
gulf between these two halves of the legal world is the task of 
the present generation of lawyers. Hidden behind apparent 
dissimilarity, there are fundamental likenesses, suggesting in-
ternational cooperation, though of course not necessarily 
unification. 
No doubt, existing comparisons of the kind required in the 
field of conflicts of laws are of recent date and far from ex-
haustive. 47 General concepts, which may be used universally, 
are being built up but slowly. However, a great deal of knowl-
edge has been attained, and to gain more is within the capacity 
of modern science. Researchers to a variable extent are of 
course engrossed in the legal culture in which they have been 
educated. 48 A lawyer is apt to state more accurately and to 
give preference to the conceptions of his system over foreign 
ideas. However, with increasing international collaboration 
in comparative work, the qualities of the different scholars 
will compensate for each other, and the multiplicity of views 
in the world will provide a rich variety of outlooks. In any 
case, an imperfect attempt to do justice to foreign institutions 
41 The following are not new admissions by the writer. See RABEL, 3 Z.ausl. 
PR. (192.9) 756; 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 2.87, Revue 1933, 1 at 61. 
48 RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR) (192.9) 756; BECKETI, "The Question of Classifica-
tion ('Qualification') in Private International Law," 15 Brit. Year Book Int. 
Law (1934) 46 at 59· 
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is superior to any technique which ignores them. Judges are 
fully entitled to limit their inquiries to the two or three laws 
primarily influencing a case in which legal science has done 
nothing to help.49 Instinctively this is what the courts do. 
With respect to the narrower subject of characterization, 
expediency alone is decisive. It may be that categories as de-
fined by internal law have a role to play in such subjects as 
jurisdiction, procedure, taxation, etc., but ordinarily not in 
the: case of conflicts rules. For conflicts law, characterization 
according to the law declared applicable in the conflicts rule 
also is by no means excluded, but only for special situations. 
Martin Wolff was perhaps inspired by the problems of marital 
property with which he first happened to deal, to suggest 
this method of characterization. In principle, a private law 
term used in a cdnflicts rule means what is common to the 
various institutions of the national laws serving the same legis-
lative purpose. 
It is not even true that the so-called connecting factors 
should always be understood as defined by domestic law. 
Domicil cannot be so simply treated. Nationality is exclusively 
defined by the state whose national an individual is claimed to 
be. The place of contracting in negotiations between absent 
parties is not to be determined by the law of the forum alone, 
at least if under this law the place is found to be situated 
abroad, et cetera. 
IV. THE SECOND PART: REFERENCE TO A LEGAL SYSTEM 
I. The Nature of the Reference 
While American students of conflicts law but recently have 
begun to discuss other general problems, as a rule they have 
been interested in the controversy regarding the locus standi 
of foreign law in court. 
49 RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) z67, Revue 1933, 1 at 37· 
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The doctrine of territorialism initiated by d' Argentre and 
perfected by Huber is predicated upon Huber's first axiom 
that the laws of a state have force only within the territorial 
limits of its sovereignty. This tenet, adopted in the American 
cases, was solemnly formulated by Story, Dicey, and Beale.~0 
The first section of the Restatement reproduces it literally: 
"no state can make a law which by its own force is operative 
in another state; the only law in force in the sovereign state 
is its own law ... " 
"Law" in this connection means internal law, and the conten-
tion therefore is that foreign internal law has no "force," even 
though invoked by a conflicts rule. The flagrant inconsistency 
of this thesis with actual needs and practices was initially re-
lieved by Huber's invention of "comitas gentium" and, after 
this shallow idea had finally exploded, 51 by Dicey's and Beale's 
attempt to reanimate the theory of vested rights.52 Hence the 
Restatement, section I, continues: 
" ... but by the law of each state rights or other interests in 
that state may~ in certain cases, depend upon the law in force 
in some other state or states." 
This theory has also been employed in modern France by 
Pillet and Niboyet 53 on the background of conceptions emi-
nently hostile to the application of foreign law. However, 
both the Anglo-American and the French theories of acquired 
rights have been critically destroyed, 54 together with that of 
neoterritorialism. 55 
50 STORY §§18ff., DICEY 9 ; 1 BEALE 5z. 
51 DICEY 8; 1 BEALE 53; GooDRICH 7; LoRENZEN, 6 Repert. 282 nos. 29, 30. 
52 DICEY 58; BEALE, 3 Cases on the Conflict of Laws (19oz) §§ 1-5; 3 
Treatise 1968; CHESHIRE (ed. r) 3, revoked in ed. 2, 86. 
53 VAREILLEs-SoMMIERES V ff., XXXIV if.; PILLET, Principes 495-571; 
NIBOYET, s Repert. 708 to 725. 
54 United States: CooK, "The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of 
Laws," 33 Yale L. J. (1924) 457, Legal Bases I; LoRENZEN, ~<Territoriality, 
Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws," 33 Yale L. J. (1924) 736; YNTEMA, 
"The Hornbook Methods and the Conflict of Laws," 37 Yale L. J. (1928) 468; 
HEILMANN, "Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in Conflict of Laws," 
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The Italian writers think, nevertheless, that the phenome-
non of the application of a law created by a foreign state still 
presents a problem, and on independent grounds eminent 
critics of Beale's theory in this country think the same. In the 
opinion once proposed and then revoked by Anzilotti, which 
has been perpetuated by others, a foreign rule cannot be ap-
plied unless it has been appropriated by the state of the forum 
and transformed into a domestic rule. 56 
This theory of "material reception" of foreign law supposes 
an untenable fiction. Nobody really believes that Norwegian 
marriage law is made the law of Oklahoma, just for the pur-
pose of deciding in Oklahoma whether the parties years ago 
celebrated a valid marriage i~ Oslo. Where one party sues for 
annulment, a Norwegian enactment intervening in the mean-
time and modifying the conditions of annullability of previous 
marriages, is applicable, 57 clearly because the Norwegian law 
and not that of the forum governs. 
Another opinion is that the foreign rule is adopted by 
"formal reception" only; the cbnflicts rule is construed as 
implying that the foreign rule is inserted into the body of the 
43 Yale L. J. (1934) 1082; STUMBERG, "Conflict of Laws. Foreign Created 
Rights," 8 Texas L. Rev. (1930) 173 and STUMBERG 9· 
France and Belgium: ARMINJON, 1 Precis 271 and ARMINJON, "La notion 
des droits acquis en droit international prive," 44 Recuei11933 II 5 esp. at 59; 
J. DONNED!EU DE VABRES 754; WIGNY, "La theorie des droits acquis d'apres 
Antoine Pillet," 58 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1931) 341 and WrGNY, Essai 
159· 
Germany: HoRST MuLLER, Der Grundsatz des wohlerworbenen Rechts im 
internationalen Privatrecht, Hamburger Rechtstudien Heft :z.6 (1935), au-
thoritatively reviewed by GUTZWILLER, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 1056. 
56 All European writers have protested against the principle of territorialism. 
See for instance NIBOYET, 604, stating that the French courts, for some time 
immediately after the Code came into force, were perhaps impressed by the 
memory of the former strict territorialism of the statutists, but actually rejected 
this nefarious principle. 
56 ANZILOTTI, Studi critici di diritto internazionale privata, parte II (r898); 
PACCH!ONI, Elementi 137; Contra: FEDOZZI 162.: "artificial," "a phantom of 
studio"; MAURY, 57 Recueil 1936 III 32.5 at 382.. 
57 BARTIN, x Principes 2.98. 
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domestic law of the forum but with the significance and value 
it has under the foreign system. 58 
The "local law theory" as developed in this country is 
kindred to these conceptions, presumably more closely to the 
idea of "formal" reception. It differs in the thesis peculiar to 
this country that the judge creates the law according either to 
his own or to foreign legal rules as the case may require. But, 
for conflicts law more than any other branch of national law, 
law must exist before and outside of lawsuits. 
After all, why can the foreign rule not simply come into 
court without crutches? Is it not sufficient that the court's own 
conflicts rule orders application? Once more, the full power 
of confliets rules seems to be greatly underestimated. On the 
other hand, no kind of domestication invests a foreign rule 
with exactly the same power that domestic rules have. For 
example, the maxim jura novit curia is usually not extended 
to foreign law. 59 The dominant opinion in Europe 60 as well 
as in this country 61 has entirely discounted the remnants of the 
doctrine inherited from Ulric Huber; there is no longer any 
problem. 
2. The Extent of the Reference 
The theory of Bartin, Kahn, and their followers purports 
not only to determine the content of the first part of the con-
flicts rule but also that of the second part; not only should 
58 ANZILOTII, Corso di diritto internazionale (Roma, 19~3) 75; GHIRARDINI, 
"Sull'interpretazione del diritto internazionale privato," 13 Rivista ( 1919) 
z9o; PERASSI, "Su l'estensione del diritto internazionale privato italiano alle 
nuove Provincie," Rivista 19z6, 518; BALDONI, La successione nel tempo delle 
norme di diritto internazionale privato (Roma, 193z) 9; AGo, 58 Recueil 1936 
IV :t47; Bosco 95; also MAURY, 57 Recueili936lll 3~5 at 386. 
59 BARTIN, I Principes Z95· 
60 PrLLET, I Traite no. SI; BARTIN, I Principes zo § Io; LEREBOURS-PJGEON-
NIERE no. z I 6; RAAPE 12; CAVAGLIERI, Revue 1930, 3971 405. 
61 CAVERS, "A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem," 47 Harv. L. Rev. 
(1933) 173, 177, thinks that the majority of voices is contrary to the local law 
theory. 
INTRODUCTION 
the matters referred to a foreign law be selected according to 
domestic conceptions, but also the foreign rules to which these 
matters are referred must accord with the domestic system. 
Consequently, within the limits of a conflicts rule respecting 
"torts," foreign substantive rules concerning what in the eyes 
of the forum would be "quasi-contract" are inapplicable. 
An example of this kind of argumentation is furnished by 
the well-known English decisions relating to the statute of 
limitations. In the leading case of Huber v. Steiner, 62 Tindall, 
C. J., refused to apply the French rule of prescription to a 
French promissory note. He declared the French rule pro-
cedural, on the ground of Story's test that a limitation im-
posed on enforcement only rather than upon the right is pro-
cedural in character. German law has been treated in the same 
way in the English courts. 63 Actually, the undisputed German 
conception and the dominant French opinion is that a limi-
tation bars the action only and the right survives. This does 
not mean that a limitation is procedural; it is substantive in 
the precise sense here relevant, namely, that it provides the 
debtor an exception to his obligation, a material right of de-
fense.64 Consequently, the French and German courts charac-
terize statutes of limitations as substantive for the purposes of 
conflicts law. Modern English writers agree that the English 
cases are wrong; they deprive the debtor of a defense because 
of the accidental forum. 115 The American decisions in cases 
62 2 Bing. N.C. 202 (C. P. 1835). 
63 Societe Anonyme Metallurgique de Prayson v. Koppel, The Times, No-
vember z, 1933, 77 Solicitor's Journal (1933) 8oo cited by BECKETT, 15 Brit. 
Year Book Int. Law (1934) 75, supra n. 48. 
64 This alone is relevant. Neither BECKETT, 1 5 Brit. Year Book Int. Law 
(1934) 46 at 75, supra n. 48, nor ROBERTSON, Characterization 248, 251, have 
reported correctly on the Continental law. 
65 BECKETT, 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1934) 75 ff., supra n. 48; CHES-
HIRE 3 8, 42; MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLDY1 "Deljmitation of Right and Remedy," 
16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law, (1935) zo at 41; RoBERTSON, Characterization 
64; CoRMACK, "Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Ques-
tion in the Conflict of Laws," 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 22 I at 234. 
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where the courts do not feel bound by the early doctrine, give 
effect to foreign statutes of limitations. 66 
While Kahn corrected his doctrine by suggesting some 
latitude in recognizing foreign rules as applicable but pro-
tested against the applicatiQn of foreign law in its totality,67 
recently Bartin has radically restricted the scope of his 
theory.68 He has done so, following an argumentation usual 
in Italy, namely, that, in the first instance, the lex fori, being 
the legal order in which the conflicts rule originates, prescribes 
the characterization to be adopted, but that, the applicable 
law having been selected, it must be applied with its attendant 
interpretation. 69 In other words, characterization by the lex 
fori for choice of law-characterization by the foreign law 
once chosen. This reasoning has found favor with several 
Anglo-American writers under the name of "secondary char-
acterization," 70 but seemingly they do not agree with each 
other on numerous details. 
This generous concession to common sense is welcome, but, 
due to its faulty origin in the lex fori theory, it is not broad 
enough and lacks a clear concept. For instance, it has been 
recently suggested 71 that, if the object of a conflicts rule is 
"primarily" characterized as property, those foreign rules that 
66 See Maki v. George R. Cooke Co. (C.C.A. 6th, 194z) 124 F. (zd) 663, 
and Note, 9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (194z) 7Zl· 
67 KAHN, r Abhandl. 190. 
68 BARTIN, I Principes Z3I; 3I Recueil 1930 I s6r, 603· 
69 ANZILOTTI, Corso di lezione ( r 9 r 8) 3 59 and Corso di diritto internazion-
ale privato (1925) 79; CAVAGLIERI 104; PERASSI, Lezione di diritto interna-
zionale, parte prima (1922.) 78; UDINA, Elementi sr; AGo, Teoria 145; FE-
DOZZI 183; Bosco 107. These authors, however, speak in a very fragmentary 
manner. 
7° CHESHIRE 37-45; UNGER, "The Place of Classification in Private Inter-
national Law," 19 Bell Yard (1937) 3 at 17; ROBERTSON, Characterization 
chs. v, II8 ff., and IX, 235 ff.; CoRMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 221 at 
234, supra n. 65. Contra: RHEINSTEIN, Book Review, 8 Brooklyn L. Rev. 
(1938) 253 at 256; FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired 
Rights," 17 Can. Bar Rev. (1939) 369 at 373; NusSBAUM, Book Review, 40 
Col. L. Rev. (1940) 1461, 1467. 
71 CoRMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) at 235 and n. 86, supra n. 65. 
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are considered property law in the foreign country should be 
applied. Yet, in a court in state X, why should a claim recog-
nized by the domestic law of the forum (state X), on the 
theory that property is recoverable, not be sustained under the 
"applicable" law of Y, which regards the property as lost 
but provides recovery on some quasi-contractual or other 
theory? Or, to return to the statutes of limitations, the German 
Reichsgericht in a notorious early decision refused to apply 
the limitation statutes of Tennessee, whose law was considered 
controlling, because in America the defense was regarded as 
merely procedural. 72 This refusal to apply a foreign pro-
vision because it is considered procedural in the foreign law, 
illustrates the theory of secondary characterization; it is evi-
dently absurd. 
Recently, the Reichsgericht discovered the correct solution 
long anticipated by many writers, namely, to apply the Amer-
ican statute. 73 The reasoning is, however, uncertain and 
partly based on the precarious ground that in German eyes 
the American remedy "also" possesses a "substantive" element 
justifying its application. 
All such doubtful and complicated manipulations are un-
necessary. The needs are simply and efficiently fulfilled by 
the application of the foreign law as it stands and, despite the 
admonition of Kahn, "in its totality." 74 If the first part of 
the conflicts rule, the description of the matter referred to the 
applicable law, is correctly formulated, i.e., not burdened by 
internationally impractical concepts, it contains in itself all 
that is necessary for its purpose. All else belongs to the selected 
system. In other words, the question which state's law governs 
the case, is answered by the choice of law; there is no reason 
72 RG. (Jan. 4> 1882.) 2. RGZ. 2.1. 
73 RG. (July 6, 1934) 145 RGZ. 12.1, IPRspr. 1934, no. 2.9, Revue Crit. 
1935> 447· 
74 See the writer's detailed argument, s Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 2.73, Revue 1933, 
1 at 44· No comparative law is needed for this purpose as certain critics have 
suspected. 
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why reference should not be made to this law as a whole 
instead of to parts prematurely chosen. (Whether some public 
policy of the forum is involved is entirely separate and in-
dependent.) More precisely, the court has to decide the ques- i 
tion exactly as a court sitting in the foreign state would do, if · 
such court had jurisdiction and had to apply its own domestic 
law. 
CHAPTER 3 
The Development of Conflicts Law 
I. RETAR.DING FACTORS 
I. Preconceptio1;1s 
I T is gratifying that the majority of writers now advocate emancipation from deductive methods. 1 Past theories have left remainders too persistent, however, not to cause 
mischief. As a matter of course, and without reference to the 
desirability of doing so, the doctrine of territorialism has al-
located broad fields to the law of the forum, including that 
of divorce and support, which is to be discussed in the present 
volume. There is still reluctance to attribute full legal effect 
to foreign acts and judgments in cases where the original power 
or jurisdiction of the foreign state is freely admitted, as is 
shown in the treatment of foreign adoption and foreign corpo-
rations. 
Moreover, foreign law, though "applicable" under the ap-
propriate conflicts rule, may nevertheless be rejected on the 
ground of "public policy" of the forum. Due formerly to the 
jealousy of small communities and princes, recently to 
chauvinism and worship of the state, this ground has abnormal 
significance. 2 Though for a long time French courts were 
1 See in particular ARMINJON, "L'objet et la methode du droit international 
prive," :u Recueil 192.8 I 433, against deductive and for analytical method; 
LORENZEN, "Developments in the Conflict of Laws," 40 Mich. L. Rev. (r942.) 
781 at 8os, "There is some indication that our courts are prepared to adopt a 
somewhat more realistic approach in conflicts situations. The immediate hopes 
for the further development of the conflict of laws in this country would seem to 
be in this direction." 
2 JusTUS WILHELM HEDEMANN, former democrat, wrote in Dt. Justiz 1939, 
152.3: "Slowly the so-called private international law will take another aspect. 
It might be that the general clauses concerning public policy and reprisals (ar-
ticles 30 and 31 of the Introductory Law) will overshadow everything else of 
68 
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generally attacked because of their exaggeration of ordre pub-
lic, European writers now tend to outdo them. 
The increase of national feeling in Europe in the midst 
of the nineteenth century engendered Mancini's famous 
doctrine of nationality. The "principle of nationality," ad-
ministered on a world-wide scale as Mancini insisted, would 
have been able to establish a balance in matters of personal 
status. But, excluded from the Anglo-American realm and 
from other countries, it created confusion on account of the 
claim of European states to govern the status and capacity of 
subjects who had emigrated to such countries. Moreover, as 
we shall see, the principle was repeatedly interpreted without 
sense of responsibility and reciprocity. 
The doctrinal arguments generally adduced against such 
practical necessities as "renvoi" and the right of the parties 
to a contract to determine the applicable law are so significant 
that these two institutions deserve preliminary discussion im-
mediately hereafter. Both have been rejected as incompatible 
with state sovereignty! The power of parties to choose their 
law by agreement was even declared "impossible," because 
there had to be first a substantive law allowing them such 
choice! 
In a similar misuse of logic,3 it has been declared that the 
law governing the effects of a contract cannot "logically" con-
trol the extent to which error, fraud, or duress affects the con-
sent of the parties-there must be a law to determine the valid-
ity of .the transaction, before the law governing its effects can 
be selected. The law of the state of incorporation, or other 
law regulating the life of a corporation, has been said to be 
unable "logically" to determine the conditions of valid con-
the private international law." In the first World War, the Reichsgericht upheld 
firmly the conflicts rules, and the government in no serious respect interfered. 
3 See on the following examples, RABEL, "Die Deutsche Rechtsprechung in 
einzelnen Lehren des internationalen Privatrechts, Vorbemerkung," 3 Z.ausl.PR. 
(19~9) 75Zi WAHL, ibid. 791; KESSLER, ibid. 768. 
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stitution of the corporation. The settled rule that the law 
governing torts decides whether or not an act is a tort has been 
characterized as a "legal impossibility." 4 Remembering 
the deduction of the clever Romanist, MUhlenbruch, that as-
signment of a chose in action is logically inadmissible, and 
similar errors of eminent jurists/; we may derive consolation 
from the thought that time will provide a remedy. 
In the United States, courts and writers are cognizant of 
such handicaps and are endeavoring to overcome them. Tra-
dition and modernism are engaged in an interesting combat 
with varying results. Circumstances differ in the parts of this 
vast country. In respect to certain problems, it is difficult to 
state what American law actually is, as the Restaters have 
come to suspect. But the writers, practically without exception, 
and the great majority of the courts are seriously conscious of 
their duty to reach adequate solutions. When handbooks and 
notes in law reviews report on a subject, they usually present 
the forward trend of advanced courts in preference to for-
malistic decisions and precedents exaggerating local policy. 
2. Renvoi 
The controversy on "renvoi" is the most famous dispute 
in conflicts law, 6 a classic example of violently prejudiced 
4 This was the expression of 2 FRANKENSTEIN 363. 
s See RABEL, Aufgabe and Notwendigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung, Miinchener 
Juristische Vortrage, edited by the Juristische Studiengesellschaft in Miinchen, 
Heft x, reprinted from 13 Rhein. Z. f. Zivil- und Prozessrecht (1925). 
6 Bibliography is to be found in PoTu, La question du renvoi en droit inter-
national prive (1913); up to 1929 in LEWALD, "La theorie du renvoi," 29 
Recueil 1929 IV 519; and in the footnotes by MAURY, "Regles generales des 
conflits de lois," 57 Recueil 1936 III 519 ff. On the history of the problem since 
a French case of 1652 see E. M. MEIJERS, "La question du renvoi," 38 Bull. 
Inst. Int. (1938) 191, 197. 
Anglo-American literature in addition to the treatises: LORENZEN, "The Ren-
voi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law," 10 Col. L. Rev. (1910) 19o, 
327; same author, "The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws--Meaning of 
'The Law of a Country,"' 27 Yale L. J. (1918) 509; idem, Cases (1932) 
832-840; ScHREIBER, "The Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-American Law," 
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literature confronting nai'vely consistent practice. Only where 
courts finally succumbed to the persuasion of world-wide 
learned criticism, did they falter, as in Greece, Italy, and in 
the isolated Tallmadge case in New York. 7 On the other hand, 
the constancy of the French, German, and Swiss courts has 
been sufficient to impress their foremost Italian opponent, 
31 Harv. L. Rev. (r9r 8) 5Z3; PoLLACK, "The 'Renvoi' in New York," 36 Law. 
Q. Rev. (r920) 91; ALLEMES, "The Problem of Renvoi in Private Interna-
tional Law," u Grotius Soc. ( r 927) 63; FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi and Suc-
cession to Movables," 46 Law Q. Rev. (r93o) 465, 47 Law Q. Rev. (1931) 
at 271; also FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi et succession mohiliere," in Revue 1932> 
254, 451; FALCONBRIDGE, "Characterization in the Conflict of Laws," 53 Law 
Q. Rev. (1937) s59-s67; FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi, Characterization and Ac-
quired Rights," 17 Can. Bar Rev. (1939) 369 at 378; FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi 
and the Law of Domicile," 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 3II to 317, 329 to 334; 
L. T. BATEs, "Remission and Transmission in American Conflicts of Laws," 
r6 Cornell L. Q. (1931) 311; DICEY, Appendix, Note r, 863 to 878; BENT-
WICH, "Recent Application of the Renvoi in Matters of Personal Status," 14 
Can. Bar Rev. (1936) 379; MORRIS, "The Law of the Domicil," r8 Brit. Year 
Book Int. Law (1937) at 32; CowAN, "Renvoi Does Not Involve a Logical 
Fallacy," 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1938) 34-39; GRISWOLD, "Renvoi Revisited," 
51 Harv. L. Rev. (1937) u65; CoRMACK, "Renvoi, Characterization, Local-
ization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws," 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. 
(1941) at 249 to 2.75. See also LoRENZEN, 6 Repert. 284 nos. 40-44, 353 no. 
366; Decision Note, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 253; BENTWICH, "The Development 
of the Doctrine of Renvoi in England in Cases of Succession," 4 Z.ausl.PR. 
(1930) 433; BELLOT, "La theorie anglo-saxonne de conflits de lois," 3 Re-
cueil 1924 II 99, 164 to r68; KuHN, "La conception du droit international 
prive d'apres la doctrine et la pratique aux Etats-Unis," 22 Recueil 1928 I r86 
at 2.7o-272. On the English cases, see furthermore MELCHIOR 194 n. 2; ELKIN, 
"La doctrine du renvoi en droit anglais," Clunet 19341 577; MENDELSSOHN-
BARTHOLDY, Renvoi in Modern English Law (Oxford, 1937); GRASSETTI, "La 
dottrina del rinvio in diritto internazionale privata e la 'common law' anglo-
americana," 2.6 Rivista (1934) 3-41, 2.33-2.6r, 350; DE NOVA, Book Review 
of GRASSETTI, I2 Annuario Dir. Comp., parte prima (1937) 258; and DE 
NovA, "Considerazioni sui rinvio in diritto inglese," 30 Rivista (1938) 388; 
RHEINSTEIN, Book Review, 12. Annuario Dir. Comp., parte prima (1937) 314 
at 3 r 6. 
7 In re Tallmadge, In re Chadwick's Will (Surrogate's Court, New York 
County, October, 1919) ro9 N.Y. Misc. 696, r8r N.Y. Supp. 336. DtAK, 
Book Review, r La. L. Rev. (1939) 6421 at 644 n. 141 notes that the court mis-
understood the French rule. On a dictum of Steinbrink J. in Lann v. United 
Steel Works Corporation (1938) r66 N. Y. Misc. 465, 1 N.Y. Supp. (2.d) 
951, "cavalierly" dismissing the problem of renvoi, see FREUTEL, "Exchange 
Control, Freezing Orders and the Conflict of Laws," 56 Harv. L. Rev. (1942) 
301 at 42. ff. 
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Anzilotti, 8 and recently their mam French adversary, 
Niboyet.9 
In the course of the debate, many wrong arguments, 
"logical" and "practical," were advanced on either side.10 
Most of these have cancelled each other long since. According 
to the view shared by the writer and gaining favor in this 
country,11 the entire problem is not to be taken in the lump 
and decided on a priori reasoning. The various categories of 
cases merit individual consideration in the light of expediency. 
Hence, in the subsequent treatment of each particular subject, 
the prevailing opinions, and the chief countries concerned, will 
be stated. Here we have to deal only with the basic issue.12 
Renvoi, translated as "remitting," "reference back," 
properly means that, when a conflicts rule of a state refers to 
the "law" of another state and the conflicts rule of the latter 
state directs the application of the former's own internal law, 
such law is applied. Thus, in a French court, succession upon 
death to the movables of an American citizen domiciled in 
'France is governed by the "Ame~ican law" but, the law of the 
domicil, i.e., French inheritance law, being applicable under 
8 ANZIL01TI, formerly against renvoi, Studi critici di diritto internazionale 
privato, parte 3, 193, 3oo, elaborated a system approaching the ideas of the Eng-
lish judges, Corso di diritto internazionale privato (1925) 66, 77; Decision 
Notes, 12 Rivista (1918) 8x, 288. 
9 NIBOYET, Decision Note, Revue Crit. 1939, 474-476, now accepts renvoi 
as definitively adopted by the courts, moreover as convenient, but in addition 
also as a tribute to territorialism. 
10 Surveys on these arguments in English: LoRENZEN, "The Renvoi Doctrine 
in the Conflict of Laws--Meaning of 'The Law of a Country,'" 27 Yale L. J. 
(1918) 509; CoRMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 221 at 252 to 26o, supra 
n. 6. Cf. in favor of renvoi: LEPAULLE, "Nature et methode du droit interna-
tional prive," Clunet 1936, 284, 296; Conclusions of M. REY in a French case 
of 1935, Nouv. Revue 1936, 114. 
11 GRISWOLD, 51 Harv. L. Rev. (I 9 3 7), II 6 5 at II 84, supra n. 6. See also 
RAAPE, D. IPR. 41; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE no. 260. 
12 The policy considerations involved in the following exposition were in-
dicated by the present writer in "El fomento internacional del derecho privado," 
I8 Revista Der. Priv. (I93I) 367; RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I93I) 28I; RABEL, 
7 ibid. (I933) I99 n. I; RABEL, Die Fachgebiete u8; they are in essential 
agreement with the opinions of MELCHIOR and GRISWOLD, fundamental for 
German and American laws, respectively. 
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American principles of conflicts, this law is applied by the 
French courts. 
When the principle of renvoi was first adopted in the For go 
case by the French Court of Cassation/3 the avowed motive 
was favor of the law of the forum, the law familiar to the 
court and appearing to him the most suitable. In that case, 
moreover, the French state had a material interest. The judg-
ment gave the property of a deceased Bavarian citizen in the 
absence of heirs to the French exchequer rather than to that 
of Bavaria. This narrowmindedness is responsible for much 
of the ensuing heated attacks on the doctrine. Nevertheless, 
many courts applying renvoi exhibit a similar attitude, and 
some writers, as well as a few projects, recognize only the 
reference back to the law of the forum, in contrast to other 
forms of reference. 14 However, renvoi ought not to be under-
stood as a concession to judicial deficiencies or prejudices. It 
represents the idea that a rule of conflicts of country X, re-
ferring to the law of country Y, should not be pursued to the 
point where the court in X applies to an inheritance the law of 
Y, and a court in Y the law of X. Except under the influence 
of the learned literature, no normal judge would approve such 
a result. The theoretical accoutrements for this feeling have 
finally been furnished by a few modern writers. Reasonable 
interpretation of conflicts rules, often, if not normally, re-
stricts the application of foreign substantive rules of law to the 
13 Cass. (req.) (Feb. 2.2.1 1882.) Clunet 1883, 64; moreover, confirming the 
doctrine, Cass. (req.) (March 1, 1910) Clunet 1910, 888, the vote of the 
Counsellor Denis, published in Clunet 1912., 1013, declared: "J'aime mieux la 
loi fran~aise que la loi etrangere." 
14 STAUB, Kommentiu zum Handelsgesetzbuch, Anhang zu § 372. no. 5 (a); 
HoLDER, 19 Z.int.R. (1909) 198; M. WoLFF, IPR. 49 (reference back as in the 
leading case) ; NusSBAUM, Principles 99• 
The drafts of the new Italian preliminary provisions allowed only reference 
back and have been justly criticized as inconsistent by Aco, "Le norme di 
diritto internazionale privato nel progetto di codice civile," 23 Rivista (1931) 
2.97 at 349, 350. 
In Soviet Russia, reference back is considered to agree with the spirit of the 
law; see MAKAROV, Precis 123. 
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territorial limits defined by the respective foreign legal systems 
in their conflicts laws.15 Hence, the reference to the "law" of 
a foreign state may mean selection of the specific internal law 
that such state itself applies, and even an express reference 
to the internal law of a state may be conditional on its ap-
plicability by the state in question to the particular case.16 
The opposite opinion, generally prevaillng until recently, 
takes it for granted that a sound conflicts rule must neces-
sarily refer to the material rules of some country and not leave 
the ultimate issue to foreign conflicts law. Why? One argu-
ment asserts that it is unworthy of a sovereign state to follow 
the commands of a foreign state. 17 It appears that Italy, influ-
enced by the intended universal significance of the Italian 
conflicts rules, has been won over by this argument.18 It seems 
most curious that Italy's dignity should be offended when 
Italian courts apply the Italian Civil Code instead of English 
case law. Another, the most popular argument, states that 
renvoi leads to a vicious circle. If the "acceptance" of renvoi 
from the (American) country of nationality to the (French) 
law of domicil is right, dominant opinion reasons, th~ same 
method must continue with renvoi from the French law of 
domicil to the American law of nationality. "Logical mirror," 
"international lawn tennis," "ping-pong," are celebrated 
names of the supposed circulus inextricabilis, 19 time and again 
designated as the "most powerful argument" for rejecting 
1~ MELCHIOR 242-244. 
16 RAAPE 74I and RAAPE, D.IPR. 42. 
17 The argument was invented in France: LABBE, Clunet I885, 5 at 9; 
VALERY 486 nos. 372, 374; PrLLET, I Traite 532; BARTIN, I Principes 205, 
and many others. 
18 See MELCHIOR zoo; cf. 241. An entire book against the doctrine of the 
Italian courts has been published by PHILONENKO, La theorie du renvoi en droit 
compare (Paris, I 9 35). 
19 KAHN, I Abhandl. 20; LAINE, Clunet I 896, 24 I at 2 57, 48 I; BAR TIN, 30 
Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I898) ISS; STREIT, 20 Recueil I927 V IOI; 
LEWALD r 7 no. 22; In re Tallmadge, In re Chadwick's Will (Surrogate's 
Court, New York County, October, 1919) 109 N.Y. Misc. 6961 I8I N.Y. 
Supp. 336. 
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renvoi. 20 By parity of reasoning, it has been supposed that 
an English or American court resorting to renvoi ought to 
accept renvoi from the French law of domicil to the American 
law ofnationality, and so forth. 
A striking, though tacit, answer has been provided by the 
English practice, more than a hundred years in development, 
in the very field where renvoi originated, viz., where national-
ity and domicil principles conflict. The practice enables the 
English courts to obtain results in harmony with the Conti-
nental decisions in specific situations and to avoid the circulus. 
Basically, confronted with the French and German renvoi 
practice, the English courts simply have given free play to 
their own principle of domicil. The estate of an English de-
cedent domiciled in France is distributed under French law, 
both in French courts by renvoi and in English courts as the 
law of domicif.21 Put to the test when Italian courts re-
pudiated renvoi, disdained to apply Italian inheritance law, 
and insisted on British law for British successions in Italy, the 
English judges exhibited real wisdom in avoiding the absurd 
result not of renvoi but of the rejection of renvoi. They 
realized that the traditional form of their domiciliary princi-
ple refers to the same law which is applied by the court of the 
domicil. Under the principle as now defined, the reference to 
the law of domicil points primarily to the conflicts law of the 
domicil. The cases use different language to express this policy 
of forbearance. Undue attention has been given to incon-
sistencies and to sayings such as that the English court should 
decide as if sitting at the place of the domicil. 2.2 
20 The "decisive argument" for innumerable writers and still so, for instance, 
for LEWALD, "La theorie du renvoi," 29 Recueil 1929 IV 519 at 545, 595; 
MEIJERS, "La question de renvoi," 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 191, 219. For this 
"powerful" reason, the Italian drafts limited renvoi to reference back, and the 
final text, C. C. (1938) Disp. Prel. art. 20, eliminated it entirely. 
21 /n re Ross, r Ch. D. [1930] 377, 388. 
22 Collier v. Rivaz, 2 Curt. Ecc. Ct. (r84r) 855, 863, per Jenner, J., often 
quoted, and adopted by DICEY in his early thesis that "the object of our courts 
is to deal with such a will exactly as the courts of the domicil would deal with 
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In fact, several modes of stating renvoi are thinkable and 
have been employed by writers, courts on the Continent, and 
British judges. Falconbridge lucidly distinguishes three kinds 
of renv~i/3 and some authors, who have contrived an intricate 
system of distinctions, call the English method "double 
renvoi." But these details do not touch the essential point, 
namely, the policy behind the cases. The writers who seem 
not to have understood this policy-unfortunately there are 
many-may be excused, since even Luxmoore, J., in In re 
Ross 24 and Lord Maugham, in In re Askew, 25 while confirm-
ing and fortifying the rule, evidently regretted that the pre-
cedents had abandoned the pure domiciliary test. The English 
rule is a praiseworthy contribution to international harmony, 
not difficult to derive from the principle of domicil. It was 
prepared by the historic doctrine that jurisdiction implies ap-
plication of the law of the court. 26 Finally, these principles 
have been illuminated by the Privy Council in a recent case 27 
"with all the weight of a considered judgment devoted to the 
issue" of renvoi in general. 28 The reference from the lex situs 
to the national law in the Palestinian Succession Ordinance, 
it." DICEY, The Law of Domicile, as a Branch of the Law of England (London, 
I879) 295· 
The differences of language and certain errors in the decisions were subjected 
to a meticulous criticism by MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, Renvoi in Modern 
English Law, followed widely by CHESHIRE (ed. 2) 44-67, in an unfortunate 
contrast to his former view, "Private International Law," 51 Law Q. Rev. (1935) 
76 at 77, (CHESHIRE, ed. 1, 135-139). Both authors, in the spell of the for-
malistic international t~eories, failed to appreciate sufficiently the policy questions. 
The same is true of the subtle criticism by MoRRIS, 18 Brit. Year Book Int. 
Law (1937) at 32, supran. 6. See GRISWOLD, 51 Harv.L.Rev. (1938) at II72, 
supra n. 6, and his Book Review, 51 Harv.L.Rev. (1938) 573· 
23 EALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi, Characterization and Acquired Rights," I 7 Can. 
Bar Rev. (1939) 369 at 378. 
24 In re Ross, I Ch. D. [1930] 3 77· 1 
25 In re Askew, 2 Ch. D. [1930] 259. 
26 See the interesting discussion by MoRRIS, 18 Brit. Year Book Int. Law 
(1937) at 32, supra n. 6; RHEINSTEIN, 12 Annuario Dir. Comp. (1937) 315 
ff. KUHN, Comp. Com. 52; DE NovA, "Considerazioni sul rinvio in diritto 
inglese," 30 Rivista 1938, 388 at 412-415· 
27 Jaber Elias Kotia v. Katr Bint Jiryes Nahas [1941] 3 All E.R. 20, per 
Clauson, L. J., the Judicial Committee (including Lords Atkin, Russel of 
Killowen, Romer and Sir George Rankin). 
28 KEITH, "The Privy Council on Renvoi," Journ. Comp. Leg. (1942) 69. 
DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICTS LAW 77 
1923, of a deceased owner is construed as pointing to the law 
which the courts of the national country would apply to the 
property in question, as distinguished from property in their 
own country, the contrary construction being regarded as "de-
liberately cutting across the principle" 29 recognized by the 
English courts. 
What, then, of the mirror cabinet? If the world is split into 
two contradictory systems, there must be some modus vivendi~ 
Renvoi is one of the best means to this end. It stands to reason 
that it cannot be applied in the same manner by the two an-
tagonistic groups and at the same time reach conformity. 80 The 
English method, in turn, is not to be observed by courts fol-
lowing the nationality principle! Theorists should not de.mand 
schematic symmetry just to obtain an argumentum ad ab-
surdum. This understood, it need no longer be feared that 
the English attitude will create new cases of circulus inex-
tricabilis.31 The difference between nationality and domicil 
as tests of personal law requires a different technique in each 
29 [1941] 3 All E.R. at 25. 
30 The view of the English courts has a striking parallel in an equally wise 
old decision of the Appeal Court of Lubeck, of March :u, 1861, Krebs v. 
Rosalino, 14 Seu1f. Arch. 644 no. I 07. The case was entirely analogous to the 
Annesley case [1926] Ch. 692. The testatrix, a subject of Frankfurt on the 
Main, according to the normal concept of domicil, had her last domicil in 
Mainz, but, as she did not have the governmental authorization for domicil 
according to the French Civil Code in force in Mainz, she lacked domicil there 
in the meaning of the law of Mainz, quite as Mrs. Annesley did under French law. 
The conflicts rule of Mainz was uncertain; possibly it subjected succession to 
movables to the law of nationality of the deceased, i.e., the statute of Frankfurt. 
The Court of Lubeck, under its own conflicts rule, referring the succession to the 
domicil of the de cuius, declared that correct application of the principle required 
that the entire law of the testator's domicil in its totality be applied and succession 
upon death be adjudicated as in the courts of the domicil. 
In his recent work, LEWALD, Regles generales des conflits de lois (1941) 491 
56, again insists that thus the Court of Lubeck refers from domicil to nationality, 
while the Forgo case and all its followers refer from nationality to domicil. But 
why should this contrast which involves no contradiction, be cited as a reproach 
to the renvoi principle, rather than to the diversity of conflicts principles arid 
of concepts of domicil? 
31 This is feared by MoRRis, "The Law of Domicil," 18 Brit. Year Book Int. 
Law (1937) 32., 37; CHESHIRE 65; MAURYJ57 Recueil1936 III 32.9> 538; DE 
NovA 441; CoRMACK, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) 221 at z7z, supra n. 6; 
NussBAUM, "Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of 
Laws," 42. Col. L. Rev. (1942) 189, zoz, and Principles 98. 
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group of countries. Indeed, the nationality principle does not 
mean that a foreign national is subject necessarily to the sub-
stantive law of his country; it means that the state to which 
the individual belongs should determine his personal relations. 
The law of domicil does not mean that everybody must be 
subject to the substantive law of his domicil. The reasonable 
construction is that the law of the place of domicil determines 
what law should govern. Instead of following writers 32 who 
with a certain pride declare that they intend to "explain away" 
the English conception of renvoi, the English model should 
be extended to other types of cases and to other countries in 
accordance with the spirit of the principles guiding the forum. 
As to such types of cases, the German 33 courts have con-
sistently assumed that reference back must be accompanied by 
the acceptance of reference to a third law ( W eiterverweisung, 
transmission). u In the case of an English testator domiciled 
in Germany who leaves immovables in Georgia (U.S.A.), 
. the German rule refers to English conflicts law which refers 
to the lex situs. The statute of distribution of Georgia, there-
fore, is applicable in a German court as well as in England, 
although German conflicts law itself does not distinguish im-
movables for the purpose of succession. The persistent ob-
jections to this extension of the renvoi principle chiefly tend 
to demonstrate that the chain of references may lead nowhere, 
a fear not justified by any noteworthy case material 35 and 
not significant in view of the standard set by the English 
precedents. There must always be some hierarchy in the ap-
plicable laws. Renvoi is not just an aimless game. 
32 MORRIS, MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY, CHESHIRE and others. 
33 More doubt exi~s with respect to French courts, but transmissive reference 
is recognized by Cass. {req.) (Nov; 7, 1933), Guez c. Ben Attar, Clunet 1935, 
88, Revue Crit. 1934, 440, 
3
' For this translation see ScHREIBER, "The Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-
American Law," 31 Harv. L. Rev. (1918) szJ. 
35 See NussBAUM, 4Z Col. L. Rev. ( 194z) zoz, supra n. 31. 
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Illustrations: 36 (a) A Danish national dies domiciled in 
Rome, Italy, leaving movables in Germany. A German court 
will consult the national "law," i.e., the Danish conflicts law, 
which refers to the domicil and allegedly does not recognize 
renvoi. Therefore, the Italian statute of distribution is ap-
plied. It does not matter that Italian conflicts law equally re-
fuses renvoi so that an Italian court under its nationality prin-
ciple would apply the Danish inheritance law. Hence a 
German judge can without difficulty apply W eiterve:rweisung 
in this case, although the two foreign conflicts laws involved, 
the Danish and the Italian, do not agree with each other. 
(b) A United States citizen domiciled in Rome leaves at 
death movables in Poland. The inheritance law of Italy is 
not applicable in any one of the three countries. An Italian 
court would apply "American" 37 inheritance law. An Amer-
ican court, were it to adopt the English renvoi practice, 
would give effect to the inheritance law of an American state. 
A Polish court, on the basis of the nationality principle and 
renvoi, should reach the same result. 
(c) An Argentinian domiciled in Rio de Janeiro dies leav-
ing movables in France. The French court is referred by its 
conflicts rule to the Argentine principle of domicil, and thereby 
to the conflicts rule of Brazil. Until recently, Brazilian conflicts 
law "accepted" the Argentine "renvoi," and Brazilian inherit-
ance law was applicable in Buenos Aires as well as in Rio de 
Janeiro. 
The present Brazilian Introductory Law of 1942, adopting 
the domicil principle, leads to the same result. The circum-
stance that the two internal laws are not in disaccord is not 
material in a French court, which simply follows the decision 
that the national (Argentine) court would render. 
In the only decision on renvoi since the five former highest 
tribunals of Italy were replaced by the present Supreme Court, 
88 The first example is solved by MELCHIOR zzs § 151 1 as in the text, while 
WoLFF, IPR. so (z), uses the first and third examples in order to show that 
renvoi to a third law should not be followed, if the two foreign laws involved 
disagree in the choice of law. The case on which they agree is often excepted 
from the doctrinal refusal of renvoi. 
87 Which atate's law? See infra pp. u81f. 
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the advantages of "transmission" or reference over, as dis-
tinguished from reference back, are recognized. 38 This case, 
decided in 1937, is regarded as spectacular, since it is contrary 
to the settled practice of other courts, to the great majority 
of writers, as well as to the formal prohibition of renvoi ex-
pressed in the new Italian Code, then soon to enter into force. 39 
While some authors accept only reference back 40 and others 
solely reference over,41 an increasing number advocate renvoi 
in either form for situations in which the same law is indicated 
by the conflicts rules of two or more foreign countries prin-
cipally involved. 42 For instance, in case two Swiss nationals, 
uncle and niece, whose intermarriage is prohibited by Swiss 
law, were to marry in Soviet Russia while there domiciled, the 
marriage would be valid according to both Russian law and 
Swiss conflicts law. 43 Presumably, it is admitted, the validity 
of the marriage would be recognized by any court. 44 Again, 
by the admission, the existence of a preconception is at least 
partially avowed. 
In addition to references from the national law to the domi-
ciliary law, others from the law of situs to the national or 
domiciliary law and vice versa, and in the field of obligations, 
have been admitted with good justification. The particular 
situations need separate consideration. 
Ordinary renvoi is not able to settle a "positive" conflict of 
conflicts rules. Where a Spaniard dies domiciled in the United 
States, his movables are distributed here under the statute of 
38 Cass. ltal. (Dec. Z9, 1937) 9 Rivista Dir. Priv. (1939) II zz8. 
39 See GRASSETTI, Note to the decision supra n. 38. 
40 See supra ,n. 1 4· 
41 The sovereignty of the forum is said not to be involved; BATE, Notes on 
the Doctrine of Renvoi (1904) xu ff.; also, Austrian OGH. (May z, 19z9) JW. 
1931, x66 (for obscure +easons). 
42 LEWALD, z9 Recueil 19:i9 IV 519 at 574; MAURY, 57 Recueil 1936 III 
32.9 at 5.49· 
43 Example adduced by RAAPE, 24, 745, as support for renvoi in general. 
44 LEWALD, Regles generales des confiits de lois (I 941) 58. 
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the domicil and in Spain under Spanish inheritance law. This 
thorny problem is best covered by bilateral treaties. Or it 
may be obviated by extraordinary concessions, as in the Swiss 
statute on conflicts. In an admirable effort to avoid collisions 
regarding Swiss nationals abroad, the statute provides that 
Swiss citizens should be subject to Swiss municipal law only 
if the law of the domicil so prescribes; where the local domestic 
law of the domicil claims to govern or where the local conflicts 
rule remits the case to a third state's law, Switzerland con-
forms. 45 Hence, the national law extends to Swiss nationals 
abroad only under certain conditions. 
At present, renvoi is prescribed by statutory provisions in 
Germany, Poland, Sweden, Hungary, China, Japan, Liech-
tenstein, and Palestine, 46 moreover by the Hague Convention 
on Marriage, 47 and the Geneva conventions concerning ne-
gotiable instruments. 48 In practice, it occurs beyond the limits 
of these provisions 49 and in other countries. 50 Under the 
influence of the theoretical literature, the recent codes of Italy, 
45 NAG. arts. 2.8, 3 I. 
46 Germany: EG. art. 2.7, in five cases of status questions. 
Poland: Law of I92.6 on private international law, art. 36. 
Sweden: Int. Fam. L. of 1904 with subsequent amendments, c. I § 2., c. 2.. § 1. 
Hungary: Marriage Law of I894, § 108. 
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 2.9; China: Law of 1918, art. 4· 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 45; S.R. art. I3 par. 2.; see also for another 
provision WAHLE, 2. Z.ausl.PR. (I92.8) 137. 
Palestine: Palestine Order in Council, Sept. I, 192.2., art. 64 (:~.). 
Cf. cases commented by WENGLER, "lnternationales und interreligioses Pri-
vatrecht in Palastina," 12. Z.ausl.PR. (I939) 772., 790. 
47 Art. I, 
45 Resolutions of the Hague (19I2.) concerning checks, art. 32., similar pro-
vision in Soviet Russia: Law on checks, of Nov. 6, I92.9, art. 36. ct. MAKAROV, 
Precis 19I. Geneva conflicts rules on bills of exchange (1930) art. 2. par. 1. 
49 The German Supreme Court especially applies the. principle of renvoi to 
all matters of conflicts law. See MELCHIOR 2.07 § 139. 
60 MELCHIOR I98, mentions Argentina (contra: VICO no. 304), Brazil 
(but see note 52. infra), Belgium, Bulgaria, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain (doubting, LASALA LLANAS 2.46 ff.), Rumania, an<,! Venezuela. To be 
added are certainly Switzerland and probably many other countries. See also 
Anglo-German Mixed Tribunals (May 31.,. 192.6) 6 .Recueil des decisions des 
tribunamt arbitraux mixtes 540. 
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Greece, and Rumania 51 have rejected renvoi, as does the 
Brazilian law of I 942,52 while at the same time reducing 
conflicts by its acceptance of the domiciliary principle. But in 
the Continental literature, the traditional hostility, of the 
writers is being abandoned. 53 In I 9 3 2, the Institute 'of Inter-
national Law, which had censured renvoi in I 895, I 898, and 
I900, recognized the ~onventional, legislative, and judicial 
trend, manifesting itself in various countries in certain ap-
plications of the renvoi doctrine, particularly with respect to 
personal status. 54 
A like change of mind is to be hoped for the United States. 
The usual case for resort to renvoi is here almost without 
significance, as, in common with almost the entire British 
Empire, none of the States accept the principle of nationality. 
This evidently is the reason why the basic need has not been 
felt as in Europe. Other conflicts, however, have occurred, 
striking enough to compel the Restaters to admit some excep-
tions to their rejection of renvoi. 55 Cowan proves that renvoi 
is "logically" possible/6 and Griswold vigorously pleads for 
51 Ital. C. C. (194~) Disp. Prel. art. JO. 
Greek C. C. (1940) art. 36. 
Rumanian Draft art. LXIII (probably unchanged in C. C. 1940). 
Also, one Belgian decision followed the pleading of Mr. van Hille against 
renvoi, see VAN HILLE, 66 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1939) 764. 
The Dutch decisions are few and divided; see MEJJERS, "La question du 
renvoi," 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 191 at ~04 n. 5; HJJMANS 153. 
5~ Brazil, Lei de Introdu~ao, of Sept. 4, 194~, art. x6. 
53 France: in addition to older writers (WEISS, VAREILLES-SOMMIERE, CoLIN), 
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, "Observations sur la question du renvoi," 51 Clunet 
19~4, 877; ARMJNJON, "Le renvoi," Revue 19H-19~3, 565 at 583 ff. 
Belgium: RoLIN, POULLET. 
Germany: NusSBAUM, M. WoLFF, in addition to the older writers recorded 
by MELCHIOR ~01 § 137• 
Italy: ANZILOTTI. 
Spain: TRiAs DEBEs, "Regles generales des confiits de lois," 6~ Recueil 1937 
IV 6~. 
64 Annuaire 193~. 471, 
55 Restatement § 8. 
56 CoWAN, "Renvoi Does Not Involve a Logical Fallacy," 87 U. of Pa. L. 
Rev. (1938) n-+9· 
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renvoi wherever no special reasons militate against it.117 Even 
from an opposed point of view, Cormack, in effect, accepts the 
practical result of renvoi in all cases respecting status and 
property, since he would determine these matters according to 
the law considered applicable at the domicil or situs re-
spectively.'58 It would accordingly seem that the critic who de-
clared his appreciation for Griswold's advocacy of a cause 
lost before the formidable array of the enemies of renvoi/; 9 
may soon have to look for another ground of sympathy. 
3· Choice of Law by the Parties 60 • 
The doctrine of "autonomy of the parties" is also to be 
noted in this connection as an example of obstinate theory op-
posed to universal practice. The details will be considered later 
in connection with contracts. 
The practice allowing parties to a contract to determine the 
law applicable to their contractual relation, recognized in Du-
moulin's theory, for centuries has been applied by courts 
throughout the world with slight dissent. 61 In commercial 
arbitration, this right of the parties is taken for granted. If 
this time-honored view has recently suffered vacillation, it is 
due to the fanatical campaign of the handbooks in the last 
decades. After World War I, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, 
S7 GRISWOLD, "Renvoi Revisited," sr Har~. L. Rev. (1937) u6s. 
58 CoRMACK, 14- So. Cal. L. Rev. (1941) u1 at u91 supra n. 6; contra 
F ALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi and the Law of the Domicile," 19 Can. Bar Rev, ( 1941) 
Jll at 335> 337• 
sg Annual Survey of English Law 1938, 388. 
60 An excellent comparative study on the subject is the book by H. BATIFFOL, 
Les conftits de lois en matiere de contrats ( r 9 3 8). 
61 The Swiss Federal Court holds that the questions connected with the for-
mation of a contract, such as those concerning consent, fraud, error, formalities, 
power of attorney, are inaccessible to the parties' choice of law; it seems that 
these questions are determined, preferably at least, under the law of the place of 
contracting. See BG. (Nov. 7, 1933) 59 BGE.II 397,3991 BG. {July n, 1938) 
64 BGE. II 34-6, 349; NIEDERER, "Die Parteiautonomie in der neuern Praxis 
des Bundesgerichtes auf dem Gebiete des internationalen OR.," 59 Z.Schweiz. 
R. N.F. (1940) 2.39, 2.45, 
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which were free to choose their method, had no doubt about 
the rule.62 
Despite this practice, prevailing theory 63 attacks the free-
dom of the parties to a contract to determine the law that shall 
govern its validity, because this enables them to evade com-
pulsory rules of a law otherwise controlling. It has been said 
thatto allow parties to select their law would elevate them to 
the rank of a legislature and delegate to them a sovereign 
power. Hence, it is supposed, each contract must be localized 
in one state whose law shall prescribe whether the contract is 
valid and whether, or to what extent, the parties are allowed 
to submit controversies to the law of another state. To recog-
nize an agreement respecting applicable law before determin-
ing which law governs the validity of the agreement, is ac-
cordingly regarded as putting the cart before the horse. 
On the other hand, courts operate on the unassailable basis 
of a customary, extremely well-settled conflicts rule. Au-
tonomy is needed in the first place by international and, in this 
country, also by interstate commerce. For such matters, at 
least in peace time, few compulsory, imperative rules of law 
are provided in the national legislations; existing prohibitions 
will more often than not be considered by the court in which 
the contract is in issue either from the viewpoint of local public 
policy or as a defense based on illegality of performance. Thus, 
the danger that prohibitions established by one law may be 
evaded ·by a party exercising the right to select another law 
is practically negligible, so that a state ordinarily has no sub-
stantial interest, as the theory postulates, warranting intrusion 
into the international freedom of contracting. On the con-
trary, the merchants have. an enormous interest that a certain 
·
62 RABEL, I Z.ausl.PR; (19~7) .p. 
63 See the endless lists of majority opinions by CALEB, Essai sur le principe 
de l'autonomie et de la volonte en droit international prive (I9~7) 8I; 
MELCHIOR 500 § 353 n. I; GUTZWILLER I6o6 n. I; BATIFFOL I I. Exceptional 
positions were taken by KosTERS (I9I7) 733; SURVILLE (I9z5) 351· 
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and preknown body of rules should govern future litigation. 
They are surrounded by a chaos of national conflicts laws and 
national legislations, private and commercial. Contracts be-
tween merchants of different nations are likely to touch several 
territories. No attorney is able to predict the law under which 
the various rights and duties of the parties will be adjudicated 
in all courts in which litigation may occur. This primordial 
need for relative certainty is documented by the multitudinous 
usages and standard forms of the several branches of inter-
national trade and impels courts familiar with business require-
ments, British, French, German, and Swedish, to grant the 
parties wide latitude. They usually assert without qualification 
that the applicable law is determined by the parties. 64 
Nonmercantile situations must be independently evalu-
ated. The case in which Dumoulin advocated autonomy of the 
parties involved marriage settlements; the French courts still 
insist on free choice of law by the parties in this case. The pre-
vailing view, however, is that the law governing in the ab-
sence of a settlement, controls the permissibility of the settle-
ment, 65 including any agreement respecting the applicable 
law. In fact, as contrasted with business contracts, marriage 
settlements are frequently subjected to restrictions im9osed 
by law. 
The attitude of the courts has finally received the support 
of a succession of Geqnan 66 and an increasing number of 
French 67 writers. The dominant theory has also been criticized 
64 See, e.g., for English dicta, CHESHIRE 250. 
65 See infra, Effects of Marriage on Property, Chapter I o. 
66 The first opposition to the dominant reasoning was expressed in my observa-
tions, 1 Z.ausl.PR. (1927) 42 n. 1, and Book Review, 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 417; 
also in 18 Revista Der. Priv. (1931) 321, 363, for the reasons explained above; 
more study was given with arguments of varying kind by HAUDEK, Die 
Bedeutung des Parteiwillens im internationalen Privatrecht, Rechtsvergl. 
Abhandl. no. 7 (1931); MELCHIOR 498 § 351 ff. (1932); NusSBAUM, D. IPR . 
.214 (1932); M. WOLFF, IPR. 84 (1933). 
67 LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, Note, DALLOZ 1931.2.33 and Precis 279 no. 
250 (1937); WIGNY, "La regle de confiit applicable aux contrats," Revue Dr. 
Int. (Bruxelles) ( 1933) 676; PLANIOL, RIPERT et ESMEIN, 6 Traite pratique 
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of late in the United States; 68 that the cases do not confirm 
the hostility of the Restatement to election of law by the 
parties, is well known. 09 
Hence, the recent literature interests itself more in the 
limits to be imposed upon the autonomy of the parties' inten-
tion than in challenging its existence. 7° Consideration was 
given to a particularly important phase of this problem in con-
nection with the uniform conflicts rules in relation to sales 
of goods prepared by the International Law Association and 
the Sixth Hague Conference. 71 The British lawyers were in 
significant opposition to the insistence of Continental scholars 
that the validity_ of an agreement making a certain law ap-
plicable, should be subject to the same law that, under the 
intended Convention, should be applied in the absence of such 
agreement. The proponents of this restriction claimed that 
this would ensure greater certainty for the parties than if the 
law of the forum were to determine the validity of the agree-
ment. However, the entire discussion and others that fol-
lowed in the literature make it desirable to sound a warning 
that business security will be further menaced by ensnaring 
commercial autonomy in a network of limitations through a 
combination of substantive and conflicts rules. 
641 no. 467; PERROUD, Clunet 1933, 289; BATIFFOL 8; J. DoNNEDIEU DE 
VABRES 253; also }EANPRETRE, Les conflits de lois en matiere d'obligations 
contratuelles, selon la jurisprudence et la doctrine aux Etats-Unis (r936) 137. 
Cf. RHEINSTEIN, Book Review, 37 Col. L. Rev. (1937) 327. 
68 CooK, "'Contracts' and the Conflict of Laws," 31 Ill. L. Rev. (1936) 143 
at 145; CooK, Legal Bases (1942) at 349; and ibid. 389; and see LoRENZEN 
and HEILMANN, "The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws," 83 U. of Pa. L. 
Rev. (r935) 555; WILLIS, "Two Approaches to the Conflict of Laws: A Com-
parative Study of the English Law and the Restatement of The American Law 
Institute," 14 Can. Bar Rev. (1936) r; YNTEMA, "The Restatement of the 
Conflict of Laws," 36 Col. L. Rev. (1936) 183. 
69 See the writers cited in the precedent note and in a detailed criticism by 
NussBAUM, "Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases versus Restatement," 51 Yale 
L.J. (1942) 893. 
70 SeeM. WoLFF, IPR. 85, 86; and M. WOLFF, "The Choice of Law by the 
Parties in International Contracts," 49 Juridical Review (1937) uo, 118. 
71 A clear resume is to be found in Int. Law Association, 35th Report (1928) 
136 fi. 
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Of course, when the world enjoys a reliable uniform con-
flicts law, neither renvoi nor self-choice of law will be so 
largely l)eeded as today. 
II. THE PuRPOSE oF CoNFLICTs LAW 
I. Uniformity 
Since Savigny, it has been customary to regard the attain-
ment of uniform solutions as the chief purpose of private in-
ternational law. Cases should be decided under the same sub-
stantive rules,_ irrespective of the court where they are 
pleaded. 72 We may gratefully note that this postulate has 
continued in favor, if only as an ideal remote from reality, 
at a time when separate conflicts laws have grown up in the 
various countries and their diversities have been prized. The 
real value of this postulate under present conditions is that it 
forms a test for the relative convenience of conflict rules. 73 
The time has come to approach the goal with more energy. 
One of the considerations leading to a universally useful 
rule is the legitimate expectation of the parties. Not to dis-
appoint fair assumptions by persons disposing of property or 
entering into engagements, was the justified motive of the 
twisted doctrines protecting vested rights. 74 For example, 
formalities are subject to the law of the place where a trans-
action has been concluded; the acquisition of property is gov-
erned by the law of the situs as of the time of the acquisition; 
capacity to contract a business obligation partly is, or should be, 
determined by the law governing the validity of the contract, 
72 SAVIGNY § 348; recently, for instance, TAINToR, "'Universality' in the 
Conflict Laws of Contract," 1 La. L. Rev. (1939) 695, 699; HANCOCK, Torts 
in the Conflict of Laws (1942) 54· 
73 See WoLFF, IPR. 6; WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 196; MAURY, 57 
Recueil I 9 3 6 III 32 5 at 42 3; NEUNER, "Policy Considerations in the Conflicts 
of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. (1942) 479,483. 
74 GooDRICH, "Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts," 36 W. Va. L. Q. 
(1930) 156, 167ff. and GOODRICH 5; CHESHIRE 4, 90; NEUNER, 20 Can. Bar 
Rev. (1942) at 482, supra n. 73· 
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etcetera. "When a matter has been settled, in conformity with 
the law then and there controlling the actions of the parties, 
the settlement should not be disturbed because the point arises 
for litigation somewhere else." 75 This "fundamental premise" 
suggests that courts should search, in the absence of express 
intentions with respect to the applicable law, for the "tacit" 
and eventually the "presumed" intentions of the parties. 
Moreover, as a European writer has recently postulated, 
when a fact or an act is governed by a certain law according 
to all the conflicts laws practically involved, this law should be 
applied by any court before which the case may come as a 
result of subsequent circumstances. 76 
In a more general way, Savigny regarded it a guarantee of 
uniform treatment of legal relations that the law of that place 
where the relation has its legal "seat" should be applied every-
where-a conception that through Wharton has been admitted 
in the Supreme Court of the United States.77 Gierke sub-
stituted for "seat" "center of gravity"; Bar sought localization 
"according to the nature of things"; and Westlake recom-
mended the law of the state with which the relation has closest 
connection. All these formulas tend toward the same goal, 
the importance of which still is in no wise impaired. But the 
obstacles barring the way to the goal have increased since the 
world order envisaged by Savigny has been dissolved into 
more than a hundred national legal systems. 
In view of the difficulties of reaching uniformity, a more 
modest aspiration has been correctly proposed by Cook, 
namely, to attain "as much certainty as may be reasonably 
hoped for in a changing world" and is compatible with 
"needed flexibility." 78 
75 GOODRICH, 36 W.Va. L. Q. (1930) 156, 164, supra n. 74· 
76 MEIJERS, "La question du renvoi," 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) at :us. 
77 Pritchard v. Norton (1882) 106 U.S. 124 at IJO. 
78 CooK, Legal Bases 432. 
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2. Policy Considerations 
A just result or the realization of prescribed policies is now 
often viewed as the main purpose of conflicts law. 79 This is 
right without doubt, if certain fundamental distinctions be 
borne in mind. 80 
(a) The usual confusion of private and conflicts laws has 
engendered the conception that both have to follow the same 
pattern of values and purposes. If this were true, all the 
differences that permeate the national laws with respect to the 
organization of the family, the categories of property rights, 
freedom of contract, privileges and duties, public interests, 
and so on, would be reflected, nay reproduced, in the conflicts 
rules of the divers countries. The writers have formulated 
their axioms according to their particular views. Kahn, 81 for 
instance, who considered relationships created by internal law 
to be the subject matter of conflicts rules, required conformity 
with the fundamental idea of the internal institution. If, in the 
doctrine of the internal law, parental power is regarded as 
a mere right, the father's personal law should govern; if the 
father's duty is accentuated, the law of the child. Under Pil-
let's leadership, French writers transformed their doctrine 
of sovereignty 8,2 so as to require the determination of what law 
ought to govern capacity to contract, succession on death, etc., 
in conformity with the "social purpose, of the state regu-
lations pertaining to personality, family, security of com-
merce, etc.; the applicable law is that which most efficiently 
79 See in particular NEUNER, Der Sinn (1932.); CAVERS, "A Critique of the 
Choice-of-Law Problem," 47 Harv. L. Rev. (1933) at 173; NEUNER, "Policy 
Considerations in the Conflicts of Laws," zo Can. Bar Rev. ( 1941) at 486; 
HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases (1937) ss, recognize "a desirable result" in 
their third and fourth classification of "social policies." 
80 RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 284. 
81 KAHN, 1 Abhandl. 1 u. 
82 See DEVos, zs Revue Inst. Belge (1929) x, 97; z6 ibid. (1930) 133. 
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77 Pritchard v. Norton (188z) xo6 U.S. 124 at. 130. 
78 CooK, Legal Bases 43Z· 
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79 See in particular NEUNER, Der Sinn (I932); CAVERS, "A Critique of the 
Choice-of-Law Problem," 47 Harv. L. Rev. (I933) at 173; NEUNER, "Policy 
Considerations in the Conflicts of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. (1942) at 486; 
HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases (I937) 55, recognize "a desirable result" in 
their third and fourth classification of "social policies." 
80 RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I93I) 284. 
8l KAHN, I Abhandl. I 12. 
82 See DEVos, I5 Revue Inst. Belge (1929) x, 97; I6 ibid. (1930) 133. 
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protects the purpose fostered by the forum's own domestic 
legislation. 83 
This identification of motives, sometimes extremely conse-
quential, aggravates the difficult task of the conflicts law be-
yond all limits. To care for social prosperity is the responsibil-
ity of the municipal private laws, which have to resolve the 
merits of each particular problem. The principle, jus suum 
cuique tribuere, instructs legislators and judges to ponder care-
fully private and public interests. But this is what each private 
law does for itself; the function of private international rules 
is to choose the applicable law with all its evaluations what-
ever they may be. Existing conflicts law presumes that all laws 
of civilized countries are of equal rank, not to speak of sister 
states in a federation. Assuredly, the origin of this idea was 
political, and its modern theoretical foundation came from its 
connection with the law of nations. But, as things are, to 
inject national policies directly into conflicts law, will destroy 
it. In such event, "international public order" would embrace 
all internal laws. 
(b) When preconceptions are eliminated, policy in the field 
of conflicts law is of course the main object of concern. Conflicts 
rules have never been entirelyuninfluenced by the underlying 
social situation. This is pioneer ground. How the interest of 
the state, of other states, of the parties, of third persons in good 
faith, of commerce or trade in general, are to be valued against 
each other in various situations and best reconciled with the 
postulate of certainty, needs renewed and detailed deliber-
ation. For the time being, it would be entirely premature to 
try to enumerate or to analyze such considerations in a gen-
eral way. 
(c) The postulate that conflicts rules should have just re-
sults may be understood-or perhaps misunderstood-as 
signifying that the outcome of lawsuits in every case should 
conform, not to the !'ex fori, but to the judge's sense of justice. 
83 See the illustrations of NIBOYET soo no. 416. 
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We well know that courts will try many direct or devious 
ways to satisfy this sense of justice. They will use the faculty 
to reject a foreign rule on the ground of a public policy of 
the forum. They will classify an unwelcome foreign rule as 
inapplicable foreign procedure. They will, with a desired end 
in view, affirm or deny a person's domicil. And we may trust 
the courts always to select, of two accessible ways, that which 
leads to the result to them appearing preferable. 84 These 
expedients of judicial wisdom cannot be closed entirely, and 
should not be, while conflicts rules remain crude and vague. 
It is good to know that inscrutable judgments occasionally al-
leviate the conflicts chaos. 
Yet, subservience to subjective and local values would be 
dangerous and unsound as a general policy. Cavers seems to 
envisage disintegration of conflicts rules as the consequence of 
his postulate of just results and, by way of palliation, recom-
mends re-enforcement of the doctrine of stare decisis and re-
course to standards. 85 Such programs, not sufficiently detailed, 
are disturbing. 
Several points discussed in this chapter are illustrated in 
the case of St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company v. 
Cox. 86 The plaintiff, having been injured on a passenger train 
in Missouri, for consideration released her rights to the local 
agency of the railroad by a document executed in Missouri. 
Under a statute of Missouri, she could not bring an action to 
cancel the release without refunding the sum received. With-
out doing so, she sued in Arkansas, and the Supreme Court 
held (I) that the failure of tender was characterized in Mis-
souri as going to the basis of the right, but ( 2) that in Arkansas 
84 American courts prefer to satisfy a desirable sol uti on in usury cases than to 
have all decisions harmonized. See STUMBERG zrz, and WENGLER, Book Review, 
11 Z.ausl.PR. (I937) 967. 
85 CAVERS, 47 Harv. L. Rev. (I933) ·173 at I96, supra n. 79· Recently CAVERS 
himself has confessed troublesome doubts concerning his reference to social and 
economic considerations, Book Review, 56 Harv. L. Rev. (I943) I I 70 at I I 73· 
88 St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company v. Cox (I9z6) I 71 Ark. IOJ, 
z83 S. W. 3 I; HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases Z7Z• 
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such a suit could be prosecuted without returning the sum, 
and (3) that, therefore, the question being merely procedural 
in the forum, the suit should be allowed. From the viewpoint 
of a sound system (or of analytical jurisprudence), there are 
three fundamental objections to be made. (I) The Missouri 
provision is questionable, though possibly directed against 
ambulance chasing. ( 2) Yet, even if wrong, the provision is 
of course substantive, affecting the material rights of the plain-
tiff, any procedural consequence being merely accessory. The 
law of Arkansas not requiring tender is equally substantive; 
it denies what the other law affirms. (3) The Court evidently 
applied the law of the place where the contract was made and 
performed. On this ground, it should not have evaded its own 
conflicts rule, as it did by a characterization according to the 
alleged lex fori. What really was intended is obvious, however. 
The Court wanted desperately to satisfy its own sense of equity 
as against an objectionable foreign law. 
III. RATIONALIZATION 
I. Special Rules 
Inductive methods include the creation of special rules for 
typical situations. Case law in this country has produced a 
wealth of such specific rules, whereas the European codifica-
tions have been satisfied to formulate conflicts rules in very 
broad and generalized terms. Specialization of the rules has 
recently become a recognized tendency, particularly in the 
field of obligations, in which, even in this country, general 
axioms have done much harm. The Institute of International 
Law has been active in this direction since I 908. The Polish 
Law of I 926 (art. 8) states different points of contact ap-
propriate to the various types of contract--contracts executed 
at an exchange or market, retail bargains, construction and 
employment contracts with the state and other public corpo-
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rations, insurance contracts, contracts with attorneys and simi-
lar persons, employment by business enterprises, etcetera. The 
Permanent Court of International Justice has held that a gov-
ernmental loan by issue of bonds having several places of 
payment is subject to the law of the issuing government.87 
Maritime shipping contracts have been made the subject of 
special international conventions. 88 The scope of a power of 
attorney is determined under the law of the state in whi_ch 
the agent acts. 89 Courts in all countries have elaborated a 
wide-flung net of specialized solutions by localizing contracts 
according to the "tacit," "presumed," or simply the fictitiously 
assumed intent of the parties.90 
This growing emphasis on the law corresponding to the 
particular type of contract has two additional wholesome ef-
fects, namely, promotion of uniformity, since types of con-
tracts are the same everywhere under modern circumstances, 
and concentration-so far as feasible-on one convenient law. 
In the latter regard-the problem of depefage 91-it is note-
worthy that both American and Continental conflicts laws 
suffer from cumulated application of several conflicts rules, 
referring to different legislations, to one and the same con-
tract. The Restatement, for instance, divides the problems 
arising on a contract into two parts, subjecting one part to 
the law of the place where the contract is concluded a~d the 
other to the law of the place where the contract is to be per-
formed. 92 The division is precarious and very objectionable 
in several respects, but chiefly because a contract should not be 
split on a priori grounds. A similar distinction between the 
87 Judgments nos. 14 and 15 of July u, 192.9. 
88 Cf. for instance, the provisions of the Montevideo Treaty of 1889 on com-
mercial law, arts. 14 and 151 changed in the Draft of 1940 on' commercial 
maritime law to art. 25. 
89 Restatement§ 345; RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 8uff. 
90 For a synthesis, see BATIFFOL. 
91 For theoretical discussion of the method of connecting isolated parts of the 
facts with different countries, see WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 230. 
92 Restatement§§ 332 and 358; cf. in particular CooK, Legal Bases 345, 346. 
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creation and the effect of contracts is admitted by the Swiss 
Federal' Tribunal. 93 Still worse, the German courts allocate 
the duties of the seller and the buyer to the laws of their re-
spective places of performance, these, if not otherwise pro-
vided, being presumed to be at the corresponding domicils. A 
bilateral contract cannot be broken up into such fragments 
without distorting a number of problems. 94 All such rules will 
vanish when the different types of contracts rather than dif-
ferent parts of contracts in general form the center of interest. 
Another point will hold our attention in the next chapters. 
Capacity to contract is generally determined in this country 
by the law of the place where the contract is made, a law not 
necessarily the same as the law governing the contract in other 
respects, for instance, that intended by the parties. In Con-
tinental Europe, an individual's capacity is determined as a 
rule by his personal law, a law potentially different from that 
or those governing other aspects of the contract. In both 
hemispheres, the respective rules concerning capacity appear 
overextended, and the distinction between capacity and other 
aspects of contracts, at least in certain cases, should be 
abolished. 95 
2. Independent Conflicts Rules 
The crucial point to be reformed is the blind subjection of 
conflicts rules to the private Jaw of each country. The ex-
tremely broad and at the same time fragmentary rules usual 
in the enacted conflicts laws of the nineteenth century, includ-
ing the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code, in-
corporate language taken from provincial legal thinking. As 
these rules are progressively refined, the more urgent is their 
independence of notions defined by the law of the forum in 
order to enable other legal systems in the pertinent cases to 
be invoked. 
93 Supra n. 61. 
s. See NEUNER, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 108. 
115 Infra p. 195· 
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This need is by no means limited to "characterization." 
Cook has pointed out how often in this country confusion is 
caused by applying the "law" of a state, without exact inquiry 
whether such law is not limited to domestic cases and raises 
no question of conflicts law. 96 Thus, a statute of Texas pre-
scribing that a married woman cannot charge her separate es-
tate to secure her husband's obligation, does not necessarily 
impose such restriction upon a wife domiciled in another state, 
even when the transaction occurs in Texas. 97 Resort to stat-
utory construction is the usual method of avoiding faulty con-
clusions. This method, however, should be limited to its 
natural domain. A statutory provision must be analyzed in 
respect to the question whether it incorporates a fundamental 
policy of the state (as in the case of the Texas statute men-
tioned). It may occasionally occur also, as we have remarked 
before, that a private law rule is not intended or is not fit to 
be applied in another jurisdiction, a situation that much more 
frequently occurs in the case of administrative (police) regu-
lations. But answers to the regular questions of conflicts law 
are rarely contained in municipal statutes. Private law rules 
ordinarily do not direct which persons or movables they in-
clude. It is as mistaken to apply such rules blindly to events 
all over the world as to presume them limited to merely 
domestic situations. They are simply neutral; the answer is 
not in them. Generally, therefore, what is needed, or even 
feasible, is not an interpretation of the statute but a rule of 
private international law to accompany and delimit the rule of 
private law. A striking example is the confusion exhibited in 
determining the relation between adoption and inheritance 
statutes in different states, a confusion chiefly attributable to 
futile attempts to interpret one or the other of these statutes, 
neither dealing with conflicts questions. 98 
96 CooK, Legal Bases. 
97 CooK, Legal Bases 438, 439· 
95 Infra pp. 195 and 6sz.. 
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A full program for the needed reform cannot be outlined in 
this place. There is no reason why this branch of law should 
not enjoy the abundance of legal devices, characterizing 
modern private or penal law. 
3· Internationalization 
Against the expectation of a priori theorists, it is remarkable 
to what extent conflicts rules are able to serve in many 
countries, once relieved from the burden of local legal tech-
niques and related to situations in actual life. The modern 
means of communication, the organization of international 
trade, the progress of science, and some general trends in the 
evolutior{ of social policy, provide a common basis. An un-
biased examination of the actual facts represented by an in-
ternational sale, an employment contract, a claim for work-
men's compensation, or a negotiable instrument payable to the 
holder, should and will result in similar solutions everywhere. 
As a matter of fact, there exists a truly international consider-
ation of all these and many other matters, which encounters 
few obstacles in national legal peculiarities but many m 
doctrinal traditions. 
Here it is that comparative research again comes in to 
indicate whether and, if so, to what extent unification or mutual 
reconciliation is feasible and desirable. In one respect, this 
statement requires qualification. With little justification, the 
comparative method is often suspected to favor imitation of 
alien ways and to sacrifice national characteristics. The facts 
are to the contrary.99 Not infrequently, foreign institutions, 
99 See, for example, FusTEL DE CoULANGES, La cite antique z: "Pour a voir 
mal observe les institutions de la cite ancienne, on a imagine de les faire revivre 
chez nous." HEYMANN, Das ungarische Privatrecht und der Rechtsausgleich mit 
Ungarn (1917) 96; EuGEN HUBER, Erlauterungen zum Vorentwurf des 
Schweizerischen Zivil-Gesetzbuchs 7; RABEL, Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit der 
Rechtsvergleichung, published as Miinchener Juristische Vortrage Heft t (19z5) 
9> ZJ. 
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naively adopted without adequate comparison, have been 
transplanted from their natural soil to degenerate in uncon-
genial surroundings. Often also, "reception" of foreign legal 
institutions has occurred without appreciation of the grave 
defects inherent in an admired law. Scientific comparison dis-
cerns the essential from the accidental causes and effects of 
legal rules; its purpose is to enrich, rather than to standardize 
the juridical world. 
Conflicts law, however, has its own measures. It urgently 
requires sanctuaries from chaos. The more private rights are 
protected by international justice, the more will unification 
be desired. Federations such as the United States or Switzer-
land 100 know fr~m copious experience how indispensable is 
a common background of legal concepts and principles to cope 
with the peculiar terms and ideas of particular states or can-
tons. The Mixed Arbitral Tribunals of the 192o's plainly 
exemplified the situation of courts that lack a "law of the 
forum" in the ordinary sense of the term and have no con-
flicts rules other than those that happen to coincide in the 
participating states.101 The great expectations for a develop-
ment of this branch of law by these courts, first dealing on a 
large scale with international private causes, were disap-
pointed.102 After the present cata~trophes, fervent hopes may 
well attach to supranational courts adjudging private actions 
of international significance.103 But any substantial develop-
100 BG. (June 30, 1905) 31 BGE. I 2.87: for the purpose of intercantonal 
conflicts law, the scope of matrimonial property law, as contrasted with inherit-
ance law, is to be defined according to the general Swiss concepts and the nature 
of things rather than to the cantonal laws involved in the case. 
101 See RABEL, 1 Z.ausl.PR. (192.7) 33-47. 
102 On the conflicts cases of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals see GUTZWILLER, 
"Das Internationalprivatrecht der durch die Friedensvertrage eingesetzten 
Gemischten SchiedsgerichtshOfe," 3 Int. Jahrbuch f. Schiedsgerichtswesen ( 19 31) 
12.J. 
103 The Institute for' International Law proposed in 192.9 to extend the juris-
diction of the Permanent Court of International Justice to disputes concerning 
the interpretation of the conventions on private international law; see Annuaire 
INTRODUCTION 
ment of such judicial relief will have to be accompanied by a 
radical turn of choice of law rules from provincial to world-
wide thinking. 
The new trend can be summarized in the three-fold effort 
toward realism, comparative method, and international 
understanding. 
1929 III 305. This suggestion has been taken up by the Protocol of March 27, 
19 31 (supra p. 32), recognizing the competence of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice to interpret these Conventions. In my opinion regional 
international courts and a second division of the World Court should be created 
to deal with various kinds of private claims having international significance. 
PART TWO 
PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS 
CHAPTER 4 
The Personal Law 
I. NATURE AND ScoPE oF PERSONAL LAW 
1. Personal Law Defined 
THE term "personal law" had its origin in the doctrine of the Italian school of postglossators (thirteenth-fifteenth centuries) and their French successors (six-
teenth-eighteenth centuries). This school divided all rules of 
law into three categories, viz., statuta realia, statuta personalia, 
and statuta mixta. Statuta personalia, "personal statutes," 
comprised those rules of law that followed a person from one 
·jurisdiction to another, thus having "extraterritorial effect," 
while the rules of the "statute real" applied exclusively 
within the territory of a single sovereign. Ever since the times 
of the postglossators, the terms have been in use but with con-
siderable variations in meaning.1 Even today writers disagree 
in defining personal law, and particular rules of law aire 
variously characterized as pertaining to the realm of the statute 
real or to the statute personal. 2 
. Despite these differences, however, it is commonly assumed 
that in certain respects the legal position of an individual 
should normally be determined by the law of that state with 
which he is deemed to be connected in a permanent way, rather 
than by the divergent laws of those states in which he may 
happen to be physically present, to act, or to engage in trans-
actions. This proposition includes two parts: 
First, that a person is attributed certain legal characteristics 
of a comparatively permanent character; and, 
1 :z ARMINJON (ed. :z) 70 ff. nos. z8-z8 ter. 
2 C/. for instance, WALKER :z4. 
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Second, that these permanent characteristics ought to be de-
termined by one law for all purposes rather than from case 
to case by different laws. 
Scope of the personal law. The sphere of application of 
the personal law has fluctuated in the course of time and is not 
everywhere the same today. Under the broadest definition, 
problems pertaining to the following subjects would be re-
garded as problems of personal law: 
Personality or capacity to have rights in general (German 
Rechtsfiihigheit, French capacite de jouissance); 
Beginning and end of personality; 
Capacity to engage in legal transactions (German Geschiifts-
fiihighei!); 
Protection of personal interests, such as honor, name and 
business firm, privacy, and the like; 
Family relations, especially the relations between husband 
and wife, parent and child, and guardian and ward, also 
transactions of family law, especially marriage, divorce, 
adoption, legitimation, emancipation, and appointment 
of a committee for an incompetent person; 
Succession, both testate and intestate, to movables and in 
more recent times also succession to immovables. 
While in the various civil law countries this list is subject to 
varying restrictions, it is sharply reduced in American law. 
It is true, the general principle, repeatedly stated by British 
courts and textwriters, that the "status" of a person is deter-
mined by the law of his domicil, a is plainly accepted in the 
United States/ where it has even been called "the most widely 
advocated rule of conflict of laws." 5 Nevertheless, current 
3 DICEY 634; CHESHIRE 208. 
4 Pfeifer v. Wright (1929 D. C. N.D. Okla.) 34 F. (2d) 69o; Strader v. 
Graham (185o) 10 How. (51 U.S.) 82; Woodward v. Woodward (1889) 87 
Tenn. 644)II S. W. 892 (emancipation in Louisiana); and others. 
6
.HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases :1.71 n. 17. See STORY§§ 57 ff. and§§ 94-96 
and 1 WHARTON§§ xox-xo4 z/3, both recognizing only restrictions of public 
policy on the ubiquity of personal law. 
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opinion in the United States is inclined to ascribe to the per-
sonal law a domain narrower than it receives in England 6 
and much more limited than it enjoys on the Continent. In 
particular, capacity to contract is now preponderantly re-
garded as being determined by the law of the place of con-
tracting rather than by the law of the domicil, although in a 
few American decisions 7 the domiciliary law has been recog-
nized as governing an individual's capacity to contract and in 
numerous cases it coincides with that of the place of con-
tracting.8 
Beale goes still further in reducing the significance of 
"status," perhaps since he encountered difficulties in recon-
ciling an ubiquitous personal law with the system of ter-
ritoriality that he advocates. 9 In his treatise and in the Re-
statement, he proposes to delete what may be described as a 
remnant of a former status law, except for a strictly limited 
number of family relationships, such as marriage, the relation 
between parent and child, adoption, and guardianship. Al-
though status is defined in the Restatement in general terms 10 
and although the topics dealt with in Chapter 5 of the Re-
statement are designated merely as "those of chief lm-
portance," they seem nevertheless to be all-inclusive.11 
6 See the results reached by DICEY 634-637, 9JI, 966, and more recently 
CHESHIRE 208 ("a rule which regulates the capacity or incapacity of a person 
is part of the law of his status"). For the entire problem, see below, p. I 90. 
7 Especially Brown v. Dalton (I889) I05 Ky. 669,49 S. W. 443; also Huy's 
Appeal (I854) I Grant (Pa.) 51; Ritch v. Hyatt (I879) 3 MacArthur 536 
(Io D. C.); Matthews v. Murchison (I883 C. C., E. D. N.C.) I7 Fed. 760; 
Freeman's Appeal (I897) 68 Conn. 533, 37 Atl. 420; cf. 2 BEALE II8o n. 4· 
8 Cj. RUDOLF MUELLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (I934) 888-890; BATIFFOL p8. 
9 See WIGNY, Essai 75· 
10 Restatement § I 19 and comment. 
11 In the Restatement, "status" is not treated as containing permanent condi-
tions or qualities, but it is limited to such "relationships" between persons as 
have been described by BEALE as relative in contrast to absolute ones, 2 BEALE 
649. This narrow definition has been criticized by KuHN as being made "wholly 
from the viewpoint of one (i.e., the American common law) system," whereas, in 
solving problems of conflict of laws, the attribution of capacity and incapacity 
to persons has also to be considered. KUHN, Comp. Com. I I 5· 
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This position will attract the attention of any civil law 
writer as a striking contrast to established doctrines. In all 
countries outside of the United States, the concept of personal 
law has preserved a dominant position and has retained more 
vigor than its ancient opponent, the territorial law, which has 
found such eminent defenders in this country. On the other 
hand, the traditional theory has been challenged in several 
respects by recent European critics, and reference has re-
peatedly been made to the American rules for this purpose. 
The broader conception of the personal law is to be found 
authoritatively defined in recent treaties concluded between 
Western and Oriental powers, whereby foreigners are ex-
empted from the territorial jurisdiction in "matters of per-
sonal law." It is interesting to note that the United States has 
participated in such treaties. The following definition is given, 
for instance, in the Agreement between the United States and · 
Persia, concluded on July u, 1928: 12 
"Whereas Persian nationals in the United States of America 
enjoy most-favored-nation treatment in the matter of per-
sonal status, ... non-Moslem nationals of the United States in 
Persia shall be subject to their national laws in the said matter 
of personal status, that is, with regard to all questions con-
cerning marriage and conjugal community rights, divorce, 
judicial separation, dowry, paternity, affiliation, adoption, 
capacity of persons, majority, guardianship, trusteeship, and 
interdiction; in regard to movable property, the right of suc-
cession by will or ab intestato, distribution and settlement; 
and, in general, family law." 
By the Convention of Montreux of May 8, 1937, which 
abolished the system of capitulations in Egypt, the Mixed 
Tribunals were retained for a further period, running until 
1949, and status and capacity were declared to be subject to 
the jurisdiction of these tribunals in the absence of consular 
jurisdiction where the religious courts are not competent. This 
12 Published in U. S. Executive Agreement Series No. 2.0. 
-
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Convention provided the following definition of personal 
status: 
"Personal status comprises: suits and matters relating to 
the status and capacity of persons, legal relations between 
members of a family, more particularly, betrothal, marriage, 
the reciprocal rights and duties of husband and wife, dowry 
and their rights of property during marriage, divorce, re-
pudiation, separation, legitimacy, recognition and repudiation 
of paternity, the relation between ascendants and descendants, 
the duty to support as between relatives by blood or marriage, 
legitimisation, adoption, guardianship, curatorship, interdic-
tion, emancipation and also gifts, inheritance, wills and other 
dispositions mortis causa, absence and the presumption of 
death." 13 
2. Legal Problems 
Status. Usually, "status," taken from the Roman doctrine 
of status libertatis (freedom), status civitatis (citizenship), 
and status familiae (position as head of the house or as free 
person subjected to the pater familias) 14 refers to situations 
subjected to the personal law. The word, "status," is com-
monly used but should not be taken as a precise legal term. Its 
exact meaning in English law has been discussed in many 
places but in a manner described by competent English writers 
as confused.15 "Of all the perplexing questions which the 
13 Rules concerning Judicial Organisation in Egypt, art. 2 8, referred to in 
art. I o pars. I and 2 of the Convention Concerning the Abolition of the Capitula-
tions in Egypt, Montreux, May 8, I937· Text in U.S. Treaty Series, No. 939, in 
34 Am. J. Int. Law Supp. (I940) 20I, I82 League of Nations Treaty Series 
(I937-I938) .37, and in HuosoN, 7 Int. Legislation 684 No. 48o-48oc. The 
Convention has been ratified by the United States, Egypt, Belgium, Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, Union of South Africa, New Zealand, 
India, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
and Sweden. See comment in I STREIT-VALLINDAS 385-400. Cf. comment in 
I9 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I938) I6I; MoRELLI in 29 Rivista (1937) 324, 
329. Other provisions in the Regulations contain elaborate rules on conflict of 
laws, prepa~ed on the basis of the Hague Conventions. 
14 In the Roman sense status means a degree in legal capacity; cf. SIBER, 2 
Romisches Recht (1928) 25. 15 See CHESHIRE 208 and for a survey ALLEN, "Status and Capacity," 46 Law 
Q. Rev. (1930) 277. 
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science of jurisprudence presents, the notion of status or condi-
tion is incomparably the most difficult," declared Austin.16 
Some American decisions also have considered the concept 
nebulous, while unwarranted conclusions have been deduced 
from it by others.17 In fact, modern law recognizes no absolute 
legal characteristics inherent in a person as in the Roman or 
medieval laws. Qualification of an individual as husband or 
legitimate father indicates no more than the existence of legal 
relations with another person, although it is true that third 
persons may thereby to a certain degree be excluded from 
challenging the relationship. 
Prohibitive policy. It is universally agreed t.hat foreign laws 
affecting a person's status are to be disregarded where they 
have a political or penal character.18 Hence, such impairments 
of a convict's capacity to enjoy civil rights or to engage in 
transactions as are provided by the English Forfeiture Act of 
July 4, 1870, the French Law of May 31, 1854 (arts. 2 and 
3), or American civil death statutes, are not enforced by the 
courts of other states.19 
Likewise, a law or decree disenabling a person from dis-
posing of his property, in a manner discriminating against 
him rather than for the purpose of his protection, is generally 
denied effect outside of the state of enactment. 20 Thus the 
16 AuSTIN, I Jurisprudence (ed. s, I88s) JSI; 2 ibid. 943: "To fix the 
notion of status with perfect exactness, seems to be impossible." 
17 See the penetrating observations of T AINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy 
and Recognition in the Conflict of Laws," I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) 589, 591, 
69I-697· 
18 See STORY§ 104; r WHARTON I 8 § 4b; STIMSON, Conflict of Criminal Law 
(I936) 1; I BAR § I46. It is no exception to this rule, that a person may be 
considered incapable of being entrusted with a function, such as guardianship, 
because of a foreign conviction; see e.g., Spanish C. C. art. 237 par. 2 and 
TRiAs DEBEs 72 no. 99· 
19 The Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of 1940, art. I, 
2nd sentence, provides that no incapacity of a penal character nor for reasons of 
religion, race, nationality or opinion will be recognized. On the non-application 
of foreign civil death statutes, see Note in 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (I939) 288. 
20 See the recent decision of Trib. comm. Bruxelles (June 9, 1938) Jur. Comm. 
Brux. I938, 412, and App. Ziirich (March r, 1939) 42 Bull. Inst. Int. (1940) 
87. 
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Soviet Russian monopoly of trade prohibiting all private per-
sons residing in Russia from concluding contracts with foreign 
countries except through the Commissariat of Commerce, 
like other monopolies of public law, is inapplicable outside of 
Russia.21 
Connection of a person with a given territory. What con-
nection must exist between an individual and a particular state 
in order to subject such person to the personal laws of that 
state? There are two different systems. In certain countries, 
the necessary connection is deemed to exist between an in-
dividual and a particular state, if the individual is one of its 
nationals; in other countries, the necessary connection is found 
in the fact that the individual is domiciled in the state in ques-
tion. 
3· Rationale 
While, a generation ago, the existence of a personal law 
was explained by such theoretical arguments as the nature of 
law, the needs of sovereignty, the character of the power of a 
sovereign over persons, and the like, in recent times the ad-
vocates of the theory of personal law customarily resort to 
more practical considerations of convenience and expediency. 
A first line of argument is based upon the interests of the 
individuals concerned. The legal position of a person, it is 
said, must be the same everywhere; it would be unjust and 
impracticable to have it determined in different ways in dif-
ferent countries or in different situations, perhaps in some 
instances even in the same court. In other words, the unity and 
identity of a person should be respected and guaranteed by 
the consistent application of one and the same law in all coun-
tries and in all situations. 
A second line of reasoning has become singularly effective 
today. Each state is said to have a profound governmental in-
" MAKARov, Precis 194 reaches the same result by another (mistaken) reason-in:. 
108 PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS 
terest in the regulation of the personal status and the family 
relations of its subjects,22 an interest which every other state 
ought properly to respect. In order to protect this interest 
more effectively, exclusive jurisdiction over questions of status 
is often claimed by the state of the personal law, or the rules 
of the personal law are declared to belong to the domain of 
public policy. Thus, a state which adheres to the principle of 
nationality attempts to extend its own system of social regula-
tion to its nationals living abroad, whereas a country adhering 
to the principle of domicil imposes its own laws upon the 
foreigners living within its borders. These tendencies, and 
particularly that of extending one's own laws to nationals 
living abroad, are so firmly rooted in the political traditions of 
Europe that recent counter-currents have not only failed to 
leave any deep impression on the legislatures but have even 
suggested to an eminent French author that the scope of ap-
plication of the personal law should be expanded far beyond 
its present extent. 23 
It seems, indeed, that uniform regulation of matters of 
status is justified; at least with respect to the basic facts of 
personal life. Whether a person shall be deemed to be mar-
ried, divorced, adopted, subject to guardianship, or civilly 
dead, should be decided at any place in the same way, if un-
certainty and confusion is not to beset the individual, his 
family, and other persons with whom he engages in transac-
tions. The weight of this consideration may vary as regards 
different problems, and careful investigation of the interests 
at stake ought to be undertaken with regard to each situation. 
But, essentially, the principle seems undeniable. 
22 With respect to those matters that are recognized in the Restatement as 
covered by status, this governmental interest is explained in § I I 9 comment c. 
23 BARTIN, 2 Principes 20, 90. Throughout the four volumes of FRANKEN-
STEIN's work, the national law is considered as "the primary basic principle of 
private international law." See vol. 4, 65o. 
Recently the Danish writer BoRUM recommended that his country go over 
from the domiciliary principle to that of nationality. See his Personalstatutet 
552, 565. 
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The most formidable objection against a single personal 
law arises from the present state of international law; the 
doctrine cannot be carried out consistently. Apart from the 
intricacies caused by conflicting rules of jurisdiction, serious 
conflicts are due to the difference between the principles of 
domicil and nationality, resulting in the subjection in different 
states of one and the same individual to different laws. Morc:;-
over, no agreement exists with respect to where a person is 
domiciled, nor is nationality an unfailing criterion. It should 
not be overlooked, however, that many such conflicts can be 
remedied by special techniques, especially by application of 
the "renvoi," an institution that, on account of its usefulness, 
should be viewed without theoretical prejudices. 
II. CoNTACTs DETERMINING THE PERSONAL LAw 
I. Domicil 
(a) Domicil of origin. In all the centuries since the post-
glossators, the traditional contact for the determination of a 
person's status has been his domicil. In earlier, ancient and 
medieval, organizations, the legal condition of an individual 
in its totality was created by his "origin"· as a member of a 
political unit, in Roman law his origo, signifying his citizen-
ship in an autonomous city. Following the older fundamental 
role of descent, some of the pandectists in various cases re-
sorted to what was shortly and paradoxically described 24 as 
the domicilium originis, generally the domicil of the father 
of the individual at the time of the latter's birth. 25 Although, 
naturally and legally, a child takes its father's domicil at birth 
and upon attaining majority may acquire a new domicil, the 
domicil of origin substituted for the actual domicil, when 
doubtful or incorrectly obtained or where no domicil was to 
24 See SAVIGNY § 359 at n. (q). 
25 See SAVIGNY § 359 at n. (n). The same definition of domicil of origin is 
still proper in, English law. See WESTLAKE § Z45; 6 HALSBURY zoo. 
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be found. This subsidiary concept was employed in the 
eighteenth century by French writers and in the Prussian 
legislation 26 as the prime test for determining majority or 
interdiction for prodigality.27 Even today in Argentina, it is 
applied to persons without an actual domicil. 28 In British 
countries, this criterion has been retained and singularly de-
veloped; not only is the domicil of origin resorted to whenever 
the domicil of choice cannot be ascertained or has been 
abandoned without establishing a new domicil, but the courts 
also require such strong evidence of abandonment of the 
domicil of origin that it has been said to be "difficult to con-
ceive of a case in which the domicil of origin can be shaken 
off." 29 It corresponds to Continental nationality rather than 
to Continental domicil. 30 
(b) Domicil of choice. The normal concept of domicil is 
presented by that domicil which is voluntarily chosen by an 
independent person. The law of this domicil primarily con-
trols personal relations in the following countries: 
All English common law countries and, in addition, Scot-
land, South Africa, and Quebec (where the principle has 
been laid down in the C.C. art. 6).31 
Denmark,a2 Norway,33 Iceland.34 
26 Prussian Allg. Landrecht of 1794, Einleitung § 29. 
It may be suggested that the same idea is implied in the much discussed words 
of § 34 of the Austrian AUg. BGB. which may be translated as "laws of the 
place to which the foreigner is subject (als Untertan unterliegt) by virtue of his 
domicil or if he has no actual domicil by virtue of his birth." 
27 Originally by FROLAND and BouLLENOIS; see PILLET, Principes 304 no. 143 
n. I; 2 ARMINJON (ed. z) 8o ff. no. I 8 ter. 
25 Argentina, C.C. arts. 96 and 89 zd part; cf. 1 Vrco no. 392. 
29 CHESHIRE I74; cf. Lord Macnaghten in Winans v. Att. Gen. [I904] A. C. 
287 at 291; Lord Hanworth in Boldrini v. Boldrini [1932] P. 9· 
30 BENTWICH in: The Law of Domicile in its Relation to Succession and the 
Doctrine of Renvoi (19II) Iz; 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I931) 57; 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 
715; 52 Jurid. Rev. (1940) 284, 285ff. 31 It seems to be recognized in Canada generally; cf. 1 JoHNSON I82, 454· 
32 BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 216 no. 19. 
33 CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 569 no. 66. 
S4 4 LESKE-LOEWENFELD I 761. 
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Estonia: Law of the Baltic Prov. (I864) introd. art. xxvii. 
Latvia: C.C. (I937) §§ 8-25.35 
Argentina: C.C. arts. 6 and 7.36 
Brazil: Introductory Law (I942) art. 7· 
Guatemala: Constitutive Law on Judicial Power (I933) 
art. xvii; Law on Foreigners (I936) arts. I7 and I8. 
Nicaragua: C. C. tft. prel. VI, I. 
Paraguay: C.C. arts. 6 and 7· 
Peru: C.C. (I936) tft. prel. art. V (for non-Peruvians). 
The Treaty of Montevideo of I 8 8 9, article I (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay) still in force among the 
contracting countries, is to the same effect. Article I of the 
text of I 940, not ratified, provides that the existence, the 
·status, and the capacity of physical persons are governed by 
the law of domicil. 
(c) Domicil by operation of law. In most of the just 
mentioned countries, although not in all, as for instance not in 
Norway, certain groups of persons (wife, minor children, etc.) 
are considered by law to share the domicil of other individuals. 
The latter accordingly determines the status of the dependent 
person. 
(d) Residence. If, according to the concepts of the forum, 
it is found that an individual has no domicil of choice or as a 
dependent, either within or without the country, different 
solutions obtain. English courts apply the law of the domicil 
of origin. In this country, it is generally assumed that a domicil 
once established continues until it is superseded by a new 
domicil.37 This proposition is a direct corollary of the axiom 
that every person must have a domicil and is therefore cate-
35 SCHILLING, 11 Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 484, 491. 
36 Domicil is decisive not only for capacity to contract but also for personality. 
See 1 VIco no. 438, rejecting other theories. 
37 Restatement § 23 and its various Annotations. See also 28 C.J.S., Domicile 
§ 13• 
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goric. In addition, it is presumed that an intended change or 
abandonment of the last established domicil is not completed 
until a new home has been acquired.38 
All these views are represented in Latin-American legisla-
tions. In addition, the subsidiary test of residence, well known 
in such fields as jurisdiCtion and taxation/9 at times appears 
in conflicts law. This method has been followed by the Monte-
video Treaty 40 and the C6digo Bustamante/1 as well as by 
the recent Brazilian law.42 In default of residence, the latter 
two enactments contain a supplementary reference to the place 
where the individual is temporarily dwelling. 
These expedients would seem to serve well also in this 
country in cases where the continuance of a former domicil 
cannot be affirmed without undue fiction. 
2. Nationality 
The pr.inciple that an individual's personal law ought to be 
determined by his nationality was first established at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century in the Code Napoleon, 
which provided that the French laws concerning personal 
status and capacity govern Frenchmen even when residing in 
foreign countries (Art. 3 par. 3). In the converse case of a 
foreigner residing in France, the French courts, after some 
initial doubts, now generally apply by way of analogy the law 
of the country of which he is a national. 
While this French provision exerted a steady influence as a 
model; an additional powerful impulse was started in the same 
38 2 8 C.J .S., Domicile § r 6. . 
39 This rule has been adopted in following the doctrine of SAVIGNY 107 § 354 
in an influential provision of the Chilean Civil Code art. 6 8: mere residence 
replaces civil domicil with respect to persons not domiciled elsewhere. · 
40 Text of 18 8g, art. g, which is not really contrary to art. 5, as has been 
claimed; text of 1940, art. s, 2 o - 4 •. 
The Argentine C.C. arts. 8g, g6, resorts to the domicil of origin, and art. 98 
declares that the last known domicil prevails when no new domicil is known 1 
but art. go, 5o, provides for a legal domicil as the place of actual residence for 
transients as well as for persons having no known domicil. 
41 Art. 26. • 
42 Decreto-Lei n. 4.657 of Igp, Lei de Introdu!;ao, art. 7 § 8 .• 
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direction by the Italian patriot, Mancini. In a famous lecture, 
delivered in Turin in I 8 5 I, he proclaimed that a person 
should be subject in all respects affecting his personality to the 
law of his nation. The Italian Civil Code adopted this doc-
trine, referring the concept of nationality to political allegiance 
to a given state and extending the sphere of the personal law 
from problems of "status and capacity," to which it was ap-
plied in France, to the whole law of family relations. 
In this way, the notion that an individual's private rights 
should be determined not by his physical location but by his 
political allegiance, owes its origin to the awareness of national 
identity that was born in the French Revolution and strength-
ened in the Italian struggle for national unity. With the ex-
pansion of political nationalism, the idea that each country 
should determine the legal status of its subjects, admitting the 
analogous claims of other states, expanded likewise and has 
been adopted in the following countries: 
France and French colonies: C.C. art. 3 par. 3· 
Italy and Italian colonies: C.C. (r865) Disp. Prel. art. 6; 
C.C. (1938) Disp. Prel. art. 7 par. I; C.C. (1942) 
Disp. Prel. art. I 7 par. I. 
Belgium: C.C. art. 3 par. 3· 
Luxemburg: C.C. art. 3 par. 3· 
Monaco: C.C. art. 3 par. 3· 
The Netherlands: Law of May I 5, 1829, arts. 6, 9; H. R. 
(Jan. 5, 1917) W.roo73, N.J. (r9q) 143; Hof 
Amsterdam (June 6, 1919) W.10444, N.J. (1919) 
I032. Neth. Indies: Law of April 30, 1847, April 6, 
I9IS, art. I6. Surinam: Law of Sept. 4, r868, art. 7· 
Rumania: C. C. art. 2; for foreigners, App. Bucarest 
(May 9, 1901) Sirey 1904,4.21 (with note by the pro-
curator of the government at the court of cassation); 
Plastara, 7 Repert. 62 nos. 141, 143. 
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Bulgaria: Court decisions, see Ghenov, 6 Repert: 189 nos. 
47, 51. 
Finland: Law no. 379 of Dec. 5, I929· 
Germany: EG. BGB. arts. 7, 9, I3-I5, I7-25. 
Greece: C.C. (1940) art. 4· 
Hungary: Customary law, cf. Szladits in 23 Grotius Soc. 
I937, 27; von Szaszy, II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) I69. 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 23. 
Montenegro: C.C. art. 788. 
Poland: Law of Aug. 2, I926, art. I par. 1. 
Portugal: C.C. arts. 24, 27. 
Spain: C.C. art. 9; for foreigners cf. Trias de Bes 66; 
Lasala Llana 2o-22, and decisions cited. 
Sweden: Law of July 8, I904: amendment of June 27, 
1924. 
Turkey: Law of March I, I9IS for foreigners: for Turks 
abroad see Salem, 7 Repert. 26I no. I99· 
Iran: C.C. art. 962. 
China: Law of Aug. s, I9I8, art. S· 
Japan: Law of June IS, I898, art. 3· 
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 3. 
Cuba: C.C. art. 9· 
Dominican Rep.: C.C. art. 3 par. 3.43 
Ecuador: C.C. art. I4. 
Haiti: C.C. art. 7· 
Honduras: C. C. art. I 3. 
Mexico: formerC.C. (I884) art. I2. Seepages II7-:II8, 
infra. 
Panama: C.C. art. sa. 
Venezuela: C.C. art. 9· 
Treaty: Colombia-Ecuador of June I 8, I903, art. 2. 
« See the reservation no. 1 of the Dominican delegation to their signature 
to the C6digo Bustamante, 86 League of Nations Treaty Series (1929) No. 19501 
24-01 24-11 3 76. 
THE PERSONAL LAW il5 
The nationality principle was also adopted in the Hague 
Conventions of I 902 and I 90 5, 44 and formed the base of the 
Treaty of Lima, 1878. In the Treaty of Montevideo, on the 
other hand, the domiciliary law was preferred. During the 
preparation of the C6digo Bustamante, vigorous efforts were 
made to overcome the cleavage dividing the American nations 
with respect to the test of personal law, but unfortunately 
without success.45 Article 7 of the C6digo declares that 
"Each contracting state shall apply as personal law the law of 
the domicil or the law of the nationality or that which its 
domestic legislation may have prescribed, or may hereafter 
prescribe." 
Hence, no unified rule whatever has come into existence. 
3. Mixed Systems 
Switzerland. Switzerland 46 applies Swiss private law to 
foreigners domiciled in Switzerland and prescribes that a 
Swiss national abroad shall be governed by the law of his 
domicil. If, however, the state of the foreign domicil does not 
subject the Swiss national to its municipal legislation, then the 
Swiss courts have to resort to the law of the canton of which he 
is a citizen. This proviso applies, for instance, to Swiss nationals 
domiciled in France, Germany, or Italy, all of which follow 
the system of national law. 
In this way, conflicts with the law of the domicil are avoided, 
the Swiss law being resorted to only where it is also applied 
by the courts of the domicil. Fallowing this approach of the 
Swiss law, the German courts are now in agreement that a 
Swiss citizen domiciled in Germany is to be judged according 
44 It also was adopted for the Egyptian Mixed Tribunals in their Regulations 
of Judicial Organisation, art. 2.9. 
45 See BuSTAMANTE, La commission des jurisconsultes de Rio :z r 3.ff. 
46 NAG. arts. :z and :z8. Capacity to contr;tct, however, is excepted from the 
rule stated in the text and is subjected to the principle of nationality; see below, p. 
rss. 
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to Swiss law and that Swiss law ought not to be interpreted as 
containing a renvoi to the law of the domicil. 47 
A us tria. The draftsmen of the Austrian Civil Code of I 8 I I 
probably intended that the law of the domicil, either of choice 
or of origin, should be applied to foreigners whether living in 
Austria or abroad. 48 The relevant section of the Code 49 was 
so badly drafted, however, that its meaning was never quite 
certain. While the older annotators regarded the provision as 
establishing the domiciliary test, 50 authors and courts of the 
nineteenth century came to look upon it as a full-fledged 
adoption of the principle of nationality.51 This development 
was motivated not only by the general trend of the period but 
also by the provision which the Code had established for 
Austrians living abroad. Under this provision, not all private 
affairs of such citizens were subject to Austrian law, but only 
acts and contracts of Austrians occurring abroad, to the extent 
that the Austrian law limits personal capacity to undertake 
such acts and contracts and these acts and contracts are in-
tended to produce legal effects in Austrian territories. 52 
Most annotators were inclined to regard this provision as a 
general adoption of the principle of nationality so far as Aus-
trians were concerned and to neglect the limitations expressed 
in the text. 53 The Supreme Court, however, following a 
47 See the following Swiss authors: STAUFFER, NAG. art. 28 no. 3; BECK, 
NAG., 141 no. 36. 
In Germany: RG. (Oct. 26, 1912) Warn. Rspr. 1913 no. 37; RG. (Nov. 8, 
1922) 105 RGZ. 34o; Bay. ObLG. (Oct. u, 1917) 35 ROLG. 38o, cf. 
MELCHIOR 224 § 150; RAAPE 750. 
48 In the case of a person having no domicil at the relevant moment, presumably 
the law of his domicil of origin was intended to be applied. 
49 Allg. BGB. § 34· 
50 SAVIGNY § 363 II; UNGER, 1 System 164; for further citations see WALKER 
92 n. 19. 
51 RANDA in 6 GriinhQt's Z. (I 8 79) 7 8 5; KRASNOPOLSKI in 2 5 Geller's 
Zentralblatt ( 1907) 1 o8; STEIN LECHNER in 2 Festschrift zur Jahrhundertfeier 
des Allg. ,BGR (191 1) 65; WALKER 93 and n. z4. 
52Allg. BGB. § 4· 
53 See WALKER 91 n. 16; I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ (1925) 94 calls there-
striction superfi uous. 
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theory which had been established by an ingenious author,54 
imbued the limitations with new life by holding that the 
numerous peculiar restrictions of Austrian marriage law would 
not be applied to an Austrian marrying abroad and not in-
tending at the time of such marriage to live in Austria. 5 5 This 
decision has been criticized as opening the door to law 
evasion. 5 6 
Latin America. However, the ideas underlying the pro-
vision of the Austrian Code appeared so reasonable to Andres 
Bello, the draftsman of the Chilean Civil Code of 1 8 55, that 
he adopted it, in a modified form, for his own country. 57 His 
example has been followed in several other Latin American 
countries, where the Austrian rule has been adopted in com-
bination with varying systems. 
Under the Chilean Code, every inhabitant of the country, 
even though he may not be a citizen or a domiciliary, techni-
cally speaking, is declared subject to the law of Chile. 58 
Similar provisions, with or without textual modification, have 
been included in the laws of Colombia, 59 Ecuador, 60 Mexico, 60a 
El Salvador,61 and Uruguay. 62 The provision in itself has 
been vigorously criticized 63 and seems to have been made the 
object of a diplomatic exchange of notes between Chile and 
54 MAX BURCKHARD, 2 System des Oesterreichischen Privatrechtes ( 1 8 84) z z 3. 
55 OGH. (May 24, 1907) 10 GlU. NF. no. 3787, 8 Amtl.S. NF. no. roo7, 
Spruchrepertorium (Collection of binding precedents) no. 198; cf. WALKER 91, 
622; see below, p. 283. 
56 PERROUD, Clunet I922, 5; WALKER 625. 
57 BELLo's notes, which indicate that he was influenced by the Austrian law 
as well as by the French Code, are referred to by 1 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 93 no. 
148. 
58 Chile: C. C. art. 14. 
59 Colombia: Law no. 145 of I888, art. 9; Law no. I49 of I888, art. 59· 
60 Ecuador: C. C. art. IJ. 
60• Mexico: C. C. art. u. 
61 El Salvador: C. C. art. 14. 
62 Uruguay: C. C. art. 3· 
63 Cf. CHAMPEAU (respecting Colombia) Clunet I 894, 932; BoRJA, 1 
Estudios sobre el c6digo civil chileno (I 899) :u 1-2 I 3; URIBE (regarding Co-
lombia) Revue I9II, 322. 
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France. 64 On the other hand, each of these legislations 
declares the national law applicable to a national living 
abroad: first, as concerns his capacity to engage in "certain 
transactions" producing effects in his own country; and, 
second, with respect to his family relations. 65 This combina-
tion of domiciliary and national law 66 has already been 
noticed as anomalous. 67 The interpretation of these provisions 
necessarily must cause difficulties; in fact, in Colombia 68 ef-
forts looking to a reasonable interpretation have been made, 
and recently, after thorough consideration, the commission. 
for reform of the Civil Code has proposed that the entire 
system be replaced by the simple law of domicil. 69 
In addition, Costa Rica has adopted the principle of nation-
ality, but prescribes that foreigners are governed by the law 
of Costa Rica when they act in that country or if their con-
tracts are made and are to be performed therein. 70 This pro-
vision has been superadded to the others in the Civil Code of 
El Salvador.71 
Contrary to their Austrian prototype, which, at least in the 
last period of the Austrian law, was used to mitigate the effects 
64 WEiss, 3 Traite ::.55 mentions a diplomatic note of August zo, 1882, in 
which the Chilean minister, Verga, refers to a restrictive interpretation of art. 
14. Apparently, the French Government had protested again~t the application 
of Chilean law to French citizens living in Chile. It has not been possible to 
ascertain whether any practical results ever came from this correspondence. 
65 Chile: C. C. art. 15. No provision in Mexico, but see former C. C. ( 1884) 
art. 1::.. 
Colombia: C. C. art. 1 9· 
Ecuador: C. C. art. 14. 
El Salvador: C. C. art. IS· 
Uruguay: C. C. art. 4· 
66 MATOS 277 no. 175; SALAZAR FLOR 483. 
67 BoRJA, op. cit. supra n. 6 3 at 2 I 3; I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 9 3 no. 149; 
SoTo's observations in: Colombia, Comisi6n de Reforma del C6digo Civil 
1939-1940, 92, 98 inter alia. The present system on that occasion was de-
fended by ZULETA ANGEL (ibid.) and }ULL!OT DE LA MORANDIERE of Paris 
(ibid. 116). 
68 See I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 93ff. nos. I49-I59· 
69 Art. 3 6 of the Draft on formation, promulgation, effects, interpretations 
and derogation of the laws, Comisi6n de Reforma del C6digo Civil op. cit. 
supra n. 67. 
70 Costa Rica: C. C. art. 3· 
71 El Salvador: C. C. 19u, art. I6 par. 3· 
THE PERSONAL LAW 119 
of the principle of nationality, these various Latin American 
countries expand their own national law beyond the limits of 
the basic principle which they have adopted. These sophisti-
cated modern endeavors are quite in line with recent Euro-
pean, especially French, 72 tendencies, claiming application of 
the domestic law to nationals living abroad as well as to 
foreigners domiciled within the forum. The principles of 
nationality and of domicil are thus inconsistently combined. 
A final stage of this unfortunate development has been 
reached at present in the Civil Code of Peru of 1936.73 This 
Code generally adopts the law of domicil 74 to govern all 
foreigners whether domiciled abroad or in Peru. Neverthe-
less, ·the Peruvian law on status and capacity extends without 
any limitations to all Peruvians living abroad. 75 The Venezue-
lan Civil Code of I 942 follows this model. 76 The same ex-
cessive claim has been made with respect to marriage in the 
recent Civil Code of Latvia. 77 
A similar conception is said to control the problems of 
capacity for contracting in the Soviet Union; everybody in 
Soviet Russia and every Russian abroad is subject to Soviet 
Russian law. However, this is not deemed to concern the 
72 See infra p. 15 z. 
73 A complete history of the matter is given by LuiS ALVARADO, Apuntes de 
derecho internacional (Lima, 1940) 43-73. 
7
'A. GusTAVO CoRNEJO, 1 C6digo Civil (1937) so no. 49 points out that 
the reference to the law of domicil is intended to include the conflicts norm of 
the domicil (as in Switzerland). 
75 C. C. (1936) Tit. Prel. art. V par. 1. For this reason, the Peruvian 
delegation appointed to revise the Montevideo Treaties declared, in a reserva-
tion to the text of 1940 on international civil law, that the provisions therein 
respecting status and capacity should be understood not to affect the provisions 
of the Peruvian national law applicable to Peruvians. Cf. RABEL, "The Re-
vision of the Treaties of Montevideo on the Law of Conflicts," 39 Mich. L. 
Rev. (1941) 517, szx. At the same time, under the original treaty provisions 
actually in force, the new code is inapplicable to Peruvians domiciled in Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay; cf. ALVARADO, op. cit. supra n. 73 at 71. 
Previously the Peruvian Code of Civil Procedure, art. II 58, had reserved the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Peruvian courts over all questions of status, capac-
ity and family relations as regards Peruvians domiciled at any place and for-
eigners domiciled in Peru; cf.RoGER, 7 Repert. 30 no. 49· 
76 Venezuela: C. C. (194z) arts. 8 and 9· 
77Latvian C. C.§ n; cf; SCHILLING, 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937) :u6, u9. 
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general capacity of having rights, which seems "not to be con-
sidered by the Soviet law as a faculty inherent to man as 
such." 78 
III. SuPPLEMENTARY RuLEs 
The principle of nationality cannot be applied to persons 
who are not nationals of any country, and it causes difficulties 
in its applications to persons who are nationals of more than 
one country. For both types of cases, the principle of nation-
ality must be supplemented by special rules. 
I. Multiple Nationality 
In matters of status, a person who is simultaneously a 
national of the state of the forum and of some other state is 
usually considered by the forum as exclusively its own national, 
his additional foreign nationality being disregarded. This 
approach has been traditionally followed in France, Great 
Britain, Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg 79 and has 
been adopted more recently by statutes in Japan and Liech-
tenstein, and by the courts of Germany and of other coun-
tries.80 The Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws (art. 
3) has recognized the right of a state to apply its law in such 
cases. 
Where, on the other hand, a person is a national of two or 
more countries but the litigation arises in a third country, the 
law most consistently applied is that of the country of which 
the person is not only a national but where he also has his 
domicil or habitual residence or, in the absence thereof, his 
78 See MAKAROV, Precis I 75 and I92. 
79 Surveys by KAiHN, I Abhandl. 59, also in 30 Jherings Jahrb. (I 8gi) 68; 
MAURY in 9 Repert. 297 no. I I 3· 
80 Japan: Law of I 898, art. 27 par. I. 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 30 par. I, 
To the same effect Brazil: Former in trod. art. 9 par, 2. 
Germany: RG. (Jan. 241 I9o8) I8 Z.int.R. 533 1 539; RG. (March I31 I924) 
Leipz.Z. 1924, 74li RG. (Nov. 5, I928) 43 Z.int.R. (I9JO-I9JI) 86, IPRspr. 
1929, no. I. 
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residence. 81 This view was approved by the Sixth Conference 
on International Private Law held at the Hague in 1928, 
which formulated corresponding provisions to complement 
the older Hague treaties on international family law; 82 
eliminating reference to domicil, the test is "habitual resi-
dence" and, in its absence, simply the "residence" at the time 
decisive for the particular purpose, for instance, when the per-
sonal capacity to marry is in question, the moment of the 
marnage ceremony. 
Another solution has been essayed by Japan, 83 and still 
others have been suggested. 84 For the purposes of public in-
ternational law, it has long been a well-recognized tendency to 
prefer among several nationalities of a person that which in 
a given case appears the most "effective" one. 85 This principle 
has been formulated by the Hague Convention on Conflict of 
Nationality Laws of 1930, as follows: 
"Within a third State, a person having more than one 
nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prej-
udice to the application of its law in matters of personal status 
and of any conventions in force, a third State shall, of the 
nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize ex-
81 Institut de Droit International, Resolution of Oslo I93z, art. 2., Annuaire 
I9JZ, 47I (residence habituelle et principale). 
Brazil: C. C. Former in trod. art. 9 (domicil, residence). 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 30 par. z (domicil, residence, last acquired citizen-
ship). 
Cf. for Spain: TRiAs DE BES in 6 Repert. Z4 7 no. 7 8; for Hungary: SzA.szy 
in II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) I70 (domicil). On other theories, see z ARMINJON 
( ed. z) 34ff. no. I o bis. 
82 See the list of the various supplementary clauses in MAKAROV 4z I VIII la. 
The Hague Convention of I930 on Conflicts of Nationality Laws, art. 5 
(HuDsoN, 5 Int. Leg. 359, also in z4 Am. J. Int. Supp. (I930) I9Z) declares 
not to prejudice the matters of personal status. 
83 Law of I 898, art. z7 {law of the last acquired nationality). 
Similarly, Thailand: Act on Conflict of Laws of March I o, I 939 (B.E. 248 I) 
s. 6 par. I, see LEWALD, Regles generales des conflits de lois, no. 4Z n. 8 at 102; 
cf. I BAR§ 88 at 26I, tr. by GILLESPIE at I94· 
.g4 See Trib. civ. Bruxelles (May 29, I934) Clunet 1937, 570 and comment. 
85 Greece: C. C. art. 31 par. 2; see FLOURNOY, "Dual Nationality and Elec" 
tion," 30 Yale L. J. ( I92 r) 693; MAURY, 9 Repert. 298 no. 1 I4· 
122 PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS 
elusively in its territory either the nationality of the country 
in which he is habitually and principally resident, or the 
nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he 
appears to be in fact most closely connected." 86 
2. Stateless Persons 
A person not being a national of any country is called an 
apatride or apolide or heimatlos. 87 Such a situation could arise 
under ordinary international circumstances, where a child of 
parents whose home country adheres to the pure principle of 
jus soli, was born in a country in which the jus sanguini.r· was 
in force. The recent unrest of legislation respecting married 
women has engendered other cases. Thus, where a Swiss 
woman marrying a Frenchman fails to sign a declaration of in-
tention to acquire French citizenship, under article I 9 of a 
French law of November 12, 1938, she does not acquire 
French nationality, though not retaining her former citizen-
ship. 88 Untold numbers of individuals have also been ren-
dered stateless by the political events of this century. Many 
thousands of emigrants have lost their nationality by Soviet 
decree and many more by the ruthless legislations of Italy and 
Germany, introducing the system of "expatriation" as a polit-
ical measure against real or alleged political enemies. Further-
more, the peace treaties following World War I and later 
events have made it frequently impossible in fact to ascertain 
the nationality of a person, who in such a case must practically 
be treated as an apatride, as is done in the case of gypsies. 89 
At present, individuals lacking a definite nationality are 
generally subject to the law of their domicil or habitual resi-
16 Art. S· 
17 This German expression is used by French and other writers, while the 
official German term is "staatenlos." 
as swiss Department of Justice, BBl. I939 II, 184 no. I4. This case would 
not arise under art. 8 of the I930 Convention on Conflicts of Nationa\ity Laws 
which Switzerland did not ratify. 
89 Poland: Law of I9161 art. I par. I, 
Hungary: Law XXXI of 1894 (Marriage Law) § 119. 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 31 par. 1, 
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dence, and, in default thereof, to the law of their temporary 
residence. This has been the view of the Institute of Interna-
tional Law since I 8 So. 90 Most countries accede to this posi-
tion. 91 It was also adopted by the Sixth Conference on 
International Private Law at the Hague in I 928 92 in the com-
plementary drafts just mentioned, in which, as in all recent 
treaties, the term "domicil" is abandoned in favor of "habitual 
residence" or, in its absence, "residence." The new Italian 
Code has intentionally chosen the test of residence.93 
Another solution was formerly adopted by the German Civil 
Code (EG. art. 29), providing that a person who had once 
held but subsequently lost the nationality of a country without 
acquiring another, was declared to remain subject to his former 
90 Institut de Droit International: Resolution of Oxford, art. 6 pars. 2. and s, 
Annuaire I88I-I88:., 57; Resolution of Oslo, art. 3, Annuaire I9]3, 47I, 472. 
Unfortunately the Institute has changed its attitude in a Resolution on "Statut 
juridique des apatrides et des refugies" voted in Brussels in I936, Annuaire 
I936, II 292.. Art. 4 provides that the law applicable in the case of a stateless 
person will be that of the country either of a nationality possessed previously 
or of his domicil or, in the absence of either, of his habitual residence at the date 
regarded as relevant by the court. 
91 Belgium: PouLLET 307 no. 255; Congo: Decree of Feb. :.o, I89I, art. 8 
(for foreigners domiciled in Congo) • 
France: Trib. civ. Nantes (Nov. 28, I90I) Clunet I9oz, 590; Trib. civ. 
Seine (Feb. 14, I9o8) Revue 19Io, IIZ; Cour Paris (Nov. 25, I9I3) Revue 
19I4, 130; App. Nancy {June Io, 19I4) Clunet I9I5, 6zo, Revue I9I4, 579; 
French Morocco: Law of I9I3, art. 5 (for foreigners domiciled in Morocco). 
Hungaryt Marriage Law of I 894, § I 19. 
Italy: C. C. (1942.) Disp. Prel. art. 29 (residence). Previously the law of 
June I3, I9IZ on nationality, art. I4, subjected the apoUdi residing in Italy to 
Italian civil law, but for other apatrides there was controversy, although resi-
dence was the test most frequently adopted. See UDJNA, Elementi I zz. The new 
code substitutes domicil as the test. 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 3 I par. 2. 
The Netherlands: KosTERS 289 (domicil). 
Poland: Law of I926, art. I par. I. 
Rumania: 7 Repert. 63 no. ISI· 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7a. 
Japan: Law of I898, art. 27 par. 2. 
China: Law of I9I8, art. z par. z. 
Brazil: C. C. Former introd. art. 9· 
Cj. TRACHTENBERG, "Heimatlose-Heirnatlosat," 8 Repert. 565 no. 72 et 
seq.; MELCHIOR 449 n. I. 
92 Cf. MAKAROV 4ZI VIII I b. 
93 Italian C. C. (I 9 3 8) Disp. Prel. art. I 9; cf. Relazione I 9 3 8, no. Is; C. C. 
(I942.) Disp. Prel. art. 29. ' 
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national law. This provision compelled the German courts 
to decide the private status and the incidents of family rela-
tions of Russian emigres in accordance with the legislation of 
the Soviet Union, i.e., the country which was their very 
enemy and which had refused to accept the role of successor to 
the former Russian Empire. 94 With respect to succession upon 
death, the situation between Germany and Russia was at first 
remedied by a treaty. 9 ~ Recently, however, Germany has ad-
hered, by a new law, to the rule proposed by the Sixth Con-
ference at the Hague. 96 
In addition, two multipartite treaties of 1933 and 1936 on 
. the status of refugees (the one treaty, in case they have no 
nationality, the other irrespective of nationality), determine 
the personal law of refugees by the law of the country of 
domicil or, in default thereof, by that of the country of resi-
dence.97 
The test of domicil or residence has thus proved to be 
indispensable in important cases. 
3· Nationals of Countries with a Composite System of Private 
Law 
Composite law on personal basis. In Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, 
Egypt, Iran, India, China, and other Eastern coun~ries, per-
94RG. (Oct. 6, 1927) Warn. Rspr. 1928, no. 13, IPRspr. 1928, no. 22. 
95 German Law of Jan. 6, 1926, on the German-Russian Treaties of Oct. I 2, 
I925 (based on the "Rapallo" Treaties of I922) RGBI. 1926 II x, art. 4· ' 
96 German Law of April 12, 1938 (RGBI. I938 I 38o) art. 7, altering the 
text of EG. art. 29, states that insofar as the laws of the state to which a person 
belongs are declared decisive, the legal relations of a person without nationality 
are to be decided according to the laws of the state in which he has, or if the 
decisive moment lies in the past, had at the moment, his habitual residence, or, 
in the case of lack of habitual residence, his residence. 
Cf. a comment by VON STACKELBERG, I 2 Z.ausl.PR. (I 938) 66. The "mo-
tives" of this legislation explain that Germany accepts the generally, adopted 
principle in the form proposed by the Sixth Hague Conference, which now 
governs the personal law so far as it goes, while other matters remain subject 
to their own special rules, as e.g., C. Civ. Proc. § 114 par. 2. 
97 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, Geneva, Oct. 
28, 1933, arts. 4, 5 in 159 League of Nations Treaty Series (1935-1936) 199, 
6 HuDSON, Int. Legislation 483ff. No. 350; Provisional Arrangement con-
cerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, Geneva, July 4, 1936, 
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sonal status is determined by religion, class, or race. 98 In India, 
for instance, the law is different for Buddhists, Hindus, Mo-
hammedans, and whites, although it is in every case a "law of 
the forum." 99 Some elements of this system also survive in 
Eastern European countries. 
Such diversity of personal law is a part of the substantive 
law of the country concerned. When a conflicts rule refers to 
the "law" of such a country, either because it is the law of the 
domicil of an individual or because it is his national law, no 
uniform law being in force in any part of the country, the ref-
erence can only be to the particular set of rules that governs 
the group of persons to which the individual belongs.100 
Under this approach, it is obvious that the conflicts rule is quite 
sufficient in itself and that it does not need any additional rules, 
complementary to those which invoke the law' of domicil or 
nationality. 
Difficulties may arise, it is true, from the fact that the 
regulation of interreligious or interracial relations in the 
oriental countries concerned is often so obscure and incomplete 
that it may not be easy for a foreign judge to cope with their 
ascertainment and application.101 
arts. 5, 6, in 171 League of Nations Treaty Series 751 7 HUDSoN, Int. Legisla-
tion 3 76 No. 448. 
98 Cf. on Egypt and other Islamic countries: ARMINJON, in Clunet 1912., 698, 
I025; Clunet I91J, 34, 435, 812.; and r Precis 102. On Palestine, Trans-
Jordan, Cyprus, Syria and Iraq: GoADBY 79, I071 142.; WENGLER, lnterna-
tionales und interreligiiises Privatrecht in Pallistina," 12. Z.ausl.PR. (I 9 3 9) 
772-8o8. On Hindus in Zanzibar before the British courts: HUGH E. KINGDON, 
The Conflict of Laws in Zanzibar (I94o) 15. On the Belgian Congo,: 
MAURICE VERSTRAETE, "lntergentiel Recht," 9 Rechtsk. Wkbl. I 940, col. I I 69. 
On the Netherlands Indies: KoLLEW!JN, "Interracial Private Laws," in The 
Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilizations in the Malay Archipelago, 
edited by SCHRIEKE (Batavia, I92.9) 204. · 
99 On the contrary, in an Indian court a Chinese Buddhist custom is foreign 
law. See the careful judgment by Sir George Rankin in Tan Ma Shwe Zin v. 
Khoo Soo Chong [1939] A. C. 52.7 (Privy Council). Cf. Casdagli v. Casdagli 
[I9I8] P.(C.A.) 89 at IIo, per Scrutton, L. J.; and, in general, ARMINJON, 
Clunet I9I31 39· 
100 GRASSETII, 5 Rivista Dir. Priv. ( 19 35) II I o. 
101 See for Palestine: GoADBY II9; For Latvia (where classes are distin-
guished): BERENT in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 577; For Bulgaria: DANEFF, 38 
Bull. Inst. Int. (I 93 8) • 
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Composite law on territorial basis.102 As contrasted with the 
grouping of population according to personal qualifications, 
the law of conflicts is directly affected when the law of a country 
to which a conflicts rule refers is split into territorially different 
systems. A composite system of law on a territorial basis makes 
nationality an incomplete criterion. The United States, the 
British Empire, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Mexico 
are examples of political units lacking a unified law on personal 
status; their territories are divided into parts where different 
bodies of rules are in force. A court which has to apply the 
"Polish law" relative to a Polish subject's capacity to marry, 
would be unable to find an appropriate set of rules, except by 
locating such person in the former Prussian or former Russo-. 
Polish or old-Russian or Austrian or Hungarian part of 
Poland. A secondary rule of conflicts is necessary. 
First case: Where interregional rules exist. 
If the country to whose law reference is made possesses 
a unified internal regulation declaring which one of the several 
private laws applies to the individual concerned, this regu-
lation is universally accepted for the purpose of secondary ref-
erence. For instance, the Polish law of "internal relations" 
(interloca:I private law), enacted simultaneously with the 
Polish law on international private law, August 2, 1926/03 
102 Cf. I ZITELMANN 403; RAAPE 2.9 and I D.IPR. 94; WALKER I04; 
MELCHIOR 451 § 310; DE NovA, in 30 Rivista (1938) 388 and 11 richiamo 
di ordinamenti plurilegislativi: Studio di diritto interlocale ed internazionale 
privata (I940) (not available); GRASSETTI1 5 Rivista Dir. Priv. (1935) II 3; 
I STREIT-VALLINDAS §§ I 6, 1 7 (the best survey of facts and literature) ; 
CHESHIRE I6I; FALCONBRIDGE1 "Renvoi and the Law of the Domicile," 19 
Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 31I. The aggrandizement of Germany caused problems 
in view of which the doctrine of interregional law has been discussed again; 
see quotations by DE NovA, 15 Annuario Dir. Comp. (1941) 338, 339· See 
furthermore the Swiss NAG. in its original main application to intercantonal 
conflicts and the French law of July 2.41 192.1 concerning the conflicts between 
the French and the local law of Alsace-Lorraine. 
103 Arts. 1 and 3· Another example is art. 14 of the Spanish Civil Code, pro-
viding that the conflicts rules established with respect to the persons, the trans~ 
actions and the property of Spaniards abroad and of foreigners in Spain are 
applicable to the persons, transactions and property of Spaniards in territories 
or provinces of different civil legislations; see BEATO SALA, I Revista Der. Priv. 
(I9IJ-I9I4) 2.01; TRiAs DEBEs, 6 Repert. z66 no. 165. 
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provided that the status and the capacity of an individual of 
Polish nationality, domiciled abroad, is to be determined by 
Polish courts in the first instance under the law of the last 
domicil he had in Poland and, in the second, under the law 
of the Polish capital. Accordingly, German, French, Italian, 
etc., courts apply the same expedients. This method was 
recommended by the Institute of International Law 10' and 
has been adopted in several statutory enactments.105 
It is easily understandable that a foreign court looking for 
the "national law" of an individual, should adopt the local-
izations effected by the sovereign of the foreign nation. But 
the theoretical background of this operation has been a subject 
of discussion. An essential resemblance between interregional 
and international private laws cannot be denied; both are types 
of conflicts rules. Yet the reference leading from the conflicts 
rules of the forum through the interprovincial rule to a par-
ticular family law of a territory must not be treated as identical 
with a regular renvoi; the foreign interregional rule is not 
in competition with the forum's own conflicts rules.106 As a 
matter of fact, the $trongest adversaries of renvoi agree with 
this use of foreign interregional statutes.107 
It must be presumed that the interlocal rules are to be 
adopted with all their characteristics, e.g., what they under-
stand as "domicil," the domicil concept of the forum being 
immaterial. Also, such particular notions must be applied as 
the Swiss cantonal citizenship 108 or the "town settlement" 
104 Resolutions passed at Oxford, x88o1 art. 3 par. 31 Annuaire x88x-x8811 57• 
105 Sweden: Int. Fam. L. of 1904 with amendments, c. 6 §I. 
Japan: Law of 18981 art. '1.7 par. 3· 
China: Law of 19181 art. '1. par. 3· 
11i6Cj. RAAPE 34 against I ZITELMANN 398 and NIBOYET 493 no. 411; 
GRASSETTI, 5 Rivista Dir. Priv. (1935) II 41 against other Italian writers; and 
see the survey by I STREIT-VALLINDAS 354• 
107 NIBOYET1 op. cit. supra n. 106; LEWALD1 '1.9 Recueil I9'1.9 IV 590; see 
RAAPE 34· 
105 
"Heimat," is still important for the matters of cantonal legislation that 
have not been unified. 
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(Heimatzustandigkeit) 109 which was a basic concept in the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy and remained in force in the 
successor states.110 In Hungary it was abolished but 
recently. 111 
Second case: Where no interregional rules exist and the 
individual is domiciled within his national country. 
·Most countries that have no uniform private law also lack 
a unified set of interlocal rules. Such a situation existed in 
Germany before the Civil Code took effect on January I, I 900, 
and after World War I the same was true in all countries 
that had annexed new provinces and in which legal unification 
was not yet achieved. Yugoslavia and perhaps Rumania are 
still in this situation. But the foremost examples are presented 
by the British Empire and the United States. With respect to 
the former, it is hardly doubtful that "there is in fact no 
system of conflict of law common to all parts of the British 
Empire," 112 that would enable a foreign court to discover 
all-British rules connecting British subjects with their several 
jurisdictions. Neither is it permissible to apply the English 
rules on conflicts or on the law of status to all British subjects, 
for the English law cannot be construed as "the true national 
law" of all British subjects.113 Perhaps in the future, some 
109 The French text of the Treaty of St. Germain of Sept. 1 o, 1919, art. 3 
uses the term "indigenat" with the Italian equivalent "pertinenza" in paren-
theses. The German translation in the Austrian Staatsgesetzblatt 1 9 20, at 1048 
is "Heimatrecht". The English version "citizenship" as published in British 
and Foreign State Papers (1919) sos, is wrong. 
110 See e.g., for parts of Yugoslavia, PERITCH in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 879 n. 
15 and LoVRIC, ibid. 1038 n. 172 (Croatia-Slovania). See also PERITCH, 32 
Bull. Inst. Int. (1935) 3· 
For Czechoslovakia, HoCHBERGER, 4 Z. osteurop. R. (1938) 621, 629 reports 
that Czechoslovakian nationals domiciled in Czechoslovakia are considered 
having the capacity of their domiciliary law, but if domiciled abroad, that of 
the law of their township. 
1l1 In Hungary it has been replaced by domicil for interlocal purposes by Law 
XIII of 1939; cf. 13 Z.ausl.PR. (1940) 258, 259. 
112 FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 322, supra n. 102. 
113 This was·contended by DICEY 873; see contra: CHESHIRE 162 n. 4; 
FALCONBRIDGE1 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) p8, supra n. 102. 
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point of localization might be found in local conceptions of 
nationality, Canadian, South African, etc., which seem to be 
in a state of development, in addition to the notion of British 
subject; 114 but the new conception of dominion nationality 
apparently has not yet been taken into consideration for such 
purpose 115 and in any event would not specify the law of one 
of the several component states or provinces of the dominion 
in question. 
However, unanimity is still to be found in one group of 
cases, viz., where the individual is domiciled at some place 
within the entire territory of the country whose legal system 
is divided, or where, as to matters of inheritance, the individual 
was there domiciled at the time of his death. The rule is quite 
generally re~ognized that the law of such place constitutes his 
personallaw.116 Thus, the principle of domicil has retained a 
further supplementary hold in Europe. 
Although this rule is well settled, it is nevertheless not 
certain whether it follows that "domicil" is to be defined under 
IMSee KEITH, The Dominions as Sovereign States (1938) 184-199. Cf. 
EMMETT, "Nationality in the Union of South Africa," 17 Brit. Year Book Int. 
Law ( 1936) 187; 18 ibid. ( 193 7) 18 I; see also GEY VAN PITTJUs, Nationality 
Within the British Commonwealth of Nations (1930) 223. 
1!5 The problem has scarcely been discussed; in 2 Encyclopaedia of the Laws 
of England (ed. 3, 1938) 467ff. it is observed that at present colonial nation-
ality is not distinguished from the British, although in the future the principles 
embodied in the Statute of Westminister, 1931 (c. 4) might affect nationality 
within the Empire. 
The latent significance of the new local nationality for the purpose of juris-
diction, in particular divorce jurisdiction, has been pointed out by KEITH, 
"Das Verhaltniss des Statute of W estminister von 19 31 zum internationalen 
Privatrecht," 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 301, 308 and op. cit. supra n. 114 at 193; 
EASTMAN, "Australian Nationality Legislation, Nationality of Married Women," 
18 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1937) 179. A more radical development toward 
the criterion of local citizenship for personal status might be expected with 
respect to Eire. 
116 I ZITELMANN 405 at n. 7i RAAPE 36 (b) I MELCHIOR 452 § 3II n. 3• 
With respect to their interprovincial rules, the Court of Cassation of Rumania 
(March 3, 1937) 5 Z.osteurop.R. (1939) 654, Clunet 1938, 946 held that 
divorce is governed by the law of the domicil of the parties at the time of the 
action, not by that of the place of celebration of the marriage nor by that of 
the origin of the parties, and, therefore, applied the Austrian Civil Code to the 
divorce of parties domiciled in Bucowina (the actual local law of that province). 
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the law of the forum and not, as in the first case described 
(where interlocal rules exist), in accordance with the con-
ceptions existing in the territory where the individual is said 
to reside. 
Third case: Where no interregional rule exists and the in-
dividual is domiciled outside his national country. 
A troublesome situation arises where there are no inter-
regional rules, and the individual is not domiciled in any part 
of his national country. Several opinions have been put for-
ward. 
(a) The prevailing doctrine in Germany,117 followed by 
the Swedish legislation, 118 applies the law of that district of 
the national's country where the individual now domiciled 
abroad had his last domicil 119 or, if he never had any domicil 
in his national country, the law in force at the capital of that 
country.120 
This doctrine is satisfactory in certain cases. The connect-
ing factors evidently were borrowed from procedural 
models; 121 to allow nationals domiciled abroad to sue or be 
sued locally, jurisdiction, ordinarily based on actual domicil, 
in emergency cases may be based upon the last previous domicil 
or, as a final resort, may be assumed by the courts of the 
capital. Such provisions make sense in the intranational rules 
of a country like Rumania. Rumanian citizens are not subject 
to foreign personal laws even when domiciled abroad and 
therefore must be connected with one of the territorial laws 
117 NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 68; LEWALD 13; RAAPE 3'6; MELCHIOR 
452· 118 Swedish Int. Fam. L. of 1904 with amendments, c. 6 §I par. 2; Law of 
March 5, 1937 on Conflict of. Laws in regard to Succession, c.3 § r. See II 
Z.ausl.PR. (I 93 7) 93 ,, 39 Bull. Inst. Int. (r 93 8) I s8. . 
119 RG. (Nov. 30, 19o6) 64 RGZ. 389 at 393; OLG. Karlsruhe (May 6, 
1898) 9 Z.int.R. (1899) 311, 315. 
120 KG. (Aug. 20, 1936) JW. i936, 3582 (Soviet Russian subjects); LG. 
Hamburg (Sept. 2, 1936) JW. 1936, 3492 (Rumanians). 
121 NIEMEYER, Das IPR.·des BGB. 68; German Code of Civ. Proc. §§ I5· 
27 par. 2, 6o6 par. 2, 642, 648. 
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of Rumania. A French or German court, adhering to the same 
principle of nationality, may very well agree to locate a 
Rumanian citizen somewhere in Rumania. For analogous 
purposes, in order to secure Frenchmen living abroad a 
domicil in France in case they need one, the French private 
draft of 1930 establishes an artificial domicil: (i) at the 
Frenchman's last domicil in France, (ii) subsidiarily at his 
last residence, (iii) otherwise at his birthplace, and (iv) in 
the last resort at any place chosen by him in a declaration 
before 'a French consul.122 
On the other hand, such subsidiary rules of the forum are 
obviously unsuitable for connecting a British subject with a 
determinate part of the British Empire. As a matter of fact, 
no German or French court is likely to apply them to a British 
subject. Where an Englishman is domiciled in France, French 
courts as well as other Continental courts apply French law, 
by renvoi. 
(b) Italian courts reject renvoi 123 and are confronted with 
a problem that has been called insoluble. When the Courts 
of Cassation of Florence and Naples, in leading cases of I 9 I 9 
and I 920, respectively, 124 proclaimed the anti-renvoi doctrine, 
they recognized at the same time that the British laws did not 
contain any rules linking British subjects domiciled abroad 
with any British legal system. The only possible result was 
to adopt the law of the domicil of origin.125 
Thus, the English judgments in the cases of Johnson and 
122 Art. spar. :z, :z6 Bull Soc. d'Etudes Leg. (1930) 176; cf. NIBOYET, :z6 
ibid. 78. 
l23 This well known rule was stated by Luxmoore, J., In re Ross, [1930] 
I Ch. 377,403. It is expressly confumed by the Italian Civil Code {194-:z) 
Disp. Prel. art. 30. 
124 Cass. Firenze (July :z1, 1919) Giur. Ital. 1919 I 1 104-0. 
125 BUZZATI fully approving of the Naples decision, Cass. Napoli {Jan. s, 
19:zo) Foro Ital. 1920 I 348. The same suggestion is made by CHESHIRE, "De-
cisions of National Tribunals Involving Points of International Law," u Brit. 
Year Book Int. Law (1931) 174 at 176, and in his Private International Law 
161. 
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O'Keefe/26 which in fact (by renvoi) resort to the domicil of 
origin to determine the distribution of the estates of British 
subjects who die domiciled in Italy, are not without support 
in Italian law. 
But, of course, it does not correspond to the spirit of British 
laws that a person firmly settled in Naples for forty-seven 
years, should be traced back to the origin of his father; at 
least, even in the eyes of a British court, the domicil of origin 
of the father of Miss O'Keefe was undoubtedly superseded 
by the domicil of her choice. For this reason alone the solution 
ofthe O'Keefe case is absurd.127 
(c) Recent Italian writers, with Falconbridge's approval, 
conclude that it is impossible to fix the status of a British sub-
ject living abroad and suggest that the Italian court apply the 
lex fori, viz., Italian municipal law.128 Such a gesture of 
despair seems to be uncalled for, however, if proper regard be 
paid to the historical development of the personal law; domicil 
was replaced by nationality in the nineteenth century, but not 
so as to exclude the test of domicil whenever the new test of 
political allegiance should fail to operate reasonably. Cer-
tainly, reference to domicil is preferable to a resigned resort 
to the lex fori. The practical consequences illustrate what the 
choice of law means in this case: 
Suppose a Canadian dies domiciled in France, and an Italian 
court has to determine the intestate succession to his movables. 
If the Italian court were to apply Italian inheritance law qua 
.lex fori, instead of French law qua lex domicilii, the solution 
would be senseless and completely destroy harmony between 
the conflicts rules of the forum and those of the domicil, as 
126 Jn re Johnson, Roberts v. Att. Gen. [19o3] 1 Ch. 8:u per Farwell, J.; 
. In re O'Keefe, Poingdestre v. Sherman [ 1940] Ch. U4 per Crossman, J. 
127 FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 324, 326, supra n. 1oz. An-, 
other argument is advanced by GRASSETTI, 5 Rivista Dir. Priv. (1935) II 3, 
7, supra n. 106. 
128 DE NoVA and GRASSETTI, supra n. 102 and FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar 
Rev. (1941) 323, supra n. 102. 
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well as with those of the Canadian courts which seek to follow 
any solution chosen by the court of the domicil but are unable 
to follow the law of the forum of a third country. 
(d) Zitelmann suggested taking domicil alone as the test.129 
He would limit the reference to nationality to the case where 
the actual domicil is situated within the national country. It 
has been objected that this view runs directly counter to the 
principle of nationality, 130 but this argument is evidently 
wrong. It is true, on the other hand, that the lex domicilii 
and the theory of renvoi result in the same decision in this 
case and are often hardly distinguishable from each other. 
But the case of a British subject domiciled in Italy induced 
the leader of the Italian school of international law and the 
prominent opponent of renvoi, Dionisio Anzilotti, to abandon 
his opposition.131 
Adoption of the law of domicil by the Italian courts, either 
as an independent secondary test or, more appropriately, as 
the result of renvoi, is the only way leading out of the impasse. 
Renvoi is the better method, since harmony is preserved with 
the British rules, especially in relation to the definition of 
domicil. One cannot reject renvoi and hope for anything 
. tolerable. 
It has been observed that the law of domicil has not the 
same domain of application in all British countries. 132 This, 
however, involves only special points immaterial for the gen-
eral rule. 
129 I ZITELMANN 405, followed by WALKER 105 n, 57· 
130 RAAPE 37• 
131 ANZILOTTI, in approving notes to Trib. Firenze (Jan. 23, 1918) in 12 
Rivista (1918) 81 and App. Firenze {Jan. 23, 1919) in the same cause, ibid. 
288. The judgments were reversed by Cass. Firenze, supra n. u4. 
132 FALCONBRIDGE, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 322, supra n. 102. His ex-
ample, however, that under the primary rule in Quebec the lex loci. actus, not 
the lex domicilii, governs the formal validity of a will, is not entirely relevant, 
since in this situation the law at the place of contracting is recognized-alone 
or optionally-by the Continental conflicts rules, and to such extent no re~voi 
problem is involved. 
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(e) The problem is not much different with respect to 
American citizens. If an American citizen is domiciled within 
a state of the United States, the reference to his "national" 
private law means the law which will be applied to him by a 
court sitting at his domicil. It has been properly noted in 
Europe that in this case the nationality principle needs no 
supplementary rule, because such domicil constitutes local 
citizenship in the state. 
Where an American citizen is, however, domiciled in a 
foreign country, renvoi has been adopted by numerous 
European courts upon the erroneous view that the conflicts law 
of the American state in which he had his last American 
domicil, referring to the law of his present domicil, 133 applies. 
The conception in this country is that such an individual is still 
an American citizen but no longer a citizen of a particular 
state.134 Consequently, if there were Federal rules of conflicts, 
they might appropriately be resorted to in such case by a 
Continental court. But there are no such rules. Since the Su-
preme Court's decisions requiring Federal courts in diverse 
citizenship cases to follow the conflicts rules of the states 
where they are sitting,ta!j it is doubtful to what extent an 
independent Federal system of conflicts law can be de-
veloped.136 However, in the United States, the scope of the 
law of domicil is substantially more uniform than in the British 
Commonwealth, with exception only of certain peculiarities 
in the law of Louisiana. Hence, it seems quite justified 137 for 
133 See the critical exposition by RHEINSTEIN, 1 Giur. Comp. DIP. 141. 
1M See Prentiss v. Brennan, 19 Fed. Cas. (1851 C.C. N.D. N.Y.) 1278, per 
Nelson, J.; Hammerstein v. Lyne (1912 D.C. W.D. Mo.) zoo Fed. 165. 
135 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U.S. 64; Sampson v. Channell 
(1940 C.C.A. ISt) 110 F. (zd) 754 and notes in 18 N.Y.U. L. Q. Rev. (194o-
1941) 1191 128 A. L. R. 4051 and now especially Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec-
tric Mfg. Co. (1941) 313 U.S. 487 and Griffin v. McCoach (1941) 313 U.S. 
498. 
1311 Supra p. 37· 
131 Professor Lawrence Preuss has attracted my attention to a somewhat 
eimilar problem which has been discussed in matters of extradition. Under the 
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French, German, Chinese, and other foreign courts to treat 
the questions that are generally decided in American courts 
by the municipal law of the domiciliary state, in the same way 
and under the same construction of domicil. 
Conclusion. To summarize, where nationality alone is in-
sufficient for ascertaining the applicable law, resort must be 
had in the first place to the rules respecting interregional re-
lations of the country whose national the individual is. If no 
such rules have been established in that country by an author-
ity covering the entire national territory, the spirit in which 
its courts generally solve the problem of demarcation between 
the legal systems included may reasonably be followed by 
foreign courts. Where, as in the United States and in the 
British Empire, domicil is generally decisive, a court of any 
other country has good reason to apply the same criterion with 
all of its implications. Only in the last resort need independent 
conflicts rules be applied, based on a former domicil of choice 
or some other contact. 
Except for the last point, the attitude of the forum may 
thus. be similar to that observed in dealing with religious, 
racial, or class differentiations. 
treaties, extradition usually depends on the recognition, by both the requesting 
and the requested countries, of the criminal character of the alleged offense. 
How is the "principle of double criminality" to apply to the United States where 
the administration of criminal law has not generally been unified? Is "country" 
in such case the United States or the state involved? In the case of Factor v. 
Laubenheimer and Haggard (1933) 290 U.S. 276, 28 Am. J. Int. Law (1934) 
149, the United States was requested to extradite to England, Factor, who had 
been found in Illinois. The Supreme Court, by a six to three vote, held it 
sufficient that the criminal character of the act was recognized in twenty-two 
states, although not proved to be such in lllinois. (It has even been said that 
the number, twenty-two, is too high; see HUDSON, "The Factor Case and Double 
Criminality in Extradition," 28 Am. J. Int. Law (1934) 274, 303 n. uo.) 
BoRCHARD, "The Factor Extradition Case," ibiJ. 744, has given the more 
cautious explanation that the considerable recognition in American state stat• 
utes was evidence of the American recognition of the criminality in question. 
The dissenting judges and HunsoN, Joe. cit., maintain the older conception that 
the law of the state where the fugitive is finally arrested is decisive. Evidently 
our own problem is easier to solve. 
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IV. DETERMINATION oF NATIONALITY AND DoMICIL 
I. Determination of Nationality 
Whether a person is a national of a certain country is a 
problem that is determined exclusively by the law of that 
country/38 a settled rule of international law confirmed by 
the Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws of 1930.139 
No other law than that of Brazil determines whether or not 
a certain individual is a Brazilian national; no other law than 
that of the United States answers to the question whether an 
individual is a citizen of the United States. The statement in 
a former American nationality law that "any American woman 
marrying an alien shall take the nationality of her husband,m40 
if taken literally, surpassed the powers of the United States.141 
The same formula was incorporated, however, in many old 
European statutes, as for instance, article 19 of the Code Na-
poleon, sometimes interpreted to the effect that the wife should 
be subject to the personal law of the husband, irrespective of 
whether she acquired his nationality by the law of his national 
country.142 
138 See Mr. Justice Gray in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) 169 
u.s. 649> 668. ' 
139 Art. 2: "Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of 
a particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of that State." 
140 Act of March 2, I907,,ch. 2543, sec. 3, 34 Stat. I228, repealed by the 
Cable Act, Sept. 22, 1922, ch .. p 1, sec. 7, 42 Stat. 1021 and later statutes; cf. 
8 U.S. C. (1940) ch. r, notes to§§ I-I8. 
141 See WALDO E. WALTZ, The Nationality of Married Women (I937) 2I 
notes I 5 and I 6. 
An analogous charge of trespass upon foreign sovereignty has been made by 
several authors with respect to legislations attaching a certain foreign nation-
ality to corporations. See TRAVERS, 3 3 Recueil I 9 3 o III 2 5; CAVAGLIERI, 
II diritto commerciale internationale 203; 2 ARMIN JON (ed. 2) 460, no. I 79· 
To the same effect 1 PoNTES DE MIRANDA 46o objects to the Polish Law of I 926 
on private international law, art. I par. 3, and P.G.R. of Liechtenstein, art. 235, 
on the ground that these provisions choose the business center of a corporation, 
even if in foreign territory, as the contact for determining the personal law of 
the corporation, although contrary to the local law of the place, and that the 
Liechtenstein provision seems in this way to determine the nationality of the 
corporation. This attack is unjustified at least inasmuch as merely the deter-
mination of private law rules is meant and renvoi is applied. 
142 CoLMET-DAAGE, 1 Revue de droit fran~ais et etranger (I844) 40I. 
THE PERSONAL LAW 137 
The principle that acquisition and loss of nationality depend 
exclusively upon the law of the country concerned, is univer-
sally recognized not only in public but also in private inter-
national law; it is expressly stated in recent codificati~ns.143 
Occasionally, however, there have been refusals to recognize 
certain foreign nationality regulations deemed to be contrary 
to public policy. French courts, for instance, have declined to 
recognize a Brazilian law of December 14, I 8 8 9, which be-
stowed Brazilian nationality upon all foreigners who resided 
in Brazil on November 15, 1889, and who did not expressly 
object to such en bloc naturalization.144 
This rule of international law is applicable without doubt 
to the determination of status under the nationality principle. 
In two cases, moreover, the conflicts law itself is affected: 
Suppose a divorced French woman goes through a second 
marriage ceremony in France with a Catholic Spaniard. To 
ascertain whether the woman by this marriage acquires Span-
ish nationality, Spanish law exclusively is consulted by all 
courts. Accordingly, as (i) Spanish matrimonial law prohibits 
the marriage of a Catholic with a divorced person, and (ii) 
under Spanish conflicts law this nullifying prohibition is ex-
tended to foreign marriages of Spanish nationals, consequently 
(iii) by Spanish nationality law the wife does not acquire the 
nationality of Spain. Thus, a French court, in determining the 
question, would not apply its own conflicts rule designating 
the law applicable to the validity or invalidity of the marriage. 
This is a remarkable case; the preliminary question relating 
143 Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 29. 
C6digo Bustamante: arts. 12, I4, I5· 
Greece: C. C. (I 940) art. 29. 
Convention of the Hague on Conflict of Nationality Laws of I 9 30: art. 2. 
144 Trib. civ. Seine (July 13, I 9 I 5) Revue I 9 I 6, 67; cf. WEISS, I Traite 768; 
the Brazilian law has been recognized, however, by Ct. Sup. Lisbon (May I 5, 
I934) Nouv. Revue I935, 424. In another case the same tribunal refused to 
recognize the acquisition of nationality by birth under a foreign country's jus 
soli: Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. I, I916) Revue I9I6, 217. Contra: JoRDAN, 4 
Repert. 6 7 5 no. I 44· 
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to the marriage apparently is ansvvered in accordance with the 
law applied in deciding the main question. On the other hand, 
for some other purpose the same court may declare the mar-
riage valid under French law. The distinction between these 
two solutions has baffled some writers unduly. 
When according to this rule that nationality depends on the 
municipal law applied by the country involved,145 the na-
tionality of an individual has been ascertained (or found un-
ascertainable), the ordinary conflicts rules of the forum de-
termine his status. In a second group of problems, however, 
the French courts, considering that French nationality is at 
stake, have gravely altered their conflicts rules. 
The decision of the French Supreme Court in the A1ares-
chal case illustrates the practice.146 An illegitimate child was 
acknowledged in Switzerland by his Swiss mother's decla-
ration on the birth register. Under Swiss law, an illegitimate 
relationship was created between the child and the mother, and 
the child acquired Swiss nati~nality. 147 French conflicts law 
would have recognized this state of affairs, had not the father 
who was of French nationality ultimately also acknowledged 
the child in a document sufficient under French law. Because 
this entailed a question of French nationality, the court ex-
amined the entire situation from the viewpoint of French 
municipal law, under which the mother's recognition was 
found insufficient. Accordingly, the father's was the first and 
decisive acknowledgment, and the child was deemed a French 
national. This doctrine subjects the determination of private 
law questions relating to acknowledgment, to considerations 
derived from a nationality law instead of the law of conflicts.148 
145 See, as to German law LEWALD 8 no. ro; MELCHIOR 253 § r6g. 
146 Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 25, 1930) D.I930.r.Ir3, S.I930.1.32I. See infra p. 
6rg, n. 40. 
147 Swiss C.C. art. 324; cf. BG. (June 29, 1928) 54 BGE.I 230, 232. 
148 CoLIN, Note D.r92r.r.r and in his report to the Court of Cassation, 
Clunet r 92 3, 8 9, 9 3; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE no. 349 A. 
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That this is not a foregone conclusion is demonstrated by 
the German law respecting legitimation, which, only if valid 
under the German laws, 149 including German conflicts rules, 150 
is a ground for acquiring German nationality, and not in-
versely. The conflicts rules operate independently and de-
termine whether there is German citizenship. 
2. Determination of Domicil 
Variety of domicil concepts. In much of the literature, the 
diversity of domicil concepts is emphasized.151 It is opportune 
to note just what the differences are. Primarily, the British 
doctrine of domicil is to be distinguished from that of all 
other systems; it is more or less unique, first, because of the 
abnormal place occupied by the domicil of origin, second, be-
cause of the prevalence of tendentious casuistry. The English 
writers, recognizing that the decisions of the House of Lords 
have done much to alienate the legal concept of domicil from 
its natural lines, 1 " 2 are frankly unhappy with the artificial 
character of their doctrine and its arbitrary results. On the 
other hand, in some countries, such as Denmark/53 the notion 
of domicil is undeveloped. 
Apart from these anomalies, however, it should not be 
supposed that in the doctrines of the great majority of coun-
149German Nationality Law of July 22, I9I3, § I7 (5). 
150 RAAPE 562. 
151 See the surveys given by BARBOSA DE MAGALHAES in 23 Recuei! I928 
III 121; LEVASSEUR, Le domicile et sa determination en droit international prive 
(193I); WERNER VON STEIGER, Der Wohnsitz als Ankniipfungsbegri:ff im in-
ternationalen Privatrecht (Bern, I934) II9; VITTORIO TEDESCHI, II domi-
cilio nel diritto internazionale privato (I 9 3 3) and the same author's review of 
STEIGER'S book, IO Z.ausl.PR. (I936) 1067; see also NEUNER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. 
(1934) 89-92. On the differences of municipal conceptions of domicil see the 
comparative study by VITTORIO TEDESCHI, Del domicilio (1936). 
152 KErTH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," I 6 Bell Yard (Nov. 
I935) 4, 5· In the Winans case, [I904] A.C. 287, KEITH recalls, the propositus 
had not found a domicil in England during 3 7 years; Ramsay, in Ramsay v. 
Liverpool [I930] A.C. 588, lived from I89I or I892 to I927 in Liverpool and 
ordered himself buried there, but the Lords unanimously declared him domiciled 
in Scotland and seemed astonished that another view should be taken. 
153 HoECK, Personalstatut 6. 
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tries there exists no common simple idea of domicil, at least at 
bottom. It would be unfortunate to press to such conclusion 
the multitude of learned definitions of domiciU 54 All coun-
tries deriving their laws from Roman conceptions agree in 
requiring both physical presence or actual abode (residence) 
and intention to maintain this residence for an indefinite time 
on the part of the person concerned. The American law shares 
this view, although terminology and definitions sometimes 
vary. Despite the frequent use of the term "residence" in 
Ameri •• an statutes involving questions of status/ 55 it is the gen-
eral opinion that an appropriate intention is also required; in 
the Restatement, it is made plain that the proper term is 
"domicil." 156 
The apparent divergence of cases concerning the domicil of 
choice is due not so much to national diversities as to the broad 
latitude of discretion which the courts all over the world seem 
to reserve to themselves in determining where a person is or 
was domiciled. In part, this is attributable to the desire of the 
courts to decide individual cases in accordance with what they 
regard as fair justice; the individualized exercise of such dis-
cretion has often given the appearance of an arbitrary or in-
consistent handling cf the problem.157 But in part the courts 
also seem to react against the exaggerated generalization by 
154 MAHAIM, reporter to the Institute of International Law, I 9 3 r, has col-
lected fifty different definitions of domicil given in the world literature. See 
Annuaire 1931 II r8o. He thinks this shows, against the current belief, that 
the concept of domicil is far from being similar in all countries. On the con-
trary, it shows that the literature has spoiled a fairly uniform subject by scho-
lastic definitions. 
155 r BEALE rro § ro.3; 4 Proceedings American Law Institute (192.6) 348. 
156 Cj. Restatement § 9 e and the use of the term "domicil" as indicated by 
the Index sub "domicil." 
157 For instance, Englishmen and Americans are declared to be domiciled in 
France (see NIBOYET 6ro) or in Switzerland (as in the decision of the Trib. 
Zurich, Oct. zs, 1935, 32. SJZ. zoz no, 41 and others of the same tribunal) 
in order to assume jurisdiction for divorce. The same occurs daily in this 
country. T4us, for example in the famous case of Gould v. Gould (192.3) 2.35 , 
N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490 the matrimonial domicil for obvious reasons was de-
clared to be in New York, although the divorce decree of Paris was recognized 
(infra p. 470, n. 40). 
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which one basic notion of domicil apparently has been adopted 
for such different fields as jurisdiction and venue, taxation, 
poor relief, exercise of civil rights, voting, and conflicts law.158 
Where an individual is not free to establish his domicil but 
is subject to the interference of legal rules, differences are more 
deeply rooted. Thus, the domicil of dependent persons, par-
ticularly of married women, gives rise to problems.159 Again, 
the former singular provision of the French Civil Code (art. 
I 3) that a foreigner had to obtain authorization by the French 
government to have a domicil in France, greatly disturbed 
the international order. A British subject who was permanently 
located in Paris but had not obtained such authorization, for 
the purposes of the French courts, was not there domiciled, 
although so regarded under German, Italian, and even 
English standards. Thus, the English courts declared that 
Mrs. Annesley acquired a domicil of choice in France, al-
though she never had applied for governmental permission.160 
By law of 1927, this peculiar doctrine was repealed, and the 
French courts proceeded in accordance with the ordinary con-
cept of domicil. Recently (1938), however, a French decree 
has required an alien to possess a police identification card al-
lowing him to stay in France for more than one year, in order 
to acquire, exercise, or enjoy statutory rights presupposing 
French domicil or residence.161 In France, adoption of chil-
dren depends on this condition (C.C. art. 360), and the cele-
158 This is well known; cf. 3 Proceedings American Law Institute (1925) 
224, esp. W. W. CooK, ibid. 226; CoUDERT, "Some Considerations in the Law 
of Domicil," 3 6 Yale L. J. ( 1 9 2 7) 949 ; Restatement, New York Annotations 
6. Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Texas v. Florida (1939) 
306 u.s. 428. 
159 For illustration take the case of German RG. (Jan. 12, 1939) HRR. 1939, 
no. 3 7 6 (the legal domicil of a child whose legitimacy is attacked, but is not yet 
avoided, is determined according to the conflict law of legal paternity (EG. 
BGB. art. 19), whereas the court of appeal had applied the lex fori). See in 
respect of the wife, below, p. 3ro, of the child, below, p. 6os. 
160 In re Annesley, Davidson v. Annesley [1926] Ch. 692. See also the dis-
cussion in Harral v. Harral (r884) 39 N.J.Eq. 7.79· 
1.6! Decret-loi (Nov. u, 1938) J. OH. u-13 Nov. 1938, art. r; SIREY 
1939·4.1o8o, D.1939·4·16z-x63, Clunet 1939, 315. 
142 PERSONAL LAW OF INDIVIDUALS 
bration of marriage is expressly subjected to it.162 But the 
prohibition does not invalidate an act in violation thereof.163 
Finally, the dogmas that every person must have a domicil, 
and that no person can have more than one domicil at a time 164 
-in force in British countries, the United States, France, 
Switzerland, Argentina, etc.-have been discarded in the 
German Code as contrary to the realities of life.165 
Despite these embarrassing variances, it should not be im-
possible to arrive at a reasonable unification of the conditions 
under which domicil may be acquired. This is demonstrated 
by those bilateral international treaties that incorporate a def-
inition of domicil in their text, as well as by the determinations 
of domicil by international courts for the specific purpose 
of treaties lacking such definition. 166 A far-reaching uni-
fication has been· achieved in this country, as a result of the 
insertion of the topic in the law of conflicts instead of regarding 
it as a matter of domestic law. The rules provided in sections 
I I to 4I of the Restatement are uniform rules of private law, 
transferred into conflict of laws. The British common law 
countries and the countries unified by the Treaties of Mon-
tevideo have attained an analogous result. 
Which law decides? As the answer to the question of domicil 
thus may vary, the question arises under what law a court 
should define the elements constituting domicil,l 67 This prob-
lem is of evident interest in the countries where domicil is the 
general test of status rights, but it is also of importance else-
162 Art. 7 of the decree. Cf. TAGER, "Statut des etrangers," Clunet 1939> 278, 
288, critical of the marriage prohibition and the immature character of the 
decree. 
163 This seems to be the meaning of Circ. Letter, Dec. 13, 1938, J. Off. 6 
Jan. 1939, A. 1939. Lois annotees 1346, Circ. 3, par. 2. 
164 NEUNER regards this dogma as the chief reason for the confusion com-
plained about by the lawyers of the common law countries, see NEUNER, "Policy 
Considerations in the Conflict of Laws," 20 Can. Bar Rev. (1942) 479 at 494· 
165 BGB. § 7· 
166 Permanent Court of International Justice, Judgment of May 25, 1926, 
Serie A no. 7, 79; Arbitral Decision (July 10, 1924) of President Kaeckenbeeck, 
33 Z.int.R. (1924-1925) 321; cj. TEDESCHI, Domicilio 105-112, 
167 See literature, supra n. 1 5 I. 
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where; for instance, in France and other countries succession 
to movables upon death depends on the law of the last domicil 
of the deceased. That this problem usually is identified by 
writers and courts with the question under which law domicil 
(or residence) required for judicial jurisdiction must be de-
termined, is unfortunate. In consequence, the application of 
the lex fori, natural where jurisdiction is concerned, has been 
advocated as if it were equally natural in matters of choice of 
law. 
Lex fori. Thus, the English courts, after some vacillations, 
now take it for granted that they have to apply the English 
concept whenever they determine an individual's domicil.166 
The same approach seems to prevail in the United States, 160 
where it has been adopted in the Restatement.170 The courts 
of the Netherlands likewise determine domicil in accordance 
with the concept of the forum and refuse to apply the na-
tional law of the person, because they believe that the defini-
tion of domicil does not pertain to the functions of the personal 
law.ln 
In a broad way, the same result has been reached through 
the theory that the determination of a person's domicil is a 
problem of "characterization" and therefore must be answered 
in accordance with the lex fori. 172 This means that the conflicts 
168 In re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan [I9oo] P. 2II, 227; In re Annesley, 
Davidson v. Annesley [I926] Ch. 692; Fleming v. Horniman (I928) 44 
T.L.R. 3I5; CHESHIRE I68. 
169 Harral v. Wallis (I883) 37 N.J.Eq. 458; Harral v. Harral (I884) 39 
N.J.Eq. 279· Cf. I BEALE § IO.I. 
170 Restatement § I o. 
171 H.R. (Jan. 5, I917) W.too7J. It must be noted, however, that the case 
dealt with jurisdiction, in a suit against a ward of German nationality; for this 
purpose the minor was consider~d domiciled with his Dutch guardian, accord-
ing to BW. art. 78, irrespective of German law; recently Rb. Amsterdam 
(Apr. 9, I926) Clunet 1928, 1296; Rb. Amsterdam (Nov. 26, 1926) Clunet 
I928, 1293; Rb. Dordrecht (Dec. 9, I936) W. 1937, no. 921 (domicil by 
operation of law for a minor foreigner in the Netherlands with his guardian, 
BW. art. 78); see also Rb. Almelo (May 13, I936) W. 1937, no. 258 (German 
illegitimate child, but domicil for the purpose of the child's bastardy proceed-
ings). 
172 See MELCHIOR I77 n. 7; DE NovA, 30 Rivista (1938) 388, at 399· 
LEWALD, Regles Generales des conflits de lois 91 n. 23 (with other citations). 
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rule of the forum referring to the law of the domicil neces-
sarily refers to the law of the place considered to be the domicil 
under the private lawof the forum. If, for instance, an Am-
erican citizen resides in Paris, a French court would determine 
at what place he is domiciled solely in accordance with the 
French concept of domicil, as indicated by examination of the 
French law. 
Yet, in the common opinion/ 73 it is not inconsistent with 
this theory that, to use the same example, the American and 
not the French definition of domicil should be decisive for 
the problem of renvoi. Where an American citizen lives in 
France at the time of his death, a French (or German) court 
in determining succession to his movables, will consult first 
his national law, i.e., the American, which is deemed to refer 
to the inheritance law of the last "domicil." To comply with 
this reference, the court must ascertain whether the last resi-
dence constitutes a domicil in the meaning of the American 
rule, because this is the rule (of back reference, loi renvoyante) 
to be applied. 174 This construction of domicil is not considered 
an exception to the supposed principle of characterization ac-
cording to the lex fori, for in this case it is the American conflicts 
rule, not that of the forum, that applies and with it the Am-
erican concept of domicil. 
173 See particularly KAHN, r Abhandl. 66; also in 30 Jherings Jahrb. (1891) 
76; NIBOYET 686 no. 565; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 378 no. 323, z 
ARMINJON (ed. z) s8ff. no. 14 sub. (3) (with restrictions, n. 15) j and 
among the French decisions Cass. (req.) (Dec. 30, 1929) D. H. 1930.65; Trib. 
sup. Colmar (Nov. 30, 1921) Clunet 1922, 379; App. Colmar (Jan. 14, 1925) 
Clunet 1925, 1044; Trib. civ. Seine (Apr. 27, 1933) Clunet 1934, 901, Cf. 
BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1935, 625. RG. (June 2, 1932) 136 RGZ. 361, 363; RG. 
(Apr. 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. IOJj OLG. Karlsruhe (Jan. 21, 1930) IPRspr. 1930, 
no. 89 (British subject died in Fr.eiburg; his domicil has to be ascertained accord-
ing to British rules relative to British subjects born in India). 
174 Great Britian: In re Annesley, Davidson v. Annesley [1926] Ch. 692, 707. 
France: Affaire Forgo, Cass. (req.) (Feb. 22, r882.) Clunet 1883, 64; 
Cour. Rennes (July 24, 1923) Clunet I924, 410; Trib. Civ. Seine (Dec. 19, 
192 7) Revue I 928, 5 I r. But there are controversies in literature and in the 
courts. See J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1939) 167 
at I 84. NIBOYET 6r o thinks even that in most cases domicil of Englishmen was 
assumed in contrast to English conceptions. 
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Is it not strange, however, that, to determine the status of a 
person according to his domiciliary law, a court in State X, 
when in doubt whether such person is domiciled in Y or Z, 
should follow its own internal law in localizing the domicil? 175 
Even in the French school of thought, in which the doctrine 
of characterization of legal concepts according to the law of 
the forum has gained its strongest foothold, other theories 
have been advanced in startling variety. Some of the older 
authors, emphasizing the nationality principle, have proposed 
that domicil be defined in accordance with the national law 
of the individual.176 Recent discussions have put forward two 
further points of contact. One opinion is that the law of the 
place of actual residence should be consulted to determine 
whether such residence constitutes domicil; this law is some-
times called the territorial law 177 and is favored as such by 
neo-territorialists such as Niboyet.178 Another opinion, or 
rather formulation of the same trend, postulates that the law 
of domicil which should govern under the choice of law rule 
of the forum should determine also where the domicil is.179 
In fact, the Swiss rule referring the status of a Swiss domiciled 
abroad to the legislation of the domicil is said to imply the 
notion of domicil in the foreign law.180 A similar interpreta-
tion-on doubtful grounds-has been given to the Argentine 
domiciliary rule by the court of Paris; in the eyes of the 
175 In contrast to the domiciliary principle itself, see NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des 
BGB. 69; NEUNER, 8 Z.ausl. PR. (1934) 90. 
176 WEISS, 3 Traite 321;VALERY 113 JlO. 116; cf. LEVASSEUR, op. cit. supra 
n. I 5 I. Some writers claim that the Hague Convention on Divorce of 1902., art. 5 
no. 2. has adopted this view, and some decisions, including German RG. (Apr. 
5, I921) I02. RGZ. 82., 84, have followed these writers. See MELCHIOR I8o n. 3; 
3 FRANKENSTEIN 520. 
177 1 BROCHER 2.4 7ff. His theory was advocated also by 1 ZITELMANN 8 3, 17 8 
and adopted by the C6digo Bustamante arts. 2.2. and 2.5 as well as (in respect of 
jurisdiction) by the Swedish Law of July 8, 1904 with amendments, c. 6 § 3· 
178 See infra n. I 83. 
179 STEIGER, op. cit. supra n. 151, especially at 161 ; TEDESCHI recognizes this 
law as determining domicil for certain status questions as a broad exception to 
the lex fori doctrine. 
180 Swiss NAG. art. 2.8; HUBER.-MUTZNER. 403. 
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Argentine l!!gislator, the domicil acquired by an Argentine na-
tional in Paris, if not authorized by the French authorities and 
therefore not recognized under the then French law, is in-
sufficient to determine the law applicable to his inheritance.181 
Actual residence in the foreign country is presupposed, how-
ever, in such cases. In these polemics, the main argument 
against the lex fori is that domicil, like nationality, establishing 
a social and political tie between an individual and a state, 
should be construed under the law of that state. Particularly, 
it has been considered strange to determine an individual's 
personal status on the ground of his domicil in a country which 
does not recognize him as one of its domiciliaries. This is the 
argument anticipated in Westlake's statement that "no one 
can acquire a personal law in the teeth of that law itself," 182 
a consideration which has much impressed Niboyet, formerly 
the strongest advocate of the lex fori doctrine. 183 
A draft treaty worked out by the League of Nations 184 at-
tempted to eliminate the "conflict of the conflict of laws relat-
ing to domicil" by combining the theory of "territoriality" 
with the lex fori principle. A similar spirit is shown in the 
rules adopted in I 9 3 I by the Institute of International Law, 185 
according to which the courts in each country determine under 
its own domestic legislation whether an individual is or is not 
181 Argentina: C. C. art. J2 8 3 (new 3 JI 7) ; Cour Paris (May I o, I 9 2 9) Cl u-
net 1930,405, Revue 1930, 126, affirmed by Cass. (March 7, I938) Revue Crit. 
1938,472, Nouv. Revue, 1938, 143; cf. }. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, "Le renvoi 
et !'affaire de Marchi della Costa," Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I939) 167. 
182 WESTLAKE § 2 54· 
183 NIBOYET inS. 1929.2.162; S. I930.2.129; Revue Crit. 19351 762; and 
among others 1 Traite (1938) nos. 514-5I5, 552ff. 
184 See Pub!., League of Nations C.343.M.tor.I928.V: BARBOSA DE MAGAL-
HAES, Memorandum, p. I 4 and Draft Convention for the Settlement of Conflicts 
of Laws in the Matter of Domicil, p. I 7 art. 2: Questions connected with change 
of domicil except such as concern a person's capacity at law or the existence of a 
domicil by operation of law shall be settled in conformity with the law of the 
court if the latter be that of one of the States concerned, otherwise, in accordance 
with the law of the place in which it is claimed that the last domicil was acquired. 
Cf. also Draft by BARBOSA DE MAGALHAES in 23 Recueil I928 III I38. 
• 
185 Annuaire 1931 II 239· 
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domiciled therein; the Institute also provides for the case 
where two or more foreign laws conflict in respect of domicil 
and declares that, between two or more voluntary domicils, 
the place of actual residence, if any, should be preferred. The 
Institute has shown a possible solution through this auxiliary 
conflicts rule. Further · progress toward unification of 
"domicil", considered as a connecting factor, will perhaps be 
reached if future writers not only distinguish the concept as 
a category of status law from other meanings of domicil, but 
also differentiate rules dealing with capacity of contracting, 
succession upon death, recognition of foreign judgments, etc., 
in order to ascertain which kind of domicil is a desirable con-
necting factor for each of these separate matters.186 
v. CHANGE OF PERSONAL LAW 
Under the system of personal law, a person's status is 
changed whenever he changes his nationality or, where the 
domicil principle prevails, when he changes his domicil. 
I. Change of Nationality 
In the countries that determine personal status in accordance 
with the law of the country of which the individual is a na-
tional, the problem arises how a change of nationality affects 
an individual's status as a person of full age. Under German 
law, infancy is terminated upon an individual's completing his 
twenty-first year of life.187 In Illinois a woman is regarded 
as of age when she has completed her eighteenth year. 188 When 
a nineteen-year-old American girl from Illinois is naturalized 
in Germany, is she again reduced to the status of infancy? 
186 Cf. FRANCIS, "The Domicil of a Corporation," 38 Yale L. J. (19z9) 335, 
341 and TEDESCHI, Domicilio 8. GUTTERIDGE, "Conflicts of Jurisdiction in 
Matrimonial Suits," 19 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1938) 19, z6ff. thinks a 
worldwide definition of domicil for the exclusive purpose of jurisdiction for 
divorce quite possible. 
187 German BGB. § z. 
188 Probate Act,§ 131. Laws, 1939, p. 4, at p. 37· 
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Article 7 paragraph 2 oi the Introductory Law to the German 
Civil Code contains an express provision by which this result 
is prevented. Even though she is now subject to German law 
as her personal law, the girl continues to be treated as of age 
by the German courts. Can the same result be reached without 
such a provision of the new personal law, for instance under 
article 3 of the Japanese Law of I 898, which, although fol-
lowing literally the German article 7, has omitted the said 
paragraph 2? This question has been answered in the affirm-
ative, 189 but it has been objected that full age does not consti-
tute a vested right and would have to be reacquired under the 
new statute.190 
2. Change of Domicil 
Since domicil can be changed more easily than nationality, 
the problem is even more acute in those countries where an 
individual's personal status is determined in accordance with 
the law of the country where he is domiciled. That a once ac-
quired status as a person of age is preserved in spite of a change 
of domicil to a country where infancy is terminated at a 
later age, has been recognized in the conflict of laws of Den-
mark/91 and Norway/92 as well as in the Treaty of Monte-
.video.193 
189 Austrian decisions, see WALKER r2.8 n. 42.; I BAR§ 144; NIEMEYER, Das 
IPR. des BGB. 12.6; RoLIN, 2. Principes I96 n. 655; PouLLET 319 n. 2.. 
190 WEISS, 3 Traite 344; I FRANKENSTEIN 42.6 n. 82.; RAAPE 79; and French, 
Italian and other German writers quoted by these authors. 
191 BoRuM and MEYER in 6 Repert. 2.I6 no. 22. (doubtful). 
192 CHRISTIANSEN in 6 Repert. 573 no. Ioo (generally recognized). 
193 Treaty on international civil law (I889) art. 2, provides that change of 
domicil does not affect capacity acquired by emancipation or coming of age. 
The new text of I 940 readsl to the effect that change of domicil does not affect 
capacity. 
Argentina: C. C. arts. 138 and I39· SCHLEGELBERGER interprets art. 138 as 
not applying to a change of domicil from one foreign country to another 
(4 Z.ausl.PR. (I93o) 75I). The opposite view is taken by VICO (vol. I, nos. 
493, 494) who refers for support to the ancient statutist theories. 
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In the United States, however, capacity is generally inde-
pendent of domicil; in the exceptional case where domicil is 
determinative, it seems that the actual domicil alone is taken 
into consideration. 
VI. RATIONALE 194 
I. Tradition 
Before modern states arose and developed the concept of 
allegiance, the only and obvious test of personal law was 
domicil, either of origin or of choice, special considerations 
applying to dependent persons. 
This test is still important in those states where private law 
is divided into different systems. Domicil is still the natural 
criterion in the British Empire and in the United States, as it 
formerly was in France before the Revolution, in Italy before 
I 8 66, and in the old German Empire and in most parts of 
the second German Empire before the Civil Code took effect 
on January 1, 1900. It goes too far, however, to pretend that 
the principle of nationality is absolutely impracticable for a 
country that lacks uniformity of private law throughout its 
territory. 195 In such a country, domicil is the best element of 
contact in the relations between the several territories, but 
in the relations of the country as a ·whole to foreign countries 
either test may be used. As a matter of fact, in I 926, Poland 
chose the domicil test for interlocal relations among her several 
territories under Warsaw-Polish, Russian, German, Austrian, 
and Hungarian laws, but declared nationality to be decisive 
for problems of personal law in international relations. Thus, 
19
• Mere reference is made to the selected bibliography and the treatment of old 
and recent so-called "theoretical arguments," by 2 ARMINJON (ed. z) 28ff. 
no. 9· 
195 See z BAR§ 91 at 267, z68 discussing WHARTON§§ 20 ff, whose arguments 
against nationality have been reassumed, however, by POLLOCK, Book Review, 
31 Law Q. Rev. (1915) 106 and 3 BEALE 1934. 
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a foreigner domiciled in Poland stands under his national 
personal law, and a Polish citizen living abroad has to obey the 
laws which Poland applies to all her nationals as well 
as the law of that Polish territory where he had his last 
domicil, or in the absence of any former domicil, the laws 
of the state capital. Such a system would be theoretically con-
ceivable for other composite countries. In the United States 
especially, despite the fact that states constitute the territories 
of private law, the constitutional circumstances are somewhat 
analogous, considering that state citizenship has become sub-
ordinate to federal nationality; the American system has been 
determined, however, by other elements. 
2. Political Considerations 
An important role has been played not only by tradition but 
also by political considerations which have influenced the law-
making agencies of the various countries, consciously as well 
as unconsciously. 
The unilateral rule of article 3,' paragraph 3 of the French 
Code, although reflecting traditions of the old coutumes, 
represented the idea that a French citizen should enjoy the 
achievements of the great Revolution wherever he might hap-
pen to be and that he should be bound everywhere by its laws 
by virtue either of tacit agreement or simply by natural law. 
Mancini held the idea that, in contrast to the strict territorial-
ity of public law and public policy, the needs of an individual 
were served best by rules of family, inheritance, and status 
law of universal application; since the laws dealing with these 
topics are the product of all those factors that determine a 
people's national character, the laws of a person's national 
community should be considered most suitable for him wher-
ever he may live. These notions of the French revolutionists 
and of Mancini were widely discussed; they appealed to the 
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trend of nationalism of the nineteenth century; and they were 
widely adopted in the numerous national codifications of the 
period. When the German Civil Code was enacted in I 896, 
the test of nationality had won such a firm hold that the tradi-
tional system of domicil could be discarded almost without 
discussion. Whenever new waves of national feeling were 
stirred up in the twentieth century, they resulted almost in-
variably in the adoption of the principle of nationality as best 
fitted to protect the needs of the national community.196 
3· Economic Considerations; Migrations 
While these ideological arguments have been working in 
favor of the principle of nationality, the domicil principle has 
found support in the desire of immigration countries to in-
corporate new immigrants into the legal life of their country 
as soon as possible, and thereby to avoid the difficulties that 
would arise if each new immigrant prior to naturalization were 
to be judged in accordance with the laws of his home country. 
These considerations have been of crucial influence in the 
United States/91 as well as in Switzerland and Argentina.198 
They have been gaining ground in Brazil: 199 the new Intro-
ductory Law of September 4, I 942, has radically substituted 
the principle of domicil for that of nationality, previously in-
corporated in the code. 200 A few other S~uth American coun-
196 Cf. PILLAUT, Revue I 9 I 6, I4, 32, and see National-Socialist writers such 
as REu in 57 RVerwBl. (1936) 52I and HoRST MuLLER in DJZ. I936, col. 
Io6s. LoRENZEN, in a Book Review, 33 Am. J. Int. Law (I939) 427 observes 
that RAAPE's recent manual on German international private law greatly extends 
the principle of nationality. 
197 See 3 BEALE I 9 35. 
198 Argentina, which had adopted the principle of nationality in I 8 57 and 
re-affirmed it in I 862, later went over to the domiciliary law in the C. C. of I 869. 
199 RoDRIGO OCTAVJO, 0 direito positivo e a sociedade internacional (Rio de 
Janeiro, I9I7) II3, quoted by 1 VICO 365 no. 424; Report of the Brazilian 
Delegate (EsPINOLA) to the Third Commission of the Sixth Panamerican Con-
ference, see Diario de la Sexta Conferencia Internacional Americana (Habana, 
I928) no. 30 p. 420; cf, BusTAMANTE, La nacionalidad y el domicilio (1929). 
200 Lei de IntrodU<;ao, r 942 Decreta-Lei no. 46 57, art. 7. 
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tries have changed in recent years from nationality to domicil, 
obviously yielding to the influence of immigration policy.201 
Especially in France, where considerable masses of for-
eigners had come to live before the outbreak of World War II, 
the advantages of the domiciliary system for an immigration 
country began to be appreciated. Characteristic of the change 
of mind is the attitude of the treatises edited by Niboyet. As 
late as 1928, he reprinted the opinion of Pillet 202 explaining 
the French doctrine as follows: 
The French sovereignty has no interest in subjecting all in-
dividuals in France to the provisions of the Civil Code in 
matters of status and capacity. It has, on the other hand, a 
marked interest not to let its nationals evade the operations of 
its laws ... 
But at the same time he declared 203 the problem to be more 
political than doctrinal and shortly thereafter became the 
leader of a movement aiming to control all inhabitants of 
France by French law. Extended discussions of the Comite 
Francais de Droit International Prive were devoted to this 
endeavor, which almost all French experts seem to approve. 204 
201 Guatemala had the nationality rule in its Law on Foreigners of r 8 94, art. 
48, 2d sentence, and adopted the principle of domicil in the C. C. of 1926, libro I, 
art. u, from which the provisions on conflicts law were transferred in 19 3 3 
to the Constitutive Law of Judicial Power, and more recently to the Law on 
Foreigners of 1936, arts. !7 and r8. See MATOS nos. q6, 172. 
In Peru, the Civil Code of r 8 51 had no express rule but was often interpreted 
in the sense of nationality test. Despite Peru's participation in the Montevideo 
Treaties of r889, the Commercial Code of 1902 seemed to confirm this theory, 
art. 15, following art. 15 of the Spanish Commercial Code and determining the 
capacity of foreigners according to their lex patriae. Draft and text of the Civil 
Code of 1936 have followed the domiciliary system; cf. supra p. 119. 
202 NIBOYET 699. See moreover PILLET, 2 Manuel ( ed. r) 515: how would 
we conceive that an individual minor in his country of origin could become 
capable or incapable according to the countries where he would be contracting? 
203 NJBOYET 702 no. 587. · 
204 See Travaux du Comite fran~ais de droit int. prive, Annees 1-4 (1934-
1937) and in Revue Crit. 1939, 171, report on the meeting of May 23, 1938, 
concurring "le statut de l'etranger ." These studies started significantly with an 
Exposition by M. Louis-Lucas on the territoriality of law and the new tenden-
cies towards it. NIBOYET, Traite Vols. 1 and 2; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNJ:ERE 266; 
BARBEY, Le Conflit 215, and respecting the question of capacity, see below. 
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Countries from which large portions of the population emi-
grate, are attracted, on the other hand, by a principle which 
tends to preserve the ties between the emigrant and his home 
country. Great Britain furnishes a striking illustration of this 
tendency, namely, the doctrine of domicil of origin, which 
has often been compared with the bonds effected by the prin-
ciple of nationality, a doctrine maintained and developed to 
satisfy the natural desire of a home country from which in-
numerable colonizers have gone out into the world. Even in 
the United States where in theory only one kind of domicil 
is known, courts usually have been reluctant to recognize that 
an American citizen has transferred his domicil to a foreign 
country, especially when there are assets in this country to be 
distributed or taxes to be assessed. 205 This, in practice, is a 
domicil of origin. 
Similar considerations have contributed to the popularity 
of the nationality principle itself in Germany and Italy, from 
which millions emigrated to the New World in the latter part 
of the nineteenth century. However, this circumstance should 
not be overestimated. Until very recent times, neither 
Germany nor Italy pursued any consistent policy in preserving 
relations with their emigrants. Until 1913, a German citizen 
living abroad even lost his citizenship after ten years, unless 
he had himself expressed his desire to retain allegiance by 
formally registering with the German consulate.206 
Wherever in those countries the principle of nationality 
did not satisfy nationalistic tendencies, there could scarcely 
have resulted a change from the principle of nationality to 
205 CouDERT, "Some Considerations in the Law of Domicil," 36 Yale L. J. 
(I927) 949, 96I; comments in 37 Yale L. J. (I928) I127, II29, and par-
ticularly the cases commented upon, by CoUDERT: Matter of Spencer, N.Y. L. J. 
June 2, I908 (not reported); United States Trust Co. of New York v. Hart 
(I9I2) ISO App. Div. 413, 135 N.Y. Supp. 8I, aff'd (I9IJ) 208 N.Y. 6I7, 
Io2N.E.III5. 
206 German Law on Nationality of I 870 (StaatsangehOrigkeitsgesetz), replaced 
by Law of July zz, 1913. 
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that of domicil but rather an extension of the application of 
the principle that "laws of public safety and police" apply to 
every person sojourning within the territory of the forum. 
By such an order of ideas, the principle of nationality is main-
tained for nationals abroad and narrowed with respect to 
foreigners living in one's own territory. This unhappy result 
has been achieved in the Latin American codifications indicated 
above.207 
4· Practicability 
Respecting the practicability of the alternative tests, it has 
often been alleged that citizenship is not changed so easily nor 
so often as domicil or residence, and in consequence that a 
law based on nationality could not be evaded so smoothly as 
a law based upon domicil. The former is therefore said to be 
better fitted to govern the conditions of such transactions as 
marriage, adoption, or testament, than a law which the pro-
positus can voluntarily renounce. Moreover, nationality is 
credited with being a relatively clear and simple concept com-
pared with the uncertainties and multiformity of domicil, 
especially in its British varieties. Recent critics in England 
have admitted that the English conception is "both artificial 
and complex." 208 The force of this argument is somewhat 
questionable, in view of the complexity of modern citizenship 
laws and the circumstance that the British domicil of origin 
is not a domicil at all. On the other hand, it has been argued 
in favor of the principle of domicil that it is closer to facts 
and more consistent with the principle of territoriality. 209 But 
neither are these considerations in themselves advantages. It 
is noteworthy, however, that, after the first World War, the 
practical difficulties caused by the consideration of strange or 
207 See supra pp. 1 1 7-1 19. 
208 FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," 16 Brit. 
Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84 at 85. 
209 NIBOYET, in z Melanges offerts a M. Mahaim 679 ("chant de la terre") 
quoted by VAN HILLE, 65 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1938) z94, z96. 
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obscure foreign laws under the principle of nationality were 
acutely felt in Germany. For this reason, the same suggestions 
were made, as in France for reasons of immigration policy, 
that the local law should again govern the status of domiciled 
foreigners. 210 
So far as outside parties are concerned, either system opens 
the door to prejudicial mistakes respecting the legal capacity 
of foreigners. 
The perplexity of the situation is illustrated by the strange 
fact that while many Continental writers are quite set upon 
restoring the principle of domicil,211 it has been said in 
England that "the best course would seem to be to adopt the 
doctrine of nationality as applied on the Continent." 212 All 
agree, however, that for the time being there is no hope of 
any such radical modifications. It may naturally be concluded 
that efforts should be directed to fundamental improvement 
of both criteria. 
5· Efforts to Reach a Modus Vivendi Between the Two 
Principles 
The contrast between the two systems of determining per-
sonal status is deeply rooted in traditions and policies, and 
the near future holds no prospect of its elimination. It appears 
therefore the more necessary to devise ways and means to 
achieve practicable decisions in individual cases in spite of the 
coexistence of the two different systems. 
(a) The most effective means has proved to be the renvoi, 
of which, in fact, the chief field of application is status and 
capacity to engage in transactions. 
210 See 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 390 on proceedings of the law commission of the 
Prussian Chamber of Representatives (particularly p. 396 on marriage require-
ments, see infra p. 291) and 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 633 an opinion of Schilling rec-
ommending retention of the domicil principle for the Baltic States. 
211 Also in the Netherlands, an address by Kollewijn in Batavia (1929) against 
the "degenerated" principle of nationality is regarded as a characteristic sign; 
cf. 0FFERHAUS1 in Gedenkboek 1838-1938, 705. 212 FOSTER, 16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84. Cf. supra p. 108, n. 23. 
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(b) The Hague Conferences simply adopted the principle 
of nationality; the Treaty of Montevideo adhered to the 
domicil principle. During the making of the C6digo Busta-
mante, serious but inadequate proposals were made to bridge 
the gulf: 213 
First, the principle of the Hague Convention on Marriage 
that the national law should govern except where it refers to 
another law (renvoi); second, an analogous idea, advocated 
by the Uruguayan delegate, Varela, that the law of domicil 
should govern, except where it refers to another law, par-
ticularly to that of nationality; and third, the notable sug-
gestion of De Bustamante that every contracting state shall 
apply to a national of another state that law which is applied 
to him by the state to which he belongs. Cubans would thus be 
treated in all states according to the national principle, and 
Argentinians according to the law of domiciP14 This would 
give nationality a certain preference in the outcome, quite as 
the renvoi theory does, and evidently produce an adequate 
solution. 
More recently, however, at the Scandinavian Convention of 
February, I 93 I, establishing conflict of laws rules for matri-
monial relations, adoption, and guardianship, 215 the problem 
was more successfully resolved. Sweden and Finland apply 
nationality as the test, while Denmark, Norway, and Iceland 
retain domicil as controlling. To regulate the relations between 
the 'five countries, the Convention admits the law of domicil 
in the first instance and secondarily the law of nationality. 
Article I provides, for instance, that where a national of one 
of the participant states is domiciled in one of the other states 
for at least two years, his marriage is governed by the law 
213 BusTAMANTE, Tres Conferencias sobre derecho internacional privado 
(I 929) 46ff. 
214 BusTAMANTE, La Nacionalidad y el domicilio (1927) 6x. In twenty dif-
ferent situations ten times nationality, and ten times domicil would result as 
test (pp. 641 6 7) . 
215 Cf. BLOCH, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 627. 
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of the state of domicil; otherwise, the law of the state to which 
he belongs controls. 
At its meetings in Cambridge, 1931, and Oslo, 1932, the 
Institute of International Law, formerly a strong supporter 
of the principle of nationali-ty, attempted a compromise with 
a marked tendency toward the Anglo-American doctrine; but 
the issue did not appear hopeful. 216 
(c) The following case illustrates a recurrent problem, 
which particularly needs efficient relief: 
A marriage between German parties was dissolved by a 
divorce decree of an American court. Subsequently, the hus-
band became an American citizen and married another wife in 
this country. The judgment not being recognized in Germany 
because of alleged lack of reciprocity of recognition, it seemed 
certain that, in Germany, the second marriage would be held 
invalid, the issue thereof illegitimate, and as such not entitled 
to share in the husband's estate. However, the court of appeals 
in Berlin upheld th<:: validity of the second marriage for 
several reasons, of which the most effective seems to have been 
the court's desire not to upset a factual situation that had been 
established in the United States. 217 Judgments of this kind, 
if more frequent, would hollow out the extraterritorial effect 
of the personal law. But the problem is comprehensive. States 
with nationality as the test extend their regulations beyond 
their frontiers to their citizens abroad, more often than not 
colliding with the states of immigration imposing different 
rules upon the same persons.218 Even if this extension of au-
216 See BRIERLY, observations on the Draft mentioned above, n. I 84-, Publ. of 
League of Nations C.J4-J.M.Ioi. I92.8. V p. I9. From the British angle, GuT-
TERIDGE, 65 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I938) I5; cf. TEDESCHI, Domicilio 
I 7• 
217 KG. (Jan. 13, I9:zs) JW. I925, :ZI4-6; cf. MELCHIOR, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 
74-5, also MELCHIOR, Grundlagen 4-14- § 2.79. See, moreover, LG. Berlin (Aug. 
6, I934-) 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. :z8 (a German national was divorced andre-
married in Czechoslovakia; the court recognized the divorce only because of the 
following remarriage); contra: MASSFELLER, StAZ. I936, 335; EcKSTEIN, 
7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 33· 
218 This is seen by FEDOZZI :ZJo, arguing with CAVAGL!ER! I4-5· 
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thority, so much resented in Latin America, were justified in 
itself, it should certainly not be allowed to produce effects 
beyond the time of acquisition of a new nationality by a former 
citizen of the forum. But even without a change of nationality, 
it is shocking that the national law should lay hold of a man 
who abandoned his country many years ago, and of his chil-
dren and grandchildren, who live in different surroundings 
and never think of themselves as subject to any law other than 
that of their new country. If the principle of nationality is to 
survive, its claim should cease at least when the propositus 
has established himself in a new country and has founded new 
family relations, or simply when considerable time has elapsed. 
The Harvard Research in International Law in its Draft Con-
vention on Nationality has proposed to restrict the acquisition 
of nationality by birth (jure sangttinis) to the second gen-
eration of an emigrant.219 This solution would be of some 
help, but the pretensions of the old personal law should be 
limited even more strictly. 
6. Conclusion 
We may well conclude that both systems of testing the per-
sonal law are seriously defective. The principle of nationality, 
however, suffers not merely from its complicated nature. We 
shall see that its unpopularity, so conspicuous in the French 
literature, has reached critical proportions in court decisions 
and legislation, in particular with respect to divorce. 
There is one more circumstance apt to destroy what use-
fulness nationality may still have as a criterion for status. 
Many millions of people have emigrated in the course of the 
war, in the estimate of some experts as many as thirty millions 
in Europe alone, and others will do so; millions have also lost 
their former citizenship or will not be able to prove to which 
state they belong. In European countries where the nationality 
219 23 Am. J. Int. Law Spec, Supp. (Harvard Law School) (1929) 13, art. 4· 
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principle had its origin, a formidable intermixture of popu-
lations is about to render it obsolete. Moreover, should fed-
erations be created, the relation of individuals to the federal 
governments will be so important as to offset the ties of nation-
ality. 
Thus, domicil, the dominant concept of the English-
speaking part of the world and the emergency concept con-
sidered above in connection with the cases of apatrides, holders 
of several nationalities, citizens of composite empires, etc., in 
Europe, might resume its old importance, if only it were not 
of such uncertain nature. 
Can the domiciliary test be improved? It should be possible 
to obviate at least the clandestine establishment of a domicil 
of choice, which renders doubtful the determination of so 
many cases. In Europe, it would seem quite feasible to re-
quire that any voluntary change of domicil be reported to a 
public authority empowered to investigate. In European coun-
tries, residence and domicil of individuals are constantly being 
controlled by official agencies for the purposes of defense, 
police, and taxation. Little innovation is necessary to establish 
the personal law by a formal record. In this country, such 
intrusive bureaucratism is probably out of the question. But 
the divorce statutes present an alternative method of assuring 
that one party is actually domiciled at the forum; they usually 
require, not a public record of the establishment of domicil, 
but the lapse of a certain period, ordinarily a year, during 
which domicil must have existed.220 Very remarkably, the 
Polish Interlocal Law of 1926 has generally provided that 
a person changing his domicil from one part of Poland to 
another, only after the lapse of one year, becomes subject to 
the law of his new domicil with respect to his capacity, his 
family relations and his inheritance.221 An analogous idea ap-
220 See 2 VERNIER§ 82; infra pp. 4o8-410, 460. 
221 Law on inter local private law of Aug. z, I 926, art. z. 
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pears in the above-mentioned French decree of 1938 requiring 
that in order to avail themselves of their French domicil or 
residence, foreigners should possess police permits to sojourn in 
the country for more than a year. 222 However questionable this 
novelty, a product of prewar apprehensions, may appear, it is 
true that the existence of a voluntary domicil can be ·better 
ascertained, if a period of factual residence is added to the 
ordinary requisites, as in the American divorce law, or if the 
individual has secured official authority to reside more than a 
year in the country, as prescribed in the French emergency 
decree. 
222 See supra p. 141. 
CHAPTER 5 
Specific Applications of the Personal Law 
I. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
I N the conflict of laws, especially in civil law countries, the sphere of application of the personal law is extensive. The branches in which the personal law is of the greatest 
importance are the law of family relations and that part of the 
law of contracts and other transactions which regards capacity. 
The application of the personal law to these branches of the 
law is to be discussed separately. The present chapter is con-
cerned only with its application ·to the remaining personal , 
relations. 
r. General Capacity to Have Rights and Duties 
While in the days of slavery personality was not enjoyed by 
all human beings, 1 it is now taken for granted that every 
human being is a person and as such capable of having rights 
and duties. However, some exceptions still persist. Under tpe 
canon law of the Roman Catholic Church, an individual is 
deemed to lose his personality upon joining certain monastic 
orders. In a few countries, this rule of the canon law is still 
recognized as exerting an analogous efi~ct in the temporal 
order of affairs. 2 The German Reichsgericht once decided, 
applying the rules of the then prevailing principle of domicil, 
that the personality of a woman who had become a nun in a 
1 Restatement § I 20 comment d. 
2 For instance: in Ecuador C. C. arts. 92-94. In the Chilean C. C., arts. 
95-97 have been canceled by Law no. 7, 612 of Oct. 11, I943, art. 2. 
In Argentina the canon law rule is expressly denied recognition C. C. art. IOJ. 
In Austria a monk was held incapable of acquiring any new rights; the assets 
owned by him at the time of his entry into the order were placed under curator-
ship, I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ (I925) I6I § 70. 
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Russian convent was extinguished to exactly the same extent 
that it was under her personal law, i.e., the law of the place 
of the convent. 3 
A few countries and states, among them several of the 
United States, have retained the old punishment of civil death. 
The meaning of this term is quite doubtful under the modern 
statutes. Constituting a penal measure, such a diminution of a 
person's legal status is generally disregarded by other states 
or countries. 4 
Capacity of having rights and duties includes capacity to 
sue and be sued in the sense of what the Continental doctrine 
terms capacity of being a party 5 or of "standing in court." 6 
As individuals generally have full personality, they enjoy 
such capacity, while it may be wanting in the case of unin-
corporated associations. It seems that procedural rules every-
where acknowledge that capacity to sue and to be sued in this 
sense is determined by the personal law, in this country the 
law of domicil. 7 The question is entirely distinguishable from 
that of the procedural capacity of a person, i.e., to effectuate 
procedural acts on his own behalf or on behalf of another per-
son, a capacity that is affected by incompetence. 8 
For a long time, Continental authors have discussed so-
called "special capacities." 9 This term covers a variety of 
different problems which preferably should be discussed in-
dividually. 
3 RG. (July I 3, I 893) 32 RGZ. I 73, I 7 5 (capacity of a Russian Catholic nun 
to be a party to a German lawsuit, decided according to the law of the place of 
her nunnery). 
4 For details see Note, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (I939) 288. 
5 See, for instance, German Code of Civil Procedure, § so: Capable of being 
a party to a lawsuit is he who is capable of having rights. 
6 
"Stare in judicio " (Roman law), "ester en justice" (French law), "capacity 
to stand in judgment" (Louisiana lawyers). 
7 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule I 7 (b). 
8 Cf. German Code of Civil Procedure, §52 apd infra p. I 8 I. 
9 C/. SAVIGNY § 364; for French theories of BouLLENOIS and FROLAND see 
2 LAINE 207, 2 I I; for a theory of BROCHER cf. GEBHARDSCHE MATERIALIEN 70, 
SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS 
The term "special capacity" has been used, first, to indicate 
those characteristics which an individual must possess. in order 
to qualify, for instance, for the office of guardian or adminis-
trator or for membership in a cooperative association or for 
eligibility as a member of a board of a corporation. Such re-
quirements, not affecting the individual's general personal 
standard, are regulated by that law which determines the other 
incidents of the legal relation in question. 10 Hence, a person's 
capacity to serve as administrator of a decedent's estate is 
determined by the law of the state in whose court the estate 
is being administered, and a person's capacity to be a member 
of a corporation is determined by the law of the state of in-
corporation. 
The term "special capacities" is used, secondly, as referring 
to the numerous rights and privileges enjoyed by a country's 
citizens as opposed to resident or sojourning aliens. As said 
before, this vast topic, traditionally covered in the French 
books on private international law, exceeds the boundaries of 
the law of conflicts and pertains to internal administrative law. 
The term "special capacities" is employed, finally, to desig-
nate requirements for certain transactions,· such as that of a 
certain age for marrying or that the parties be not married to 
each other as a condition for the validity of a gift. \Vhere such 
requisites are not regarded as mere applications of the personal 
law, they must be considered separately. 
2. Beginning and End of Personality 
The determination of the exact moment at which an in-
dividual's personality begins 11 is generally referred to the 
10 German courts, see LEWALD 39, no. 43, NEUMEYER, IPR. (ed. r) §zo; 
GUTZWILLER 1626. 
11 The various municipal laws are not all alike in this respect. § 1 of the 
German Civil Code provides, for instance, that an individual's personality 
(Rechtsfahigkeit) begins with the completion of his birth. According to the 
Civil Code of Spain (C. C. art. 30), however, an individual is not recognized 
as a person until he has lived at least twenty-four hours. 
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personal law, which also determines the legal status of a child 
en ventre sa mere.12 
Difficult problems of conflict of laws are caused by the 
differences of municipal laws with respect to absentees. The 
two world wars have given this subject ominous importance. 
Most laws follow one or another of three different-systems: 
First: the rebuttable presumption of the common law, ac-
cording to which an individual is presumed to be dead when he 
has been absent without being heard of for a stated number of 
years, for instance, seven years; 
Second: the French system, according to which a perso-!l's 
unexplained absence for a stated period of time is judici~lly 
investigated and established and certain effects similar to those 
of death are incurred; 13 
Third: the German system, of much influence upon recent 
legislations, according to which the legal effects of death take 
place when and only when a judicial decree has been issued 
providing that the absentee shall be regarded as dead ( decla-
ration of death) and as having died at a certain moment.14 
12 Art. z 8 of the Codigo Bustamante reads: 
"Personal law shall be applied for the purpose of deciding whether birth 
determines personality and whether the unborn child shall be deemed as born for 
all purposes favorable to him, as well as for the purpose of viability and the 
effects of priority of birth in the case of double or multiple childbirth." (Trans-
lation in u Am. J. Int. Law Supp. (192.8) 2.76). See also HUBER-MU"IZNER 
410. 
On the other hand, art. 53 P.G.R. of Liechtenstein applies the law of that 
principality to persons born within its territory, in matters governed by Liechten-
stein law. Application of the territorial law is also advocated by GEMMA, Revue 
1930, 48, and by FEDOZZI 370. 
13 This system prevails in most countries whose private laws follow the general 
pattern of the French Code, including Italy. For Switzerland, where it has been 
modified in several respects, see below n. I 6. 
14 German BG:!J. §§ IJ-19. War emergency laws of 1916, 1917 and 192.5. 
Although French writers had disapproved of this institution, it was imitated in 
the first World War for persons missing in war; see RHEINSTEIN, 13 Rheinische 
Z.f. Zivil- und Prozessrecht (1924) so. Shortly before World War II in 1939, 
Germany and Italy modified their laws on absentees according to the model of 
the rules concerning persons missing in war; see R. SCHMIDT, "Das neue, 
italienische Verschollenheitsrecht," 13 Z.ausl.PR. (1940) 103. While Italy, 
however, retained the declaration of absenteeism, Spain, by Law of Sept. 8, 1939, 
adopted the German system, see 42. Bull. Inst. Int. (1940) uo. 
SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS 
A workable solution of some of the most important prob-
lems of conflict of laws respecting absentees has been provided 
by article 9 of the Introductory Law to the German Civil 
Code, as modified by the Law of July 4-, 1939, § 12, which 
may be summarized as follows: 
( r ) An absentee is declared dead by a German court in 
accordance with German law, if he was a German citizen at 
the time of his disappearance (§ I 2 par. I); a foreign declara-
tion of death will not be recognized in such case by a German 
court. 
( 2) Upon the application of his wife, a male absentee of 
foreign nationality is declared dead by a German court in ac-
cordance with German law, if the wife is domiciled in Germany 
and is a German national or was a German national before 
her marriage ( § I 2 par. 3); this provision is designed to enable 
the wife to remarry. 
(3) Irrespective of whether or not he has been a resident 
of Germany, a foreign absentee is declared dead pursuant 
to German law with respect to such of his assets as are situated 
in Germany and to legal relations governed by German law 
(§ 12 par. 2). 
These rules have been used as a model in several countries, 
either for statutory enactments 15 or in judicial practice.16 
Austria, which is among these countries, considers a foreign 
15 Poland: Law of I9z6, art. 4· 
China: Law of I9I8, art. 8. 
Japan: Law of I898, art. 6. 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 57 par. z. 
18 Belgium: Trib. Antwerp (July IJ, I939) cited by VAN HILLE, 66 Rev. 
Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I9J9) 758, 76o. 
Switzerland: particularly, the third rule stated above is followed, see App. 
Basel-Stadt (Feb. r9, I9JZ) 30 SJZ. (I933-1934) z69 no. 53 (a man born in 
Basel, naturalized a citizen of Minnesota, not heard of since I 906; assets inherited 
by him in r 9 I a were taken in public deposit; in absence of a written rule, the 
judge decides as in the case of a Swiss citizen); cf. Just. Dep.I, BBl. 1933, II 
75 no. 9, 30 SJZ. 120 no. 94; FRITZSCHE and PESTALOZZI, 9 Z.ausl.PR. (1935) 
7oz; SCHNITZER 139. On other controversial points see BEcK, NAG. 424. 
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absentee's last domicil in the country as a ground for juris-
diction.17 
The principles that problems of the law of absentees should 
be determined in accordance with the personal law of the ab-
sentee, and that jurisdiction for judicial action belongs pri-
marily to the state of which he is a national or domiciliary, as 
the case may be, have been recognized in France 18 and Italy 19 
and in many other countries. 20 Hence, for instance, the 
Austrian law was applied in both Germany and Switzerland 
to determine whether the former Austrian Archduke Johann, 
who had become a ship's captain, had assumed the name of 
Johann Orth and had disappeared without being heard of, was 
to be regarded dead.21 Local rules are in force, however, 
practically everywhere, providing for temporary care and cus-
tody of the property of a foreign absentee. 22 
Under the principle of personal law, a court recognizing 
a declaration of death pronounced by the competent national 
17 Austrian Law of February 16, 1883, §I, amended by Law of March 3I, 
I 9 I 8. With respect to an absentee whose last domicil was in Austria, the courts 
of the country of which he was a national have been declared to lack jurisdiction 
by the Austrian Supreme Court (Nov. 3, I909) I2 GlU. NF. no. 4776; contra: 
WALKER 221. On Czechoslovakia see HocHBERGER, 4 Z.osteurop.R. (I938) 
623· 
For Switzerland, see Civil Code arts. 35-38; Just. Dep., BBl. I916, II 522; 
HUBER-MUTZNER 411. The question whether Swiss courts may pronounce a 
foreigner absent was declared unsettled by the Swiss Department of Justice on 
July 12, 1933, 30 SJZ. (1933-1934) I20 no. 94· 
18 Trib. civ. Seine (April 24, I93I) Clunet I9J2> 83, Revue 193I, 504. Swiss 
law was applied not only with respect to the family relations of a Swiss absentee 
but also with respect to his property. The decision has been criticized by J. 
DoNNEDJEU DE VABRES 436, 437· 
19 See FEDOZZI 271; no decisions seem to have been published, however. 
20 The Belgian Trib. Antwerp (July IJ, I939) 9 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1939, 44 
no. 8 excepts the first period of absence from being exclusively governed by the 
Polish law, but contra the opinion of the State Attorney Van Hille and the note, 
ibid. 
21 German RG. (June 28, I893) 4 Z.int.R. (I894) 72; Swiss BG. (Jan. 22, 
I897) 23 BGE. I 166, I7I. The remarriage of the wife of a missing Russian 
husband was held invalid by a German court because the Russian absentee was 
not declared dead and was deemed to be living under Russian law, OLG. Kiel 
(Nov. 30, I926) Schlesw.-Holst. Anz. I927, I45· See also LEWALD 41 no. 47 
and NussBAUM, D. IPR. II7· 
22 See I V1co 433 no. 499 with respect to the countries of Latin America. 
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court, will also recognize restrictions imposed upon the effects 
of such a declaration. Thus, the wife of a Czechoslovakian 
national declared dead in Czechoslovakia ~as not permitted 
to remarry in Germany, since an additional decree was neces-
sary to dissolve the marriage under Czechoslovakian, though 
not under German, law. 23 
The approach which regards a man as either alive or dead 
for all purposes is more satisfactory than to regard the same 
person as alive for some purposes and as dead for others. For 
instance, whether a missing heir or legatee is to be regarded as 
dead can more consistently be answered in accordance with his 
personal law than in accordance with the laws governing the 
descent or the distribution or the administration of assets, 
possibly lying in different jurisdictions.24 
There also are different rules in the case where two or more 
persons perish in a common disaster: some laws presume 
that the deaths have taken place in a certain order, others re-
verse that order, and in a third group no presumption exists. 
Is this problem a question of the personal law? Writers are 
in disagreement. 25 The Brazilian Law suggests application 
of the national law; the C6digo Bustamante also applies the 
23 Czechoslovakian Law of June 30, 1921, art. V; KG. (Sept. 25, 1931) 
IPRspr. 1932, no. 12; cf. WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 238 n. r. 
24 The law governing the distribution of the estate has been applied in the 
following cases: German RG. (Jan. 7, 189o) 25 RGZ. 142, Clunet 1892,1191; 
KG. (May 31, 1897) 9 Z.int.R. (1899) 468, Clunet 1900, 163; OLG. Hamburg 
(Nov. 27, 1896) Hans.GZ.Beibl. 1897, 243; OLG. Colmar (June 12, 1912) 
Els. Lothr. J. Z. 1913, 38. The personal law of the absentee has been applied by 
Ob. Trib. Stuttgart (July 8-1o, 1862) 15 Seuff. Arch. 321; Bay. ObLG. (May 
17, 189o) 13 Bay. ObLGZ. so no. 17 (a man who had emigrated to the 
United States in 1869 and was declared dead in 1886, was considered to have 
inherited a share in the meantime, as he was presumed living at the time of the 
succession under the law of his last German domicil). A third solution was 
adopted by OLG. Dresden (Dec. 20, 1909) 66 Seuff. Arch, 68, 70. The applica-
tion of the lex successionis has been approved by LEWALD 41 no. 46, and M. 
WoLFF, IPR. 59, and disapproved by NussBAUM, D. IPR. 117, 
25 Cf. WEISS, 4 Traite 571. and DESPAGNET 1046 no. 365 (advocating personal 
law); z BAR§ 365, p. 311, tr. by GILLESPIE 8os (law of succession on death); 
VALERY 1194 no. 841. and NussBAUM D. IPR. 117, n. 1. (lex fori). 
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national law, but only to the field of distribution of estates, a 
limitation of the principle which has been criticised.26 
3· Name 
(a) Individual name. Beale has stated that the deter-
mination of an individual's personal name is not regarded in 
common law countries as a problem of status, since a person is 
traditionally free to assume a name and to change it at his 
discretion.27 However, today most American states allow 
special court proceedings to aid and confirm a change of name, 
and a name thus acquired cannot again be changed without the 
intervention of the court. 28 Moreover, the right to use a name 
is governed by important legal rules.29 In civil countries it is 
well recognized that a person's name is determined by law and 
that, therefore, problems of conflict of laws can arise with 
respect to the determination of an individual's name and to the 
manner and extent of his protection against abuse of his name. · 
Traditionally, these questions are decided in accordance with 
the individual's personallaw,30 except such as are controlled 
by imperative local regulations.81 
26 C6digo Bustamante art. 29; cf. the criticism by PoNTES DE MIRANDA, 39 
Recueil I932 I 555,622, 671. 
27 Linton v. First National Bank (I 882) r o Fed. 894; Application of Lipschutz 
(I94I) 32 N.Y. S. (2d) 264. Cf. 2 BEALE§ 120.3. 
28 CoHEN, "The Law Concerning Change of Personal Names," 2 Conn. B. J. 
(I928) IIo, 1I5 n. 14; Note, I6 Chi. Kent Rev. (1937) 65, 66 n. 15. 
29 See 45 C. J., Names 382 § r8. 
30 G~many: RG. (April II, I892.) 29 RGZ. 123, 127; RG. (Dec. 12, I918) 
95 RGZ. z68, 272. KG. (Aprilzz, 1927) IPRspr. 1927, no. 19. KG. (Aprilrs, 
1932) JW. 1932, 28I8, IPRspr. I9J2> no. II. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 28; BG. (Oct. 24, 1907) 33 BGE. I no, 776; BG. 
(July 14, I91o) 36 BGE. I 39r, 395; BG. (Nov. 22, 1934) 6o BGE. II 387, 388. 
G!ESKER-ZELLER, Der Name in lnternationalen Privatrecht (in Festschrift fiir 
Georg Cohn (Zurich, I9I5) 167ff); HuBER-MUTZNER 419. 
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 28, 1935) D.H. 1935. 276; a.ff'd by Cour 
Paris (Dec. 15, 1936) D. H. 1937.72, Revue Crit. 1937, 690 (Prince Colloredo-
Mansfeld, right of divorced wife to carry the name of her former husband). 
Italy: FEDOZZI 362, quoting a decision of Cass. pen. Feb. 17, 1928. 
31 The reported judgment of the court of Paris (n. 30) supposes French 
laws respecting names possibly to have public interest but discounts expressly any 
influence of French public policy. 
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Thus, it has been held by German courts that an individual's 
right to use a title of nobility is to be determined by his na-
tional law. 32 Such titles having been entirely abolished in 
Czechoslovakia, a citizen of that country is denied the right 
to call himself a count in Germany. On the other hand, the 
Reichsgericht has held a Swiss citizen entitled in accordance 
with Swiss custom to append to his own name the titled name 
("von B") of his wife. 33 Whether a foreigner's change of name 
is recognized depends on the recognition or non-recognition 
of such change of name by the country of which he is a na-
tional.34 
In suits for damages for abuse of a person's name, or in 
suits for an injunction against such abuse, a tendency exists, 
however, to resort to the local law, or to the law applicable 
to delictual actions, even where the personal law provides 
actions on other theories. In Germany it has been held, for 
reasons of public policy, that the measure of damages in a 
foreigner's action for wrongful appropriation of his name, is 
not higher than in an ~nalogous action by a German national. 35 
It has also been suggested that it should never be lower. 36 
Within the realm of application of the personal law, doubts 
have arisen with respect to families whose members are not 
all of the same nationality. Where, for instance, a wife's na-
tionality is different from that of her husband, the Swiss Fed-
eral Tribunal has held her name to be determined by her own 
32 KG. (Sept. 19, 1904) 15 Z.int.R. (r9o5) 329; KG. (Dec. 19, 1907) 19 
Z.int.R. (1909) 244; KG. (April 15, 1932) JW. 1932, 2818, IPRspr. 1932, 
no. r r. 
33 RG. (Dec. u, 1918) 95 RGZ. 268,272. 
34 Switzerland: The Justice Department refuses, in the case of a child of 
Swiss nationality (BBl. 1907, I 539), and recognizes in the case of a German 
child (BBl. 1921, III 836), the name given to the child by a German step-
father according to a German institution unknown to Swiss law (viz., the 
cantonal law in 1907 or federal law in 1921), 
Dutch decisions; see VAN HASSELT §I, 
35 KG. (April29, 192o) JW. 1921, 39; KG. (AprilS, 1914) Leipz.Z. 1915, 
1327; RG. (Nov. 2.9, 1920) roo RGZ. 182, 185 (both referring to the "Gervais" 
case). Cj. EG. art. 12 restricting tort actions against German nationals to what 
may be claimed under German law. 
36 RAAPE, z D. IPR. 38o; see also J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 437· 
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nationallaw,87 while in Germany the general rule governing 
marital status presumably applies, and the wife's name is 
determined in accordance with the national law of the hus-
band.88 
(b) ·Commercial name (firm). In Gemany 39 and Switzer-
land/0 it is held that the firm or official name of a commercial 
enterprise is determined by the law of the principal establish-
ment. On the other hand, in Belgium national and foreign 
firms are equally protected under the local law. 41 In France, 
a foreigner is held not to be entitled to any protection of his 
commercial name, unless such protection is provided by treaty 
or reciprocity is otherwise assured. 42 The most important 
treaty, to which France, together with the majority of the 
commercial countries of the world, is a party, is that of the 
Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property. 43 Under 
article 8 of this convention, the commercial name of a citizen 
or corporation of any signatory country is protected in every 
other signatory country without any preliminary registration, 
deposit, or other formality being required. 
4· Status as Merchant 
In most of the countries of the European Continent and 
of Latin America, merchants are subject to duties which are 
37 BG. {July I4, 19Io) 36 BGE. I 39I, 395; see STAUFFER, NAG. art. 8 no. 
15. 
38 GEBHARDSCHE MATERIALIEN I8J; RAAPE 290; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. IZ5· 
The Reichsgericht (Nov. 23, I 927) I I 9 RGZ. 44 has applied in an analogous 
way to the name of an illegitimate child the law governing illegitimate relation-
ship rather than the child's personal law. An obscure rule is in force in Liechten-
stein, P.G.R. art. 45· 
39 RG. (Oct. z, I886) 18 RGZ. 28; RG. (Nov. I3, 1897) 40 RGZ. 6I, 64; 
RG. (May 31, 19oo) 46 RGZ. us, 132. 
40 z MElLI z6z § I 67; tr. by KuHN 450. 
41 Cass. beige (Dec. z6, 1876) Pasicrisie 1877.1.54; PouLLET 155 no. 150. 
42 Decisions in Clunet 1902, 304; Trib. Bordeaux (Aug. 4, 1902) Clunet 
1903, 866. In the Netherlands, however, protection to a foreign commercial 
name depends on a Dutch Law of July 5, 1921 (S.842) cf. the liberal decision 
of H. R. (May 31, 1927) W. 11675, VAN HASSELT 653; to the con.trary effect 
Kg. Amsterdam (Sept. 30, 19:1.4) NJ. 1925, 142, 
43 English text in U.S. Treaty Series, No. 834. 
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not incumbent upon other individuals and, correspondingly, 
entitled to special privileges not enjoyed by non-merchants. 
Special rules also apply to numerous types of contracts where 
the parties, or in certain cases one of the parties, belong to 
the class of merchants. Wherever such special rules are in 
force, the determination of a person's status as merchant or 
non-merchant is generally regarded as a problem of personal 
law. However, in consonance with the traditions of the law 
merchant, in the determination of the personal law nationality 
is disregarded in favor of the law of the "commercial domicil," 
i.e., of the place where the business is established. 44 The French 
Committee for Private International Law, after full discus-
sion, recently voted a legislative motion to amend the French 
law accordingly.45 
Distinguishable from the quality of being a merchant is 
the capacity of carrying on a business as a prerequisite to be-
coming a merchant; this question is commonly regarded as 
governed by the law determining the legal acts of minors, 
married women, insane persons, etc. 46 
44 Germany and Italy: dominant opinion cf. FICKER in 4 Rechtsvergl. 
Handworterb. 462. 
Poland: Law of 1926, art. 2. 
Switzerland: cf. HUBER-MUTZNER 420. 
Argentina: cf. 3 VI co, nos. 221, 243, etc. 
Treaty of Montevideo on international commercial law of 1889, art. 2; 
Treaty of Montevideo on international terrestrial commercial law, text of 1940, 
art. 2. More detailed provisions in C6digo Bustamante arts. 232ff. 
Other opinions: 2 BAR § 290 (2) at qo and in 1 Ehrenberg's Handbuch des 
gesamtc:n Handelsrechts (1913) 330; MELCHIOR 151 § 105; NuSSBAUM, D. 
IPR. 211; SCHNITZER IJ4, 151· 
45 Travaux du Comite fran<;ais de droit international prive, Seconde annee 
( 1 9 35) IJ 2, on t):le capacity to be a merchant in international relations (text of 
proposition at 169). See also the resolution of the Institute of International Law 
in Cambridge (1931 ), 36 Annuaire II 1931, 181, on NIBOYET's proposal. Against 
the unfortunate application of the lex fori in the Hague Draft of 1925 on Bank-
ruptcy, see NIBOYET 519, no. 426. 
46 BAR, 1 Ehrenberg's Handbuch 343; 3 VIco, nos. 234, 237. 
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Insofar as the character of a transaction as commercial or 
non-commercial ("civil") is determined by elements other 
than the status of the parties, the law that governs the contract 
in general is held to be decisive. 41 
5· Infancy 
Another situation regarded by civil law lawyers as per-
taining to status is that of infancy. An infant's capacity to 
engage in transactions is limited; he is subject to parental 
power or guardianship; his domicil is fixed by operation of 
law; his position as a party to a lawsuit is peculiar; and a 
variety of other special rules apply to him. Hence, the personal 
law determines the age at which infancy generally terminates, 
as well as the events which may affect the individual's position 
during infancy. 
A basically similar view obtains in England and has some-
times guided American courts, for instance, in affirming the 
power and duty of the domiciliary state to decree custodian-
ship 48 or to terminate guardianship 40 over infants. It has oc-
casionally been recognized that attainment of majority at the 
domicil is sufficient to terminate ancillary administration of 
a minor's property in another jurisdiction. 5° Story, however, 
speaking of the disabilities of minors as well as of other in-
capacities, associated himself with those among the statutists 
who, in this then much debated question, 51 instead of conceiv-
ing infancy or majority as aspects of personal status, regarded 
incapacity to take part in legal transactions as incidental to 
specific contracts or other acts. 52 As indicated below, this has 
become the general doctrine of this country. (See Chapter 6.) 
47 DIENA, I Dir. Commer. Int. 62. 
48 Griffin v. Griffin ( 192o) 95 Ore. 78, I 87 Pac. 598, 604. 
49 In re Honeyman (I922) II7 N.Y. Misc. 653, I92 N.Y. S. 9io. 
5° For cases see 2 BEALE 663 n. 2. 
51 See STORY, throughout c. IV; I FoELIX ( ed. 3) c. II I 8 I. 
52 STORY § I03. 
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In the Continental discussion, the two following points have 
attracted interest: 
(I) In certain jurisdictions, marriage ends the period of 
infancy, whether of females or of both males and females, 
either unconditionally or with certain provisos. This is il-
lustrated by the statutes of twelve American jurisdictions 53 
as well as by a number of European laws. 54 Under the 
European conflicts rule, such attainment of majority by mar-
riage depends upon the personal law of the infant. Since, for 
instance, under Hungarian law women reach majority by 
marriage, a nineteen-year-old Hungarian girl who marries an 
American and, by this fact, neither acquires American citizen-
ship nor loses Hungarian citizenship, will be regarded as 
being of full age by every court applying the nationality test. 55 
On the other hand, a young Englishman marrying in Italy is 
not em~mcipated, as the Italian rule on emancipation does not 
apply to his status. 56 The case of a bride who acquires her hus-
band's nationality on marriage under the nationality law of 
the husband's country is more doubtful. If a Swiss girl of 
seventeen marries a German and thereby changes her nation-
ality, is the Swiss rule, "Marriage imports majority," able to 
terminate her infancy, although she abandons her Swiss per-
sonal law at the very moment of her marriage? Affirmation 
of this question is favored in recent German literature. 57 
(2) Under the German and related systems the status of 
a person of full age may be granted to an infant by decree of 
a court or an administrative agency-"declaration of major-
53 5 VERNIER§ 271, 
54 The Netherlands: BW. art. 385. 
Hungary: ALM.Asr, 1 Ungarisches Privatrecht (Berlin, 1922) 54· 
Switzerland: C. C. art. 14 par. z. 
Turkey: C. C. art. 1 r par. :z. 
55 RAAPE 69, 
56 Dr EN A, z Prine. 115. 
57 WALKER u8 n. 39> 788; WAHLE, :z Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 142, mentiomng 
Austrian decisions to this effect; RAAPE 77; M. WOLFF, IPR. 61. Contra: 1 
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ity" 58-whereas in France, Italy, Spain, etc., less effective 
forms of "emancipation" are provided. 59 Similarly, at com-
mon law and under certain American statutes, a judicial decree 
may eliminate a part of a minor's disabilities.60 At civil law, 
jurisdiction to render such a determination is generally held 
to rest with the country which furnishes the personal law of 
the infant. 61 This law also determines whether emancipation 
is possible at all, for what causes it may be conferred, and what 
effect it produces; it decides in particular whether the minor 
thus emancipated enjoys unlimited legal capacity or whether 
he needs special authorization or consent in particular situa-
tions. 62 As will be discussed in detail below, the general rule 
of capacity in this country forms part of the law of the con-
tract, while in the Continental system it refers to the personal 
law. 
II. PuBLIC PoLICY 
Foreign law in the field of "status" is more often denied 
application on account of local policy considerations than in 
FRANKENSTEIN 423, 3 FRANKENSTEIN 235 n. 31; LEWALD 57; BECK, NAG. 
175n0.72. 
As to the effect of a newly acquired nationality of the bride, see RG. (Jan. Io, 
1918) 91 RGZ. 403,407 dealing with the question of whether guardianship over 
a German girl ended by her marrying a Russian in Czarist times. It seems that 
the court classified the question as one of the effects of marriage; this is why it 
quoted EG. arts. I4 and 15 and the Hague Convention of July 17, 1905 on 
Marriage Effects, arts. I and 2. 
liS Germany: BGB. §§ 3-5. 
Austria: Allg. BGB. §§ I74, 252. 
The Netherlands: BW. arts. 473 ff. 
Brazil: C. C. art. 9; cf. PoNTES DE MIRANDA, 39 Recueil I932 I 622. 
59 France: C. C. art. 477· 
Italy: C. C. (I 865) art. 3 I I; C. C. ( 1942) arts. 39off. 
Spain: C. C. art. 322. 
60 5 VERNIER § 282. 
61 On general principles, it would not appear unthinkable for a decree of 
emancipation to be rendered by a court of a country not that of the nationality, in 
accordance with the substantive law of the infant's national law. On this question 
I FRANKENSTEIN 427; STAUFFER, NAG. art. 7 no. 7i RAAPE 9I (who thinks 
that it could be done where the procedure required by the personal law limits the 
cooperation of an authority to mere recordation (blosse Beurkundung). 
62 DIENA, 2 Prine. r I4; 0. VON GIERKE, I Deutsches Privatrecht (Leipzig, 
1895) 22 I ff.; WEISS, 3 Traite 342, and following these writers Swiss BG. (May 
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any other field of law. Regrettable as the disharmony caused 
thereby may be, it is a common trait of existing laws, a trait no-
where more distinct than in France where, to quote Julliot 
de la Morandiere, each day the application of the personal 
law is progressively restricted in favor of French law.63 
However, a peculiar doctrine has been expressed by Dicey 
and repca ted in America by Beale and the Restatement 
( § I 20), that a foreign status of a kind unknown at the forum 
(English or American law respectively) will not be recog-
nized. 64 No other authority exists for this proposition than a 
few English cases which have been critically destroyed by 
Cheshire. 65 
Thus, prodigality is "not a status at common law." 66 If a 
Frenchman domiciled in France is judicially declared a spend-
thrift by a French court, American courts will certainly 
recognize those effects of the decree which relate to transac-
tions carried on in France. 67 But the question is whether an 
American court will ascribe effects to the French decree with 
respect to American transactions. In France, for instance, the 
spendthrift can bring a lawsuit only through a committee 
(family council). Can he sue without any guardian in the 
United States or in England? No doubt, appointment of a 
conservator in one American jurisdiction under a local statute, 
has been said to be inoperative on transactions in another juris-
diction, a statute being bare of extraterritorial meaning under 
an ancient statutist doctrine. 68 Whatever the actual merits of 
this antique rule, a French interdiction of a prodigal does in-
:q, 1912) 38 BGE. II 1, 3 (the declaration of majority is governed by the 
national law). 
63 Colombia, Comision de Reforma del Codigo Civil (1939-1940) :1.18. 
64 DICEY 531 Rule 136 (I); 2 BEALE§ 120.1. 
65 CHESHIRE 144. He thinks that In re Selot's Trust [1902] 1 Ch. 488, is to be 
explained upon other grounds and that Worms v. De Valdor (t88o) 49 L.J. 
N.S. (Ch.) 261, has been decided wrongly. 
66 2 BEALE§ 120.8. 
67 Restatement § 120 comment c; 2 BEALE § 1 20.1 : "The existence of the 
foreign status is a fact and should be recognized as a fact by a court in any state.'' 
68 Gates v. Bingham (1881) 49 Conn. 27 5· 
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tend to restrict the capacity of the individual everywhere. 
Dicey and Beale derive their thesis that such decree can not 
be recognized in a common law jurisdiction from an English 
decision, Worms v. De V aldor/9 in which Frey, J ., errone-
ously reasoned that the French adjudication of prodigality did 
not change the status of the person, although he asserted in 
addition "that if a change of status were effected by an order 
of a French court, this (English) court would not take notice 
of a personal disqualification caused by such change of status." 
No such problem is known in civil law. A French decree 
declaring an individual of French nationality and domicil a 
spendthrift is recognized in any other country, including 
Guatemala 70 and Chile, 71 as affecting the individual's per-
sonal status. The principle has been well formulated by the 
Swiss Department of Justice with respect to foreign declara-
tions of death, which are unknown to Swiss law; if not con-
trary to public policy, the foreign decree must be granted the 
same effect as conferred upon it by the foreign law. 72 
With respect to legitimation and adoption, the implications 
of the Dicey-Beale theory are even more serious. Is such an 
act, performed abroad, not to be recognized by a court whose 
domestic law has not yet introduced the institution of legitima-
tion or adoption? If such institutions are known to the forum, 
but the particular variety adopted by the foreign law is not, 
should the effect of the foreign act be limited to that given 
locally to the most nearly related type, rather than simply 
recognized to the same extent as in the foreign jurisdiction? 73 
American cases show a strong tendency to limit recognition of 
the foreign institution. An analogous opinion is widely held 
69 (188o) 49 L.J. N.S. (Ch.) 261; followed in In re Selot's Trust [1902.] 
I Ch. 488. 
70 See MATOS nos. 2181 219, 
71 Chile: App. Santiago (Nov. 7, 1934) 34 Revista Der. J. y Cien. Soc. 
(1937) II sec. 2r_J4 (interdiction by judgment of the Italian Court of Genoa; 
exequatur granted by the Supreme Court). 
72 BBl. 1916, II 522 no. 5· 
73 See GooDRICH § I42.; STUMBERG 309; see also LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 349 
no. 340. But see FALCONBRIDGE1 Case Note, 19 Can. Bar Rev. (I 941) 3 71 39· 
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in the case of a foreign business organization whose exact type 
is not included in the domestic commercial order.74 Or, in ac-
cordance with a recent suggestion, should the "status" created 
in a foreign country be recognized but its specific "effects" or 
"incidents" be reserved for close inspection under the light 
of the internal law of the forum? 75 This line of thought seems 
to result directly or indirectly in an extensive application of 
public policy, much as French courts and writers invest the 
provisions of the Code Napoleon with the dignity of inter-
national public order.76 A foreign adoption of an infant was 
not recognized in France before such act was permitted in 
France in 1923 by an internallaw.77 The Codigo Bustamante 
declares that none of its provisions relating to adoption will 
apply to states whose legislations do not provide for adop-
tions. 7 s All such rules are indefensible, inasmuch as they deny 
effect to foreign institutions without an urgent national in-
terest in the particular case, a point clear to most French 
writen; but often ignored by courts. Vlhy should a country's 
own civil code rule the world? 
On the other hand, English courts, before the Legitimacy 
Act of r 926, did not hesitate to recognize legitimation by sub-
sequent marriage executed under foreign domiciliary law, 79 
and at present they recognize California legitimations by rec-
ognition, though unknown to English statutes. 80 Argentine 
courts seem to treat foreign adoptions in the same way, their 
internal law notwithstanding.81 The Portuguese Supreme 
Court, recognizing a Brazilian adoption under analogous cir-
cumstances, held it a constant international rule that the non-
existence of an institution in the lex fori does not prevent the 
74 This will be discussed in the second volume. 
75 This theory has been proposed by T AINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy and 
Recognition in the Conflict of Laws," I 8 Can. Bar Rev. ( 1940) 691 at 708. 
76 Cf. NIBOYET nos. 382, 66o and note in Nouv. Revue 1935, 425. 
71 SeeApp. Paris (Jan. z, 1936) Gaz. Pal. 19J6.I.551. 
78 Codigo Bustamante art. 7 7. 
79 In re Wright's Trusts (1856) 25 L. J. (Ch.) 621, 2 K. &. ]. 595· 
80 In re Luck [1940] A. C. Ch. 864. 
81 
:t VICO no. 172; RoGER, 6 Repert. 683 no. 44· 
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rights flowing from it from being given effect. 82 The legal 
situation of a French illegitimate child recognized by a parent 
is enforced in Germany where this type of status is unknown. 83 
The prevailing opinion certainly favors simple recognition of 
foreign legal situations without provincial restraint. 
A third problem is illustrated in the Restatement by an 
English case, Atkinson v. Ander.son: 84 
"By the law of state X, the inheritance tax imposed upon 
'strangers in blood' who inherit is at a higher rate than that 
imposed upon inheriting relatives and the term 'strangers in 
blood' is construed as including natural illegitimate children. 
The status of 'recognized natural child' exists in state Y but 
not in X. A dies domiciled in Y, bequeathing chattel~ in state 
X to C, who, according to the law of Y, is A's recognized 
natural child. C, on taking the chattels in state X, pays a suc-
cession tax as a stranger in blood." 85 
However, this is an interpretation of a tax law and not a 
problem of international private law. It may well appear that 
an inheritance tax statute is intended to apply a higher tax rate 
to all illegitimate children. In such case, it would make no 
difference whether such children are or are not "recognized." 
Hence, the English decision in the case of Atkinson v. Ander-
son may be an entirely correct interpretation of the English 
tax statute, but it is not at all necessary to resort for its justifica-
tion to a general theory of non-recognition of a foreign status 
unknown to the lex fori. For example, the Argentine tax em 
gratuitous transfer of property has been held applicable to a 
foreign adopted person "by simple interpretation of the tax 
statute" without regard to a conflicts rule. 86 
82 Sup. Trib. Lisbon (May I 5, I 934) Nouv. Revue I935, 424, 427. 
83 Prussian Minist. Ord. of Aug. 29, 1924 (StAZ. 1924, 198): cf. RAAl'E 
szz. 
64 Restatement § 12.0 comment b; 2 BEALE § uo. I relies on Atkinson v. Ander-
son (r882) 21 Ch. D. roo. 
ss (I882) 21 Ch. D. roo. 
86 App. B~nos Aires (Dec. 10, 191.6) 1.3 J. A. 856. 
CHAPTER 6 
Capacity 
I. OBJECT OF THE DISCUSSION 
T HE laws of the various countries differ widely with respect both to the grounds on which certain in-dividuals are denied normal competence and to the 
scope of the disabilities imposed. Also, the term, "capacity," is 
not used with quite the same meaning everywhere. For the 
purpose of the conflict of laws, distinction should be made 
between a general rule of capacity and numerous exceptions 
thereto defined by special rules. 
The purpose of the general rule is to determine the law 
that is to govern a person's ability to bind himself by contract 
with other parties or by unilateral acts. In most countries, the 
general rule applies also to dispositions of property, though 
in some the law governing title to property, especially tangible 
assets, movable and immovable, extends to capacity. 1 The 
most important qualifications of the general rule are as fol-
lows: 
(a) The personal characteristics necessary to hold a person 
liable in tort are generally subject to the law governing tort.2 
(b) The effects upon property interests of such events as 
1 For the United States see z BEALE 1180 § 333·3; GooDRICH §145. Also 
art. 10 of the Argentine C. C. seems to have been drafted in accordance with 
SToRY §§ roz and 42.4, and, following this model, to determine capacity with 
respect to immovables by the law of the situs; this has been demonstrated by 
CHAVARRI 76 nos. 67ff., contrary to various opinions hitherto held. For Hun-
gary, VON SZLADITS in 23 Grotius Soc. 1937, z8 explains that every woman, 
whether of Hungarian or foreign nationality or domicil, has free disposition of 
immovables on Hungarian soil. This subject is very difficult and cannot be 
treated here. 
2 To be treated in succeeding volume. 
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marriage, bankruptcy, or appointment of a committee are the 
object of special conflict of laws rules.3 
(c) Questions pertaining to the borderline zone between 
the law of capacity as a general topic and the law of distribu-
tion of estates, must be discussed in connection with the latter 
subject. But it may be noted that the provisions in the French 
law designed to protect minor heirs in the distribution of a 
decedent's estate have been declared to be a part of the per-
sonal law of the heirs and therefore to be inapplicable to 
foreign heirs. 4 In the United States, provisions that protect in-
fants against the effects of statutes of non-claim apparently 
are considered part of the procedural law of the state where 
the assests are administered; 5 the parallel with the French 
law is, of course, not perfect. 
(d) Capacity to marry and to engage in other transactions 
of family law constitutes a particular topic to be discussed 
below. 
In numerous countries, married women are still subject 
to restrictions of various kinds upon the legal effectiveness of 
their promises. The Restatement classifies the problem to what 
extent a married woman is subject to such restrictions as a 
problem of the law of contracts, which, both in accord with 
the general approach of the Restatement and in agreement 
with the majority of decisions, is declared to be determined by 
the law of the place of contracting. 6 There is respectable 
authority, however, for the view that the state where a married 
woman is domiciled is justified in holding her incapable of 
3 Restatement §§ 237, 238, 289, 290; Germany: M. WoLFF, IPR. 61, II. 
4 Cass. (civ.) (April q, 1932) S.I9J2.I.J6I and Note by AuDINET; 
D.t932.1.89 with Note by BASDEVANT; Revue 1932, 549· Cf. ]. DoNNEDIEU 
DE VABRES 507. The estate of the late Robert of Bourbon, Duke of Parma, 
was distributed in accordance with the family statute of the house of Hapsburg-
Lorraine, which was recognized as his personal law by Austria, the country of 
which he was a national. Hence, the French Supreme Court held that his 
family statuw~determined what protection was to be extended to minor heirs. 
5 Cf. Restatement § 498. 
6 Restatement§ 333 comment. 
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contracting under its own rules, even where the contract was 
made in another state under whose law such contract would be 
binding upon her. 7 
Recognizing that limitations on the contractual capacity of 
married women are closely connected with the structure of 
the family and are motivated to a large extent by a desire 
either to protect families against financial ruin or to safeguard 
the dominating position of the husband as family head, the 
European laws tend toward classifying the problem of con-
tractual capacity of married women as a problem of the law 
of family relations. Consequently, the law by which these 
problems are determined is that applying generally to the 
personal relations between husband and wife. This law need 
not necessarily be the personal law of the wife. 8 • 
(e) The legal consequences of insanity are determined by 
the personal law. Under the system of domicil, however, the 
voluntary acquisition of domicil by an insane non-resident 
presents difficulties, 9 and the claim of the law of the domicil to 
govern transactions in such situations has been doubted.10 
(f) The capacity of an individual to determine the conduct 
of a lawsuit to which he is a party, as distinguished from 
capacity to be a party, which has been trea,ted above, 11 seems to 
be considered in this country as a matter of procedural law 
and governed, in consequence, by the internal law of the 
forum. 12 In the eyes of a Continental lawyer, this is a question 
of capacity to exercise rights, and therefore the answer de-
pends on the personal ~aw. Thus, it has been decided in the 
Netherlands that Swiss law governs the question whether a 
7 Union Trust Co. v. Grosman (1918) 245 U. S. 412, per Holmes, ].; 
BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1936, 59·7, 619-621. 
8 See infra p. 302. 
9 CHESHIRE 403. 
1° CHESHIRE 406 proposes the law with which the transaction of an insane 
person· is most closely connected. 
11 See supra p. 162. 
12 See Restatement § 58 8 and cf. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule r 7 
(b) and (c). 
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Swiss married woman can bring a lawsuit in a Dutch court with-
out the consent of her husband. 13 In an analogous way, the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal has declared that the power to do so 
affects capacity and therefore in the case of Swiss nationals is 
to be governed by the Swiss federal statutes rather than by the 
cantonal laws of procedure.14 However, as an exception to 
this rule the German Code of Civil Procedure declares that 
a foreigner lacking procedural capacity under his national law 
is deemed to have it when he would possess it under the law 
of the court.15 
II. THE LAw GovERNING CAPACITY 
I. Capacity Governed by the Law of the Place of Contracting 
The notion that the permanent characteristics of an in-
dividual are all to be regarded as incidents of his "status" and, 
therefore, all governed by the individual's personal law, is 
not current in the United States. 
In this country, excepting Louisiana, the almost universal 
rule, clearly supported by commercial expediency, is, as stated 
by Goodrich, that the capacity of married women-which is 
typically involved in capacity cases-is governed by the lex 
loci contractus.16 "Some authorities seem to hold that capacity 
is to be determined by the 'law of the contract,' " 17 which may 
be different from the law of the place of contracting; but 
"many courts hold that capacity is governed by the lex loci 
contractus, even while they assert that some other law may 
13 Hof Amsterdam (July 13, 1923) W.xxx63, N.J. 1924, II8. Belgium: 
Trib. comm. Bruxelles (Oct. 30, 189o) Pasicrisie I89I.3·5· 
,
14 BG. (Dec. 27, 1916) 42 BGE. II 553, 555; BG. (April 7, 1922) 48 BGE. 
I 24, 29. 
15 German C. Civ. Proc. §55; KG. (March 3, I 936) JW. 1936, 3570 
(English minor), see infra p. x86, n. 38. 
16 GoODR!CH 266 § xos; Restatement§ 333a; Milliken v. Pratt (x878) 125 
Mass. 374, 28 Am. Rep. 241. 
17 GooDRICH 267, excluding the possible influence of the intention of the 
parties, because a circulus vitiosus would result. 
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govern the obligation and validity (in other respects) of the 
contract." 18 At present, it is true that some courts of agricul-
tural states are inclined to protect married women domiciled 
in the forum against their out-of-state creditors. This is 
scarcely a domiciliary rule; it represents rather a public policy 
of the forum in preference to a recognized conflicts rule. But 
the law of the domicil also has it advocates, especially when 
it agrees with the lex fori. 19 
In the less frequent cases relative to the capacity of infants, 
the law of the place where the infant acts is generally ap-
plied.20 Minor 21 explains the rule by the particular character 
of the infant's disability, evidenced by the fact that his con-
tract is not void but only voidable; the infant is not incapable 
"in his person" but has a privilege to disaffirm the contract. 
Beale 22 denies the existence of a status of minority at common 
law b~cause "the effects of minority are not so uniform or 
clearly fixed as to be described as the incidents of a status." 
These are obscure arguments. The true reason of the rule, 
commercial expediency, has been well indicated by Story him-
self 23 and has been accepted .by the courts as necessary in a 
country where a large part of the population is constantly 
moving from one state to another. 
In consequence of the rule, an individual reaching full age 
at his domicil, for instance at the completion of his eighteenth 
year or by marriage, is nevertheless treated as an infant, even 
at his domicil, with respect to transactions executed in a state 
where full age is attained only at twenty-one years of age.24 
Capacity for the purpose of contracts relative to immovables, 
18 2 BEALE§ 333·3 at II77• 
19 Cf. Union Trust Co. v. Grosman (1918) 245 U.S. 412; STUMBERG :u6; 
and supra p. 103, n. 7· 
~0 GooDRICH 267. 
21 MINOR§ 72; cf, §§ 5, II. 
22 2 BEALE§ 120.II. 
:za STORY§ 102 a, b, quoting Burge; cf. § 76 at p. 97, n. 2, 
24 0'Dell v. Rogers (1878) 44 Wis. 136 at 181 (majority of a woman con-
ferred by marriage). 
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correspondingly, is governed by the lex situs.25 And a decree 
based on a local statute, which in part removes an infant's dis-
abilities for certain purposes, does not enlarge his capacity for 
acts in another state. 26 
The American view 27 has been keenly observed in recent 
years in Europe 28 and has served as a major argument for 
the opponents of the traditional European approach. 
The notion that capacity should not be separated from other 
problems of validity of contracts was once advocated by a few 
statutists, such as John V oet 29 and Bi j nkershoek,S0 and ap-
plied during the first half of the nineteenth century in Den-
mark.31 
The rule that capacity to contract is simply determined by 
the law of the place of contracting is also said to prevail in the 
Soviet Union. 32 
25 Beauchamp v. Bertig (1909) 90 Ark. 351,119 S. W. 75· 
26 State v. Bunce (1866) 65 Mo. 349 (authorization by Arkansas court); 
Philpott v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. (1884) 85 Mo. 164 (emancipation 
in Texas); Beauchamp v. Bertig (1909) 90 Ark. 351, 119 S. W. 75 (author-
ization in Oklahoma to sell). 
27 Beauchamp v. Bertig (1909) 90 Ark. 351 1 119 S. W. 75; Deason v. 
Jones (1935) 7 Cal. App. (2d) 4821 45 Pac. (2d) 1025. This approach is 
consistently followed by the Restatement; capacity to contract is declared to 
be determined by the law of the place of contracting (§ 333); capacity to 
transfer land and chattels by the law of the situs (§§ 216 and 255 1 respectively), 
capacity to marry by the law of the place where the marriage is celebrated 
(§§ udf.); see also the statement about capacity to be held responsible for 
a tort implied in § 3 79· With respect to the theoretical basis of BEALE's opin-
ion, see his Summary,§ 551 522, and the criticism by WIGNY, Essai 19, 103. 
28 The American cases down to 1933 have been collected and analyzed by 
RUDOLF MUELLER, "Die GeschaftsHihigkeit natiirlicher Personen in der inter-
national-privatrechtlichen Rechtsprechung der Vereinigten Staaten," 8 
Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 885. 
29 See STORY § 54 a. 
30 BIJNKERSHOEK ( 1673-1743), 1 Observationes Tumultuariae (edited by 
MEI]ERS, DE Bd:coURT and BoDENSTEIN, 1926) no. 71 expressly invokes 
}oannes Voet. He applied the lex loci actus as to capacity to marry; see LEE, 
"Bijnkershoek's Observationes Tumultuariae," 1 7 Journ. Comp. Leg. ( 1935) 
3 8 at 43· 
31 See BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 216 no. 21. 
32 See MAKARov, Precis 190 • 
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2. Capacity Governed by Personal Law 
Outside of the United States and the Soviet Union, prob-
lems of capacity are generally treated as belonging to the 
domain of personal law. Even in the United States, this ap-
proach is followed in Louisiana, 33 although it appears 
weakened recently. 34 A peculiar position is occupied by Switz-
erland, where problems of capacity are determined by the 
national law of the individual, 35 while problems of personal 
status in general are referred to the law of the domicil. 
Since Mancini's time, the European rule has been justified 
upon the ground that the country of nationality is the one 
best qualified to determine· whether and to what extent re-
strictions should be imposed upon the individual citizen in his 
own and his family's interest. Rules determining capacity are 
regarded as the very core of the rules that permanently deter-
mine an individual's legal status. It is obvious, of course, that 
incapacities accompanying an individual wherever he goes may 
endanger others who bona fide enter into transactions with 
him, but the principle is based upon the consideration that any-
one who engages in a transaction with another must ascertain 
at his own risk whether such other party has sufficient legal 
capacity, or, as stated ~n the Roman maxim, Qui cum alia 
contr.ahit, vel est vel debet esse non ignarus condicionis eiu.r 
(Dig. so.q.r9). (He who contracts with another either 
knows or ought to know the other's condition.) In interstate 
or international transactions, the results of this maxim are 
even harsher than in transactions involving parties both sub-
ject to the same law. While it may often be difficult to ascertain 
33 Marks v. Loewenberg (1918) 143 La. 196, 78 So. 444; Lorio v. Gladney 
{1920) 147 La. 930, 86 So. 365; National City Bank of Chicago v. Barringer 
(1918) 143 La. 14, 78 So. 134. 
34 See as to capacity to sue Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc. (1942) 2o:z La. sos, 
12. So. (:zd) 253, Note, r8 Tul. L. Rev. (1943) 319,321. 
35 BG. (Nov. :z1, 19o8) 34 BGE. II 738, 741; BG. (May :z3, 1912) 38 BGE. 
II r, 4; BG. (Feb. 7, 1934) 61 BGE. II z:z, 17 (:z). 
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whether an individual is under age, married, or of unsound 
mind, it may be more difficult to find out that he is a foreigner 
and that his capacity is restricted by his personal law. 
As a matter of fact, in order to alleviate embarrassments to 
national business life, exceptions to the rule have been found 
necessary for transactions contracted wholly within the ter-
ritory of the forum. 
(a) In the famous Louisiana decision, Saul v. His Credi-
tors, it was recognized that a foreigner twenty-two years of 
age, a minor under the law of his domicil, could not plead this 
foreign law against a contract entered into by him in the 
state.36 The same rule was adopted occasionally in other juris-
dictions at a time when the law of domicil was held to govern 
capacity. 37 
(b) In the Prussian and other German codes since the 
eighteenth century, the validity of transactions in which con-
sideration is given and the capacity of standing in court, were 
in one way or another declared independent of foreign-created 
disabilities.38 By the German law (EG. art. 7 par. 3), it is 
provided that a foreigner who engages in a transaction in 
Germany is considered to have the same capacity as he would 
36 Saul v. His Creditors (I 827) 5 Mart. N.S.569, I6 Am. Dec. :u2, discussed 
by LIVERMORE, Dissertations on the Questions Which Arise from the Con-
trariety of the Positive Laws of Different States and Nations 32 § I 7; STORY 
§ 76; I WHARTON§ II4ff. 
37 See in particular Woodward v. Woodward (I889) 87 Tenn. 644, II 
s. w. 892, 897· . 
38 Prussian Allg. Landrecht of I7941 Einleitung §§ 35, 38, 39 provides that 
the rules of the Code shall be applied to foreign-domiciled persons engaging 
in contracts within the territory if these rules are more favorable to the validity 
of the contract than the laws of the domicil; cf. DERNBURG, I Lehrbuch des 
Preussischen Privatrechts (ed. I, I875) 46; Prussian AUg. Gerichtsordnung 
of I 793, I§ 5: the capacity of a foreigner to stand in court is determined by the 
law of his domicil, § 6: but if he has completed his 25th year, it is immaterial 
whether the law of his domicil, or of the situs of the res, or particular acts that 
have not been presented to the court determine a later coming of age. 
Baden: C. C. of 18o8, art. 3 (a). 
Saxony: C. C. of 1863, § 8. 
Germany: Code of Civil Procedure (I877) §53· 
Greece: C. G~of 18561 art. 4 par. 2. 
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have if he were a German, even if his capacity be more limited 
under his own national law. This provision, designed to pro-
. teet German business, is not applicable to transactions con-
cerned with land outside of Germany, family relations, or in-
heritance, but applies to donations between living persons. 39 
Moreover, this provision is strictly limited to transactions 
made within Germany, and does not protect anyone when he 
contracts in a foreign country. Varying provisions of this type 
have been adopted in numerous codes!0 
Another kind of rule of more general scope was contained 
in article 84 of the German Bills of Exchange Law of r 848, 
and now appears in the Geneva Conflicts Rules on Bills of 
Exchange and Promissory Notes of 1930.41 Article 2 reads as 
follows: 
"The capacity of a person to bind himself by a bill of ex-
change or promissory note shall be determined by his national 
law. If this national law provides that the law of another 
country is competent in the matter, this latter law shall be 
applied. 
"A person who lacks capacity, according to the law specified 
in the preceding paragraph, is nevertheless bound, if his signa-
ture has been given in any territory in which according to the 
law in force there, he would have the requisite capacity." 
Und~r these provisions the signature is valid not only in the 
country where it has been made but also in every other country 
39 After removal of doubts, the Italian C. C. (I938) Disp. Prel. art. 7 par. 21 
C. C. ( I942) Disp. Pre I. art. I 7 par. 2 states the same rule, see Relazione I9 3 8, 
no. 7· 
40 Switzerland: art. 7b, par. I of NAG. provides that a foreigner who has 
engaged in a transaction in Switzerland cannot plead his lack of capacity if he 
would have capacity under Swiss law. 
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. 9· 
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Prel. art. I7 par. 2. 
Japan: Law of I898, art. 3 par. z. 
Iran: C. C. art. 962. 
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 24. 
Montenegro: C. C. art, 7 8 8. , 
For Hungary see SZLADITS, 23 Grotius Soc. 19371 251 27. 
41 See supra p. 34· 
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signatory to the Convention. The country of which the signer 
is a national is allowed, however, to treat the signature as in-
valid.42 
Under neither of these provisions does it matter by what 
law the contract is generally governed, of what country the 
parties are nationals, or where they are domiciled. Nor is it 
relevant whether the incapacity of the foreigner was known 
or unknown to the other party. A purely objective test is be-
lieved best to serve the interests of commerce; this policy of 
disregarding individual circumstances in laws intended to pro-
tect trade was consistently carried out in German law before 
I9JJ. 
(c) A subjective test is applied in France, however, as 
established by the Court of Cassation in the celebrated Liz.ardi 
case.43 A twenty-two-year-old Mexican, being still a minor 
under Mexican law, bought jewels in Paris; he would have 
been of full age had he been a Frenchman. The court, con-
sidering that the seller had acted "in good faith and without 
negligence or imprudence," declared the buyer bound by his 
contract. This decision has been followed consistently by the 
French courts. 44 Under this so-called "doctrine of national 
interest," protection is given against excusable ignorance of 
foreign incapacities, dependent upon the circumstances of each 
individual case. 45 Accordingly, the courts are disinclined to 
accord the benefit of the doctrine to bankers or other business-
42 Germany has availed herself of this permission: German Bills of Exchange 
Act of June 2I, I933> art. 9I par. 2, 2d sentence. 
43 Cass. (req.) (Jan. I6, I86I) S.I86I.1.305. 
44 Cour Paris (Feb. 8, I 883) Clunet I 883, 29I; Trib. civ. Seine (July I, 
I886) Clunet I887, I78; Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 23, I89I) D.I892.I.29; Cour 
Paris (July zz, I933) Gaz.Pal.I933·2.724, Clu'net I934, 9Io. In the last-men-
tioned case, a contract was made in France by a Rumanian married woman, who 
exhibited to the other party an instrument purporting to be a judicially legal-
ized general power of attorney of her husband. The instrument was ineffective 
under Rumanian law. The court characterized the conduct of both spouses as 
"truly tortiouf'_! ("un veritable quasi-delit"). J. DONNED!EU DE VABRES 509 
in discussing this case, notes an increasing tendency of the courts to limit ex-
ceptions from the application of the personal law to such grave situations. 
45 This "serious defect" of the French solution has been admitted by 2 
ARMINJON no. 2I. 
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men who can reasonably be expected to investigate the per-
sonal status of their customers. Relief is generally granted, on 
the other hand, against a foreigner who fraudulently repre-
sents that he has his capacity. 46 
This French approach is well-known throughout the Latin 
countries, but opinions are divided;17 
More emphatically than the French courts, the Swedish 
Law of r 904-, as amended June 2 7, I 924- (c. 4- § 5), provides 
that transactions shall be valid in cases where the other party 
has not known of and has been unable to ascertain the in-
capacity.48 
(d) A combination of the German and the French rules has 
been undertaken in article 3 of the Polish Law of I 926 on 
private international law, prescribing that the capacity of a 
foreigner who lacks capacity under his personal law and who 
in Poland has entered into a transaction intended to have effect 
in Poland, is to be determined in accordance with Polish law 
when such determination is necessary for the security of honest 
commerce. This provision is as complicated and impracticable 
as that recently proposed by the Institute of International 
Law.49 
(e) · These various exceptions to the principle of the per-
sonallaw have resulted in widespread doubts on the propriety 
of the principle itself. Nevertheless, the only exception basi-
cally affecting the principle is the provision of the Uniform 
46 France: SURVILLE, Clunet 1909, 6:1.5. 
Spain: Trib. Supr. (April 21, 1892) 71 Sent. 504. 
Austria: Allg. BGB. §§ 866, 1041. 
47 Especially in Italy, the doctrine was not adopted by the courts and has 
been advocated by only a few writers, such as ANZILOTTI I53 no. 2; I FroRE 
no. 449· Now the German model has been followed, supra n. 39· In Belgium, 
PERROUD's hostile attitude (Clunet 1905, 305) has been followed by the authors 
of Novelles Belges, I D. Civ. 221 no. 157. 
48 The provision does not apply, however, against a foreigner who is a na-
tional of a state which is a signatory to the Hague Convention of June 12, 1902 
(Ord. of Oct. 10, 1924). . 
In Norway, the domiciliary law is applied without exception. See CHRIS· 
TIANSEN, 6 Repert. 573 no. 99· 
49 Resolution of Cambridge 1931, Annuaire I931, II 69-93, 237; cf. on 
Resolution of Oslo 19321 BAAK in Revue 1932, 820. 
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Geneva Conflicts Rules noted above. Other existing exceptions 
are intended strictly to protect businessmen (and not even all 
of them) operating in the state of the forum, while the rule 
shields the forum's own nationals who engage in transactions 
abroad.50 Indeed, a German court would allow the plea of 
incapacity of a twenty-year-old Frenchman who contracts an 
obligation in Switzerland (because of the principle of nation-
ality), although he would be barred from such a plea in a Swiss 
court (because of the Swiss provision, analogous to the Ger-
man exception). 51 On widely different theories, writers have 
criticized the exceptions as well as their limits. 5.2 
3. Mixed Systems 
(a) English law. No English decision has decisively settled 
the question whether an individual's capacity to contract is to 
be determined in accordance with his personal law, i.e., the 
law of his domicil, or in accordance with the "proper law of 
the contract." Dicta can be quoted for either approach. 53 The 
text writers increasingly tend toward advocating the applica-
tion of the proper law of the contract insofar as mercantile 
transactions are concerned. 54 This opinion has been followed 
50 See for instance Trib. civ. Seine (June 30, 1919) Clunet 192.0, 184 (a 
Frenchman who was placed under guardianship in France entered upon a 
contract abroad; when he was sued in France his defense of incapacity was 
sustained). Cf. also for Bulgaria, GHENOV, 6 Repert. 189 no. 48. 
5! RAAPE 84, 85; PLANCK, 6 Kommentar zum BGB. (ed. x) art. 7, no. 6 (d). 
sz Cf. NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 125; WALKER I I Iff.; LEWALD 59, no. 
74; M. WoLFF, IPR. 63. Only NEuBECKER 62. believed that the exception stated 
by EG. art. 7 par. 3 could be extended by interpretation. 
53 For application of the domiciliary law: Udny v. Udny (1869) L. R. 1 Sc. 
App. 441, 457; Sottomayor v. De Barros (no. x) (I877) 3 P. D. C. A. x, s; 
Cooper v. Cooper (x888) IJ App. Cas. 88. 
For application of the proper law of the contract: Sottomayor v. De Barros 
(no. 2) (1879) 5 P. D. 94, Ioo, per Sir James Hannen; Ogden v. Ogden 
[I9o8] P. (C. A.) 46; Chetti v. Chetti [I909] P. 67; Simonin v. Mallac 
(186o) 2 SW. & Tr. 67, per Sir Cresswell Cresswell. Cf. also ALLEN, "Status 
and Capacity," 46 Law Q. Rev. (I93o) 277 at 2941 309. 
54 DICEY 63 7 Rule 15 8 Exc. 1 ; WESTLAKE 40; CHESHIRE 217, who cites the 
Scotch case of M'Feetridge v. Stewarts and Lloyds [19I3] S.C. (H. L.) 773, 
and the old and Goubtful English case of Male v. Roberts (x8oo) 3 Esp. 163. 
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by a Canadian court. 55 Both Cheshire, who is the most 
vigorous advocate of this view among the text writers, and 
the Saskatchewan court seem to be influenced by American 
ideas. There remains, however, a twofold difference from the 
American rule: on the one hand, not all contracts are ex-
empted from the law of the domicil; on the other hand, the 
law of the place of contracting is not followed unless it governs 
the whole of the contract. We shall have to examine this latter 
point when discussing the law governing contracts. 
(b) Former I tali an system. The rule that an individual's 
capacity is determined by his personal law is clearly established 
by the Italian Civil Code. 5 6 Hence, a contract made by a mar-
ried woman of Italian nationality is held valid by the Italian 
courts, even if made in a country where a married woman can-
not contract without her husband's authorization, 57 and her 
husband happens to be a national of that country. So far as 
mercantile transactions are concerned, however, article 58 of 
the Commercial Code of I 8 82 provided that capacity of the 
parties is determined by the law of the place of contracting. 5 8 
The coexistence of these two different rules raised some minor 
problems that might have been overcome. But the fact that 
the two rules are theoretically antagonistic was much stressed. 
Recent critics have expressed their preference for the rule of 
the Commercial Code which is based upon the consideration 
that commercial transactions are concluded speedily and with-
out the felt necessity of inquiring into the other party's nation-
ality and capacity.59 Nevertheless, the commercial rule has 
55 Bondholders Securities Corp. v. Manville [I933] 4 D. L. R. 699 (Sask.). 
Cf. FALCONBRIDGE, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. ISS, IS6. There seems no doubt, on 
the other hand, that the law of the domicil governs capacity for engaging in 
other transactions, see I JoHNSON I83. 
56 Italy: C. C. (I86s) Disp. Prel. art. 6; C. C. (194z) Disp. Prel. art. 17 
par. x. 
57 DIENA, Clunet I9zo, 77· Under Italian law a married woman as such is 
no longer subject to any incapacity (Law no. II76 of July 17, 1919). 
58 See DIENA, Clunet 19zo, 79· 
69 See FORMIGGINI, z9 Rivista (1937) 39, 40 n. t; he criticizes art. 2 of 
the Geneva Convention, where the national law is adopted as the general rule 
(see supra p. 187 ), as a step backwards. 
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been sacrificed to the nationality principle in the recently re-
cast legislation. 60 
III. PROBLEMs RAisED BY INCAPACITATING PRoVISIONS 
oF THE LAw oF THE PLACE oF CoNTRACTING 
A peculiar problem arises when a person who is fully capable 
under his personal law makes a contract in a foreign country 
where persons of his class are not capable of contracting. This 
case presents no difficulty to a court which follows the personal 
law principle, as his personal law gives this individual capacity. 
What, however, is the position in a court applying the law 
of the place of contracting? Does it consider the contract 
invalid? 
This question has been discussed in connection with the 
former Italian commercial rule (C. Comm. art. 58), which 
established the principle of the lex lod contractus, as well as 
with reference to the exceptional rule contained in the 
Uniform Bills of Exchange Conflicts Convention. By pre-
vailing opinion, it has been answered in favor of the validity 
of the transaction, in view of the basic function of the national 
law.61 
The considerations involved may be illustrated by the fol-
lowing hypothetical case: 
A Swiss national, twenty years old, having his domicil in 
Geneva, Switzerland, goes on a trip and buys a car on the in-
stalment plan: 
(a) in Paris; 
(b) in London; 
(c) in New York. 
Being of full age under Swiss law, he is considered of age in 
France under the nationality principle and in England under 
60 Art. sS of the Comm. C. has been repealed by art. 11 z of the R. D. of 
April 24, 1939, containing provisions for the introduction of the First Book 
of the Civil Code. 
61 FoRMIGGINI,r.:-9 Rivista (1937) at 46 n. z, supra n. 59· 
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the domiciliary principle (if applied), in respect to all three 
contracts. Therefore, he would probably be held capable also 
by an American court in cases (a) and (b), although this 
decision would amount to a sort of renvoi. In the third case, 
the propositus is incapable under the law of the place of con-
tracting. It would hardly be correct within the meaning of the 
theory of vested rights to consider the full age required by 
the young man in his country as a "right." Such an approach 
has been refuted in analogous situations. 62 In the case of a 
married woman who is incapable under the law of the place 
of acting, but capable under her domiciliary law, the American 
authorities tend to hold her incapable/3 and contracts of a 
person of full age in his own state, who acts in a state where he 
is regarded as a minor, seem generally to be held voidable, 64 
except under the domiciliary system of Louisiana. 65 
A similar question arises where an American who is 
domiciled in the United States and is more than twenty-one 
years old, contracted an obligation in Chile, while the old 
law was in force under which minority lasted until the com-
pletion of the twenty-fifth year.66 
Must an American court prefer in these cases the place of 
contracting to the domicil? Lorenzen's 61 suggestion that 
capacity should be determined by domicil in international 
62 See change of domicil, supra p. I48, n. I go. 
63 Burr v. Beckler (19I4) 264 Ill. 230, Io6 N. E. 206; Nichols & Shepard 
Co. v. Marshall (1899) Io8 Ia. SI8, 79 N. W. 282; Pearl v. Hansborough 
(I8.48) 28 Tenn. (9 Humph.) 426; criticized in II Col. L. Rev. (I9II) rsn 
DeFur v. DeFur (1928) 156 Tenn. 634,4 S. W. (2d) 341. Cf. 2. BEALE 674 
n. 3· 
64 See I WHARTON§ ''4 and cases supra n. 2.7, probably not allowing the 
doubt expressed by I Wharton§ usa after n. 5· 
65 Saul v. His Creditors (I82.7) 5 Mart. N. S. 569, I6 Am. Dec. 2r:z, states 
the case expressly, as similarly did Woodward v. Woodward (r889) 87 Tenn. 
644, I I S. W. 892., 897• 
66 C. C. art. 26, modified by Law no. 7, 6I2 of Oct. 1 I, I943· 
67 LoRENZEN, "Uniformity Between Latin America and the United States in 
the Rules of Private International Law Relating to Commercial Contracts," 
rs·Tul. L. Rev. (1941) 165 at 168, 170. 
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transactions, as contrasted with interstate business, would do 
justice in these situations. 
IV. CoNcLuSIONS 
The proper approach to capaci_ty problems in conflict of laws 
has been repeatedly discussed in recent years in Europe, and 
an approximation toward the American system of lex loci con-
tractus has been advocated in various quarters. In particular, 
Batiffol who studied American conflict of laws in the United 
States, recommended in 1934 in the newly founded French 
Committee of Conflict of Laws, a cautious application of other 
criteria than nationality. 68 Some critics of the present Euro-
pean system have expr.essed themselves in favor of the proper 
law of the contract or, for special cases, that of the place of 
contracting, while others have wished to substitute the law of 
domicil for the national law. 
The main argument against subjecting capacity to the law 
of the place of contracting or to the proper law of the con-
tract is that either alternative greatly facilitates evasion of the 
statutory disabilities imposed by the domiciliary or national 
law. In addition, the domiciliary or national courts employing 
either conflicts rule are confronted by the dilemma whether to 
observe this rule and sanction evasions or to enforce their statu-
tory provisions on grounds of public policy. Such a casuistic 
approach causes a great deal of uncertainty. 
In this country, the uncertainty is somewhat mitigated by 
the circumstance that a sizable majority of the courts unquali-
fiedly prefer the law of the place of contracting to any 
domiciliary policy. Dissenting cases exist, however, and there 
is increasing emphasis on the interests of the domiciliary state. 
68 Travaux: du Comite fran~ais de droit international prive, Premiere annee, 
1934, :u-66. Cf. BARBEY, Le Conflit 35; BATIFFOL 325 no. 363:ff. Contra: 
]. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 5101 who defends the French case law, described 
above, p. x 88, \8 infinitely more flexible and more richly detailed than the 
American system. 
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Moreover, if the advice of Cook were to je heeded, the pic-
ture would change. He recommends that statutes restricting 
the capacity of married women be examined to determine 
whether they involve only married women domiciled and 
acting within the state, or also foreign domiciled women acting 
in the state, or acts of locally domiciled women out of the 
state, or all these categories. 69 This suggestion seems to favor 
as narrow as possible a construction of the statutory prohibi-
tions. Its effect would probably reduce the scope of the restric-
tions upon capacity, whether under the law of the place of 
contracting or under the law of domicil, whichever is applied. 
Nevertheless, statutes do not easily lend themselves to such 
construction; although the results may be beneficent, this 
method of inquiry would considerably complicate the task of 
the courts and, at least for the time being, render it more 
difficult to ascertain the validity of contracts. 
A retrospective view of these various attempts to solve this 
old and not yet liquidated problem, indicates a compromise 
useful in all countries and adequate to all interests concerned, 
which also promises more definite results than those reached 
thus far in the two opposite camps. The transactions in which 
an incompetent individual participates should, by reference to 
an objective criterion, be divided into two groups: one in which 
local interests prevail sufficiently to justify the application of 
the law of the contract; another in which the domiciliary or 
national protective policies are entitled to be effectuated every-
where by means of the personal law. For the purpose of con-
flicts rules, business contracts already are distinguished from 
transactions regulating family relations and decedents' estates 
in the statutes of Germany, Switzerland, Poland, Italy, etc., 
as well as in the English doctrine, though particulars vary. 
Following this lead, capacity to engage in transactions should 
be determined, consistently and without exceptions, by the 
69 CooK, Legal Bases 438ff. 
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law governing personal status, when family relations and 
other personal matters are concerned, and by the law govern-
ing the contract in general, when exchange of property or 
services is involved. This approach, which would need to be 
elaborated more specifically, could be further refined by a 
carefully developed distinction between those incapacities 
which businessmen may justly be expected to investigate, and 
disabilities which may justifiably be ignored. Where the in-
terests of third parties empirically appear worthy of protec-
tion, there should be no room whatever for interference by the 
personal law. Vice versa, the American rule extends the law of 
the place of contracting beyond any possible justification. It 
is even applied to the capacity to marry. 
The law thus in part replacing the personal law should con-
veniently be the law governing the contract as a whole rather 
than the law of the place of contracting. 70 This is evident in 
the case where a contract is clearly localized in a place other 
than that of execution. 
70 Lorenzen's suggestion (supra n. 67) of a compromise between North and 
South American laws also tends toward the law governing the validity of 
contracts in general, rather than that of the place of contracting. He assumes, 
moreover, that the domicil of persons engaged in international trade is suffi-
ciently stable to furnish a standard. The proposition above may not be far away 





I. ENGAGEMENT TO MARRY 
No American case seems to be in point. We have to deal, 
therefore, with foreign conflicts rules only. 
I. Groups of Conflicts Rules 
U:TIL recently the problems arising out of an engage-ment to marry have received little attention in the conflict of laws. Insofar as they have been dealt with 
at all, their treatment has suffered from divergency of classi-
fication in the various municipal laws. 
Numerous countries treat a betrothal as a contract pertain-
ing to the field of family relations and similar to the contract 
of marriage itself. Where this notion prevails, as for instance, 
· in England, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the 
Scandinavian countries, the choice of law rules concerning the 
subject matter have been developed by analogy to those re-
lating to marriage. 2 Formal requirements are accordingly 
treated as being determined by the law of the place of celebra-
1 For surveys on the substantive marriage laws, see: HERMAN CoHN, The 
Foreign Laws of Marriage and Divorce, Part I, The Countries of the European 
Continent (Tel-Aviv, 1937); LESKE-LOEWENFELD, Rechtsverfolgung im inter-
nationalen Verkehr, vol. IV, I. Teil, Das Eherecht der europaischen Staaten und 
ihrer Kolonien (Berlin, ed. 2, 1932-1937); BERGMANN, lnternationales Ehe-
und Kindschaftsrecht, 2 vols. (Berlin, ed. 2, 1938-1940); Articles "Ehe," 
"Ehehindernisse," "Eheliches Giiterrecht," "Ehescheidung und Ehetrennung," 
"Eheschliessung," "Ehevertrag," by different authors, in 2 Rechtsvergl. Hand-
worterb. (Berlin, 1929-1938); EVERSLEY'S Law of the Domestic Relations, 
ed. 5 by ALEXANDER CAIRNS (London, 1937). 
2 In the United States also, the action for breach of promise is recognized as 
being "in form at least ex contractu," although damages are awarded as in 
tort matters. See DAGGETT, Legal Essays 44, 78. 
In Italy the contract theory has been defended by FUNAIOLI, 9 Annuario Dir. 
Comp. (1934) 3, 383; 5 Giur. Comp. Dir. Civ. 55· 
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tion, whereas the intrinsic validity of an engagement to marry 
is determined in accordance with the personal law of the 
parties.3 Sometimes, however, an old view is still followed, 
according to which engagement and marriage are treated like 
ordinary contracts; consequently the conflicts rule concerning 
rescission of contracts is applied.4 
The personal law is also applied for the determination of 
the consequences of a breach of engagement. In this respect 
the difficulties that arise wherever the parties have different 
personal laws are particularly noticeable, for the various 
national laws attach widely different consequences to a breach 
of promise to marry. Nowhere, it is true, will a promise to 
marry be enforced by a decree of specific performance, 5 but 
with respect to the duty to pay damages the laws vary from 
non-recognition of any such duty to recognition of a duty to 
pay compensatory damages for special injury, damages for 
mental pain and suffering, or even punitive damages. In this 
wide variety of domestic laws, the two solutions most fre-
quently advocated are to determine the extent of either party's 
liability (I) by his own personal law 6 and ( 2) as limited to 
3 Germany: the rule has been applied in all cases; for particular applications 
see footnotes infra n. 6 and n. 7· 
Switzerland: App. Zurich (May I, I9o5) Bl.f.Ziirch.Rspr. (I905) 247 no. 
I 59 (in the absence of a federal conflicts rule resorting to the former Ziiricher 
Privatrechtl. Gesetzbuch) . 
. The Netherlands: Rb. Almelo (Dec. 2, I925) W.II568, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 
53I; Rb. den Haag (Aprilu, I935) W.I936, no. 409, II Z.ausl.PR. (I937) 
204. 
Iceland; Law of domicil, EYJOLFSSON in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 761. 
4 Switzerland: the law of the place of performance, identified with the com-
mon domicil of the parties and, in the absence of such, the intended :first marital 
domicil; see BEcK, NAG. I77 no. 76, followed by App. Luzern (Oct; I9 1 I938) 
36 SJZ. (I938-I939) 2I9 no. I5o. 
5 Even the mere unenforceable obligation to marry has disappeared from the 
canon law, still in force in several countries in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe, under the Codex Juris Canonici, c. I o 17 § 31 which instead grants 
damages for rescission of an engagement without just cause. 
6 OLG. Koln (Dec. 4, I925) Leipz.Z.I926, 6o2, IPRspr. I926-I927, no. 
63; KG. (Feb. 23, I933) IPRspr. 1934, no. 4I; particularly KG. (Feb. 71 
1938) ]W.1938, 17151 Nouv. Revue 1939, 26o; KG. (Jan. xi, 1939) Dt. 
Recht 19391 xou. See also :z. ZITELMANN 8ox; RAAPE 266, 270. 
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the extent to which liability is recognized by the personal laws 
of both. 7 Both opinions are influenced largely by a regard for 
the law of the forum, for in most cases the personal law of the 
defendant is that of the forum. 8 
The majority of the countries following the French system, 
consider liability for breach of promise to marry to pertain to 
tort law. Consequently, in conflicts cases the law of the place 
of the wrong is held to be applicable, 9 but no clear rules exist 
for the determination of the place of the wrong in such in-
stances.10 
The C6digo Bustamante 11 and other recent codifications 12 
simply declare the law of the forum to be applicable. 
2. Cases 
The functioning of the various choice of law rules may be 
illustrated by the following cases, one hypothetical and one 
real. 
(a) A Frenchman, engaged to marry a French girl, re-
pudiates his promise, while both he and his fiancee are 
temporarily residing in Germany. 
If an action for breach of promise is brought against him in 
a French court, German municipal law, as the law of the place 
of the wrong, would have to be applied. The fact, however, 
7 0LG. Miinchen (March 13, 1929) IPRspr. 1929, no. 69; KG. (May 2, 
1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 66; see also NEUMEYER, IPR. (ed. 1) 19; M. WoLFF, 
Familicnrecht (1928) § 7; also M. WoLFF, IPR. II5; LEWALD 77; 2 STREIT-
VALLINDAS 272 n. 8. 
8 Cf. the dicta quoted by 3 FRANKENSTEIN 46 n. 34; ibid. 47 n. 42. The 
Kammergericht, however, in its decision of Feb. 23, 1933, supra n. 6, applied 
the personal law of the Turkish defendant without regard to the law of the 
forum. 
9 Trib. civ. Valenciennes (Dec. 19, 1935) Nouv. Revue 1936, 325 (French 
law applied to Polish parties living in France as the law of the place of wrong, 
and Polish personal law rejected). 
10 In France receipt of a "letter of rupture" by the fiancee regarded as de-
cisive: Trib. civ. Seine (June 16, 1936) Gaz. Pal. 1936.2.744· 
11 C6digo Bustamante art. 39· 
, 
12 Finland: Law of Dec. s, 1929, on certain family relations of international 
character, § 46, In the English case of Hansen v. Dixon (1906) 23 T. L. R. 
56, English law was applied with scant justification. 
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that the German law treats liability for breach of promise to 
marry in the fourth book of the Civil Code, which is entitled 
"Family Law," has led a text writer 13 to believe that French 
courts, in view of their treatment of breach of promise to 
marry as a tort, would apply not the rules applicable under 
the German classification, but rather the German rules on 
torts. Strange consequences would result from this view. The 
defendant could be held liable, only if shown to have been 
aware that his conduct would cause pecuniary damage to his 
fiancee and, furthermore, his behavior constituted a violation 
of good morals. Then the additional question might be raised 
whether this is to be determined by German or French stand-
ards. Obviously, the French court would do better to apply 
the rules of family law provided for the case in the German 
Civil Code. 
If the case arose in a German court, the German judge 
would have to apply French law as the personal law of the 
parties; but inasmuch as the French law would regard the 
question as one of tort and refer it to the German law as the 
law of the place of the wrong, the German court would ac-
cept the renvoi so as to apply the provisions of the fourth book 
of the German Civil Code. Thus, although the courts in 
France and Germany would start from different premises, the 
decision would be the same in both. 14 
(b) An American citizen domiciled in New York, while 
temporarily residing in Germany, seduced a German girl by 
13 RAAPE 267. 
14 Decisions, subjecting one party to a law recognizing liability and the other 
to one which does not, are considered inequitable, by M. WoLFF, IPR. II 5; 
contra, RAAPE, loc. cit. This latter author's more recent book (z Deutsches 
Internationales Privatrecht I68, I7o) proposes use of the choice of law rule 
applicable to obligations neither contractual nor delictual, i.e., roughly the 
quasi-contractual obligations of the common law, as once used by the Reichs-
gericht, (Oct. zi, I887) 20 RGZ. 333 and (Feb. 28, I889) 23 RGZ. Ip, and 
by the Trib. Baselstadt (Sept. 9, I89I) II Z. Schweiz.R. N.F.64. There is, 
however, no choice of law rule generally recognized that can be used for the 
purpose. RAAPE'S own suggestion is to apply the domiciliary law of the in-
nocent or, alternatively, the female party. This,, indeed, would be a universal 
rule. 
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promrsmg to marry her and subsequently repudiated his 
promise. The German court denied the girl's action, holding 
that the German conflict of laws rules referred to the law of 
New York as the personal law of the defendant, under which 
actions for breach of promise to marry are not recognized.15 
3· Public Policy 
In those countries where choice of law rules refer the courts 
to some foreign law, the lex fori is frequently resorted to in 
order to prevent the enforcement of liabilities regarded as 
contr:.try to the public policy of the forum. In the Netherlands, 
for instance, damages allowed by German law for breach of 
the contract to marry could not be recovered unless the mar-
riage banns, a prerequisite to such suits in the Netherlands, had 
been published.16 Enforcement of penalties agreed upon in the 
contract of engagement is generally denied. 17 Some countries 
consider damages for breach of promise to marry, whether 
based on domestic or foreign law, as contrary to public policy.18 
Even where public policy is resorted to more sparingly, doubts 
have been expressed with respect to such enormously high 
claims as are allowed in England and in some American 
states. 1 9 A recent Finnish statute expressly limits the amount 
15 New York Laws I935 1 ch. 263 amending C.P.A. by inserting art. (2a). 
The German case is KG. (Jan. I I, I939) Dt. Recht, I9391 Io12. 
16 Dutch BW. art. I IJ par. 2. See Hof s'Hertogenbosch (Jan. 5, I9J2) W. 
I2416, II Z.ausl.PR. (I937) 204; Rb. Rotterdam (May 121 I922) W.I0996 
and (July 27, I932) W.12584, II Z.ausl.PR. (I937) 204. These decisions 
were criticized by VAN DER FLIER, Grotius I927, Io8; ibid. I924, 123, at 
I25 and ·OFFERHAUS, Gedenkboek I838-I938, 7I3 1 but recommended for 
Italian law by FEDOZZI 401. 
17 Penalties are still used in Greece; see 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 274. They are 
considered contrary to public policy by the German KG. (Jan. 23, I901) 2 
ROLG. 132, II Z.int.R. (1902) 99, Clunet I902, 629 and by most other courts. 
C01ztra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 45· 
18 Norway: see LUNDH 'in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 7I 7• 
More often it is alleged that the law of the forum fixes the maximum damages 
that can be awarded, e.g.: 
Italy: FEDOZZI 401. 
Iceland: EYJOLFSSON in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 761. 
19 Against awarding: NussBAUM, D. IPR. I3I n. 2; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 
274 n. I5; contra; DEMERTZES1 Family Law 91 1 § 24, cited by STREIT-
VALLINDAS; RAAPE 27I. 
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recoverable to that allowed by both the plaintiff's personal 
law and the law of Finland.20 On the other hand, a foreign 
law occasionally has been denied application because it failed 
to recognize a claim for damages for breach of promise to 
marry/1 to that extent frustrating the elimination of such suits 
by the so-called "heart balm" statutes. Almost all these ap-
plications of public policy are obviously arbitrary. 
4· Conclusion 
An Anglo-American writer recently suggested application 
of the foreign characterization of a breach of promise where 
the foreign systems of law applicable to the situation concur 
in characterizing it (as breach of contract or as tort), but where 
the engagement and the breach occur in two foreign juris-
dictions having different characterizations, that the forum 
should apply its own characterization.22 This exception to the 
author's theory of lex fori characterization is inconsistent with 
any general theory, nor does it help in the more important 
cases. 
It would be preferable for the conflicts rule to be free 
from interfering substantive law; the rule should simply refer 
the rights and obligations flowing from an engagement to the 
law of the place regarded under the circumstances as the center 
of the social relation between the parties at the time of en-
gagement. 
II. THE CoNCEPT oF MARRIAGE IN THE CoNFLICT oF LAws 
Experience has shown that marriage must be defined in the 
conflict of laws in broader terms than those in which it is 
20 Law of Dec. s, 1929, § 46. 
21 OGL. Kiiln, cit. supra n. 6; contra: M. WoLFF, IPR. I 15 n. 4· The de-
cision of the Kammergericht of 1939 (supra n. 6), declares expressly that the 
American statute denying a claim for seduction of a betrothed woman is not 
contrary to the international public policy of the court, though contrary to the 
German Civil Code. 
22 RoBERTSON, Characterization 76-78, 177. 
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understood, legally and sociologically/3 in the several systems 
of municipal law. Two groups of cases have been given 
practical consideration. 
r. Soviet Marriage 
In 1929 a man was sued in the Probate Division of the Eng-
lish High Court for separate maintenance by a woman with 
whom he had entered into an agreement of marriage in the 
Soviet Union. The defendant contended that this so-called 
marriage did not correspond with the English notion of mar-
riage because, under the Soviet law at the time in question, 
such a rrl.arriage could be dissolved by the simple unilateral 
act of either party without the necessity of any reason being 
specified. Following this argument, Hill, J., held that the 
relation existing between the parties was not such as to con-
stitute a marriage and, therefore, that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to recover. The Court of Appeals reversed this de-
cision on the grounds that, although Soviet law may thus 
permit the relation to be voluntarily dissolved, the parties may 
be presumed to have intended it to be permanent. Thus, the 
relation created in the Soviet Union was not considered to 
be fundamentally different from the English notion of mar-
riage.24 The Supreme Court of Hungary, on the contrary, 
declared a Soviet marriage not in accord with humanity and 
ethics, constituting nothing more than concubinage. 25 
23 On the relation between the sociological and the legal concept of marriage 
and the function of law with respect to the regulation of sex relations, see 
LLEWELLYN, "Behind the Law of Divorce," 32 Col. L. Rev. (1932) 1281, 
33 Col. L. Rev. (1933) 249· 
24 Nachimson v. Nachimson [1930] P. 85; [1930] P. (C. A. ) 217. 
25 Hungarian Royal Court (Feb. 23, 1926) P. III 1616/1926, German 
translation in Z.f.Ostrecht 1927, 62o; cf. 5 Z.ausi.PR. (1931) 783, Clunet 
1929, 1202; Hungarian Royal Court (Nov. 6, 1928) P. III 841r/27, cf. JW. 
1931, 167 and the article by SZLADITS, "Some Features of Hungarian Private 
International Law," in 23 Grotius Soc. 1937, 25 at 34 ff. 
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In virtual agreement with the English Court of Appeals, 
the Reichsgericht recognized first a "recorded" 26 and later 
a "non-recorded" Soviet marriage/7 consid~ring it essential 
that, although the Soviet law does not r~cognize any mutual 
rights and duties between the spouses, yet they have intended 
to unite themselves for a life to be lived in common. The 
court, indeed, has felt it impossible to deny validity to all 
Russian marital unions. 
The possibility that a marriage of non-Russians, and es-
pecially of persons subject to the law of the forum, might 
occur without formalities, was not at issue. This matter and 
the common law marriage will be discussed in connection with 
the formalities requisite for marriage. 
2. Polygamous Marriage 
Polygamous marriages formerly were absolutely excluded 
from recognition, inasmuch as English doctrine limits the no-
tion of marriage to "Christian marriage," which is necessarily 
monogamous. On numerous occasions, however, British courts 
have had to concern themselves with the polygamous mar-
riages of Mohammedans, Hindus, Chinese, and other peoples 
not belonging to the realm of Western civilization,28 while 
in the United States Indian tribal marriages and those 
formerly practiced by the Mormons have been recognized. 
Whereas the celebration of such unions within the forum is 
rigidly prohibited, it is neither workable nor convenient to deny 
that for~ign marriages of such a nature function within the ter-
ritories of the peoples concerned. ~ 9 Moreover, there is not 
sufficient public interest to do so in cases where the existence 
or nonexistence of a foreign marriage is only a consideration 
preliminary to the decision of a problem of property law, tax 
26 RG. (Oct. 22, 1930) ]W. 1931 1 1334 no. 1. Similarly Brazil: App. Rio 
de Janeiro (June ro, 193:1.) Clunet I9JZ1 1124. 
27 RG. (April 71 1938) 157 RGZ. z57, z6z, 2.65. 
28 For details see 2 BEALE§ rzr.r and CHEATHAM, Cases 871 no. 5· 
29 See the basic exposition by KAHN, r Abhandl. 161 ff. 
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law, or some other matter not immediately affecting the mores 
of the forum. 30 
III. FoRMAL REQUIREMENTS oF MARRIAGE 
I. Survey of Problems: Requirements of Form and In-
trinsic Validity Distinguished 
It has been customary from old times to permit foreigners 
to marry; the churches ·have not made distinction on account 
of nationality in the administration of marriage ceremonies. 
It is a singular exception to this usage that the French decree 
of 193 8, mentioned earlier, disallows the marriage of for-
eigners unless they possess a police permit of sojourn for more 
than a year. 31 On the other hand, nationals may marry abroad, 
although they may have to observe certain prescriptions of 
their national laws. 
In legal systems outside of the United States, conflict rules 
distinguish the form and the intrinsic validity of marriage. 
The former is referred to the law of the place of celebration 
and the latter to the personal law of the parties. This difference 
is steadily gaining in favor in the literature of the United 
States. 
Generally defined, the terms "formal requirements" and 
"formalities" of marriage mean the external conduct required 
of the parties or of third persons, especially public officers, 
necessary to the formation of a legally valid marriage. These 
formal requirements are distinguished from the substantive 
30 See GooDRICH 319. The cases are discussed by BECKETT, "The Recog-
nition of Polygamous Marriages under English Law," 48 Law Q. Rev. (1932) 
341; cf. FoSTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," 
16 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84, 88. An interesting discussion has 
been held in Canada: see FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [1932] 4 D. L. R. 19 and 
contra: 1 JoHNSON 312. The view adopted in the text, as explained by FALCON-
BRIDGE in Rivista Dir. Priv. (1932) I 297-307, has been recommended for 
Italian use by FEDOZZI 456. 
31 Circular letter of the Garde de Sceaux of Dec. I 3, 19 3 8 concerning the 
marriage of foreigners in France, J. Off. Jan. 6, I939; cf. Nouv. Revue I938, 
935 and supra pp. 141, 142, n. I 62. 
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conditions for validity such as age, race, religious affiliation, or 
health of the parties. 
The purpose of the distinction in the conflict of laws is ob-
vious. On the one hand, the personal law of the parties leaves 
the determination of formalities to the law of the place of 
celebration but reserves to itself the determination of the 
intrinsic conditions of marriage. On the other hand, the law 
of the place of celebration scrupulously takes into considera-
tion the requirements of the personal law as to intrinsic condi-
tions but disregards its prescriptions as to form. 
The borderline between the two categories, however, is not 
traced uniformly in the various systems of municipal law. Al-
though differences of such classification in the conflict of laws 
systems are not accentuated, there is sometimes a tendency 
to classify certain conditions precedent as substantive merely 
for the purpose of giving these conditions extraterritorial ef-
fect. This is a natural tendency where social policies or ec-
clesiastical conceptions are regarded as too important to be 
sacrificed in any instance, irrespective of where the marriage 
may be celebrated. Internationally relevant rules, however, 
should be expressed in an adequate common language. To deal 
with such divergences in classification, two methods are avail-
able. One is to let each court accept as for~ality what internal 
law regards as such; the ensuing chaos evoked criticism long 
ago. 32 The other is to define the notion of formalities in a 
universally acceptable sense. As a matter of fact, although there 
seem to be four principal points which have occasioned dif-
ficulties for an international understanding, it does not appear 
that agreement to eliminate them would be impossible. These 
are controversial matters: 
(a) Proclamation of banns and similar proceedings pre-
liminary to the celebration of a marriage were occasionally 
32 NIEMEYER in 2.6 Z.int.R. (1916) 3, MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLD¥, 
zz Z.int.R. (1912.) 364, and 3 FRANKENSTEIN IJo, who attempt various other 
solutions. NrBoy;ET 732, however, follows the lex fori, though he is exclu-
sively concerned with the point mentioned, infra p. 2.14. 
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classified in early times as substantive requirements. But it is 
now generally agreed that they are to be regarded as mere 
formalities. The same opinion prevails with respect to recorda-
tion and similar acts required under some laws when parties 
have married abroad. 
(b) Except in England, the requirement of parental con-
sent to the marriage of a minor is universally characterized 
as closely connected with the intrinsic requirement of consent 
of the party. The English qualification itself is open to criti-
cism.33 
(c) Classification of the requirement of freedom from mis-
take has caused some writers difficulty.34 Their doubts can be 
resolved easily when two different situations are kept separate. 
On the one hand, due form requires that the parties make their 
declarations at the time and in the words or by the conduct 
demanded by the applicable law. If, for instance, A says "no" 
but is understood to have said "yes," the law governing 
"formalities" should be resorted to in order to determine 
whether there exists a validly declared consent. On the other 
hand, whether a declaration of intention must be supported 
by an intention in fact or whether the declaration is to be 
considered valid even where the intention of the party does 
not coincide with his expression, is a matter which concerns 
the essentials rather than the formalities of the contract. Thus, 
if both parties use the correct ceremony but have secretly 
agreed to be married only nominally (simulation), the law 
governing substantial requirements should determine whether 
or not they are bound in marriage. This has been denied by 
canon and English law but affirmed by Italian law and the 
German Code before its amendment. 35 
33 See below, p. 267. 
34 CHESHIRE 346 classifies a "fundamental mistake" as pertaining to for-
malities and hence refers it to the law of the place of celebration, while he claa-
sifies "capacity" only as personal law. This reasoning neglects the essential 
distinction between intention and declaration of intention. In accordance with 
the text, e.g., }EMOLO, Matrimonio 97· 
36 See infra p. 272. 
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(d) The last and most discussed problem concerns the re-
quirement made in some, but not all, of the states which still 
regard marriage as an essentially religious institution: that 
their subjects observe the religious ceremony even when they 
celebrate marriages abroad. In these countries, dependence 
on the religious rites is considered to affect the capacity of 
the parties and, hence, to be properly a matter of the personal 
law. In the rest of the world, comprising by far the majority 
of states, the religious celebration, whether indispensable or 
not, is treated as a formality. This point will be examined 
later.36 
The domain of formality as distinguished from that of pro-
cedure has been considered with respect to the rebuttable pre-
sumption of British law that a man and a woman having 
cohabited and having enjoyed the reputation of being married 
are deemed to have been duly married. A presumption of this 
kind has been characterizedas relating merely to the manner 
of proof and therefore as a rule of procedure of the forum. 37 
A contrary decision of British Columbia, however, has been 
defended 38 and seems to be the right answer. If the core of 
a law suit depends on whether a man and woman have been 
merely regarded as married in the eyes of their community or 
whether they were, by being so regarded or otherwise, legally 
married, then the essential elements constituting marriage 
are involved. Moreover, it would be impractical to try to 
submit to different conflicts rules the existence of a marriage 
by repute and the choice of facts determining the existence 
of such a marriage. 
2. Locus Regit Actum 
Formalities of marriage have been, from the middle ages, 
a particularly important field for the application of the maxim 
36 See infra pp. 214-216; cf. 2pff. 
37 See particularly FALCONBRIDGE, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 214. 
38 Leong Sow Nom v. Chin Yee You (1934) 49 B. C. R. 244, [1934] 3 
W. W. R. 686, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 9o, with approving note by CANSACCHI 
2 I J• 
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locus regit actum, a maxim not everywhere understood in quite 
the same sense nor applied with entire consistency. We may 
distinguish in the following survey three types of provisions: 
(a) Compulsory rule. In one group of countries, including 
the United States,S9 England, Denmark, and Japan,40 the law 
of the place where a marriage is celebrated is decisive, ir-
respective of whether the marriage be concluded within or 
without the territory of the forum. No other law is allowed 
any influence on the formalities of marriage. The personal 
laws of the parties are irrelevant, and the parties have no 
choice other than to select the place of celebration. In countries 
following this principle, the marriage ceremonies of their own 
countries or churches are not available to the parties, unless 
these formalities happen to coincide with those permitted at 
the place where they are being married. 
Illustration: Under Danish matrimonial law a marriage 
may be celebrated before a minister of some religious de-
nomination. But a marriage of two Danish subjects before a 
minister of their church in Berlin will not be recognized in 
Denmark because in Germany civil marriage is compulsory.41 
(b) Optional rule. Most countries adhere to a double 
system: parties celebrating a marriage within the forum must 
comply with the domestic formalities; parties marrying 
39 For the state statutes see I VERNIER§ 32; for the cases 2 BEALE 671ff. 
40 England: Berthiaume v. Dastous [1930] A. C. 79· 
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 2I8 no. 38; MuNCH-PETERSEN, 
4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 745 n. 78. 
Japan: Law of I898, art. I3'J>ar. I sentence 2. 
The Austrian Supreme Court has held the same way beginning with a de-
cision of March 11, 19131 so GlU. NF. no. 6345; see decisions of Sept. 20, 
1927, 9 SZ. no. 127; Oct. 24, 1934, Zentralblatt I935> no. 1; May 21, 1937, 
66 J. Bl. (I937) 296; even after the conclusion of the Austrian Concordat with 
the Holy See, a marriage celebrated before a Catholic clergyman in a country 
where civil marriage ceremony is compulsory, is invalid in Austria; this de-
cision, however, adds: "at least if one party is a foreign national." Cf. WALKER 
666. 
Presumably Liechtenstein, where Austrian marriage law is still in force,· 
follows the saine doctrine, but it has been ranged within the group described 
under (b) by an official German handbook; see BERGMANN, Der Auslander im 
Deutschen Recht (I934) 66 n. 70. 
41 See BoRUM and MEYER in 6 Repert. 2 I 9 no. 40. See another example 
under (b). 
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abroad must observe either the formalities prescribed at the 
place of contracting or those of the personal law or laws. 42 
This system also is adopted in article 7 of the Hague Con-
vention on Marriage. Where the parties are of different na-
tionalities, in accordance with the opinion prevailing in most 
countries/3 the Convention provides, however, that a mar-
riage not complying with the formal requirements in the 
country of celebration must satisfy the national laws of both 
parties in order to her recognized by other participant states. 44 
The practical difference between the two systems described 
so far may be illustrated by a case decided a few years ago by 
the Privy Council. Two Catholics domiciled in the Province of 
Quebec participated in a marriage ceremony before a Catholic 
priest in Paris. The marriage was void in France but would 
have been good if performed in Quebec. The Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council, speaking as the final appellate 
court of Canada, felt itself compelled to hold the marriage 
invalid.45 If, however, the parties had been Swedes marrying 
in Paris before a minister of the Swedish Established Church, 
their marriage would have been held valid in Sweden.46 
An analogous question is apt to arise when a marriage by 
mere consent is invalid under the local law but may or may 
42 Instead of the personal law, a former system had the law of the place of 
"performance," which was understood as the intended matrimonial domicil, 
as an alternative to the local law. In ·this senge the Law of the Baltic Prov., 
introd. art. XXXVI was applied in I92.8 in Latvia; cf. BERENT in 4 Leske-
Loewenfeld I 576 n. 2.II. . 
43 See e.g., Austrian OGH. (May 2.I, I937) I9 SZ. no. I66 (Austria was 
not a participant in the Hague Convention). 
44 An illustration of the difficulties arising from this rule is the decision of 
the German Reichsgericht (April 6, I9I9) 88 RGZ. I9I. 
4
"Berthiaume v. Dastous (I92.9) [I93o] A. C. 79, [I93o] I D. L. R. 849, 
99 L. J. (P. C.) 66. Cf. FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [I9J2.] 4 D. L. R. 8. . 
For the same reason Italian courts and writers consider a religious marriage 
of Italian Catholics in France invalid, even after the Concordat; see BALLA-
DORE-PALLIERI, Dir. Int. Eccles. 2. I I against an isolated decision of Trib. 
Milano (April 2.7, I938) cited by him. 
46 Sweden: Law of I 904 with amendments, c. I § 8 par. x. 
The problem is well known in Latin America; cf. I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 
xio no. I97· 
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not be recognized by a personal law which admits such mar-
riages.47 
(c) Rule modified by religious requirements. The prin-
ciple, locus regit actum, compulsory in every case under the 
first system described above, (a), and optional in foreign 
marriages under the second system described above, (b), is 
profoundly modified in a group of countries emphasizing the 
importance of religious rites. This group of countries, which 
is characterized by strong ties between the state and an es-
tablished church, formerly included Turkey, Czarist Russia, 
and after the Russian Revolution the parts of Poland and 
Lithuania formerly in Russia. Today it embraces Palestine 
in part, Bulgaria, Greece, parts of pre-war Yugoslavia, 48 
Egypt/9 Malta, Cyprus,0° Iran, and after 1938 with respect 
to Catholics also Spain.51 
Since in these countries a religious ceremony is required, a 
marriage celebrated abroad by civil ceremony is not recog-
nized. In Greece it was doubted whether this rule applied to 
citizens other than those of the Greek Orthodox faith, but 
it is now agreed that it includes Roman Catholics, Moslems, 
47 A third case where a marriage invalid under the local law could satisfy the 
requirements of the personal law is construed, quite hypothetically it seems, by 
BEcK, NAG. art. 7£ no. 36, and RAAPE 251 (b) par. 3· 
48 For details of the very complex legal situations, see the reports in 4 Leske-
Loewenfeld I: on Serbia, by PERITCH at 9821 (see also PERITCH in 40 Bull. 
Inst. Int. (1939) 1, 186, 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (1940) 1); on Croatia-Slavonia, 
by LOVRIC at 1034; on Bosnia-Herzegovina, by EISNER at 1050; on 
Montenegro, by EISNER at 1056. 
49 Under their own law however, Moslems and Oriental Jews may marry simply 
before witnesses of their people without any religious ceremony; see GoADBY 148. 
50 For Cyprus see the facts in the English case of Papadopoulos [1930] P. 55 
(infra n. 68); where only one party, however, is of the Greek Orthodox faith and 
the other a member of another church, certain difficulties have been cleared away 
by the Marriage (~lidation and Amendment) Law, No. 3 of 19371 s.4 and 
s.5 (e). 
51 Law of March 12, 1938; C. C. art. 42 allows marriage before the municipal 
judge to non-Catholic and such Catholic parties who declare not to practice the 
Roman Catholic religion. 
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and Jews.52 Moreover, it is held sufficient that one of the 
parties be of the Orthodox creed in order to necessitate the 
attendance of a priest (pope) of this denomination. 53 
Grave complications are bound to occur when a national o'f 
a country where such an imperative rule is in force attempts 
to marry in a country where observance of a civil ceremony 
is indispensable. 5 4 The only certain way for the parties in such 
case to effect a valid marriage is to go through both ceremonies, 
the civil one prescribed by the local law and the religious rite 
required by the personal law. 5 5 
It is noteworthy that this conflict is often designated by 
theorists as an insoluble conflict of qualifications. In connec-
tion with the idea that marriage is a sacrament to be ad-
ministered in the proper way and with the attendance of the 
persons required by the particular denomination, it has been 
denied that these religious conditions of marriage can be 
treated like other forms of contract; rather must they be con-
sidered part of the personal status of the party concerned. This 
position was once taken by the Czarist Russian Church, 5 6 and 
it is so firmly rooted in Greece that in the new Civil Code the 
52 See z STREIT-VALLINDAS 3 r 9 n. 3 6, who quotes the former opinions (3 I 7 
n. p). 
The rule was generally applied in former Russia too; see MAKAROV in 4 Leske-
Loewenfeld I 48 8, as well as under the Marriage Law of I 8 3 6 of the Kingdom 
of Poland until I 9z6. See infra n. 56. 
On Lithuania see Z.f.Ostrecht I93r, 65; RuTENBERG in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld 
I sos. 
~3 See z STREIT-VALLINDAS ·3ro, 320 and the evidence in the case of Stathatos 
v. Stathatos (I9IZ) [I9IJ] P. 46. 
For Bulgaria see KG. (Jan. 19, I934) IPRspr. 1934, no. I6. 
54 See infra p. z3zff. 
55 Civil officials are required so to advise the parties in Prussia; see BERGMANN, 
Der Auslander im Deutschen Recht (1934) 66 n. 70. 
In Switzerland the parties must even give assurance that the religious ceremony 
will follow; see GMOR, Familienrecht art. r I 8 n. 6. 
~6 Decision of the Civil Department of Cassation (April rs, I898) Decisions 
I 899, no. 39· This conception was maintained in Eastern Poland until the 
Polish Law on international priva~e law of I9z6, which made the law of the 
place of celebration govern the form of foreign marriages. But it took a decision 
of the Polish Supreme Court in Plenary Meeting on April rz, I9Z9 (Z.f.Ostrecht 
I930, srz) to state that "forms" include the ecclesiastical manner of marriage; 
for details see 0STROWICZ, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 445 n. zsz; WERMINSKI, Note, 
6 Giur. Camp. DIP. no. ro6. 
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necessity of a religious ceremony was not formulated as an 
exception to the maxim locus regit actum, since this maxim, 
applying to formalities only, does not include the necessity 
of a religious ceremony regarded as a substantive condition. 57 
Formerly as well as recently,58 some Western writers, too, 
have been greatly impressed by this characterization. For a 
time, French courts considered a civil marriage celebrated in 
France by a Greek Orthodox or Catholic foreigner, if not 
recognized in his homeland, invalid even under French law. 5 9 
But no such concessions to foreign laws are made any longer 
by any country requiring its own subjects to ,observe a civil 
marriage ceremony. The true reason for this attitude is not, 
or at least should not be, any method of characterization. 60 
By classification as "mere" form, the secular ceremony is not 
degraded but, on the contrary, is emphasized as the ob-
jective of an intransigent public policy, quite as cogent as 
the mandatory requirement of a religious ceremony. Indeed, 
those countries that regard ecclesiastical acts either of mar-
riage or divorce, even in the case of foreigners, as private 
transactions without legal effect so far as the state is concerned, 
have been accused of intolerance.61 Nevertheless, while, on 
the one hand, the dominant American conflict rules concerning 
marriage minimize the personal law of the parties, it certainly 
is not cl~ar, on the other hand, why the forum should yield 
to the pretensions of foreign countries to regulate local mar-
. . 
nage ceremomes. 
The problem of classification in this case is not more than a 
mere question of terminology. For the purpose of technical 
57 MARIDAKIS, 11 Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 121. For complete literature see z 
STREIT-VALLINDAS 318. 
SSUNGER, I System 210j 2 FIORE no. 528; PERROUD, Clunet 1922, 5; 1 
FRANKENSTEIN 524; 3 ibid. 133; RAAPE 253· Contra: 1 BAR§ 169; WALKER 
662 n. 55, and in I KLANG'S Kommentar 337; NEUMANN-ETI"ENREICH and 
SATTER in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 206 and particularly BALOGH, 57 Recueil 1936 
III 6 8 5-702. 
59 See infra p. 2 r 8, n. 69. 
60 NrBOYET 731 no. 623, applies this very method. 
613 FRANKENSTEIN 137. 
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understanding in matters of international law, it is submitted, 
religious marriage, including the participation or mere pres-
ence of an ecclesiastical officer, like any secular solemnization, 
constitutes a formality in which the contract is "clothed." This 
conception is traditional in almost the whole world and has 
been confirmed for the Catholic Church by the Codex Juris 
Canonici, which clearly distinguishes form of celebration 
(c.I094-II03) from impediments (c.I03S-I08o) anddefects 
of consent (c.I08I-I093).62 For international terminology, 
such a common denominator of formalities is the only con-
venient one. Formalities have more than one function-among 
others, those of guaranteeing the finality and seriousness of 
the solemnized act, of publicizing the marriage, and of furnish-
ing trustworthy evidence of its occurrence. All such purposes 
are common to any kind of marriage ceremony. Furthermore, 
the fact that an omission of the prescribed words or acts may 
adversely affect the validity of the transaction is not peculiar 
to religious marriage. At any rate, the policy of Greece, 
Bulgaria, and the other countries enumerated above on page 
213, is sufficiently summarized by saying that these countries 
regard the religious form as essential for all marriages of their 
nationals. 
3· The Law of the Place of Celebration as Applied to Do-
mestic Marriages 
General rule. In spite of doubts occasionally expressed, the 
almost general rule is that a marriage celebrated within the 
:62 The same classification has, quite naturally, now been confirmed by the 
Italian writers on the Catholic marriage with civil effects, established by the 
Concordat of 1929 with the Holy See, Bosco, "Le Nuove leggi sui matrimonio," 
22 Rivista 1930, 363, 372: FEDOZZI 418 n. 2. To the same effect in other 
Catholic countries, see in 6 Repert.; for Austria: KuNz, 110 nos. 199-201; for 
Belgium: ]ANNE 149 nos. 46-48; for Brazil: BEVILAQUA r 66 no. 39· This means 
that a purely ecclesiastical ceremony of Austrian Catholics in Italy was invalid in 
Austria, despite canon marriage being the prescribed form in the Austrian Allg. 
BGB.; see for instance OGH. (May 21, 1937) 66 J.Bl. (1937) 296, and 
below, p. 233, n. 137· 
MARRIAGE 217 
territory of the forum is invalid, unless the formalities pre-
scribed by the matrimonial law of the forum are satisfied. The 
forms of marriage which a state places at the disposition of the 
parties are available to foreigners and citizens alike, but no 
other forms are allowed. If the law of the place of celebration 
leaves the parties free to choose between solemnization by a 
minister of the gospel or a priest and solemnization by a civil 
officer, a judge, or a civil commissioner, as is done in almost all 
Anglo-American countries, Sweden, Italy,63 and others, for-
eigners can easily satisfy both the local and the personal law 
by choosing that ceremony which will be recognized by their 
personal laws. Hardships may arise where civil marriage is 
compulsory at the place of celebration. 
The rule that the domestic formalities are exclusive is ex-
pressly contained in the following statutes, among others: 
Germany, EG. art. I3 par. 3· 
Hungary, Marriage Law of I894, §I I3. 
Italy, C.C.(I865) art. I03; C.C.(I942) art. u6. 
Poland, Law of I 926, art. I 3 par. I. 
Sweden, Law of I904, c. I § 4 par. I. 
Switzerland, NAG. art. 7c par. 2.64 
Brazil: Introductory Law of I942, art. 7 § I. 
Soviet Union, Family laws of I926 of Russian Soviet Re-
public, art. I36; of Ukraine, art. !07 par. 2.65 
Ordinarily the rule is treated as unquestionable and justi-
fied as being required by elementary publit policy.66 Every 
63 The form of marriage ceremony provided for by the Italian Concordat with 
the Holy See, viz., and ecclesiastical marriage recorded by the state civil registrar, 
is available to foreigners, according to the general opinion, which is contested, 
however, by BALLADORE-PALLIERI, Dir. Int. Eccles. 220. 
64 To this effect BG. (Oct. 6, 1883) 9 BGE. 449, 453; Just. Dep. April 30, 
I 924, BBl. I 924, II 2 5; BBl. I 940, 1462 no. 9 (no marriage by proxy for 
foreigners prevented from entering Switzerland); HUBER-MUTZNER 434; 
contra: STAUFFER, NAG. art. 7c no. 26. 
65 FREUND in 4 Leske-Loewenfeid I 366; MAKARov, Precis 331ff. 
66 Cf. 2 FIORE no. 54I; RoLIN, Principes 79:ff. nos. 576, 578, 581; TRiAs DE 
BEs, 6 Repert. 2 52 no. I o 1 ; 1 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ I 09 no. 19 6. 
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state is said to have decided, after careful deliberation, whether 
marriages shall be solemnized in religious or temporal form, 
or parties shall be permitted to marry without any formality 
at all. From this point of view, it is understandable that states 
should not wish to see exceptions made within their territories 
in favor of aliens. Not quite so obvious, however, is the neces-
sity of permitting foreigners to avail themselves of local cere-
monies which are at variance with their personal laws. Doubt-
less, it is believed appropriate to render marriage possible for 
alien residents. 
An exception to the general rule requiring marriages ·cele-
brated within the country to comply with the prescribed 
formalities is that of foreigners in Greece who are permitted, 
according to an old doctrine, to avail themselves of all public 
solemnizations provided for by their personal laws. This rule 
permits all sorts of religious and consular marriages, exclud-
ing, however, simple consensual contracts of the common law 
or Soviet type. 67 
Illustrations: 
(a) Validity of marriage in municipal form: In the Eng-
lish case of Papadopoulos v. Papadopoulos, P., domiciled in 
Cyprus and belonging to the Greek Orthodox church, married 
a woman of French nationality before a registrar in London 
in compliance with the formalities of English law. His mar-
riage was held valid in England, although it was not recog-
nized in Cyprus because not celebrated in a church by a priest 
of the Orthodox church. 68 
There is abundant authority to the same effect in other 
countries. 69 
67 Cf. z STREIT-VALLINDAS 306, 3I5• 
as [I93o] P. 55· 
69 Belgium: Cass. (Jan. I9, I8p) Pasicrisie I85z. I. 85; Antwerp (July 3, 
I939) 9 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1939, 44· 
France: In a series of decisions beginning with App. Douai (Nov. 1 8, I 903) 
Clunet I904, 394, down to a particularly objectionable decision of the Trib. of 
Metz (Oct. 30, 1929) StAZ. 1930, 198, the marriage has been held invalid if 
the formalities of the personal law were not observed. More recently, however, 
the trend favoring territoriality rather than the personal law has won the upper 
hand, and it is now well established that a marriage celebrated in France in ac-
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(b) Invalidity of religious marriages not provided for by 
the municipal law: Thus, in a German case, Jewish subjects 
of Czarist Russia went through a religious ceremony in Ger-
many before a rabbi. Although good in Russia, the marriage 
was held nonexistent in Germany, as no ceremony was per-
formed before a civil officer. 70 Similarly, a marriage was cele-
brated in Germany according to religious formalities by a 
Greek and a Serbian subject. Although valid in both Greece 
and Serbia, the marriage was held nonexistent in Germany.71 
(c) Invalidity of common law marriage: Two American 
citizens from New York live together as husband and wife in 
Belgium without a marriage ceremony. Belgian courts will 
hold the marriage invalid. 72 
Apparent exceptions. Obviously, it is not inconsistent with 
the rule of compliance with local formalities for France and 
Spain to authorize or compel 73 their nationals in their re-
spective colonies to marry in compliance with the formalities 
of the mother country. 
Neither is it an exception, when a French court applies 
Spanish law in deciding whether or not a French woman has 
cordance with the French formalities is valid, while a marriage celebrated in 
France in accordance with religious formalities is invalid. See Trib. civ. Seine 
(Nov. 20, I9I2), aff'dCourParis (Dec. 22, I92I) inClunet, I922, I35; Trib. 
civ. Seine (Jan. 7, I922), aff'd Cour Paris (Nov. I7, I922) Clunet I923, 85; 
Trib. civ. Nice (June 26, I923) Clunet 1924, 670. All writers agree. 
Germany: RG. (Dec. 17, 1908) 70 RGZ. 139; RG. (Nov. 16, 1922) I05 
RGZ. 363; OLG. Dresden (March I3, I91I) 7 Sachs. Arch. (1912) 272 and 
OLG. Dresden (Nov. 9, 1933) IPRspr. 1934, no. 46. 
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 6, 1883) 9 BGE. 449, 453· 
70 OLG. Miinchen (March 10, 192I) 42 ROLG. 98. To the same effect: 
RG. (2d criminal section, Dec. 10, 1912) 18 DJZ. I913, 588; Bay. ObLG. 
(March 22, 1924) 23 Bay. ObLGZ. 56. 
Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Jan. 31, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925.3.129. 
Switzerland: BEcK, NAG. art. 7c no. 86. 
71 RG. (3d criminal section, Feb. 16, I914) Leipz. Z. 19I4, 869. 
72 Belgium: PouLLET 469 no. 365. 
73 In French Morocco, the Dahir of u-IJ of August, I 9 I 3, declared that 
Frenchmen and foreigners are unable to marry except in accordance with the 
formalities permitted by their, national law or those which will eventually be 
determined for l' hat civil in the French Protectorate. The latter formalities 
have been determined by the Dahirs of Sept. 4, I9I5, and Sept. IJ, 1922, to be 
~dentical with those of the Civil Code. Since then, the French form of marri11ge 
rs compulsory for French nationals, as the Court of Cassation held in two decisions 
of March 3, 1937, Revue Crit 1938, 86, 88. 
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acquired Spanish nationality by marrying a Spanish citizen 
in France. The court may find that the marriage is invalid 
under Spanish law because the religious ceremony was not ob-
served and that therefore the wife has not become a Spanish 
citizen, although it is certain that the marriage is valid in 
France.74 
The Japanese Civil Code limits its own provision to the 
marriage of nationals without mentioning the marriage of 
foreigners. Probably, foreign parties may use any formalities 
agreeing with their national law or laws. 75 
Consular marriages performed within the forum. Where a 
consular or diplomatic· agent is endowed by the state repre-
sented by him-the sending state-76 with the power of of-
ficiating at marriages, a marriage performed before him is 
valid in the receiving state only if the latter state has agreed 
to his acting in this capacity. Numerous marriages celebrated 
in an embassy or consulate have been declared invalid by the 
courts of the countries involved, because this function of the 
diplomatic agent or a priest officiating in a legation was not 
recognized. 77 Hence, for instance, a marriage celebrated by 
two British subjects before a British consul in Germany is 
74 Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. I9, I92o) Clunet I92o, I98; (Nov. I9, I92o) Clunet 
I92I, I84; (March 29, I928) Clunet I929, 402. Comments expressing con-
troversial opinions by PERROUD, Note, Clunet I929, 404, andJ. DoNNEDIEU DE 
VABRES 455· See supra p. I37· 
75 See BATY, "The Private International Law of Japan," in I Melanges 
Streit (I939) I03 at Io6. 
76 Where a marriage was celebrated before the consul of Guatemala in Paris 
and it appeared that, according to the law of Guatemala, representatives of that 
state had no authority to officiate at marriages, the act was declared null also 
under French law. Trib. civ. Seine (March I5, I932) Revue Crit. I935> 436. 
77 Austria (one party Austrian): OGH. (Aug. I7, I88o) I8 GlU. no. 8o66, 
Clunet I88I, I7I. 
Belgium (one party Belgian): Trib. Antwerp (Aug. 4, I 877) Clunet I 88I, 84. 
France (one party French): Trib. civ. Seine (July 2, I872) S.I872.2.248, 
Clunet I874, 7I; Trib. civ. Seine (Sept. 2, I920) Revue I92I, I65 n.2; (June 
2I, I 873) Clunet I 874, 73; cf. infra n. 83, and Note AUDINET, S.I924.2.65. See 
also the case of Hay v. Northcote [I9oo] z Ch. z6z, 69 L. J. (Ch.) 586, where 
the English court, though referring to a French judgment which had declared 
the marriage void, held it valid under English law. 
Italy: App. Firenze (July 3Ij I877) Ann. Giur. Ital. I877, 3, 2.83 (an 
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held nonexistent in Germany/8 though it is considered good 
in England. 79 
Although some states are unwilling to consent to this func-
tion of diplomatic agents, numerous treaties embody agree-
ments to recognize consular marriages performed within ter-
ritory of the forum. 80 In some countries, consent is deemed to 
be given even without any express declaration. This is the 
case in Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Greece, Peru, Ru-
mania, Spain, Turkey, and elsewhere, 81 particularly in France, 
where by "traditional customary law" 82 foreigners belonging 
to the same country are permitted to marry before their consul. 
This liberal exception to the French system does not extend, 
however, to religious marriages before a priest or chaplain at-
tached to a diplomatic mission, sanctioned in former times by 
the so-called freedom of the Chapel. Hence, French courts 
American man and an Italian woman at an American consulate); see also Trib. 
Roma (May 6, I936) Giur. Ital. I936, I, 2, 465. 
Switzerland: Just. Dep. BBl. I 924, II 2 5, no. 5; Answer of Federal Council to 
the British Legation, BBl. I9II, I 43I, no. 12, where it is added that the British 
Legation in a note showed its willingness to make British consuls in Switzerland 
conform to the Swiss conception. 
Spain: Trib. Supr. (July u, I 899) 66 Sent. I 69 (Frenchman at the Anglican 
Church of Puerto Rico, then a Spanish colony). 
See, furthermore, Rb. Rotterdam (June 17, I935) W. I936, no. 633 
(Egyptian consul). Decisions relating to Portuguese, Turkish, and Russian 
consulates; cf. 3 FRANKENSTEIN I 70 n. I 76, 
78 German EG. art. I.3 par. 3· 
79 British Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, §I. 
80 See infra p. 238; see also the Colombian Law, No. 266, of Dec. 2I, I9J8. 
81 Belgium: Cour Bruxelles (May 29, I852) Pasicrisie I852.2.237; Note, 
Clunet I 907, 335, 339; PouLLET 470 no. 366. 
The Bolivian Law of December I5, I939; continues to recognize marriages 
celebrated by diplomatic or consular agents of foreign powers, but requires 
recording in the register of civil status. 
Brazil: Lei de Introdul;iO (I 942) art. 7 § 2. 
Bulgaria: GHE:Nov, 6 Repert. I9I no. 63. 
Greece: z STREIT-VALLINDAS 3I5. 
Peru: customary law for Catholics and Congressional Act of Dec. 23, I897, 
art. 7 for non-Catholics (on the condition of subsequent registration). 
Roumania: Trib.Ilfov (March 2I, I 89o); see PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 66 no. I 83. 
Spain: Trib. Supr. (Feb. 2I, 1935) 217 Sent. 567 implicitly; see TRiAs DE BE& 
85 no. II8. 
Turkey: see SALEM, 7 Repert. 267 no. 2I8. 
82 WEiss, 3 Traite 563. 
··' 
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have invalidated a marriage celebrated before an Orthodox 
priest of the Gre.ek legation in Paris and a marriage celebrated 
before a Protestant minister authorized by the King of 
Sweden. 83 
The validity of consular marriages as determined by the 
law of the sending state will be discussed in connection with 
other foreign marriages. 84 
4· The Law of the Place of Celebration as Applied to Foreign 
Marriages 
In general. All states, except those which require a religious 
marriage for their nationals abroad and, to a certain extent, 
Spain, recognize as valid a foreign marriage celebrated in 
compliance with the formalities prescribed by the local law. 85 
Such compliance is compulsory according to the English and 
American conflicts rules ~ut optional under the laws of most 
other countries. 
83 France: Circulaire du Garde des Sceaux, Aug. 27, I879, Bull. Off. Min. 
Just. I879, I46; Trib. civ. Seine (June 6, I893) Clunet I893, 88o; Trib. civ. 
Angers (July 27, I896) and App. Angers (May 3I, I898) Clunet I898, 9II; 
Cass. (civ.) (July 30, 19oo) S.I902.1.225, D.I90I.I.3I7, Clunet I9oo, 969; 
App. Douai (Feb. 2, I899) Clunet I899, 825. The marriage of two Greeks, 
celebrated according to their religious formalities at their legation, was held valid 
by Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 20, I92o) Revue I92I, 226, but the judgment was 
reversed, Cour Paris (March I, I922) S.I924.2.65; cf. ARMINJON, Revue I926, 
I69; AUDINET, II Recueil I926 I 209. 
Spain: Trib. Supr. (July 12, I 8 8 9) 66 Sent. I 69 (French parties in the 
Anglican chapel of Puerto Rico). 
84 /nfra pp. 236-240. 
85 In most countries this rule is not questioned. 
In Soviet Russia the statutes are interpreted to the same effect by FREUND in 
4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 366, with some reservations, however. 
In Spain the Supreme Court held on May I, I 9 I 9, I 46 Sent. I 7 6 and again on 
April 26, I 929, I 88 Sent. 1286 concerning Spanish couples having married in 
Argentina and Habana respectively, that non-Catholic Spaniards may marry 
only in accordance with Spanish formalities before a Spanish consul or vice-
consul; LASALA LLANAS I07 and TRiAS DEBEs, in 3I Recueil I9JO I 654, 673, 
and in his Sistema espafiol de derecho civil internacional, nos. I I I, I I 2 state this 
to be the actual law, but restrict the unwelcome rule to the cases where both 
parties are of Spanish nationality, or the man is a Spaniard and the woman is not 
a national of the country of celebration. Moreover, in a country prohibiting 
consular marriage the parties are believed to be free to choose the local ceremony. 
For Eastern Poland, see supra n. 56, and for Turkey, SALEM, 7 Repert. 268 no. 
22I; but cf. GouLI~, Mariage, 8 Repert. nos. 4I, 288, and 382. 
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The local form, including the proper officer 86 and the 
proper ceremony, must be observed in its entirety as de-
termined by the law of the place of celebration. 87 In Morocco, 
Egypt, and parts of China, religious ceremonies are customary 
but dependent on certain conditions with which foreigners ac-
cordingly have to comply in order to satisfy their national 
laws. On the other hand, Swiss authorities recognize a Japanese 
temporary marriage (the famous Madame Butterfly mar-
riage), entered into by a Swiss national, as valid without time 
restriction, the Swiss law disapproving such restriction. 88 
Under the Concordat of 1929 between Italy and the Holy 
See, Italians may marry in Italy either in~accordance with the 
Civil Code or in accordance with the ecclesiastical ("canonic") 
formalities, provided, however, that the ecclesiastical mar-
riage is recorded by an Italian civil officer. 89 Since this al-
ternative does not exist outside of Italy, a marriage of Italian 
nationa~s abroad before a Catholic priest is not valid, even 
under the Italian conflicts law, unless it has been performed 
in accordance with the formalities established by the forum. 90 
Special problems: (a) CommonZaw marriage.s·. Since some 
formal marriage ceremony is required in almost every 
European country, 91 the question has been presented whether 
the principle of locus re git act~tm could be extended to a com-
mon law marriage of nationals of a European country cele-
86 Wher!! a French Catholic woman married an orthodox Serb in a Catholic 
church in Yugoslavia, the marriage was held invalid in France, because according 
to the local law it should have been celebrated before an orthodox priest; see 
Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 22, 1937) Revue Crit. 1937, 65o. 
The American decision in In re Lando's Estate (1910) 112 Minn. 257, 127. 
N.W.I125, is based upon the same principle. The court was mistaken, however, 
when it interpreted EG. art. 13 par. 3, as permitting a marriage in Germany 
before a minister of a religious community. Cf. KESSLER, 1 Z.ausl.PR. (1927) 
865 n. x. 
87 2 BEALE§ 121,4; § 122.1. 
88 Just. Dep., BBl. 1925, II 143. 
89 Hence, an unrecorded religious ceremony performed in Italy will not be 
considered sufficient by a foreign court; cf. Austrian OGH. (May 21, 1937) 
19 SZ. no. x66. 
9ll See Bosco, 22 Rivista (1930) 469ff.; FEDOZZI 419ff. 
91 Except in Soviet Russia and until recently in Scotland. 
224 MARRIAGE 
brated in a jurisdiction where common law marriage has not 
been abolished. Despite objections, the validity of common law 
marriages celebrated in the United States has been upheld not 
only by English courts 92 but also for their respective nationals 
by the courts of Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy.93 
Gretna Green marriages, too, have been recognized in Eng-
land 94 and other countries. 95 
Furthermore, recorded marriages entered into by non-
Russians in Soviet Russia have been recognized in other juris-
dictions, 96 and even non-recorded marriages have been de-
clared valid by the German Reichsgericht on the ground that 
itwas often difficult for German parties resident in Russia 
to reach a German consulate. 91 The court stated, however, that 
92 Rooker v. Rooker (r863) 3 Sw. & Tr. sz6; In re Green, Noyes v. Pitkin 
(I909) z5 T. L. R. zzz.I JoHNSON 299, however, has express doubts concerning 
the validity of such marriages celebrated by domiciliaries of Quebec who go 
abroad for this purpose. · 
03 Belgium: Trib. Antwerp (Jan. 13, I 886) J. d. Trib. I 886, col. 3 I r; App. 
Bruxelles (July Z9, I909) Clunet I9IZ, 583; POULLET 46Z no. 360; WIGNY, 
58 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I93r) 34I at 346. 
France: Continually so held since Cass. (req.) (Dec. zo, r84I) S.I842.I.JZI; 
see WEiss, 3 Traite 531; Cass. (req.) (Jan. I3, I857) S.I857.I.8I; Trib. 
civ. Seine (Apri12o, I89I) Clunet I89I, 932; Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. 3, 1894) 
Clunet I895> 374; Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. I7> I924) Revue I9z5, :u6; Cour 
Paris (Nov. 2o, I928) Clunet I929, Io5o. 
Germany: RG. (Oct. 26, I932) 138 RGZ. 2I4, 2I8, IPRspr. I9J2, no. 8 at 
z5; LG. Tiibingen (July 25, I934) JW. I934> 28o2, IPRspr. I934, no. 57 
at I30; RG. (April 7, I938) I 57 RGZ. 257 at 262, JW. I938, I7I6. 
Italy: Trib. Ariano (Feb. 4, I898) and App. Napoli (March 3I, 1898) 
cited by FEDOZZI at 426 n. I, who himself requires that the conclusion of the 
marriage be proved by an act of consent, excluding inference from the sub-
sequent conduct of the parties. 
94 Compton v. Bearcroft (I769) 2 Hag. Con. 444; Bach v. Bach (1927) 
43 T. L. R. 493 (by implication). 
95 Prussian Obertribunal (Jan. I5, I855) 29 Entsch. Kgl. Ob. Trib. 380 
no. 5I. 
96 Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (I93 I) no. V. 10.644, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (I932) 448. 
France:Trib. civ. Seine (June I7, I927) Revue I928, 332 (Spanish man and 
Russian woman.) 
Germany: RG. (Oct. 22, I930) JW. I93I, I334> IPRspr. I93I, no. 57; 
RG. (Oct. z6, I9JZ) I38 RGZ. 2I4 at 2I7, IPRspr. 1932, no. 8 at 25. 
Switzerland: see BEcK, NAG. 222 no. 12. 
97 RG. (April7, I938) I57 RGZ. 262 at 265. 
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strict proof that the marriage was a true marriage and intended 
to be permanent was necessary in each case. 98 
(b) Tribal marriage. As a rule, marriages of white persons, 
in accordance with the formalities of uncivilized native tribes, 
are not recognized.99 Colonial practice has, however, recog-
nized various exceptions.100 
(c) Marriage by proxy. Marriage by proxy, where per-
mitted by the law of the place where the proxy participates 
in the marriage ceremony, has been recognized in the United 
States.101 A Turkish immigrant to the United States, for 
instance, was allowed to marry by proxy a woman living in 
his native country, thus enabling her to join him in this coun-
try.102 A similar case was that of a German prisoner of war in 
Morocco who married by proxy an Austrian woman in 
Austria.103 Although section I 24 of the Restatement requires 
only that the absent party consent to the marriage, Continental 
courts seem to require also that this consent be expressed in 
98 q8 RGZ. at 218; I57 RGZ. at 266. 
99 In re Bethell, Bethell v. Hildyard (1888) 38 Ch.D. 220. Contra: Cour 
Paris (April 24, I926) D.1927.2.9 held void a marriage of a French explorer 
in Mongolia and an American girl before a Belgian Catholic missionary, as 
Mongols do not use religious marriages. This was, however, an unusual case 
due to the remote place, see EscARRA, ibid.; infra n. I79· 
100 On French practice in Indo-China and Tunisia, cf. J. DoNNEDIEU DE 
VABRES 447· On marriages of white persons and Indians in the United States 
and Canada see GooDRICH 319; I JoHNSON 320-327· On the very precarious 
position of a white woman marrying a native in the British Empire or even 
a member of an Oriental religion or of a Hindu caste, cf. memorandum of the 
British Foreign Office transmitted by the British Consul in Berlin, printed in 
StAZ. 1923, 31; see also 2 BERGMANN, 75· 
101 See Restatement§ 124. See LoRENZEN, "Marriage by Proxy and the Con-
flict of Laws," 32 Harv. L. Rev. (19I9) 473, 484; 
102 Cf. GooDRICH 303; United States ex ret. Modianos v. Tuttle (1926) 12 
F. (2d) 927; see also Clunet I929, 205. It is true that according to s. 28 (n.) of 
the Immigration Act of May 26, I924, the terms "wife" and "husband" do not 
refer to a proxy or picture marriage, but on the interpretation see HACKWORTH, 
2 Digest of International Law (194I) 367 s. I64. On the contrary, Canadian 
federal and province authorities do not recognize any marriage by proxy for 
the purpose of immigration; see note of the Canadian Government to the 
German Government, 2 BERGMANN 78. 
103 Opinion of the Saxon Government of May 24, I 9 I 6, cited by LEWALD 86 
no. II7. 
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advance in an instrument in writing, stating the name of the 
other party. Provisions to this effect are contained in some 
codes, as for instance the Austrian and the Cuban 104 and, for 
soldiers, in the new Italian Code.105 
If these precautions are taken, there is no room for the 
objection that marriage by proxy does not fulfill the require-
ment of consent. The party for whom the proxy acts must ob-
serve the regular form of consent. The proxy himself is no 
more than a messenger, and whether or not a party may 
express his consent by messenger is clearly a matter of formal-
ity.106 
Prevention of secret marriages. Elaborate precautions have 
been taken in the municipal laws of Western and Central 
Europe to prevent prohibited and secret marriages. Marriages 
may not be celebrated without prior publication of banns, and 
after celebration all marriages must be recorded by civil of-
ficers. These acts, both that preceding and that following the 
main ceremony, are regarded as formalities 107 and, therefore, 
as a general principle, are governed by the law of the state 
of celebration.108 
(a) Provisions by the state of celebration. To prevent pro-
hibited and secret marriages numerous countries endeavor to 
make sure that the marriage is not prohibited by the personal 
law of the parties. Thus, banns are required to be published 
not only at the place of celebration but also in the country or 
104 Allg. BGB. § 76, first sentence. Consent of government also required. 
Cuba: C. C. art. 87. 
In the Netherlands, BW. art. I 34 requires royal permission. 
10
"C. C. (I942) art. III. 
See also the German war-time provisions of the period of I9I4-I9I 8. 
106 Cj.RAAPE I76, 255; but also 3 FRANKENSTEIN I54· 
107 It is not true, as often alleged, that banns are considered part of the 
formalities only in Germany but not in France. 
108 This principle is followed in Switzerland by the regulation of banns in the 
case of a foreign marriage of Swiss nationals; no banns are required unless the 
authorities at the place of celebration ask for a Swiss certificate showing no known 
impediment to marry, in which event banns are published for the purpose of 
granting the certificate. See BBl. I 8 99, I 3 6 I no. 4; id. I 9 I z, I 5 07 no. I 5; BEcK, 
NAG. art. 7c no. 95· 
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countries where the parties reside or have resided at some time 
prior to their marriage. Foreigners are commonly not per-
mitted to marry unless they can show a certificate of their own 
country that no impediment to the marriage is known.109 
(b) Banns prescribed by the personal law. In addition, some 
countries have established analogous provisions for their na-
tionals abroad. Under the French Civil Code, which contains 
the prototype of all such regulations, a French national who in-
tends to marry in a foreign land must, under certain circum-
stances, have banns published in France, particularly if he has 
resided in France in the six months preceding his marriage.110 
The Code itself imposes no sanction for the performance of 
this duty. The courts, however, have pronounced null the mar-
riages of parties who intended to keep their marriage a secret 
in France or who intended to evad<? the prohibitions of French 
law.111 
Although the provisions of the French Code have been 
copied by Italy, the Netherlands, and other countries, few of 
these countries 112 have followed the French decisions directed 
109 See below, p. 2 84. 
110 C. C. arts. 170 and 6 3· 
!11 Cass. (req.) (March 28, 1854) S.1 854.1.295; Cass. (req.) (Nov. 20, 1866) 
8.1866.1.442; Cass. (req.) (March 8, 1875) S.1875.1.171; Cass. (civ.) (June 
15, 1887) S.189o.r.446; Cass. (req.) (July 5, 1905) Clunet 19o6, 1145, 
8.1906.1.141, Revue 1905, 714; Cass (req.) (Jan. 3, 19o6) Clunet 19o6, 1149, 
Revue 1907, 211; and particularly Cass. (civ.) (July 13, 1926) S.1926.r.263. 
Cf. on this peculiar practice NIBOYET 725ff. no. 616. 
112 To the, same effect as the French decisions: 
Belgium: C. C. art. 170 as amended by law of July 12, 1931, art. 13. (Seems 
clearly to require observance of the local foreign formalities only.) 
Quebec: Durocher v. Degre (1901) 20 S.C. 456, criticized by Charbonneau, 
J., in Hebert v. Clouatre (1912) 41 S.C. 249, 258ff. 
Contra: Italy: C. C. (1865) art. 100 par. 2; C. C. (1942) art. II5; the 
consequence of omission is not nullity but only a penalty, Cass. Napoli (June 26, 
1883) Legge 1884.1.14; App. Messina (Nov. 9, 1927) cited by FEDOZZI 419 n. 
2; Trib. Pesaro (June 14, 1928) 21 Rivista (1929) 420. Cass. (Aug. 2, 1935) 
Rivista Dir. Pubbl. 1936, II 204. 
The Netherlands: BW. art. 138 requiring banns is generally understood as 
meaning banns in the Netherlands. Non-compliance was believed to result in a 
nullity but not since the decision of the H. R. (May 31, 1872) W. 3484 and the 
Law of July 7, 1906, S. no. 162, art. 6. 
Hungary: Marriage Law of 1894, § II 3 par. 2. 
228 MARRIAGE 
against fraude a la loi, since the French courts have inter-
preted these provisions in their peculiar manner and have 
assumed discretionary powers of doubtful validity. 
In reconciling these variations, the Hague Convention on 
Marriage provided that the requirements of the national 
law concerning publication must be observed, with the proviso 
that omission of publication does not invalidate the marriage 
except in a state whose law has been violated.113 
(c) Recordation prescribed by the personal law. A French 
national who has married abroad, moreover, must have his 
marriage recorded at his French place of residence within 
three months after his return to France.114 This provision of 
the French Code has likewise been widely imitated.115 No 
sanction is provided, 116 except that the Portuguese provision 
that a foreign marriage can be proved only if recorded in 
compliance with law,117 has had some following. 118 
A steadily increasing number of states in this country re-
quire residents who go elsewhere to be married and who 
113 Hague Convention on Marriage of I9o2, art. 5 par. 3, followed-by Sweden, 
Law of I904, with subsequent amendments, c. I § 4 par. 2. 
114 French C. C. art. I 7 I, no cause of nullity; App. Aix (Dec. 20, I 900) 
Clunet I903, 639; Trib. civ. Seine (Oct. 27, I92I) Clunet I921, 940. 
115 Belgi urn : C. C. art. r 7 I. 
Haiti: C. C. art. I 56. 
Italy: C. C. (I 865) -art. IOI. 
Eritrea: C. C. art. I I 2. 
Monaco: C. C. art. I39· 
The Netherlands: BW. art. 139· 
Neth. Indies: C. C. art. 84. 
Nicaragua: C. C. arts. Io6, 525. 
Venezuela: C. C. (I942) art. I03· 
116 See for Belgium: App. Liege (April 8, I925) Clunet I926, 502; Italy: 
Cass. Palermo (Aug. s, I905) Foro Ital. I905, I, I443; I Rivista (I9o6) s86; 
App. Messina (Nov. 9, I 9 2 7) see supra n. I I 2. 
117 Portugal: C. C. art. 2479 and Law of Dec. 25, I9Io, arts. 6o, 6I. CuNHA 
GoN«;ALVEs, I Direito Civil 685 explains that the marriage is considered valid as 
to effects in the country of celebration, and with respect to bigamy even in 
Portugal. 
118 The similar view of the former C. C. of Peru, art. I 59, has been abandoned 
in the C. C. of I936; cf. APARICIO y GoMEZ, 2 Codigo Civil, Concordancias 324 
and 356 (I4). 
Mexico: C. C. art. I 6 I par. 2 is characteristic of laws declaring that the 
civil effect of the marriage is retroactive to the time of the celebration only if it 
is recorded within three months. 
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return to reside within the state, to file a certificate of their 
marriage with the proper officer.119 
In the Soviet Union, a circular of the Commissariat of 
Justice of the U.S.S.R. required all Soviet nationals marrying 
abroad to have their marriages recorded at the office of the 
diplomatic or consular representative of the U.S.S.R. But 
the code of only one Soviet Republic, the Ukraine, has ex-
pressly declared compliance with this provision essential for 
recognition of the marriage.120 
Defective celebration. The law of the place of celebration 
establishes the formalities and what constitutes failure to 
comply with them. It is universally agreed that the same law 
also determines the effect of such failure of compliance on the 
validity or invalidity of the marriage. 
It is interesting that this principle is more firmly settled 
than two broader principles of which it would seem to be an 
application. 
First, it is fairly well established, although not without 
some opposition, that the same law determines the causes as 
well as the effects of the nullity of a marriage.121 This broader 
rule, which includes formal and substantive requirements for 
marriage, has been adopted by the Restatement § I 3 6: 
"The law governing the right to a decree of nullity is the 
law which determined the validity of the marriage with respect 
119 Maine Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 72 § 7, as amended by Laws of 1933, c. 24 § r; 
New Hampshire Rev. Laws (1942) c. 337, § 7; id., c. 338, § 30; North Caro-
lina Gen. Stats. (1943) § 51-2, as amended by Public Laws 1939, c. 375; 
Vermont Pub. Laws (1933) § 4093; Virginia Code Ann. (r942) § 5077; 
West Virginia Code Ann. (1937) c. 48 § 4692 [14]. 
12° Circular letter of July 6, 1923, no. 144, The Weekly for Soviet Justice 
622; Ukrainian Family Law of 1926, art. 105; this provision seems not to 
apply, however, unless both parties are Soviet citizens. Cf. FREUND, 4 Leske-' 
Loewenfeld I 366-9. Dr. V. Gsovski states that the requirement is not in any 
recent Soviet code and seems not to have been enforced. 
121 Germany: RG. (June 22, 1931) 133 RGZ. r61, IPRspr. 1931, no. 231 
OLG. Dusseldorf (Oct. 311 1922) JW. 1923, 191; KG. (Jan. 29, 1934) DJZ. 
1934, 1158, IPRspr. 19341 no. 16. 
France: Ch. civ. Douai (March 281 1928) Clunet 1929, 4001 Ch. civ. 
Montpellier (June 21, 1928) Clunet 19291 10621 cited by GouLt, 9 Repert. 
82 no. 423. 
The Netherlands: see MuLDER 38, 109. 
Switzerland: see GAUTSCHI1 27 SJZ. (19Jo-1931) 321. 325. 
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to the matter on account of which the marriage is alleged to be 
null." 
In England these problems are ordinarily discussed under 
the heading of jurisdiction. If, however, a marriage has been 
celebrated abroad, English courts are prepared to respect the 
jurisdiction of the forum loci actus, and therefore the result 
now stated for the first time in modern form by Cheshire is 
the same as that in other countries. 122 
Second, the results of a formally defective transaction of 
any kind are said to be determined by the law whose formal-
ities have not been properly observed.123 
Although both general rules, and particularly the second, 
" have been opposed on the ground that either the law of the 
forum or the lex causae should prevail, in the particular case 
of a formally defective marriage the rule is virtually un-
challenged.124 The forms of marriage vary too much, indeed, 
for one jurisdiction to determine the sanctions for violating 
the formal requirements of another. 
Consequently, the law of the place of celebration determines 
whether or not a defect is material to the validity of the mar-
riage and, if so, whether it renders the marriage nonexistent, 
void, voidable, or annullable (whatever may be meant by 
these terms) ; whether an omission can be cured by some addi-
tional act, as for instance, recording or factual cohabitation; 
and whether or not an annulment has retroactive effect.125 
122 See Salvesen v. Adm'r of Austrian Property [ 19z 7] A. C. 64 I ; CHESHIRE 
J46, 347· 
123 See GooDRICH § 1 o6; 2 ARMINJON, no. 49· 
124 NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 115, RAAPE 183, I FRANKENSTEIN 56I, 
3 FRANKENSTEIN 183, and MANNL, II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 786, have advocated 
the lex causae. RAAPE I 86, and MANNL, however, admit that this theory is 
impracticable for marriages, and it has been formally rejected "at least with re-
spect to the conclusion of marriage" by the Reichsgericht (June 22, I931) 133 
RGZ. 161, I65. Likewise, J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 46I seems to agree that the 
Court of Montpellier (supra n. 12 r) was right, although he defends the pre-
dominance of the personal law in determining sanctions for defects in marriages 
in general. In still another opinion, it was thought that the law more favor-
able to the marriage should be followed, but no decision seems to have applied 
this illogical thesis. 
125 RG. (June u, 1931) 133 RGZ. I6I, 165, 
MARRIAGE 231 
There are, of course, exceptions to the rule. The most sig-
nificant exist in Switzer land. According to article I 3 I of the 
Swiss Civil Code, no marriage may be annulled on the ground 
of a formal defect, if it has been celebrated before a public 
marriage officer. Nor may a Swiss court annul a marriage, 
unless the ground of nullity is also recognized by Swiss mu-
nicipal law.126 Thus, a Swiss court will not annul a foreign 
marriage of Swiss nationals celebrated before. a public officer, 
although a formal defect invalidates the marriage under the 
local law, nor will a foreign annulment in such case be 
recognized in Switzerland.127 
Another exception exists in France. On the theory of "pos-
session of status" (possession d'hat), article I96 of the Civil 
Code prohibits an annulment on the ground of formal defect, 
when the marriage is commonly reputed h> exist and the 
record of celebration before a civil officer can be produced. 
·while the Court of Cassation has refused to apply this pro-
vision to marriages celebrated abroad, 128 there is a tendency 
to extend it to all marriages celebrated before a French civil 
officer and to all marriages of French nationals.129 
Where the conflicts rule of the national law makes observ-
ance of the local ceremonies optional, a celebration, defective 
under the Jaw of the place of celebration, may be considered 
valid in the homeland. 
Evasion of formalities. Apart from the requirements of 
some -countries concerning publication and recording by their 
nationals (see above at page 2 2 7), parties are generally free to 
choose for an intended marriage a place anywhere in the world 
and may thus avoid the formalities prescribed in their own 
country: 
126 NAG. art. 7f par. 2. 
127 BECK, NAG. art. 7f no. I 72. 
128 Cass. (req.) (May 9, I9o5) D.I905.1.367, Revue I9o5, 349; followed 
by Cour Paris (May IS, I93r) Gaz.Pal.I93I.2.262; Trib. civ. Seine (March 
rs, I932) Revue Crit. I935• 436. 
129 PILLET, I Traite 563 no. 265; LEREBOURS-P!GEONNJ:ERE 3sr n~ I. 
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"No exception is made to the principle even where the sole 
object of the parties in marrying in a foreign country has 
been to evade some troublesome formal requirement of their 
lex domicilii." 130 
This is a rule well recognized in England and in all other 
countries not prescribing compulsory religious marriage. 
An occasional exception exists where, as in Arkansas, 131 a 
marriage out of the state is not recognized, unless the parties 
actually resided in the foreign state or country at the time of 
the marriage. 
5. Religious Ceremony Considered Essential by the Personal 
Law 
Point of view of the personal law: (a) Foreign civil mar-
riage. Those countries which consider marriage essentially a 
religious institution, such as Bulgaria, Greece, Liechtenstein, 
et cetera1
132 treat as null and void a marriage celebrated abroad 
by one of their own subjects in accordance with civil formali-
ties. This rule has been expressed repeatedly by the highest 
authorities of Czarist Russia 133 as well as by the attorney 
general of Greece, 134 who in an opinion stated that such a 
marriage is simply nonexistent, i.e., that anyone may invoke 
its invalidity, no decree of nullity being necessary. 
The Hague Convention on Marriage (art. 5 par. 2) ex-
pressly reserved to the states prescribing religious formalities 
the right to treat marriages celebrated abroad by their na-
tionals in disregard of such prescriptions as invalid. 
13° CHESHIRE 325. 
131 Pope's Dig. Stat. (I937) § 9023. 
132 See supra p. 2 I 3. 
133 Decisions of the Cassation Departments, penal, I 889, no. 2; civil, I 899, 
no. 39; of the first Plenary Meeting of the Senate, Aug. I 2, I 9 I I; Circular of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Russian Representatives in Germany of 
February 25, I889, no. I384; Decree of the Consistorium of St. Petersburg, 
May 20, I9 I I; cited according to MAKAROV, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 488 n. I os. 
134 Opinion of Mr. GIDOPOULos, procurator at the Areopague, to the Ministry 
of Justice, no. 54 (Dec. 28, I936) Clunet I937> 902; for the literature and cases 
in point see 2 STREIT-V ALLINDAS 3 I 7 n. 32· 
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(b) Foreign religious marriage. Under Greek law a Greek 
national may marry abroad in accordance with the formalities 
of his church, no matter what the local law provides.135 A 
similar rule was in force for subjects of Czarist Russia.136 In 
other countries, such as Croatia, which is governed by the 
older Austrian law, a foreign marriage of Catholic nationals 
must comply with the formalities established by the Catholic 
church at the place of celebration.137 
Point of view of the local law. Where a Bulgarian national 
marries before a civil officer in Germany and does not go 
through an additional religious ceremony, the marriage is 
valid in Germany and invalid in Bulgaria.138 This situation is 
apt to give rise to puzzling problems under the law of the 
country where the celebration took place, i.e., Germany. It 
has been held that such a "limping marriage" (matrimonium 
claudicans) can be dissolved by a German decree of divorce, 
although generally divorce presupposes a marriage valid under 
the personal law of the parties.139 In this case, the grounds for 
divorce are fixed exclusively by German law. But many re-
lated questions are open to discussion. What happens if one 
of the parties marries another person in Bulgaria? Is he or she 
punishable for bigamy in Germany? And shall it be held that 
remarriage is allowed·even in Germany, since German law 
provides that a person's capacity to marry is determined by his 
national law? 140 Prevailing German opinion is to· the effect 
that the marriage ought to be binding in Germany in every 
135 2 STRErr-VALLINDAS 32 I: a Greek may marry a Bulgarian girl before an 
Orthodox priest in Germany. 
136 MAKAROV, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 48 8; MAKAROV, Precis 32 5. 
137 See LOVRIC, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I IOJI, IOJ4· 
This seems to be the rule in Colombia also, as art. 12 of Law 57 of April Is, 
I887, declares that marriages celebrated according to the Catholic rites produce 
all civil and legal effects. Cf. I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ I I I no. 202. 
138 See supra n. 69. 
139 Cf. KG. (Dec. II, 1933) JW. I9J4, 619. 
140 EG. art. I 3 par. I. 
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respect, the personal law notwithstanding.141 Furthermore, if 
the female party to the marriage was a German national, she 
has, on account of the marriage, lost her German nationality, 
though she has not acquired that of Bulgaria. 
While the same basic principle with regard to an English 
marriage was clearly adopted in English precedents such as 
the Papadopoulos case, a strange modification was caused by 
recognizing a marriage annulment pronounced at the hus-
band's foreign domicil for the mere reason that the marriage 
lacks the proper ecclesiastic form· Hence, after such foreign 
annulment, the wife cannot obtain her rights as a spouse nor 
can she sue for divorce.142 This attitude of the English courts 
has been influential in Canada and Scotland. 143 
Another problem concerns the consequences of such a mar-
riage, valid under the law of the place of celebration and in-
valid under the personal law. Are marital property rights and 
other incidents of the marriage governed by the personal law 
of the parties, 144 although this law treats the parties as not 
married? The more reasonable answer seems to be in the 
affirmative, 145 because this is just the normal consequence of 
considering the parties married. 
Point of view of third countries. What is the position of a 
third country when a conflict arises between the state of cele-
bration and the national or domiciliary state of the parties? 
The answer is clear when the third state adopts locus regit 
actum as the absolute binding rule, which is the case in Great 
Britain and the United States. A marriage celebrated by a 
141 See LEWALD 111 no. 158; NusSBAUM, DJPR. 162; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 214; 
MASSFELLER, Das grossdeutsche Ehegesetz ( ed. z, Berlin, 19 3 9). 
Contra: RAAPE 38'3, 400. 
142 See KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," 16 Bell Yard ( 19 3 5) 
xs. 
143 See infra p. 422. 
144 Cf. EG. arts. 14ff. 
145 SeeRAAPE I D.IPR.x8o, in conflict with KG. (May 3, 1937) JW. 1937, 
2523, and several writers. 
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Greek citizen before a city recorder in San Francisco 146 is 
certain to be recognized in England. On the other hand, a 
religious marriage of the same man celebrated in France 
would be considered invalid in the United States, because it 
is invalid in France. 
Where, however, a COlJrt must follow the national law of 
the parties, ascribing to the law of the place of celebration only 
an optional role, it is doubtful which law is applicable when 
they are in conflict. Prevailing opinion favors the solution 
afforded by article 5 of the Hague Convention on Marriage 
according to which a marriage formally valid at the place of 
celebration is formally valid in all third countries, the national 
country alone being entitled to consider it void because of the 
lack of a religious ceremony. On the basis of this rule, the 
Reichsgericht recognized as valid in Germany a marriage 
celebrated before a civil officer in Brazil between a Turkish 
national of Roman Catholic faith and a stateless woman who 
had once been a national of Prussia, non-recognition of the 
marriage under existing Turkish law notwithstanding.147 It 
also upheld a marriage entered into before a Norwegian civil 
officer by a Greek national of Orthodox faith and a N orwegi<).n 
woman.148 The Swedish statute and the C6digo Bustamante 
have adopted the same rule, 149 and French and Belgian de-
cisions are to the same effect. 150 
146 Case.ofOLG. Hamburg (Nov. IS, I926) Hans.GZ. I927, Beibl. 4, IPRspr. 
1926-I927, no. 28. 
147 RG. (April 6, 1916) 88 RGZ. I9I. 
148 RG. (Oct. x, 192s) JW. 1926, 37S• IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 27. See 
also OLG. Karlsruhe (April 18, 19 I 7) 35 ROLG. 343; OLG. Hamburg (Nov. 
IS, I926), supra n. 146. 
Contra: RAAPE, 2S3, 172; 3 FRANKENSTEIN I6o. 
149 Sweden: Law of 1904 with amel'\dments, c. I § 6. 
Codigo Bustamante art. 41. 
150 Belgium: Antwerp (April 20, I927) Clunet I928, 488; (Pole whose 
national law required religious ceremony and Belgian woman marrying before 
the registrar in London): Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Jan. 3I, I92S) Clunet I926, soo. 
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. IS, I922) Clunet I9221 396; Trib. civ. Seine 
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In the opposite case of a marriage invalid in form under the 
law of the place of celebration, article 7 of the Hague Con-
vention provides that it "may" be recognized by third coun-
tries, if the formalities of the national law or laws of both 
parties are satisfied. A marriage celebrated in accordance with 
the religious ceremony prescribed by the personal law, but not 
in compliance with the civil formalities of the place of celebra-
tion, is regarded as valid in France, Germany, and the other 
countries following the optional rule.151 
Except for this instance of reference to the personal law, 
the few countries which require their subjects to follow a 
religious ceremony even when marrying abroad find them-
selves isolated. Their requirements are observed neither by 
the countries of celebration nor by third countries. The difficul-
ties involved are illustrated by such cases as the recent sequel 
to the famous Papadopoulos case, which revealed a first mar-
riage in England and a second in Greece, the man being mar-
ried to two women fo~ ten years. 15.2 
6. Other Tests 
Foreign consular marriage: (a) In general. We have had 
occasion to deal with the position of the forum as concerns 
marriages at which a consular or diplomatic agent of a foreign 
power has officiated within the territory of the forum. 153 Con-
(June I7, I927) Revue I928, 332; Trib. civ. Seine (April 27, I933) Revue 
Crit. I935, 759· 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7f, whereby marriages celebrated abroad are valid 
if in accordance with the law of the place of celebration, is applied also to 
foreigners by STAUFFER, NAG. art. 7 no. Io, and others, but interpreted other-
wise by BEcK, NAG. 230 no. 48. 
151 France: PILLET, I Traite 552 no. 259; BASDEVANT, Revue I9o8, 284 (On 
occasion of an Austrian decision); AuDINET, I I Recueil I 926 I 202ff., LERE-
BOURS-PIGEONNIERE 383 no. 325· 
Germany: EG. art. I 3 par. I ; art. I I par. 1. . 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Dec. 15, 19I3) Revue I9I4, 6II, approved by 
PouLLET 472 no. 367. 
152Papadopoulos v. Papadopoulos (no. 2) (I935) [I936] P. Io8; cf. supra 
n. 68 for the first Papadopoulos case [I93o] P. 55· 
153 Supra pp. 220-222. 
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sent by the receiving country to such official action of a foreign 
representative is intiicated either by liberal custom, as for in-
stance, in France or Greece, or by an express clause of an 
international treaty. Now we are concerned with the status 
of a "consular" (or "diplomatic") marriage in the sending 
state. 
Recently, the institution of consular marriage has been used 
primarily by Europeans and Americans marrying in Oriental 
countries, where marriage forms depend on the various reli-
gious denominations or national groups. Treaties allowing 
representatives of Western powers to exercise non-litigious 
jurisdictiori have partly superseded the old system of capitula-
tions. The recent increase in provisions concerning consular 
marriages, however, seems to indicate other needs. Switzer-
land, for instance, though generally prohibiting consular mar-
riages, specially authorizes her representatives to officiate when 
located in remote countries or when Swiss nationals are unable 
to marry according to local formalities and the country of 
celebration is not likely to object.154 Thus, relief might be 
given a Swiss couple who had obtained a divorce in Switzer-
land and wished to remarry each other in Spain, since Spain, 
ignoring the divorce, could make no technical ceremony of 
remarriage available to them, although a form of reconcilia-
tion is in such case provided.155 
A remarkable concession for the sake of international co-
operation was made by the participant states in the Hague 
Convention on Marriage. By article 6, paragraph I, second 
sentence, the signatory powers bound themselves not to op-
pose a, diplomatic marriage, even though it would offend their 
own laws on remarriage or religious impediments. Thus, if 
154 C/. Swiss Rev. Consular Regulation of Oct. 26, I923, art. 63. This was, 
indeed, the situation in Peru for non-Catholics until the Law of Dec. 23, 1897· 
Cf. German RG. (June 9, 1883) 9 RGZ. 393 at 402. 
And in Turkey for parties of different religions until the Civil Code of 
I 926; see SALEM, 7 Repert. 268 no. 220. 
155 BBl. I 9 I 9, IV. 3 I o, no. 2 I. 
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both parties are aliens, the second marriage of a divorce or 
even the marriage of an ordained Catholic priest is valid, 
although it would otherwise be considered repugnant to local 
policy. n;s In England, also, foreign marriages of aliens, cele-
brated before the consul of their common country, are re-
garded as valid, notwithstanding their invalidity according to 
the law of the place of celebration. This concession to the law 
of nationality is masked by the fiction that the parties have met 
on extraterritorial territory.157 
(b) Authority granted by the sending state. As a condition 
of consular marriage, the solemnizing official must be em-
powered by his· own state to officiate at marriages in general or 
at specific marriages. Such authority is given either by law, as 
in Great Britain, France, and Italy/;;8 or by administrative 
acts based on legislation, as in Germany. 159 A few states do 
not allow their agents any such function. 16° Consular officers 
of the United States are authorized to solemnize marriages if 
the parties are domiciliaries of the District of Columbia, a 
territory, Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or if they are United 
States citizens domiciled abroad.un Other countries require 
either that both parties be their subjects 162 or that at least 
156 WALKER 656, and others very inappropriately call this concession strange. 
157 See FosTER, 6 5 Receuil I 9 3 8 III 444, no. z 5. 
158 Great Britain: Foreign Marriage Act, I 89z. 
France: C. C. art. 48. 
Italy: C. C. (I86s) art. 368. 
159 Germany: Laws of May 4, I87o, §I; Feb. 6, I875, § 85; Law on Con-
sular Jurisdiction of April 7, I9oo, § 36 par. z. 
Switzerland: C. C. art. 4I par. 3; Rev. Consular Regulation (supra n. IS4). 
16
°Former Austria was in this group; see WALKER 647 (whose mention of 
Sweden and Portugal, however, is wrong). 
Argentina seems disinclined to allow diplomatic marriages; see ZEBALLos, 
Bull. Argent. de Droit Int. Prive I9o5, szo. Likewise: Guatemala, cf. Trib. 
civ. Seine (March I5, I93Z) Revue Crit. I935> 436; El Salvador, cf. IS Bull. 
lnst, Int. (19z6) I6o. On Colombia see RESTREPO HERNANDEZ III, §zoo 
n. I; on Peru, RoGER, 7 Repert. 30 no. 53· 
161 Congressional Act of I86o, Rev. Stat. § 408z, zz U. S. C. 7z, Code of 
Fed. Regulations, Title zz § 91. 4zo; Mass. Gen. Laws (I9JZ) II c. zo7 § 43; 
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) c. z76, § 5150. 
~62 The Netherlands: Consular Law of July zs, I87I, as redrafted on July 
15, 1887; Spain: C. C. art, 100 par. 3; Portugal: Law of Dec. 25, 191o, art, 
s8 § z, etc. 
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one party belong to the sending state.163 Still others permit 
consular marriage even of foreign couples; Great Britain does 
so when the country of celebration consents and both parties 
are nationals of the same country.164 
Illustration: France, not having authorized a celebration 
of marriage between a French party and a Bulgarian party be-
fore a French consul in Bulgaria, declares such marriage 
invalid in France; 165 it is therefore invalid in Bulgaria too. 
States should not be entirely free, however, and most 
states do not feel free, to fix the permissibility of consular mar-
riages. In case both parties are not nationals of the sending 
state or, at least, where one party is a subject of the receiving 
state, the consent of the latter state should be required. A 
satisfactory rule has been laid down by the Hague Convention 
on Marriage, article 6 paragraph I, first sentence: 
"In respect of formalities the marriage is to be recognized 
everywhere, if it is concluded before a diplomatic or consular 
representative in conformance with the laws of his country, 
provided that neither of-the spouses is a citizen of the state 
where the marriage is celebrated and that this state does not 
oppose the celebration." 166 
Section I 2 6 of the Restatement requires more simply that 
the marriage should be performed "in accordance with the 
163 France: C. C. art. 170 pars. 2 and 3, as completed by the Decree of 
March 8, 1937 (Clunet 1937, 649), listing remote non-Christian countries 
only; Germany: (supra n. 159) including denizens; Great Britain: Foreign 
Marriages Order in Council, 1913, arts 1, 2. Switzerland: Bundesrat requires 
as to marriages in China that the husband be a national, BEcK, NAG. 223 no. 19. 
The Belgian law of July 12, 1931, art. 7 par. 2 permits by exception marriages 
between Belgian men and foreign women "in the countries where the local 
legislation prevents the celebration of marriages of the kind." Perhaps the idea 
is related to that prevailing in Switzerland (supra n. 154). 
164 See Bailet v. Bailet (1901) 17 T. L. R. 317. · 
165 Cf. Trib. civ. Seine (May 7, 1937) with note in Clunet 1938,522,525: 
Trib. civ. Seine (March 15, 1932) Revue Crit. 1935, 436 (marriage celebrated 
before Guatemalan consul in Paris, who acted without authorization from 
his government, declared void). 
166 This provision is supplemented by arts. 6 and 7· Sweden: Law of 1904 
with amendments, c.I § 7 adopted the same solution. Great Britain and Bel-
gium, supra n. 163; and Italy: Consular Law of Jan. z8, 1866, art. 29, take into 
consideration the consent of the receiving state. 
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law of the country where it takes place or with a treaty to 
which that country is a -party." 
Unfortunately, many states are not so considerate.167 
A peculiar feature of a few laws is that a religious minister 
may be authorized to officiate. 168 
The treaties are as varied as the statutes or customs of the 
sending states. Usually they require either that both parties 
belong to the sending state 169 or that one be a national or 
d<?miciliary of the sending state, the other belonging to a third 
state.170 
(c) Law of third states. Except for article 6, paragraph 1, 
of the Hague Convention, courts will, according to the princi-
ple of lex loci celebrationis1 follow closely the position taken by 
the local law.171 In this regard, section r 26 of the Restate-
ment expresses a rule of universally settled law. But it must 
be borne in mind that most countries are satisfied when the 
marriage form agrees with their own municipal prescriptions. 
Hence, if both parties belong to the same state, it suffices to 
observe the regulations of this state and, if they are subjects of 
different states, to comply with the formalities of both states. 
(d). Ceremony. Respecting details of the ceremony, the 
rules of the sending state are customarily followed in a 
187 Particularly Great Britain (cf. Hay v. Northcote, supra n. n), although 
Foreign Marriage Act, I89:z, s. I9, instructs the officer. to refuse to perform the 
marriage if the celebration would be contrary to the rules of international pri-
vate law or to the principles of international comity. 
168 Connecticut, Gen. Stat. (I9Jo) c. :z76 § 5I5o. 
Sweden: Law of I 904 with subsequent amendments, c. I, § 5 par. :z, § 8. 
Norway: Law of June :z6, I9:z5. · 
169 See, for instance, the treaties of Germany with Italy (May 4, I 89I ), 
Soviet Union (Oct. u, I9:z5), Panama (Nov. :zi, I9:z7), Lithuania (Oct. 30, 
I9:z8), South Africa (Sept. I, I9:z8), Bulgaria (June 4, I929), Turkey (May 
:z8, I929), and Haiti (March 10, I9Jo), the treaties with Bulgaria (art. I9) 
and Turkey (art. I 8) containing marriage regulations and the others confer-
ring the right of the most favored nation. 
170 See for instance the three consular conventions between the three Baltic 
States of July u, I9:ZI (II League of Nations Treaties (r9:z:z) 87, 99; zs 
ibid. (I9:Z4) 299) art. I5. 
171 This is the widely prevailing opinion; contra: 2 ZITELMANN 6IJ and 
LEWALD in STRUPP, I Worterbuch des Volkerrechts und der Diplomatie 264. 
MARRIAGE 241 
diplomatic marriage, 172 although Soviet law does not respect 
this custom. 173 · · 
Marriage on the high seas. Insofar as the law of the place of 
celebration is competent, marriages on board ship on the high 
seas are governed by the law of the flag. 174 This rule seems 
to be universally accepted. Most domestic laws, however, are 
reluctant to authorize such marriages on their own vessels. 
Great Britain allows captains of vessels to officiate, provided 
the parties were unable to take advantage of a local law or 
consular intervention.175 In the United States, it is generally 
held that the marriage is valid, if in conformance with the law 
of the shipowner's domiciP76 To be sure, the law of the flag 
may permit marriage by mere consent.177 
Marriage in remote places. The validity of a marriage per 
verba de praesenti has been admitted where there was no 
means of solemnizing the marriage under some local law, 
e.g., in the Far East, 178 although there is less doubt about its 
validity if an ordained priest or ;minister is present.179 
Military marriages abroad. Soldiers serving abroad in time 
of peace or war, if allowed to marry at all, usually enjoy special 
privileges. There may be a special marriage officer, or soldiers 
may be allowed to marry by proxy or even by their own written 
declaration filed at the marriage office of the bride.180 
172 C6digo Bustamante art. 41.. 
173 See MAKARov, Precis 31.8. 
174 Restatement §§ 11.7 and 45· 
175 Foreign Marriage Act, I 89z, § I z; and .Foreign Marriages Order in Coun-
cil, I9I3, art. zo(z); R. v. Anderson (I868) L.R. I C.C.R.I6I. 
176 See GooDRICH 304. 
177 Cf. Fisher v. Fisher (I9z9) 1.50 N.Y. 3I3, I65 N. E. 46o. See HAcK-
WORTH, z Digest of International Law (I941) 37I § 165. 
178 See with respect to Japan: BATY, op. cit. supra n. 75 at 106-Io9. 
179 England: Lord Campbell in R. v. Millis ( I843-1844) 10 Cl. & Fin. 
534, 786; Catterall v. Catterall (1847) 1 Rob. Ecc.58o. Cf., on the ecclesi-
astical form, Culling v. Culling, Law Rep. [I896] P. II6. 
Canada: Re Sheran (I899) 4 Terr. L. R. 83; cf. Connolly v. Woolrich & 
Johnson ( I867) II L. C. J. I97> I R. L. (K. B.) 1.53 (involving the Indian 
marriage of a white man with an Indian woman). See also I JoHNSON JZI •. 
180 The method last mentioned was introduced by a recent German regulation 
of Nov. 4, I939> RGBI.I ZI63,§§ 13, I4: marriage in the absence of the hus-
band, which consists of separate declarations of the parties without proxy. 
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In France it is provided that only French soldiers with 
brides of French nationality may appear before a civil officer 
of the army, while foreigners have to comply with the local 
formalities. 181 
IV. CoNCLUSIONS 
This subject has presented an excellent illustration of the 
thesis that a uniform conflicts rule is easily obtainable despite 
fundamental differences in municipal legal systems-provided 
that these differences do not prevent mutual tolerance. The 
only serious disturbance in this harmony is attributable to 
the attachment of a few countries to the traditional claims of 
certain religious denominations. In view of the general de-
velopment in the last century and a half, such perseverance is 
hardly justifiable, although it reflects deserved gratitude 
for the civilizatory work of the churches during many cen-
turies. Catholic countries such as Austria, Italy, Colombia, and 
Ecuador which at present have or had a short while since mar-
riage rules largely accommodated to the conceptions of the 
Roman Church, nevertheless agree in the conviction that their 
nationals should not be prevented from using the marriage 
ceremonies that are legal in foreign countries. The Spanish 
Supreme Court criticized by the literature requires Spanish 
nationals to marry at the consulates, but not on the ground of 
religious law. 
It may be hoped that the period of readjustment following 
the present war will stimulate reconsideration of these basic 
problems of international relations. 
181 C. C. art. 93 par. 3, as amended by Law of Dec. zo, 1922. The British 
regulations do not apply to all parts of the army. E.g., the Foreign Marriages 
(China) Order in Council, 1938, excludes the solemnization by a marriage 
officer in China of marriages between parties either of whom is serving in 
China in His Majesty's Naval or Military Forces or the Royal Air Force. 
CHAPTER 8 
Substantive Requirements for Marriage 
I. SuRVEY 
r. Terminology 
r THE traditional language of the canon law and most modern codifications, marriage requirements not con-cerned with formalities are labeled "impediments ( ob-
stacles) to marriage." According to their effect upon the 
validity of the marriage, they are divided into impediments 
merely capable of postponing its celebration--impedimenta 
impedientia, directory requirements-and those rendering the 
marriage void or voidable--impedimenta dirimentia, manda-
tory requirements. This division is well known in every law. 
(Cf. Restatement§§ 9, 122). 
The term "requirements," which is frequently used today, 
is more convenient and more correct, because it includes the 
conditions of consent to marry, while "impediments" fails to 
include defects of consent. 
"Capacity" to marry far from covers the whole concept. It 
denotes the general ability of a person to marry at all, for in-
stance as defined by requirements of age and parental con-
sent, but it does not refer clearly to an individual's being per-
mitted to marry a specific person or a person of a determinate 
class. Nor does the term, capacity, include the requirement of 
sufficient consent of the parties; for this reason, in the text 
of the Hague Convention on Marriage, article I, the words 
"The capacity to contract marriage" were replaced by "The 
right to contract marriage." 1 As short terms, however, both 
terms are and may be used. 
1 For this discussion see decision of the German RG. (Dec. xs, 1930) IPRspr. 
1931, no. 58 at 119. 
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2. Two Rival Basic Principles 
Not only are the municipal rules on intrinsic requirements · 
of marriage extremely different, but also the rules relating to 
the conflict of municipal laws are confusingly varied. A few 
observations may help us to find our way. 
There are two main principles, both coming from the statu-
tists: 
(a) One principle, represented in its purest form by the 
dominant conflicts law of the United States, points to the law 
of the place of celebration; a marriage good where contracted 
is good everywhere, and vice ver:sa. The practice of applying 
this maxim/ which clearly originated in the ordinary con-
tract theory,3 to the substantive requirements of a contract 
creating a status, was in defiance of the traditional doctrine of 
status. The reason for this custom is perhaps that the machin-
ery of marriage licensing has seemed inadequate to meet the 
unknown laws of the respective domicils of the parties. And 
an avowed purpose of the principle has always been to make 
marriage possible for persons who could not marry under their 
domiciliary laws. 
(b) In the European systems, the personal law of the 
parties controls the intrinsic requirements. Under this system 
the personal law may be determined either by the domicil or 
by the nationality of the parties, as the status rule may be. 
Illustration: A sixteen-year-old girl of Serbo-Yugoslavian 
nationality is married in Michigan. She has capacity to marry 
under rule (a) and also accordit}.g to English law based on 
domicil (under rule b) but is incapable according to her 
national law applied under rule b. 
By certain regulations, however, both these points of con-
tact, and sometimes even that of the place of celebration as a 
2 ULRICH HuBER, De conflictu legum in diversis imperiis, no. 8 (GuTHRIE, 
translation of SAVIGNY 512.) "Si licitum est eo loco, ubi contractum et cele-
bratum est, ubique validum erit effectumque habebit." 
3 See JoHANN STEPHAN POTIER, 3 Auserlesene Rechtsfalle, part 1 (Gottin-
gen, 1777) §§ u-xs. · . 
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third element, are combined with each other, with obscure 
complexities resulting from the combination. Other serious 
complications are bound to arise under this system when the 
personal laws of the parties are different. 
3· Influence of Public Policy 
Both basic principles have proved one-sided, each being 
closely limited by numerous exceptions. Whatever principle 
a country may have adopted, there will be a marked tendency 
not to apply a foreign marriage rule which conflicts with the 
matrimonial law of the forum. Marriage is one of the favorite 
objects of tenacious local custom and of more or less singular 
enactments. Once almost every town in Central Europe had 
its own law of marriage. Although centralizing states have 
always succeeded in unifying a multitude of matrimonial sys-
tems \Vith almost no resistance except for the claims of 
churches, still each existing international private 'law is in-
fluenced (and if we except the United States, even greatly 
influenced) by the idea that its domestic rules alone are 
morally justified and form an indispensable gift to its own 
subjects. If we observe how varied marriage laws are and how 
antiquated or arbitrary many of them appear, we understand 
the reluctance of states to recognize each other's laws. 
The matter is further complicated because more than one 
country may be involved, and in consequence different coun-
tries may apply their own public policies. There is the country 
where the parties intend to marry, the country which considers 
one or both of the spouses its subjects, the country where a 
lawsuit for annulment is brought, the country where recogni-
tion of the marriage or recognition or execution of an annul-
ment is sought, and there may be other countries interested in 
the status of children. 
The question of public policy depends on which of the two 
basic principles mentioned is adopted. 
MARRIAGE 
Under the main principle accepted in the United States, the 
substantive requirements for marriage are determined by the 
law of the state where the marriage is to be or has been cele-
brated. But apart from certain elementary exceptions, such 
as the rejection of polygamous and incestuous bonds, there has 
appeared a "substantial" and "growing" body of cases to pro-
tect the law of the domicil of the parties! Moreover, im-
portant legislative attempts have been initiated to curb 
"evasions" of the domiciliary policy of marriage. 
In various other countries on the American continent, where 
the same basic principle prevails, the influence of the per-
sonal law has made itself felt even more pronouncedly. 
Conversely, in a country allowing foreigners to marry only 
if the marriage is not prohibited by their domiciliary or na-
tional laws, additional requirements are established to satisfy 
local public policy (prohibitory public policy) and certain 
foreign prohibitions are disregarded as offending the local 
order (permissive public policy). 
The phenomena mentioned above will be treated in the fol-
lowing pages. The situation arising when the validity of a 
marriage is examined in a lawsuit or when a foreign judgment 
on its validity or invalidity is presented for recognition, will 
be dealt with separately, since the problem is essentially the 
same for intrinsic and formal requirements. 
4· Ecclesiastical Courts 
A particular position is tak~n by ecclesiastical courts of all 
faiths. As the churches claim universal efficacy for their 
rulings, the tribunals constituted by them apply their own 
laws exclusively, irrespective of whether the marriage is cele-
brated in one country or another. Conflicts rules are lacking, 
'See Note, 26 Harv. L. Rev. (1913) 536 and GooDRICH 305; BEALE and 
others, "Marriage and the Domicil," 44 Harv. L. Rev. (1931) 501, 527, n. 85, 
notice "a growing c~msciousness of the power of the domicil." 
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and in some parts of the world the resultant confusions are 
considerable. 5 
II. LAW OF THE PLACE OF CELEBRATION 
I. The Principle 
The United States. In the United States,O the law of the 
place of celebration has greater influence on the substantive 
requirements of marriage than in any other country. In this 
country, this law is applied by the marriage officials and judges 
of the state where the marriage is to be or has been celebrated, 
by the courts of the state or states where the parties had their 
domicils at the time of the marriage, and finally by the courts 
of any other state. In other words, from the standpoint of the 
domiciEary state or the standpoint of the state of celebration, 
the rule is the same for domestic and foreign marriages and for 
domiciliaries as well as for foreigners. 
Argentina and otht?rs. The law of the place of celebration 
has also been adopted in a group of Latin-American countries 
but its application is greatly restricted, as each of these coun-
tries requires those persons whom it regards as its subjects (by 
domicil or nationality, respectively) when marrying abroad 
to observe all its prescriptions or a large number of them. This 
group includes Argentina, 7 Guatemala, 8 Paraguay, Peru, and 
Costa Rica.9 In this spirit the Treaty of Montevideo of 1889 
5 On Bulgaria, cf. DANEFF, 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 5; on Palestine, 
GOADBY I4·3ff. 
6 Restatement § 12 r. Cf. BISHOP, 1 New Commentaries on Marriage 
§§ 841ff.; 1 WHARTON§ 165a; MINOR§ 73; 2 BEALE·§§ 121.21 121.61 121.7; 
KESSLER, I Z.ausl.PR. (1927) 858 n. 5· 
7 Argentine Civil Marriage Law of 1888, art. 2, relating not merely to for-
malities as some wri.ters have suggested; see ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 99; 2 
VICO no. 13; RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 277. 
8 Guatemala: Law on Foreigners (1936) art. 36. See MATOS no. 228 at 
342, 343· 
9 Paraguay: Marriage Law (r898) art. 2; 
Peru: C. C. Tit. Prel. art. V, par. 2; 
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 9 (by implication). 
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(art. II), recast in I 940 (art. I 3 par. I), formulates the 
principle as follows: 
The capacity of persons to contract marriage, the form and the 
existence and the validity of the marriage act, are determined 
by the law of the place where it is celebrated. 
The article enumerates a number of essential defects on ac-
count of which annulment may be sought, provisions with 
which we shall deal later. The main rule for substantive re-
quirements seems, however, unqualified with respect to the 
marriage of two foreigners. In this case, the rule is applied 
regardless of whether the marriage takes place within or with-
out the country. The same result was implicitly adopted by 
the Civil Code of Mexico for the Federal District 10 but has 
not been repeated in the Code of I 9 3 2. 
Chile and others. In another group of Latin-American 
countries, a formula has been adopted similar to that of 
Chile, as follows: 
Marriage celebrated in a foreign country in conformity with 
the laws thereof, or with the Chilean laws, shall have in Chile 
the same effects as if it had been celebrated on Chilean terri-
tory. (C.C. art. II9 par. 1.) 
Apparently, an option is granted between local and national 
law with respect to formalities as well as other requirements. 
But the more recent Chilean Law on Civil Marriage, of J anu-
ary ro, I884 (art. I5 par. r), simply states: 
Marriage celebrated in a foreign country in conformity with 
the laws thereof, shall have in Chile the same effects as if it 
had been celebrated on Chilean territory. 
This text seems to indicate that requirements, both formal 
and substantive, are controlled by the local law alone, whereas 
Chilean subjects, according to an additional paragraph, must 
in addition obey the "prescriptions" or (in a more recent 
wording) the "prohibitions" of the Chilean marriage law. 
1
°C. C. (x884) art. 1741 (1928) art. x6x. 
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This group of countries/1 therefore, seems to join the 
group discussed above. 
Brazil's recent law (I 942), going over to the domiciliary 
principle, contains two provisions: 12 In the case of any mar-
riage celebrated in Brazil, Brazilian law is applicable to man-
datory requirements (impedimentos dirimentes) and formali-
ties. In case the parties have different domicils, the validity of 
the marriage is governed by the law of the first marital domi-
cil. In the light of the foregoing parallels the language sug-
gests that marriages celebrated in Brazil are exclusively gov-
erned by Brazilian law-correspondingly with the rule in this 
country-but that capacity to marry in foreign countries is 
determined according to the common domicil of the parties 
rather than to the place of celebration. The only available 
comment by a Brazilian author, however, transfers from the 
system of the Hague Convention to the new rules the con-
sideration of the impediments established by the national 
laws.13 
The obscurity of drafting in all these enactments is re-
grettable. 
Denmark. In Denmark, likewise, the primary rule refers to 
the law of the place of celebration. This rule is not exclusive, 
however, sin~e a marriage official may not preside at the mar-
riage of two nonresident foreigners, if some impediment es-
tablished by one of the domiciliary laws is proved to him.14 
But where a person domiciled in Denmark enters upon a mar-
riage in a foreign country, the Danish law does not claim any 
11 Ecuador: C. C. art. I I 5 par. I is similar to the older Chilean text; it is 
added, as it was formerly in the Argentine C. C. art. I 64, that any annulment 
of a foreign marriage by an ecclesiastical authority must be respected. 
Uruguay: C. C. (I868 as amended I893 and I9I4) art. Ioi, par. I and Act 
of May :u, I 885, are certainly to the same effect, as Uruguay is a participant 
in the Montevideo Treaty. 
I2 Lei de IntrodU«;iio (I942) art. 7 §§ I and 3· 
13 ESPINOLA, 8-B Tratado 820 no. 203. 
14 BoRuM, Personalstatutet 424, 427, 440; see also HoEcK, Personalstatut 
I 6; BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 2 I 8 nos. 34 and 3 7; MuNcH-PETERSEN, 
4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 746. (These writers do not entirely agree with each 
other.) · 
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influence, unless a strong public policy, such as that regarding 
bigamy or incest, requires attention.15 
C6digo Bustamante. A singular application of the law of the 
place of celebration is made by article 48 of the C6digo Busta-
mante. While this code invokes as a general principle the per-
sonal law of the parties, article 48 provides that coercion, fear, 
and abduction as causes of nullity of marriage are governed by 
the law of the place of celebration. 
Switzerland. Whereas the American rule, as conceived by 
the Restatement, refers exclusively to the municipal law of the 
place of celebration, in Switzerland a parallel rule is estab-
lished 16 for foreign marriages of Swiss nationals, with the 
distinct implication that above all the conflict law of the place 
of celebration shall decide what legal order applies to the 
case. This rule, which indicates an unusually broad-minded 
policy, has not always been correctly applied by non-Swiss 
courts. Taking into account the diversity of conflict laws, Swiss 
conflicts law gives way to any other conflicts rule of the foreign 
domicil. As a matter of fact, the draftsmen realized that in the 
statistical majority of cases the foreign conflicts rule would, on 
the basis of the nationality principle, refer the case to Swiss 
matrimonial law to govern the substantive requirements for 
Swiss nationals. The decision, however, is left to the local law, 
the intention being to rule out any conflict with the law ap-
plicable under the local conflicts rule. It follows that a mar-
riage of Swiss nationals in the United States, if good at the 
place of celebration, is good under Swiss law too. It is im-
material whether the parties are domiciled at the foreign place 
of celebration.17 
There is much doubt, however, whether this rule applies 
only where both parties are Swiss nationals or whether the 
local law governs mixed marriages as well. Sometimes the 
15 BoRuM, Personalstatut~ 45 7; 6 Repert. z 1 8 no. 3 7. 
18 NAG. art. 7f. 
17 BECK, NAG. ~31 no. so, ibid. 275 nos. x8-z3. 
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courts have extended the rule to the latter case, 18 but generally 
it is argued that only where both spouses are Swiss can the 
Swiss concession succeed in avoiding conflicts; where another 
legal order is involved, the nationality principle is preferred.19 
Soviet Russia. Soviet Russia applies her marriage laws to all 
persons, including foreigners, who marry within the 
U.S.S.R.20 
2.. Exceptions: Prohibitive Public Policy 
The United States: Policy of the forum. Exceptions to the 
rule that a marriage validly contracted at the place of cele-
bration is valid everywhere are made by common law practice 
as well as by statute. 
A marriage is held invalid when it is, in the opinion of the 
forum, contrary to the general principles of Christendom. The 
only applications concern polygamous and incestuous mar-
riages, and both are dealt with discriminately. Practical cases 
of polygamy are those of the so-called "progressive" .sort, viz., 
where a party has gone through a second marriage after a 
divorce recognized at the place where granted but not recog-
nized at the forum.21 Incest is not a characteristic of every mar-
riage between near relatives prohibited at the forum; but such 
has been assumed in a few cases of marriage between nephew 
and aunt 22 or even the widow of a nephew and an uncle. 23 · 
The decisions respecting marriages of first cousins are in con-
flict. 24 
18 BG. (Dec. I8, I875) I BGE. IOI; BG. (March I8, I876) 2 BGE. 32; 
BG. (Oct. 28, I881) 7 BGE. 658, 662. 
·
19 BEcK, NAG. uo nos. IO and II; HUBER-MUTZNER 427 n. I7I· 
20 See FREUND in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 366; MAKARov, Precis 327. 
21 Restatement§ I32 comment a; 2 BEALE§ I32.I. 
22 Restatement § I32 comment b; Campbell v. Crampton (C.C.N.D.N.Y., 
r88o) 2 Fed. 4I7; State v. Brown (189o) 47 Ohio St. 102, 23 N. E. 747; 
Laughran v. Laughran (I934) 292 U.S. 216. England: (uncle and niece) De 
Wilton v. Montefiore [I9oo] 69 L. J. (Ch.) 7I7, [I9oo] 2 Ch. 481. 
23 Osoinach v. Watkins (1938) 235 Ala. 564, t8o So. 577· 
24 For validity: In re Miller's Est. (I927) 239 Mich. 455, 2I4 N. W. 428; 
Schofield v. Schofield (I912) 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 564. For voidness: Weinberg 
v. Weinberg (I927) 242 Ill. App. 4I4; Johnson v. Johnson (I9Io) 57 Wash. 
89, 106 Pac. 500. 
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A further exception is made by common law on behalf of 
"a distinctive national policy of the forum." On this ground, 
miscegenation is considered a cause of invalidity in all 
Southern and some Northern and Western states. 25 
Policy of domicil. Though the subject of endless contro-
versy, a few other requirements established by the law of the 
domicil of a party have been enforced regardless of the local 
law; thus the provisions of Oklahoma and New York about 
nonage 26 and certain prohibitions against remarriage. 27 The 
Restatement does not hesitate to generalize in this respect; 
every time a state makes it clear that it regards a prohibition as 
arising out of a "strong public policy"-what in Europe is 
called extraterritorial or international public order-the pro-
hibition limits the rule that the local law governs. If this ex-
tension of the force of the law of domicil were accepted unan-
imously, the situation would be somewhat clarified. Under 
no theory, however, would the law of the place of celebration 
be excluded in any jurisdiction by a domiciliary prohibition 
that, though of mandatory character or of public interest, is 
not held to be clearly of primary importance. 28 
Under the common law, apart from the general function 
of public policy, the fact that the parties attempt to elude their 
domiciliary prohibitions is immaterial. The law of the place 
of celebration is applicable, as Judge McSherry stated in Jack-
25 Restatement·§ I 3 z comment c; Dupre v. Boulard (I 8 55) I o La. Ann. 4 I 1 ; 
State v. Bell (1872) 7 Tenn. (Baxt.) 9, 32 Am. Rep. 549; Kinney v. Com-
monwealth (1878) 30 Va. (Grat.) 858, 32 Am. Rep. 69o; Eggers v. Olson 
(I924) 104 Okla. 297, 23I Pac. 483. Cf. Jackson v. Jackson (I895) 8z Md. 
17, 33 Atl. 3 I 7· Denying extraterritorial effect: The Inhabitants of Medway 
v. The Inhabitants of Needham (I 8 I 9) I 6 Mass. I 57, 8 Am. Dec. I 3 I. 
26 Ross v. Bryant (I923) 90 Okla. 300, 217 Pac. 364, criticized in 23 Col. 
L. Rev. (I923) 782; Cunningham v. Cunningham (I912) 206 N.Y. 341, 99 
N. E. 845 (where, however, the parties had not cohabited). Contrary result 
in Massachusetts: Levy v. Downing (I9I3) 2I3 Mass. 334, too N. E. 638. 
27 Cf. Restatement§§ qo, 13I; z BEALE§ I30.1; STUMBERG z6o. 
28 Cf. Restatement§ I32 comment a; Sturgis v. Sturgis (1908) SI Ore. 10, 
93 Pac. 696, on marriage without parental consent. Fensterwald v. Burk 
(I9I6) 129 Md. 131, 98 Atl. 358, on the prohibition in Maryland of marriage 
between uncle and niece. 
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son v. Jackson, "even when they have left their own State 
to marry elsewhere for the purpose of avoiding the laws of 
the domicil." 29 Thus, infants domiciled in Wisconsin, mar-
rying validly in Minnesota, are considered validly married in 
Iowa, although the marriage is invalid because of nonage i~ 
Wisconsin under its evasion clause.30 In the same spirit, the 
Civil Code of Argentina, article I 59, expressly establishes the 
law of the place of celebration as governing, "even where the 
marrying parties have left their domicil in order not to be sub-
jected to the formalities and laws there in force." 
By statute, however, specific provisions against evasion have 
now been introduced in seventeen states. 31 Five of these 
states 32 have adopted the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act of 
1912, section I of which reads as follows: 
"If any person residing and intending to continue to reside in 
this state who is disabled or prohibited from contracting mar-
riage under the laws of this state shall go into another state or 
country and 'there contract marriage prohibited and declared 
void by the laws of this state, such marriage shall be null and 
void for all purposes in this state with the same effect as though 
such prohibited marriage had been entered into in this state." 
This provision presupposes prohibitions rendering the mar-
riage void under the home law; if it be understood as referring 
29 (r895) 82 Md. 17, 29; cf. Fensterwald v. Burk (1916) 129 Md. 131, 
cited above in note z8. Danelli v. Danelli (r868) 4 Ky. (Bush) 51 (widow 
and brother of late husband marrying in Switzerland contrary to their domi-
ciliary Austrian law); Stevenson v. Gray (r856) 17 Ky. (B. Mon.) 193, and 
BISHOP, r New Commentaries on Marriage § 843. A similar statement in 
McDonald v. McDonald (1936) 6 Cal. (2d) 457, 58 Pac. (2d) 1-63, that the 
intention of the parties to evade a requirement is entirely immaterial, has 
shocked BATIFFOL, the distinguished French writer, in spite of his familiarity 
with American conBicts law; see his spirited comment on this case in 32 Revue 
Crit. 1937, r6o, 167ff. French law especially is accustomed to repression of 
fraude a la loi. 
30 Boehm v. Rohlfs (1937) 224 Iowa 226, 231, 276 N. W. 105, 108. 
31 HARPER and T AINTOR, Cases 7 r 3, distinguish the statutes enacting a 
subjective test of evasion, those enacting an objective test of evasion, including 
the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, and those covering all ceremonies between 
persons who intend to live in the state. 
32 Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Vermont, ahd Wisconsin. 
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solely to voidness ab initio, the provision may be criticized as 
ineffectuaP3 At least it is not confined to single enumerated 
prohibitions as are some other evasion statutes; 34 hence, it 
would not be impossible to bring child marriages under its pro-
tection, though no such decision is known.35 Nor does the Uni-
form Act require, as three states' enactments do, 36 that the 
parties intend to evade a prohibition. 
The Uniform A-ct has extended its scope remarkably by 
adding section 2, whereby an evasive marriage is prohibited 
by the state of celebration itself. Further repression of evasive 
marriages can obviously be accomplished by reciprocation 
among the states sharing the policy of preventing evasion; in 
fact, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has declared void a 
marriage celebrated in Indiana in defiance of the marriage 
prohibition and the evasion statute of Illinois, the parties being 
domiciled in Illinois. And other cases seem to promote this 
approach,31 which has been properly construed as a r.envoi to 
the conflicts rule of the domicil. 38 
33 RICHMOND and HALL, Marriage and the State (1929) 196. As a matter 
of fact, it seems that not every mandatory requirement is given extraterritorial 
effect even in interpreting the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act; see Lyannes v. 
Lyannes (1920) 171 Wis. 381, 177 N. W. 683; cf. KESSLER, 1 Z.ausl.PR. 
(1927) 858, 861. 
34 E.g., miscegenation (Montana), capacity (Connecticut), blood relation-
ship (West Virginia). 
35 Recently all jurisdictions have established statutory rules on age. Evasion 
of such provisions was one of the principal purposes of marriage out of the 
state; cf. the enumeration of motives for such marriages by GooDRICH 306, 
There are still marked variances among the statutes. 
36 Indiana Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 44-209. 
Maine Rev. Stat. (1930) c. 72 § 9 (intention of returning). 
West Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1937) c. 48 § 4695 [17]. 
37 Hall v. Industrial Commission (1917) 165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312; 
note that Wisconsin bas adopted the same Uniform Act as Illinois. In L. 
Meisenhelder v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company (1927) 170 
Minn. 317, 213 N. W. 32, a Kentucky marriage between first cousins, valid 
where celebrated, invalid at the domicil in Illinois under the evasion statute in 
force there, was held invalid in Minnesota. See also People v. Steere (1915) 
I84 Mich. 556, 151 N. w. 6I7, criticized in 13 Mich. L. Rev. (1915) 592, 
but cf. GooDRICH 313 n. 54· See for comment TAINTOR, "Effects of Extra-
State Marriage Ceremonies," xo Miss. L. J. (1938) 105. 
38 GRISWOLD, "Renvoi Revisited," 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) I 165 at I 199ff. 
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Under common law principles also, bigamy, incest, and mis-
cegenation, when subject to a "strong" domiciliary policy, 
are sufficient cause for annulment in the courts of any third 
state having the same distinctive public policy. The Restate-
ment again achieves a broad generalization. According to · 
section 132, wherever a statute at the domicil makes a mar-
riage void even though celebrated in another state, the mar-
riage is void-not only at the domicil but also in all third states 
and even in the state of celebration, for section 132 says 
"everywhere." 39 
The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, section 3, provides 
the following additional precaution: the li<;ensing official must 
a~certain that a party residing in another state is not prohibited 
from marrying by the laws of the jurisdiction where he re-
sides. 40 Yet no independent verification of the allegations of 
candidates is usual. 41 
The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, section r, prohibiting 
the parties from going "into another state or country," was 
probably intended to be applicable in any country as part of a 
domiciliary law. Under this assumption, the marriage, cele-
brated in Florida, of an American or an Englishman d~miciled 
in Illinois with his first cousin, is invalid under the laws not 
only of Illinois but also of France, where the principle of 
nationality requires the application of the law indicated by the 
national law of the person.42 
It may be noted that, except for miscegenation, the notion 
of evasion apparently is not extended to the case of parties 
effectively changing their domicil, i.e., abandoning their old 
39 It has been repeatedly stated that no support can be found in the cases for 
this view, cf. e.g., VARTANIAN, Foreign Marriages-Recognition, I I 7 A. L. R. 
(I938) I86, I88. 
40 Improved in Wyoming Comp. Stat. (I9zo) § 496o, amended by L. 
I9JI, c. 99 §I; Rev. Stat. Ann. I9JI, ch. 68 art. Io6 (68-Io6). 
41 RICHMOND and HALL, Marriage and the State (I9Z9) I97> regretting 
this and other deficiencies, advocate an efficient verification of assertions, state 
supervision, and interstate exchange of records. 
42 C/. KEsSLER, 1 Z.ausl.PR. (x9z7) 858, 863. 
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place of residence and establishing themselves for the time 
being at the foreign place where they have their wedding. If, 
for instance, the parties are forbidden at their domicil to marry 
within a certain time under the sanction of nullity, they may 
transfer their domicil to another state and validly marry under 
its law.43 The marriage will be recognized even in the former 
jurisdiction. 44 
Denmark. A foreign marriage of Danish domiciliaries is 
annulled when it contravenes the prohibitions against biga-
mous or incestuous marriages.45 Moreover, in case both parties 
were domiciled in Denmark, the marriage may be annulled by 
royal decree. 46 
Latin-America?~ countries. Restrictions of much greater 
significance are imposed on the principle lex loci celebrationis 
in the Latin-American countries mentioned above (p. 24 7). In 
some of these countries, the entire body of domestic prohibi-
tions is declared compulsory on subjects marrying abroad.47 
In others, a broad catalogue of requirements is similarly pre-
scribed. 48 The Treaty of Montevideo of I 8 8 9, article II, re-
cast in I 940, article I 3, had the task of limiting the influence 
of public policy in the mutual relations of. the participant 
states. This convention, however, still reserved to every state 
the right to consider void a marriage valid where celebrated, 
in the event of any of the following defects: 
(a) Defect of age in one of the parties, the minimum re-
quired being fourteen years completed by the man and 
twelve by the woman; 
43 Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (I933) 2IO Wis. 543, 246 N. W. 68o. 
44 State v. Fenn (I9o7) 47 Wash. 56I, 92 Pac. 4I7; Pierce v. Pierce (I9Io) 
58, Wash. 622, I09 Pac. 45; GOODRICH 307 n. 29· ' 
4S See BoRuM, Personalstatutet 45 I and 6 Repert. 2 I 8 no. 3 7. 
46 Denmark: Crim. Code of Feb. 10, I 86.6, § 4; cf. HoECK, Personalstatut 24. 
47 Chile: C. C. art. 1 I 9 par. 2. 
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 9· 
Ecuador: C. C. art. I 15 par. 2. 
48 Argentina: Civil Marriage Law (I888) art. 2. 
Mexico: C. C. (1884) art. 175. Cf. RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 280. 
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(b) Relationship between the spouses in direct line by 
blood or affinity, either legitimate or illegitimate; 
(c) Relationship between the spouses of legitimate or il-
legitimate brother and sister; 
(d) Having caused the death of one of the spouses of a 
former marriage as perpetrator or accomplice in order 
to marry the surviving spouse; 49 
(e) A former marriage not legally dissolved. 
Analogous reservations as made by some states, e.g., Argen-
tina (C.C. art. 159), are evidently meant to apply only to 
their own subjects. The reservations contained in the Conven-
tion of Montevideo, on the contrary, seem to be standard re-
quirements, common to all participant states, which may be 
raised by any participant state in any case of a foreign mar-
riage. If this assumption is correct, the influence of public 
policy has been correspondingly unified to a considerable ex-
tent. 
In Ecuador (C.C. art. II5 par. r), a foreign marriage of 
any person that is valid at the place of celebration is recognized, 
although, however, invalidation by an ecclesiastical court 
must be respected. 50 
Switzerland. Swiss law is applicable in cases of evasion, 
where the parties marry in a foreign place with evident in-
tention to evade the grounds of nullity of Swiss law.51 The 
three premises for this rule are that only an artificial contact 
with the foreign place of celebration existed, that mandatory 
requirements have been evaded, and that both parties knew the 
facts and manifestly intended to evade the Swiss prohibitions. 
All these three conditions are seldom proved in a single case. 52 
49 The case of a married person· causing the death of his or her own spouse, 
must obviously be included. 
60 No analogous consequence of the state's connection with the Catholic church 
exists in Italy or Spain. 
51 NAG. art. 7£ par. r. 
62 In the practice of the Federal Tribunal there is just one decision, BG. 
(Jan. 19, 1934) 6o BGE. II r, Clunet 19381 9841 where a lunatic and his bride 
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A tacit fourth condition for the application of this rule seems 
to be Swiss nationality or at least Swiss domicil of both 
parties; 53 if the parties have in fact, and not merely fictitiously 
transferred their domicil from Switzer land to a foreign place, 
the provision is inoperative, just as the American evasion 
rules. 
Apart from the rule just mentioned on evasion, which may 
or may not be included in the idea of international public 
policy, Swiss courts reserve to themselves the discretionary 
power to consider a marriage void on grounds of public policy. 
The Federal Tribunal, emphasizing the necessity of such 
stringent national policy, has recently denied recognition to a 
foreign remarriage of a Swiss citizen who was still married 
under Swiss law.54 However, not all grounds for invalidity, 
opposed to the marriage of foreigners in Switzerland, are ap-
plicable to the foreign marriage of a Swiss subject.55 Particu-. 
larly, the provisions preventing marriage between uncle and 
niece and aunt and nephew do not have the effect of invali-
dating a marriage celebrated abroad, although in such cases 
Swiss certificates that the candidates are capable of intermar-
rying are not issued. 56 
3· Exceptions: Permissive Public Policy 
The United States. In the United States, it is a fairly well 
settled policy that foreign penal restrictions upon freedom are 
not recognized. This principle applies to penal legislative pro-
hibitions on remarriage; extraterritorial effect is denied to 
traveled to Brighton, England, to marry there, and NAG. art. 7£. was invoked 
ad abundantiam. 
53 Cf. SCHNITZER 159, and BECK, NAG. 241 no. 88, having different opinions. 
BEcK, NAG. 241 no. 85, and others suggest that the husband must be a Swiss 
citizen; I havedisregarded this arbitrary opinion. 
64 BG. (May 13, 1938) 64 BGE. II 74· 
65 BEcK, NAG .. z3z no. 56 and ibid. z6z no. 154. 
56 BEcK, NAG. 232 no. 57· 
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such prohibitions everywhere, even when they are established 
by the domiciliary state. 57 Disregard of racial prohibitions 118 
falls in the same category. 
Switzerland. Swiss law has established the following im-
portant general limitations on recognition of foreign marriage 
prohibitions: 
A marriage contracted abroad, which is invalid according to 
the law of the place of its celebration; may be declared invalid 
in Switzerland only if it also is invalid under Swiss law. 59 
The idea is that the domestic legal order is not iNterested in 
annulling a marriage that satisfies Swiss requirements. It is 
doubtful, however, to what group of persons this provision is 
intended to apply.60 
III. PERSONAL LAW 
I. The Primary Principle 
Law of the domicil. The law of t~e domicil of either party 
governs marriage requirements in Great Britain, according to 
prevailing opinion, and in the British Empire, Norway, and, 
as has been mentioned, to some extent in Denmark. 61 The Scan-
dinavian Convention on Family Law also has established 
this as a primary rule. · 
The position of British law, it is true, is. not quite clear. 
English courts are accustomed to think in terms of jurisdiction 
rather than to distinguish competency of tribunal and appli-
cable law. They are supposed to recognize, however, foreign 
judgments affecting the status of Englishmen domiciled 
57 Commonwealth v. Lane (1873) II3 Mass. 458; Van Voorhis v. Brintnall 
(1881) 86 N.Y. 18; State v. Shattuck (1897) 69 Vt. 4031 38 Atl. 81. 
For further details see STUMBERG z6o. 
58 State v. Tutty (C. C. S.D. Ga., 189o) 41 Fed. 753· 
59 NAG. art. 7£ par. z. 
60 See discussion by BEcK, NAG. z58 no. 143, and SCHNITZER 16o. 
61 Cf. supra p. Z49; for Denmark, supra p. z56, ns. 45, 46. 
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within the jurisdiction of the foreign court. Nevertheless, in 
Wilton v. Montefiore (1900),62 a marriage between a Jewish 
maternal uncle and his niece domiciled in England was de-
clared void, although it was alleged to be valid by both Jewish 
custom and the law of the place of celebration. In Sottomayor 
v. De Barros (1877)/3 it was held that a marriage of first 
cousins domiciled in Portugal, prohibited from marrying 
there, is to be deemed invalid also in the eyes of an English 
court; a contrary result was reached in the second case of 
Sottomayor v. De Barros in 18 79,64 solely because it had then 
been established that the bridegroom had his domicil in Eng-
land when the parties married in England. 
On the basis·of this latter case, many writers have believed 
that English courts would always apply domestic law, if the 
marriage is celebrated in England and one party, or at least 
the bridegroom, is domiciled there, irrespective of any inca-
pacity by which the other party may have been affected under 
his own domiciliary law. 65 Thus, whereas a domiciled Eng-
lishman marrying abroad would remain subject to the English 
rules on capacity, the foreign grounds of incapacity of a per-
son domiciled abroad would be disregarded. This alleged rule 
has acquired world-wide notoriety; it has been labelled a badge 
of "insular pride and complacency." 66 In fact, apart from 
the unclear grounds of the court in the second Sottomayor 
decision and the entirely discredited case of 0 gden v. 0 gden, 61 
there is no reasonable support for such a unilateral English 
62 [19oo] 2 Ch. D. 481. 
63 [1877] 3P.D.1. 
64 [1879] 5 P. D. 94· 
65 WESTLAKE §§2I, 25; DICEY, Rule 183 Exc. I; 6 HALSBURY 376; less 
decidedly, FOOTE 125. 
66 CHESHIRE 228; FOSTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict 
of Laws," 16 Brit, Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84, 88. See e.g., BATY, "Ca-
pacity and Form of Marriage," 26 Yale L. J. ( 191 7) 444; GoODRICH 316 n. 
66; and more recently GRAVESON, "Matrimonial Domicil and the Contract of 
Marriage," 20 Jour. Camp. Leg. (1938) 55, 65; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 6o n. 17. 
61 [19o8] P. 46; cf. infra p. 267 and n. 95· 
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doctrine. 68 That the place of celebration has no importance 69 
was expressly stated in the second Sottomayor case. 
Cheshire criticizes the rule from another point of view, 
suggesting that only the "matrimonial domicil" should be 
decisive. We shall discuss the merits of this doctrine shortly. 
At any rate, Cheshire himself believes that only the second 
Sottomayor case is in his favor; he admits that Sir James Han-
nen did not base his decision upon the fact that England was 
the matrimonial home and, further, that the grounds of de-
cision are unsatisfactory. 70 In any event, a recent English 
decision, 71 overlooking Cheshire's opinion, adopts with better 
foundation the prevailing doctrine that the domicil of either 
party determines the capacity to marry. 
N ationallaw. In the rest of the world, 72 the national law of 
either party governs intrinsic marriage requirements. The 
Hague Convention on Marriage of I 902, article I, and the 
68 In Chetti v. Chetti [I909] P. 67 the prohibition against intermarriage 
between a Hindu Brahman and a foreigner was disregarded, but this disability 
was one that the person affected could discard at will (CHESHIRE 22 8 n. I). 
Moreover, it was considered inappropriate to assert such a prohibition against 
an English marriage to an English partner, obviously because repugnant to 
public policy to do so. , 
69 However, BECKE'IT, "The Question of Classification ('qualification') in 
Private International Law," IS Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I934) 46 advo-
cates the American principle. 
7
°CHESHIRE 226; contra, see GRAVESON, 20 Journ. Camp. Leg. (I938) 55, 
cited supra n. 66. 
71 In re Paine, In re Williams, Griffith v. Waterhouse [I940] 1 Ch. D. 
46, [I939] Io8 L. J. (Ch.) 427 per Bennett]., cf. Note, 56 Law Q. Rev. 
(I 940) 22. BENTWICH, "Recent English Cases on Domicile in Matters of 
Personal Status," 52 Juridical Review (I94o) 284, 288 (English prohibition 
applied to marriage in Germany of a man domiciled in Germany and his late 
first wife's sister, previously domiciled in England). 
72 Austria: OGH. (I907) 44 GlU.NF. no. 38II; WALKER 597, 598. 
Belgium: C. C. art. I 70 ter, as established by Law of July 12, I 93 I, art. I4• 
Bulgaria: see I BERGMANN 6 5. 
Finland: Law of Dec. s, I 929 on Family Relations of International Nature, 
sec. I (Finns abroad); sec. 2 par. I (foreigners in Finland). 
France: C. C. arts. 3 and I 70. 
Germany: EG. art. I3 par. r. 
Greece: C. C. (r8s6) art. 4 par. 3; C. C. (I940) art. I3· 
Haiti: C. C. art. 155 (Haitiens abroad). 
Honduras: C.~· arts. 137-139· 
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C6digo Bustamante, article 36 (for states following the na-
tionality principle), adopted this rule, while the Scandinavian 
Convention on Family Law acknowledges it as a subsidiary 
rule. 
If, within a state, religious law determines the personal law, 
the substantive requirements of marriage are usually in-
cluded.73 
Renvoi. In the conflict of domicil and nationality principles 
or of either of them with the law of the place of celebration, 
renvoi is accepted in most European countries. 74 
Illustrations: (i) Two Swiss parties domiciled in Switzer-
land married in Brighton, England. Swiss law (NAG. art. 7f) 
refers the validity of the marriage to the English conflicts law, 
Hungary: Marriage Law of I894, §§ Io8, I09, IIO; cf. Clunet I924, 597; 
6 Repert. 463 nos. 83 and 88. 
Italy: C. C. (I865) art. Ioopar. q C. C. (I942) art. II5 (Italians abroad); 
art. II6 (foreigners in Italy). 
Luxemburg: C. C. art. 3 par. 3 and art. I 70. 
Monaco: C. C. art. 3 par. 3 and art. I38. 
The Netherlands: BW. art. I38; H. R. (Jan. 6, I91I) W. 9125. 
Nicaragua: C. C. arts. I02 and I03· 
Poland: Law of I926 on private international law, art. I2 par. 1. 
Portugal: Code of Civil Register of February I8, I9II, arts. 40 and 245; 
Regul. Consular, D. no. 6462 of March 7, I920, arts. 143, 144; see CUNHA 
GoNc;:ALVES, I Direito Civil 678. 
Spain: C. C. art. 9; Trib. Supr. (July 10, I9I6) I37 Sent. I05 (Spaniards 
abroad). Spanish Morocco, Dahir de la condicion civil de los espaiioies y 
extran j eros, art. I o. 
Sweden: Law of July 8, I904 with amendments, c. I §§ I, 2. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7c (for marriage within the state). 
Turkey: 7 Repert. 264 no. 209. 
China: Law of I9I8, art. 9· 
Japan: Law of I 898, art. 13· 
73 The rule that religious law governs the requirements for marriage is in 
accordance not only with Catholic canon and Greek Orthodox law but also 
"with Ottoman and Orieqtal tradition" in Palestine, as GoADBY, I 52, declares; 
he cites, id., n. 8, Re Alison's Trusts (I874) 31 L. T. 638 (marriage in Persia of 
an Armenian Christian woman held invalid under Armenian canon law) and 
Moharem Benachi c. Salomon Sasson, infra p. 272, n. II 8. 
74 France: Cour Paris (March 23, I888) Clunet I889, 638; cf. WEISS, 3 
Traite 478 n. 2. 
Germany: EG. art. 27; RG.(Feb. I 5, I9I2) 78 RGZ. 234, for further renvoi; 
Bay. OLG. (Jan. I8, I9I8) JW. I9I8, 375; KG. (March 22, I9o6) 32 
Jahrb. FG. A 28. On certain controversies see RAAPE 260. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7£, based on art. 54 of the Swiss Con~titution. 
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which, in turn, refers the question to the Swiss domestic law. 
Hence, Swiss law ,was applied by the Swiss Federal Tri-
bunaF5 
(ii) An American citizen domiciled in Germany married a 
German woman, apparently in Germany. The German court 
applied German law to the requirements for both parties, on 
the erroneous basis that the American law referred the man's 
capacity to marry to the law of his domicil; but the court could 
have reached the same result through the application of the 
American principle of lex loci celebrationis• 76 
Contrary to its general attitude, the Hague Convention of 
I 902, article I, in deference to the aforementioned Swiss rule, 
allowed an "express" reference of the national law to another 
law, thus affirming the Swiss rule while condemning renvoi in 
general. 
2. Problems Arising when Parties are Subject to Different 
Personal Laws 
Each law applied separately. The general doctrine is that 
each party must be free from prohibitions to marry the other 
party, this to be decided, in a country following the domiciliary 
principle, separately according to the law of the domicil of 
each party and, in a country following the nationality prin-
ciple, separately according to the national Ia.w of each party. 
It must be noted, however, that this doctrine has had and 
still has opponents. 
Minority opinions. Savigny, 77 at the time when the dom-
iciliary principle was unchallenged, pleaded for the law of the 
first matrimonial domicil, which he identified with the domicil 
of the future husband, unless the parties had in fact established 
their domicil at another place or intended to do so. Savigny 
was followed by many writers of the early and later nineteenth 
75 BG. {Jan. I8, I934) 6o BGE. II I. 
78 OLG. Dresden {Jan. IS, I9IZ) z6 ROLG. :u I. 
77 SAVIGNY § 3 79, tr. by GUTHRIE Z9I• 
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century/8 but his view has finally been abandoned, since long 
ago objections were made that it is unfair and antiquated to 
disregard the personal law of the bride. 79 It is also frequently 
urged that the validity of the marriage cannot be tested by the 
law of the place where the parties establish their domicil after 
their marriage. Nevertheless, Cheshire explicitly invokes 
Savigny's theory for his resurrection of the same opinion. 80 
The Marriage Act of Hungary provides that in anycase 
where a Hungarian man marries a foreign woman, either at 
home or abroad, her personal law is to be considered only 
with respect to her age and capacity to consent, while in all 
other respects the validity of the marriage is to be tested 
exclusively by Hungarian law. 81 The Civil Code of Honduras 
even makes Honduran law obligatory on the capacity of both 
parties to marry abroad, when one party is a citizen. 82 By such 
laws, the influence of domestic public policy, described below, 
is certainly exaggerated. 
Another opinion, now discredited, urged the application of 
the more severe of the two laws involved. 83 At present, the 
only doctrine of importance is the general doctrine first stated. 
Doctrine of unilateral prohibitions. To apply to either party 
his or her personal law has proved delicate. Following the 
canon law and Savigny, 84 a distinction has been drawn between 
78 RoTH, 1 System 288; GIERKE, 1 Deutsches Privatrecht 236 - these two 
fascinated by old German law; WINDSCHEID, 1 Pandekten (ed. 9) § 35 no. 4· 
The rule was partly accepted by 1 BAR§ 16o and is now advocated by BARTIN, 
2 Principes 1 2 3. 
79 WALKER 569. 
8
°CHESHIRE zzo, 221. Cf. also GRAVESON, 20 Journ. Comp. Leg. (1938) 55,. 
68, supra ri. 66. Contra: GooDRICH 314. 
81 Marriage Law of I 894, §§ 11o, 111. 
82 Art. 138. 
83ARMINJON, 2 Precis 457 no. 214. Occasionally certain impediments usually 
considered involving only one spouse, are given a broader interpretation affect-
ing both spouses, see e.g. 2 ZITELMANN 6o9 n. 300 and KG. (Dec. 21, 1936) 
JW. 1937, 2039 and see contra RAAPE, 2 D.IPR.144 n. 3· 
84 SAVIGNY § 379, tr. by W. GUTHRIE 291.; "Denkschrift," 14 Z.int.R. (1904) 
524, 525· KuRT STEINLE, Die zweiseitigen Ehehindernisse im internationalen 
Privatrecht, Thesis (Munich, 1939). 
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unilateral and bilateral prohibitions, although no settled def-
inition of these terms exists nor even seems necessary. Roughly 
speaking, some provisions of matrimonial law concern only 
one person, while others apply to both parties or generally to 
the conclusion of the marriage. In the first case, one of the 
parties lacks capacity, and this party alone is prohibited from 
marrying (unilateral); in the second case, the prohibition 
resulting from the disqualification of one of the parties in-
cludes both .. 
In consonance with the personal law, each requirement must 
be observed just as it would have to be observed in the home-
land. Illustration is provided by the following four important 
unilateral prohibitions (a-d). A fifth example (e) leads to 
the related question of the party who may bring suit for annul-
ment, the determination of which also depends on the personal 
law.85 
(a) Age required for marriage. 86 In all countries following 
the system of nationality, an Italian girl may marry on attain-
ing fourteen years of age, a German at sixteen, a Serbian at 
seventeen, and a Greek, Spanish, or Northern Irish girl at 
twelve. It is immaterial what the law of the other party pre-
scribes. 
(b) Consent in form but not in fact; defective intention. 
Defects affecting consent to marriage, such as consent induced 
by error, fraud, or duress, are exclusively determined by the 
law of the spouse whose intention is alleged to be vitiated. 
The law of the partner is immaterial. 87 
85 For other cases in French practice, see J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 439ff. 
86 Germany: RG. (Dec. 2I, I9I6) JW. I9I7, 364. 
87 France: Cases of mistake: Trib. civ. Strassbourg (Dec. 21, I 920) Clunet 
I92I, 933; App. Dijon (March 2o, I922) Clunet I922, 409; Trib. civ. Seine 
(June It, I929) Revue I93o, 458. For duress see AUDINET, "Les Confiits 
de lois en matiere de mariage et de divorce," II Recueil I926 I I75 at t8o. 
Germany: RG. (May 3, I9I7) Warn. Jahrbuch I9I7, no. 2Io; RG. (Oct. 
6, 1927) Revue I93o, 129; RG. (June 23, I93o) IPRspr. 1930, n. 65; RG. 
(Feb. I6, I9JI) JW. I9JI, IJ40, and many decisions of lower courts collected 
by 3 FRANKENSTEIN 82 n. 86. In the case RG. (Feb. 6, I9Jo) JW. 193o, I003, 
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Illustration: A Belgian man married a German woman. He 
was mistaken as to her virginity. The man is not allowed to 
avail himself of the German provision that a marriage may be 
attacked upon the ground of error concerning the personal 
characteristics of the other spouse, but is limited to the Belgian 
provision which regards only an error in physical identity of 
the other spouse as relevant. 88 
(c) Consent of parents or guardians. The consent of parents 
or guardians required for a marriage of parties who have not 
reached a certain age, such as twenty-one, 89 and, according to 
some laws, the duty of the child to notify his parents of his 
intended marriage ("acts of respect"),90 all come under the 
general rule regarding the capacity of the child or ward to 
marry. This is one of the requirements called, according to the 
French doctrine, "formes habilitantes," understood in France 
to have nothing to do with formalities. These requirements 
are governed by the same law that is competent to declare a 
party incapable of marrying by his own will alone. Continental 
opinion has it that these requirements are ruled by the national 
law and not by the law of the place of celebration. 91 For 
IPRspr. 1930, no. 64, the error of a Swiss husband was decided under the Swiss 
Civil Code instead of the Swiss conflicts rule (NAG. art. 7£), calling for the 
application of the German Civil Code; cf. 3 FRANKENSTEIN 59 n. r 3· 
Italy: Cass. Torino {July 31, r883) Giur. Ital. 1883, I 6r7, Sirey 1886.4.1 
Switzerland: OG. Bern {Oct. 27, 1927) 64 ZBJV. (1927) 185. 
88 German Marriage Law of 1938, § 37 (even broader than BGB. § 1333); 
Belgian C. C. art. r8o; cf. Cass. Belg. {July 17, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925.1.370, 
emphasizing that not even "dol," fraudulent misrepresentation, justifies an 
action for avoiding the marriage, the same as in France, see Chambres Reunies 
(April24, 1862) D.1862.1.153. 
89 E.g., France: c. c. arts. 148, 158, 159; Germany: BGB. §§ I303-1J08, 
Marriage Law of I 9 3 8, §§ 3ff.; Quebec: C. C. art. I I 9· 
9° France: c. c. art. I 51. 
Belgium and Luxemburg: C. C. art. 151. 
Spain: C. C. art. 4 7. 
The Netherlands: BW. art. 99· 
91 Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles {Jan. 3, 1913) Clunet 1914, 633. 
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. 4, 188o) Clunet 188o, 478; Trib. civ. 
Seine (Dec. 21, 1885) Clunet 1886, 448; Trib. civ. Seine {July 28, 1905) 
Clunet 1906, II52; Trib. civ. Seine {June 15, 1910) Clunet 1911, 212; Trib. 
civ. Seine {Jan. Io, I917) Clunet 1918, I192; Trib. civ. Seine (March 8, 1920) 
Clunet 1920, 206; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 17, 1926) Clunet 1928, 404. Similarly, 
on consent of council of family and tutor ad hoc for a natural child, Trib. 
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example, the opposition of an American father to the 
marriage of his daughter, likewise an American national, has 
been rejected because of her nationallaw.92 
This conception also seemed accepted for a time in England. 
English courts applied in accordance with their meaning for-
eign statutes requiring the consent of parents or similar acts, 
that is, the statutes were construed as in the countries of their 
enactment, either as postponing the marriage or as threatening 
its validity. 93 At present, however, such permission is or-
dinarily regarded in England as a formal requirement and 
governed, for this reason, by the law of the place where the 
marriage is celebrated. 94 It is again primarily the decision of 
Ogden v. Ogden which led to this change, a "very much dis-
credited" authority indeed. 95 A better rule would perhaps have 
superieur Papeete (] une 28, I 909) Clunet 191 o, r6 7; ratification of marriage 
by parents, Cour Paris (May 15, I9I7) Clunet I9I7, I4I3; Trib. civ. Seine 
(Jan. I8, I923) Clunet I924, II7· 
Germany: RG. (Dec. 2I, I9I6) JW. I9I7, 364; somewhat confused KG. 
(March 22, I9o6) 32 Jahrb. F.G. A 28. 
Greece: Law of May 28-29, I887, see 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 291 n. 27. 
Quebec: Agnew v. Gober (I907) 32 Que. S.C. 266, (19I9) 38 Que. S.C. 
313 (judgment revised); cf. I JoHNSON 283, 287. 
92 Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 30, I923) Revue I922-I923, 494· 
93 Postponing impediments: Simonin v. Mallac (I86o) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67; 
Gretna Green cases: see Brook v. Brook ( 1 8 61) 9 H.L. I 93 ; prohibitory im-
pediment: Sussex Peerage Case (I844) II Cl. & F. 85. 
94 DICEY, Rule I82 at 736; WESTLAKE§§ I8, 25; FOOTE IOI; also FoSTER, 
"Some Defects m the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," I6 Brit. Year Book 
Int. Law (I935) 84, 90 (although sharply disapproving of this view); 3 
FRANKENSTEIN 85, and many other Continental writers. More hopeful of future 
better advised decisions: BECKETT, 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I936) 46, 
77-80, supra n. 69, and CHESHIRE 2 3 I. 
Recently, the problem has been, if possible, still more confused by the question 
whether the matter pertains to "primary" or "secondary" characterization, 
see CHESHIRE 34-36; RoBERTSON, Characterization 239-245, CoRMACK, 
"Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the Con-
flict of Laws," I4 So. Cal. L. Rev. 2ZI at 235; an unfortunate controversy, see 
also FALCONBRIDGE, "Renvoi and the Law of the Domicile," I9 Can. Bar Rev. 
(I94I) 3II, 338. 
· 
95 [I9o8] P. 46, criticized by the Privy Council in Attorney General for 
Alberta v. Cook [I 926] A. C. 444, 455; by the House of Lords in Salvesen v. 
Adm'r of Austrian Property [I927] A. C. 64I, 646; by WESTLAKE § 25, CHES-
HIRE 338ff., BECKETT, 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I936) 46, 8off., supra n. 
69; FALCONBRIDGE, 53 Law Q. Rev. 235, 247, RoBERTSON, Characterization 242, 




been found, were it not for the misleading habit of English 
courts and writers, even such critics of current opinion as 
Cheshire and Beckett, customarily contrasting mandatory re-
quirements with formal instead of with directory require-
ments. Instead of saying that in English family law the want of 
parental consent does not invalidate a marriage, every writer 
asserts that consent is a formal requirement in English matri-
monial law; 96 therefore, discussion continues whether it is such 
also in English conflicts law. 
Hence, it is not certain that (I) a marriage official 111 
England is empowered to officiate at an attempted marriage of 
foreigners that he knows is prohibited at their domicil be-
cause of lack of permission and that ( 2) a marriage celebrated 
in England would be held valid in the absence of parental 
permission, if this is an essential requisite under the domicil-
iary law for the validity of the marriage. These assumptions 
would be necessary, if it were true that the power given parents 
in Continental codes to interfere with their children's mar-
riages "cannot be tolerated in England or the United States," · 
as Wharton once asserted. 97 But at present nobody seems to 
envisage such a public p'olicy. Dean Falconbridge hopes that 
English and Ontario c~mrts will recognize the nullity of 
French and Quebec marriages in the absence of the requisite 
parental consent. 98 
Less radical, an unusual provision of the Civil Code of 
Venezuela, article 134, declares, apparently on grounds of 
public policy (and not because of wrong classification), that 
lack of permission or lack of an "act of respect" does not in-
validate a marriage, unless such permission or "act of respect" 
is requir~d in the interests of ascendants or guardians. 
,
96 CHESHIRE 35, z3r; FoSTER, r6 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1935) at 90, 
supra n. 94· This formulation is also to be found in the critical report of FALCON· 
BRIDGE, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 89, on the basis of a particular theory of 
classification against which CANSACCHI, ibid., protests. 
97 I WHARTON § Z53 at 573• 
98 Annotation [193z] 4 D.L.R. r at 35· 
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The formality of notification, of course, is adjusted every-
where to the modes available locally. 99 
Although form and substance need not be distinguished 
in the United States, since the law of the place of celebration 
governs both, on grounds of public policy the domiciliary law 
is occasionally taken into consideration with respect to parental 
consent.100 No such attention would be given to a mere 
formality. 
(d) Prohibition against remarriage. A prohibition to con-
tract a new marriage, not because of another existing marriage 
but as an effect of a former dissolved marriage, is considered a 
unilateral incapacity. 
Illustrations: (i) An Italian married a widow, a citizen of 
Fiume, where Hungarian law was in force, before the expira-
tion of the ten months' period prescribed by Hungarian law, 
the widow having obtained, however, a dispensation under 
Hungarian law granted to her upon a finding that she was 
not pregnant. The Italian Tribunal of Alba recognized the 
marriage,101 although Italian law did not admit such dispen-
sation from its corresponding impediment. 
(ii) A Belgian divorcee domiciled in Paris was held bound 
by the three hundred days' delay of the Belgian Civil Code 
(arts. 228, 296) and ineligible for dispensation under the 
analogous French provision.102 On the other hand, when the 
French provision is more severe than that of the national law, 
French courts are likely to insist upon the former. 103 
(e) Impotence. Because of a personal characteristic of one 
party, a statute may give to the other an exclusive right to 
have marriage annulled. This is often assumed to be the case 
99 CUNHA GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 679. 
100 Cf. the survey of cases given in Sturgis v. Sturgis (I9o8) 5I Ore. xo, 93 
Pac. 696 and GOODRICH 3 I 2. 
101 Trib. civ. Alba (Fe\!. 27, I9:u) Giur. Ital. I9:u, I, z, ISS· 
102 Cour Paris (Nov. 301 1934) Revue Crit. 19351 486; cf. BATIFFOL, ibid. 616, 
103 See infra n. I 5 z. 
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when a spouse is found to be impotent/ 04 although this is not 
the only nor the most modern view. In consequence, it has 
been contended105 that if, e.g., a Brazilian, married to a 
woman of French nationality, was affected by this condition, 
the wife could not avail herself of Brazilian law, and French 
law would afford her no relief on this ground. 
Doctrine of bilateral prohibitions. Many obstacles involve 
both parties, even if founded on the qualities of one party. 
In this event, each party may avail himself of the remedy 
offered, irrespective of whether it is established by his own 
personal law. In other words, the personal law of either spouse 
decides whether a prohibition concerns one party or both; 
if both, the ensuing conflicts rule gives full international 
weight to the decision of the personal law. 
(a) Social policy. Of such a bilateral nature are the enact-
ments that forbid bigamy, 106 marriage between near rel-
atives, 107 miscegenetic marriages, 108 marriages of lunatics, 
syphilitics, epileptics, drunkards, persons afflicted with con-
tagious diseases, and the like.109 Insanity falls into this cat-
egory only when treated from the viewpoint of eugenics, not 
when considered a defect of consent.110 ' 
(b) Adultery. Doubts have been expressed concerning the 
scope of statutes under which, in the case of an adultery stated 
·
104 This was the justified construction of Italian C. C. (r86$) art. 107, but 
has been changed by C. C. (1938) art. 121, C. C. (1942) art. 123. 
105 KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 63. 
106 See RG. (April22, 1932) IJ6 RGZ. 142, 144-145 and RG. (June 8, 1936) 
I5I RGZ. 313, 317· 
107 E.g., under Swiss C. C. art. I oo no. I, uncle and niece are prohibited 
from marrying if either one is a Swiss. 
Swedish Marriage Law of I92o, c. 2 §§ 7, 8. 
GreatBritain:Mettev. Mette (1859) I Sw.&Tr.416. 
108 Twenty-eight states of the United States, Germany, Italy, etc. 
109 Many states of the United States; Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and an 
ever-increasing number of other countries. 
IIO See RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. 144 n. 3, in opposition to KG. (Dec. 21, 1936) JW. 
19 3 7> 2039· 
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in a divorce decree, adulterer and paramour are forbidden to 
marry each other.111 
The German prohibition was considered bilateral under the 
Civil Code, 112 and the official comment on the recent Marriage 
Act has confirmed this interpretation. 113 This means that both 
guilty persons are involved in the prohibition, and therefore 
the marriage is forbidden if the unmarried accomplice is a 
German, even though the adulterous spouse may be non-
German. 
Illustration: A German was divorced on the ground of 
adultery, then became a Polish national and wished to marry 
his paramour. The Prussian Ministry of Justice held that the 
unmarried woman, who was still a German citizen, needed a 
dispensation. 114 
In the Netherlands, this question is unsettled, but the courts 
treat the impediment as an obligatory policy of good morals, 
precluding marriage within the state by any guilty party 
mentioned in a divorce decree, 115 no matter whether the judg-
ment be domestic or foreign and whether or not the personal 
law so provides.116 In both Germany and the Nether lands, 
however, a marriage concluded in spite of the prohibition is 
not annullable. 
(c) Impediments connected with religion. The famous 
Austrian religious impediments were intended to be bilat-
lll E.g., Belgium: Law of April r6, 1935 (limiting the period of prohibition 
to three years) . 
Germany: BGB. § 1312, Marriage Law of 1938, § 9· 
The Netherlands: BW. art. 89. 
112 RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. 144· 
113 Ordinance of July 27, 1938, RGBl. I 923 § s(s); ANZ, JW. 1938, 2072. 
114 StAZ. I 934> 292· 
115 H.R. (April16, 1908) W. 87r8, KosTERs-BELLEMANS 135, Clunet 1912, 
293 and H.R. (June z, 1936) W. 1936, no. 1013, criticized by ScHOLTEN, 
N.J. 1936, 1013 and AssER-SCHOLTEN, Familierecht 64. This criticism probably 
affects also the decision of Rb. Haag (Feb. 1, 1935) W. 12974, whereby the 
prohibition does not concern a foreign woman who has received a dispensation 
from an analogous impediment under her own law. 
116 Rb. Amsterdam (Nov. 12, 1936) W.' 1937, no. 270. 
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eral 117 and were so applied in the countries where they were in 
force. The same is true for the impediment of difference of 
faith as it still exists in Egypt 118 and elsewhere.110 
The Spanish provision, now again in force, whereby no one 
is allowed to marry a divorced person, also is a bilateral pro-
hibition directed against both parties to the intended marriage. 
Thus, under Spanish law, a French divorced woman cannot 
marry a Spanish bachelor. In France, however, not less than 
three different opinions have been expressed: 120 that the 
prohibition is unilateral but as such makes the marriage in-
valid; 121 that it is bilateral but the capacity of the woman 
depends on French law alone; 122 and that Spanish law is 
primarily applicable but eliminated by French public policy.123 
(d) Sham marriages. An obvious but notable example of a 
twofold defect is presented by the case of parties who go 
through a ceremony of marriage for some purpose other than 
that of creating a true marriage. Legislation that regards mar-
riage essentially as a contract, is inclined to deny validity to 
simulated consent to marry;, thus canon law/24 as well as 
117 See the explicit exposition by WALKER 6o2 ff.; it may be remembered that 
these impediments were not applied if the parties married abroad and did not 
intend to go to Austria. Similarly, Spain: Trib. Supr. (July 10, 1916) 137 
Sent. 105. 
118 Moharem Benachi c. Salomon Sasson, Mixed Trib. (June II, I9IJ) 
3 Gaz. Trib. Mixtes no. 428 (Egyptian woman, forbidden under Moslem law to 
marry foreign Christian; marriage internationally invalid), 
119 Poland: Supr. Ct. (July 22, I924) Revue I925, 440; Supr. Ct. (Nov. II, 
1933) Z.f. Ostrecht I934-1935, 444· 
Czarist Russia and Lithuania: BucHLER in StAZ. 1929, I 92 to the effect that 
Christians as well as Jews are prohibited by their respective religious laws 
recognized by the state. 
120 Special literature: CHAMPCOMMUNAL, in "Conflit de lois nouveau," Revue 
1921, 4I, 47ff; SERIN, Les conflits des lois dans les rapports Franco-Espagnols 
en matiere de mariage, de divorce et de separation de corps (Toulouse, 1929). 
121 Trib. civ. Montpellier (March 18, I92o) S. I92I.2.1 1, Revue 1921, 79, 
Clunet I920, 633. 
122 App. Aix (Jan. 24, I924) Gaz.Pal.t924.I.507, Revue I924, 99, 277, 
Clunet I 924, 670 (cumulating the various rationes decidendi). 
123 Trib. civ. Seine (May 5, I9I9) S.I92I.2.9, Revue I9I9, 543· Recently 
prevailing opinion has favored this interpretation. Cf. AUDINET, I I Recueil 
I926 I I75> I82; J. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 443· 
124 Codex Juris Canonici c.Io86 § 2. 
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French, Scotch, English,125 and probably American opinion/26 
consider the marriage in such case void. Modern codifications 
presume that a public formal declaration of marriage should 
not be disavowed by revealing an intention to misuse the mar-
riage institution. But recently in Germany, marriage for the 
sole purpose· of procuring a name for the woman 127 or merely 
to give her the nationality of the husband, 128 has been excepted 
and considered void. In Switzerland similar rules were advo-
cated 129 and have been adopted in a changed practice of the 
Federal Court and the Swiss Government.130 The United 
States has reacted against sham marriages designed to facili-
tate immigration; the Federal Act of May 14, I 93 7, simply 
orders deportation. In all these cases it is sufficient that one 
personal law establish the invalidity. 
Illustration: During World War I, a French girl married 
an American in Turkey with the understanding that she should 
escape internment in a camp and that the marriage should 
serve no other purpose. The Tribunal of Grenoble declared 
this marriage void according to French law, regardless of the 
law of the domicil of the American husband. 131 
Time element. It is well settled th~t the applicable personal 
law is the personal law as of the time of the celebration of the 
125 M'Innes v. More (H. L. I 7 8 5) 3 Craig. & St. 40; Taylor v. Kello (I 7 8 7) 
3 Craig. & St. s6; also Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (I8II) 2 Hag. Con. 54, IOI, 
I6I Eng. Rep. 665, 8o2. 
126 Cf. BISHOP, I New Commentaries on Marriage §§ 328ff. 
127 BGB. § I325a (Law of Nov. 23, I933). 
128 Marriage Law of 1938, § 23 par. x; and RG. (April 7, I938) 92 Senff. 
Arch. 3 I I no. I 29. 
129 See EGGER in Festgabe fiir Fritz Fleiner (I937) 85; RICHARD, "Les 
mariages fictifs," 66 Bull. Soc. Legisl. Comp. (I937) 337· 
130 BG. (November 9, I939) 65 BGE. II 133 and (Oct. I8, I94o) 66 BGE. 
II 225. In both cases a Swiss citizen had married a German woman threatened 
by expulsion because of her behavior; the courts stated in both cases that the 
woman had not intended permanent marital community. The Federal Council, 
by Order of Dec, 20, 1940, article 2, par. 2 has even authorized the Just. Dep. 
to annul nationality acquired by such marriages; see 38 SJZ. (194I) 173. 
131 Trib. civ. Grenoble (July II, I923) cited by J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 
440 n. I, Cf. 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 29I n. 28; RG. (Dec. IS, I930) JW. 193I, 
IJ40o 
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marriage 132-not that to which a party is subject at a time 
prior to or subsequent to the marriage. 
Consequently, a defect inhering in a marriage at its inception 
is not cured by the acquisition of a new domicil or a new 
nationality; a void marriage remains void. 
Exceptions have been made, however, in favor of validity. 
Thus, the German Reichsgericht in a recent case 133 had to 
deal with a marriage void under Austrian law on the ground of 
disparity of cult (Christians and non-Christians), the 
parties having changed their Austrian nationality for that of 
Italy. The court saw no reason why it should invalidate a mar-
riage considered valid in the new homeland because of public 
policy contrary to the impediment. Likewise the Kam-
mergericht in Berlin stated recently134 that, if both husband 
and wife voluntarily acquired a new citizenship, their marriage 
could not be declared void on a ground not recognized as an 
impediment under their new law. 13 ~ 
Conversely, a valid marriage is not affected by a change of 
personal law; for instance, where a former French Catholic 
priest married and afterwards became a citizen of Spain, the 
132 Germany:RG. (Dec. I7, 1908) JW. 1909, 78; RG. (Feb. rs, 1926) II3 
RGZ. 38; RG. (June 23, 1930) IPRspr. 1930, no. 65; RG. (Dec. 15, 1930) 
JW. I9JI, 1340; 46 Z.int.R. (1932) 14; RG. (June 22, 1931) 133 RGZ. 
1 6 r, and others. 
France: App. Chambery (Feb. 7, r885) Gaz.Pal.r885.1.7o3, Clunet r888, 
796. 
133 RG. (May r6, 1931) 132 RGZ. 416, JW. 1932, 227. In this case the 
Reichsgericht went so far as to reverse the principle, holding that the decisive 
time should be that when the action for annulment is brought. But this can 
hardly be taken literally in view of the general rule illustrated in the preceding 
note. 
134 KG. (Aug. s, 1937) JW. 1938, 855 (marriage celebrated in 1916 before 
the German consulate in Adana, Chile, between a German woman and a Russian 
who afterwards became a Chilean subject; error as to the personal qualities of 
the husband entitled her to sue for nullity under German BGB. § 1333 but not 
under Chilean Law of Jan. 10, r884, art. 33; she was held to be deprived of 
the right under German law if she had become a Chilean national on her own 
application; if only the husband had applied, her citizenship would depend on the 
validity of the marriage. In a note MASSFELLER, without protesting, expresses 
doubts). 
135 BARTIN, 2 Principes 122 suggests that a defect that can be cured· according 
to prior law should be eliminated by a new law not retaining the impediment but 
that an "absolute" voidness cannot be cured. 
SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR MARRIAGE 275 
marriage would not b.e invalidated under French law and 
probably not under Spanish law. 
A far-reaching deviation from this principle is implied by 
the C6digo Bustamante, article 40, whereby any country is en-
titled to deny recognition to a marriage, if the marriage is con-
trary to certain expressly enumerated prohibitions of the 
forum. This provision, taken literally, would entitle Brazil to 
declare void a marriage celebrated validly in Chile between an 
uncle and his niece, 136 if the parties became citizens of Brazil 
and perhaps even if they did not. Such an application of public 
policy would be unreasonable, unless the court believed the 
continuance of the marriage within the forum to be as shock-
ing as did the Ohio Supreme Court in the famous case of State 
v. Brown.131 
3· Prohibitive Public Policy of the Country of Celebration 
The Hague Convention. The Hague Convention on Mar-
riage reduces the prohibitory effect of domestic marriage im-
pediments to a few fundamental points. This was the main 
achievement of the Hague treaty. It includes five prohibitions, 
entitling the participant states to prevent the celebration of 
marriages on grounds, not of the personal law of the parties, 
but of its own local law: · 
(a) Absolute prohibition on account of relationship or af-
finity; 
(b) Absolute prohibition between parties to adultery, pro-
vided the marriage of one of them has been dis-
solved on the ground of this adultery; 
(c) Absolute prohibition between persons who have been 
convicted of a joint attempt upon the life of the 
spouse of one of them; 
(d) Prohibitions concerning a former marriage; 
(e) Religious prohibitions. 
135 Argued by M. WoLFF in 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 4.03. 
137 {189o) 47 Ohio St. 1oz, 26 N. E. 74· 
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The grounds for the first three prohibitions listed above are 
contained in article 2, paragraph I ; the last two are implied in 
article 2, paragraph 4· 
An absolute prohibition is a prohibition which is not dis-
pensable. In case of adultery, for instance, dispensation may be 
granted in Germany; Swiss parties, their national law includ-
ing no prohibition at all to marriage on account of adultery, 
may therefore marry in Germany. The Dutch courts, however, 
consider adultery an absolute obstacle both for nationals and 
foreigners. 138 
In the countries that have been or still are members of the 
Convention, every prohibition of local law has been examined 
in this way to meet the test of article 2. The Convention goes 
still further in limiting the local prohibitory rules. If a mar-
riage has been celebrated in violation of one of the prohibitions 
listed above but is valid according to the personal law of the 
parties, it is valid everywhere with the exception that it may 
be considered invalid in the state of celebration (not in a third 
state) in the cases mentioned in (d) and (e), not (a)-( c) 
above.139 
Hungary, for instance, may forbid an ordained Catholic 
priest of Belgian nationality to marry within Hungarian terri-
tory; if 'he succeeds in doing so, however, Hungary may con-
sider the marriage void, but it is valid in Belgium and there-
fore in all other participant states. 
No prohibition other than those mentioned above is proper 
ground for preventing a marriage of nationals of another 
member state. Hence, an Italian girl fourteen years old or a 
Rumanian girl of fifteen may marry in Switzerland or Sweden, 
. where the age limits are seventeen and eighteen respectively. 
C6digo Bustamante. The C6digo Bus-tamante, article 38, 
138 Settled doctrine, see H. R. (June 2, 1936) W. 1936, no. ror3, and cf. 
II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 205. 
139 The Polish Law on international private law of 1926, art. 12 par. 2, was 
drafted less clearly; see Pol. Supr. Ct. (Jan. 7, 1931) 6 Giur. Camp. DIP. 
(1940) no. 104, with a critical note by RENCKI. 
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permits the local law to avail itself of (all) its prohibitions 
which are not dispensable. Article 40 adds a rule for marriages 
already celebrated, whereby "the contracting states," i.e., as 
it seems. each of them, may refuse recognition to a marriage 
conflicting: 
With their provisions relative to the necessity of dissolution 
of a former marriage, to the degree of consanguinity or affinity, 
in respect to which there exists an absolute impediment, to the 
prohibition of marriage established in respect to those guilty 
of adultery by reason of which the marriage of one of them 
has been dissolved, to the same prohibition in respect to one 
guilty of an attempt against the life of one of the spouses for 
the purpose of marrying the survivor, and to any other excus-
able grounds of annulment. 
Trend. International literature, long critical of unlimited 
local policy, has encouraged the trend towards restricting its 
influence. This tendency is exhibited in the Polish Statute of 
I 926 (art. I 2 par. 2) which confines the cases of overriding 
local policy to four enumerated impediments. That the Italian 
Civil Code of I 865 (art. I02 par. 2) reserved to the local law 
every prohibition contained therein (arts. ss-69); was con-
sidered an "excessive and irrational" rule, 140 needing a re-
strictive interpretation,141 although hardly seeming to permit 
it.142 The new Code no longer tries to override the nationality 
principle 143 to such an extent and enumerates the prohibitions 
that are intended to apply to foreigners. 144 It is true that for-
eign Catholics desiring a canon law marriage with civil effect 
must comply not only with civil requirements but with all those 
established by the canon law and their national laws.145 In 
140 UDINA, 6 Repert. 513, no. 139; UorNA, Elementi I 77, no. I 27. 
141 Cf. KuHN, Comp. Com. 128. 
142 ANZILOTTl (1919) 236; UDINA, Elementi 178, no. 1271 n. 2. 
143 Relazione del Guardasigilli on. Solmi (Report of the Minister of Justice) 
in C. C., book I, Progetto definitivo (1936) 54· 
144 C. C. (1938) art. I 14 par. 2, C. C. (1942) art. I z6 par. 2. The Minister 
of Justice declined to include Italian provisions on nonage in the list of 
inderogable impediments, where the personal law does not infringe public policy, 
See Relazione 1938 no. 78. 
145 FEDOZZI 425. 
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Spain, a similar position seems to be taken, all the Spanish 
requirements for Catholic marriage being added to those of 
the nationallaws.146 
Another example of increased understanding is that of a 
recent Greek decision confining to Greek subjects the old pro-
hibition of marriage between Christians and non-Christians.147 
The Scandinavian Convention on Family Relations 148 in-
corporates chiefly nondispensable prohibitions arising out of 
relationship and affinity, and the Finnish law of 1929 149 enu-
merates only relationship, affinity, and existing marriage as 
obstacles under local policy. 
But exaggerated mandatory local requirements are still 
frequent. The period of delay instituted for women after the 
dissolution of a fo~mer marriage figures in the list of com-
pulsory prescriptions of local policy in Switzerland/50 the 
Netherlands/51 and France.152 The most recent civil code, 
146 Spanish Trib. Supr. (July Io, I9I6) 137 Sent. I05. Cf. TRiAs DEBEs, 3I 
Recueil I930 I 674. 
147 Court of Athens (I 93 7) no. 2462, Clunet I 9 3 8, 902, on the ground of Cod. 
Just. L. I, 9, 6 of A. D. 388; Basilica L. I Tit. I, 38, and Rule 72 of the H. 
Synod of Troullos. 
148 Final Protocol no. I. According to no. 2 of the Final Protocol, persons who 
have acquired full age by marriage under Finnish law or by dissolution of 
marriage under Icelandic law, may be prevented from marrying unless they are 
twenty-one years old. 
149 Finland: Law of Dec. s, I929, on Family Relations of International Nature, 
§ 2 par. 2, and§ 6 par. 3· 
150 See Swiss C. C. art. 103 and BECK, NAG. I67 n. 53· 
151 The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (Nov. II, I925) N.J. 1926, 391 (Rus-
sian bride); H. R. (June z, I936) W. I936, no. IOIJ (applying Hague Conven-
tion on Marriage of I 902, art. 2 par. 2). A convenient exception was made for a 
Norwegian woman, first separated under the Norwegian Marriage Law of May 
31, I9I8, § 43, and then divorced more than a year later: Rb. Rotterdam (Feb. 
2, 1937) W. 1937, no. 482. 
152 France: C. C. art. 228; Cour Paris (Feb. 13, I 872) S. r 873.2.I 12, D.r 873. 
2.r6o, (public policy "of decency"); WEISS, 3 Traite 486; PouLLET 449 no. 350. 
The same doubtful assertion was made even under the Hague Convention on 
Marriage of 1902, art. 2 par. 3· Prevailing opinion contra in Switzerland, cf. 
BEcK, NAG. 289 no. I7· In France this doctrine has been elaborated; the for-
eign law may be applied when it requires an even longer delay. Cass. (Nov. 
27, I934) Nouv. Revue I934> 796 (Swiss delay for divorced women; no cur-
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that of Venezuela, has retained its long and exacting list.153 
Thus, the result is the same as when the law of the place of 
celebration is taken as decisive, and therefore all requirements 
of the local law as well as of the personal law impede the 
marriage of foreigners. 154 
Effect of treaties and conventions. Has the adherence of a 
state to a treaty, such as the Hague or the Montevideo 
treaties, or a state's participation in the Scandinavian Conven-
tion, any effect beyond the scope of the treaty, generally limit-
ing the realm of unyielding public policy? Some Italian deci-
sions155 and a few writers 156 have answered this question af-
firmatively with respect to the Hague Convention. They argue 
that states, having once subscribed in a treaty, for example, to 
the principle that the domestic age limit is alterable for 
foreigners, can no longer allege the contrary with respect to 
nationals of non-member states. Such a construction of an 
international treaty is not only untenable but would indeed 
endanger the conclusion of future treaties. Treaties are binding 
upon states only within their limits. 
4· Permissive Public Policy of the Country of Celebration 
The Hague Convention. According to article 3 of the 
Hague Convention, the law of the place of celebration may 
permit the marriage of foreigners contrary to their national 
laws, if these prohibitions are based exclusively on grounds of 
a religious nature. The other states are entitled to deny to a 
marriage contracted under such circumstances recognition as a 
valid marriage. 
tailment by dispensation); Cour Paris (Nov. 30, 1934) Nouv. Revue 1935, 49, 
Clunet 1935, 927. 
153 Venezuela: C. C. (1916) art. I32, C. C. (I942) art. I04 referring to all 
mandatory requirements valid for nationals. 
154 See supra n. 4 7. 
155 See infra pp. 29 df. 
IS6 WEiss, 3 Traite 478 n. 2; PoULLET 444ff.; AUDINET, II Recueil I926 I 
174, 186; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 1I3 n. 202; ibid. I95· 
Contra German RG. (Dec. 2I, I9I6) JW. 1917, 364; M. WOLFF, IPR. u9. 
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Which impediments are of religious nature? The question 
has been extensively discussed in the countries whose liberal 
doctrine denies recognition to foreign discriminations on ac-
count of religion. In agreement with the dominant opinion 
of these countries, the commentators on the Convention ascribe 
religious character to prohibitions based on: 
(a) Difference of religion ( disparitas cultus) / 57 such as 
the canon law prohibition of marriages between 
Christians and non-Christians in Austria, Spain, 
Poland, Bulgaria, and Greece; the prohibition of 
marriages between Christians and pagans in 
Sweden; between Moslems and non-Moslems ac-
cording to the laws of Islam; and between Jews and 
non-Jews under Jewish law. 
(b) The relation between godfather and godchild (co gnatio 
spiritualis) under canon law 158 and in Rumania. 
(c) The vows of priests or monks, endowed with civil effect 
in former Austria, Spain, parts of Yugoslavia, Po-
land, and Hungary.159 
It is doubtful, however, whether article 3 applies to a for-
mer marriage still considered existent for religious reasons 
157Not recognized: by enacted law in Venezuela, C. C. (1942.) art. I05i by 
the courts in: · 
France: Cour Paris (Nov. 17, 192.2.) S.I924.2.65, Clunet I923, 85, Revue 
1923, 437 (Serbian). ' 
Switzerland: Kreisschreiben (June 30, 1928) n. 13, 25 SJZ. 183. 
Italy: Trib. Livorno (May 5, 1894) Clunet 1898, 415 (Jewish law); Trib. 
Torino (Oct. 18, I9Io) Clunet 1912, 288, and Corte di Venezia (Dec. 7, 
1910) Clunet 191I, 1326 (Austrian); App. Trento (March 8, 1928) Foro 
Ital. Rep. 1928, 1171, no. 27 (Austrian). 
Germany: A much cited decision of the OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 6, 1908) 18 
Z.int.R. (1908) 541 is to the same effect, but the prohibition was recognized by 
the OLG. Karlsruhe (March 28, 1917) 35 ROLG. 358 (marriage celebrated in 
London); and finally by the RG. (May 16, 1931) 132 RGZ. 416, 418 and RG. 
(Oct. 1o, 1935) 148 RGZ. 383. Cf. RAAPE 2.39. 
158 Cf. the controversy between SA'l"rER, 32. Z.int.R. (1924) 69 n. 88, and 
3 FRANKENSTEIN 114 n. 204. 
159 Not recognized in France (contra: AUDINET, II Recueil 1926 I 174, 
184). 
Great Britain, cf. DICEY, Rule 183 Exc. 2. 
· Italy: Cass. Roma (July 31, 1924) Monitore 1924, 727. 
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despite a divorce (Italy 160 and, for Catholics, former Austria, 
Spain, and the Warsaw district). 
No other prohibition established by the national law of a 
party may be neglected, not even the politically inspired im-
pediments which the Western tradition is accustomed to dis-
regard.161 Thus, military deserters and conscientious objectors 
from Austria and Germany, prevented fr:om producing a cer-
tificate of ability to marry, had to be refused the right to marry 
in other member states.162 To France this result seemed so in-
tolerable with respect to the emigrants from Alsace and Lor-
raine, that France left the Hague Convention on May 3 I, 
r 9 q, followed by Belgium on May 3 I, I 9 I 9· The Hague 
Conferences of 1925 and I928 tried in vain to win these 
countries back by permitting a member state to ignore prohibi-
tions arising from military obligations or from the status of a 
prince who needs the consent of the head of his house. 
The Swiss authorities apply these prohibitions as well as 
the provisions of an Italian law of I9J8 requiring govern-
mental authorization for the marriage of an Italian to a person 
of other nationality.163 On the same ground; German writers 
now claim that the German legislation on difference of race 
must be recognized by all other participants in the Conven-
tion.164 
It is, of course, left to the law of the place of the intended 
celebration whether or not it will respect a religious prohibi-
160 Viewed as a religious impediment by WALKER 587, 588; SATTER, Note op-
posing App. Liege (Feb. 2, I937) 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 13 n. I x. Many 
writers think that art. 3, compared with art. 2 par. 3 and art. 6 par. I, excludes 
the impediment of former marriage from the conception of religious impedi-
ments. 
161 See supra pp. I o6, 2 58. 
162 Cf. Swiss Fed. Dep. of Justice, BBl. I 9I71 III 57 5, no. I4: canton govern-
ments may grant license to marry {under NAG. art. 7e par. 2 to foreign ob-
jectors and desertors only if they are subjects of states having not adhered or 
having left the Hague Convention). 
1£3 Swiss Just. Dep., BBl. 1940, I463 no. I3, referring to art. 2 of the Italian 
Law of Nov. 17, 1938. 
164 Cf. the summary by RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. I 591 I 62. 
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tion of the homelanCl. Switzerland, e.g., respects such prohibi-
tions in the case of non-resident foreigners, while it ignores 
them in the case of domiciliaries.165 Third states are equally 
free to determine their position. 
In general. Outside of the Hague Convention and apart 
from the religious prohibitions which have already been dealt 
with, all political and penal prohibitions of a foreign country 
are generally ignored. This liberal doctrine underlies the 
Civil Code of Venezuela/66 which expressly rejects prohibi-
tions of marriage founded on differences of race, class, or 
religion.167 
In view of the American discussions of the effect of remar-
riage prohibitions, it may be noted that the situation in other 
countries depends on analogous considerations. The first 
problem is to determine whether the law forbidding remar-
riage is intended to be applied abroad and, if so, to what mar-
riages.168 A prohibition meant to be applie~ extraterritorially 
may not be applied by another country because it is regarded 
165 BEcK, NAG. 293 no. 12. 
166 Venezuela: C. C. (1916) art. 133, C. C. (1942) art. 105. 
167 Hindu caste: Chetti v. Chetti [1909] P. 67. Racial prohibitions: Trib. 
civ. Pontoise (Aug. 6, r&&4) Clunet r&85, 296. The Danish Minister of 
Justice, by Circular of Oct. u, 1937, informed interested officials that the 
German racial laws were applicable if no party was domiciled in Denmark. 
This seemed to indicate that a contrary policy was expected in the case where 
at least one party was a domiciliary; cf. RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. 1 6o n. 2, who also 
notes the reaction of other countries to the German "law for the protection of 
German blood" of Sept. 15, •935· 
An interesting combination of considerations may be illustrated by a South-
African decision. In the Roman-Dutch law, the old rule of lex loci contractus 
still obtains. In addition, the facts that the bride was domiciled and the mar-
riage was celebrated in the forum, Natal, formed grounds to disregard the in-
ability of the man, under the common law of his domicil in Transvaal, to 
marry his late wife's sister. Friedman v. Friedman's Executors (1922) 43 
Natal Law Rep. 259, at 264, 266. 
168 For instance, German courts have discussed at length whether by the 
enigmatic provision of the Argentine Civil Marriage Law (r888) art. 82, 
parties who have married in Argentina and have been divorced abroad are 
prohibited from remarrying 9nly in Argentina or everywhere. See infra p. 
432>n,I78• 
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as penal. 169 Otherwise, it applies as part of the personallaw.170 
Relation to the forum. The subject under discussion fur-
nishes significant applications of the general doctrine of public 
policy. To enforce a domestic policy upon a case subject to 
foreign law, a strong tie between the case and the forum should 
be present. Thus, Swiss law quite appropriately entitles a 
foreigner domiciled in Switzerland to invoke the Swiss 
Federal Constitution, as opposed to his national law, in protec-
tion of his right to marry. Political or racial prohibitions, even 
if not specifically eliminated by the Constitution, will be dis-
regarded on behalf of a resident foreigner. A non-domiciled 
alien has no such right; on the contrary, the cantonal author-
ities are required to prevent him from entering into a marriage 
not recognized by his homeland. 171 
Some codes, it may be remembered,172 following the ex-
ample of section 4 of the Austrian Civil Code, are restricted in 
their external effect to transactions intended to have effect 
within the territory of the personal law. The Austrian Supreme 
Court declared valid, despite Austrian impediments, a mar-
riage celebrated abroad by an Austrian citizen, in the absence 
of intention to return to Austria immediately.This rule was 
applied even to former Catholic priests and to marriages be-
169 England: Scott v. Att. Gen. ( 1 886) I 1. P.D. 128 declared inoperative the 
South African restriction on remarriage by the guilty party .. 
France: Trib. civ. Marseilles (Nov. 2.5, I92.5) Clunet I92.6, 388 refused 
recognition to a Serbian episcopal decree of divorce, because it contained a 
clause making remarriage dependent on the bishop's consent, which the court 
deemed inseparable, but the court should have recognized the divorce without 
the remarriage clause, see Note in Gaz. Pal. I926. 1. 442.. 
Germany: KG. (May 30, I938) JW. I938, 2.75o.refused to apply the delay 
for remarriage imposed by a Swiss court in accordance with arts. I 04 and I 50 
of the Swiss C. C. because o£ its penal ("somewhat disgracing") character. i 
Switzerland: Prohibition of remarriage declared in a divorce decree by a 
Yugoslav bishop is not recognized, Just. Dep., BBl. 192.8, II 309. 
170 England: Warter v. Warter (I89o) I5 P.D. I52. per Sir James Hannen, 
Pres., recognizes a six months' delay after decree under the . Indian Divorce 
Act, No. 4 of I 869. See also supra p. 2.69. 
171 HuBER-MUTZNER 430, gives a clear picture; BEcK, NAG. 2.05 no. 49· 
172 Supra p. I I 7, n. 55· 
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tween Christians and Jews.173 Thus, a foreign court had no 
need to resort to its own public policy to allow such a marriage. 
Consequences of tt state's acts. A permissive policy of the 
country of celebration may be based upon reasons different 
from those thus far mentioned. Shall the forum permit a 
party locally divorced, which divorce is not recognized by his 
personal law, to remarry? This problem arose in Germany out 
of two apparently conflicting rules, viz., one determining ac-
cording to the personal law whether a person is married or 
unmarried (EG. art. 13 par. 1) and the other ascribing full 
credit to a domestic divorce decree.174 The second rule ought 
to be enforced, if the authority of the state is to be maintained 
consistently. A state is not supposed to dissolve a marriage and 
yet deny the parties the advantages of the dissolution. In 
Switzerland, however, the majority opinion has taken this very 
position; 175 hence, a marriage between an Italian and a Swiss 
woman may be dissolved in Switzerland, but the right of re-
marriage is enjoyed only by the woman.176 
5. Sanctions for the Fulfillment of Intrinsic Requirements 
Certificate of ability to marry. Officials issuing marriage 
licenses or presiding at marriage ceremonies are in an unfavor-
able position to ascertain the impediments of a foreign candi-
date. A large number of countries, therefore, require foreign 
173 0GH. (May 24, 1907) Spruch-Repertorium no. 198, 10 GlU.NF. no. 
3787 and OGH. (July 17, 19o6) 9 GlU.NF. no. 3485 (Austrian Catholic 
marrying an Austrian Jewess in New York). Singular distinctions were de-
veloped. For instance, the Austrian prohibitions upon marriage were main-
tained where an Austrian abroad had a job, the loss of which would force him 
to return to Austria, OGH. (Oct. 28, 1936) 55 Zentralblatt (1937) 120 no. 
so; See also OGH. (July 23, 1937) 56 Zentralblatt (1937) 889. 
174 Two opinions correspond to these two rules. The first opinion, stressing 
the conflicts rule of EG. art. 13, was advocated by LEWALD II 8; RAAPE 404; 
OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 3• 1923) 78 Seuff. Arch. 57· The second opinion: KG. 
(March 13, 1911) 24 ROLG. 19; REICHEL, 124 Arch. Civ. Prax. zoo; MAss-
FELLER, StAZ. 1938, 112, 115; Dt. Justiz 1939, 1236ff. 
175 BB1. 1922, II 582 no. 14 (Spaniard); BEcK, NAG. 464 no. 223. 
176 See for fuller discussion infra pp. 517-519. 
SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR MARRIAGE 285 
nationals or domiciliaries to exhibit a certificate issued by a 
competent officer in the country from which they come, to the 
effect that to his best knowledge no impediment is known to 
the prospective marriage.177 Accordingly, in a great number of 
states, measures have been taken, and offices have been desig-
nated/78 for the issuing of appropriate certificates to be used 
abroad. 179 The Hague Convention on Marriage, article 4, 
paragraph r, prescribed this precaution to the extent that the 
Convention adopted the rule of national law. Some important 
countries are unwilling to issue such certificates; 180 therefore, 
either dispensation in the country of celebration is frequently 
obtained, 181 or "certificates o"f custom" are produced.182 
The underlying idea of this institution is clearly demon-
strated in Switzerland; foreign citizens intending to marry 
177 E.g., Austria: Hofkanzleidekret of Dec. zz, 1814, Justizgesetzsammlung No. 
I 11 8. 
Finland: Gen. Ord. of Dec. 2 8, I 9 29, cf. SAJNIO in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 
68o n. s6. 
Germany: BGB. § I3I5 par. 2, Marriage Law of I938, § I4 par. 1. 
Cf. RAAPE 264, on the complicated case of a foreign annulment not recognized. 
Hungary: Marriage Law of 1 894, § I I 3 par. 3· 
Italy: C. C. (I86s) art. Io3, C. C. (1938) art. II4 par. I, C. C. (I942) art. 
II 6 par. I, not abolished as had been proposed. 
Sweden: Royal Ord. of Dec. 3, I9I5. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7e, BECK, NAG. I85, 200. 
'
178 BosCHAN in 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I 9 3 I) 3 3 2 n. 2 gives a list of offices declared 
competent in numerous states. 
179 In some countries banns are issued before giving the certificates, as in 
Hungary, Luxemburg, and Switzerland. 
180 This is true particularly for Great Britain (excepting treaties concluded 
on the basis of the Marriage with Foreigners Act, I9o6) and almost all the 
states of the United States, except perhaps Wyoming, where a provision cor-
responding to§ 3 of the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act is in force. (L. I935> 
ch. 3 §I, Suppl. 194I to Rev. St. Ann. I93I, 68-1o6). On the difficulties caused 
by this attitude see HACKWORTH, 2 Digest of International Law (1941) 356 
§ 16I. 
In France a "certificat de non-opposition" may be issued, but it is not rec-
ognized as equivalent to a certificate of "no impediment." 
181 E.g., Switzerland and in ·an cases of Americans, Federal Council, BBl. 
1887, III 7oo; Just. Dep., BBl. 192.2, II 581 no. q, in view of the recognition, in 
the United States, of Swiss marriages celebrated according to Swiss law. 
Germany: Allg. Verfiigung des Reichsministers der Justiz, Feb. 4, 1936, Dt. 
Justiz 1936, 208 and Durchfiihrungs VO. zum Ehegesetz of July 27, 1938, § 7• 
152 Mostly through the diplomatic service of the country of celebration; see 
Swiss Just. Dep., BBl. 1938, II 498 no. 7· 
286 MARRIAGE 
within the country must apply to the government of the canton 
for permission and, with the constitutional exception of domi-
ciled foreigners/ 83 are not permitted to marry unless it is 
shown that the marriage would be recognized in the home-
land.184 
Dispensation. Dispensation, likewise, is governed by the 
personal law. Not the law of the place of celebra~ion but the 
personal law determines what officials are competent to grant 
dispensation from any prohibition to marry.185 
./'"" Effect of violation of personal law. Because of the broad 
scope of the personal law, it is necessary to determine what 
law governs the effects of a violation of its prescriptions. As we 
have seen in connection with formal prescriptions, the domi-, 
nant opinion is that the same internal law that establishes a 
requirement determines the effect of failure to comply with 
the requirement.186 Covered by this rule are the problems 
whether a prohibited marriage is valid in spite of the prohibi-
tion or whether, if not, it is absolutely null (nonexistent), 
conditionally valid until annulment, or voidable at the instance 
of certain persons; whether or not an annulment has retroactive 
effect; by what persons action may be brought; whether an 
annulment may be pronounced by persons other than judges; 
by what events the right to annul is extinguishad, etc. 
183 Swiss Federal Constitution art. 54 par. 3; NAG. art. 7e. Where the bride-
groom is of Swiss nationality, authorization is unnecessary, Just. Dep., BBl. 1925, 
II I43 no. I 2. 
184 HUBER-MUTZNER 433· 
In Germany, besides the certificate of ability, other documents are required, 
such as a certificate that the husband's nationality will not be lost by marriage 
under foreign law; another showing that the husband transfers his nationality 
to the bride is probably obsolete. Moreover, it is remarkable that where 
religious marriage is compulsory in the homeland of a party, Germany and 
Switzerland require a priest to declare himself ready to marry the parties. 
Cf. supra p. 214, n. 55· 
185 KosTERS 3 66 states this principle and exceptions thereto granted by Royal 
favor in the Netherlands. 
Switzerland: Just. Dep., BBl. 1922, 11 581 no. II points out: a Swiss cannot 
marry his late wife's sister who is of Italian 11ationality, unless she receives 
dispensation under Italian C. C. (I86s) arts. 59, 68, and hence produces an 
Italian certificate of nihil obstat. 
186 See citations supra p. 229, n. 12 I. 
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Where the parties have different personal laws, each of the 
two laws must be consulted with respect to the consequences of 
a violation. The law of the husband may give him an exclusive 
right to avoid the marriage or may perhaps entitle the wife 
alone to do so; sometimes both laws concur in the same or in 
more or less similar effects. In addition to the illustrations im-
plied in the cases discussed above, the following may be of 
interest: 
(i) Case decided by the Reichsgericht on January 20, 1928 
(r2oRGZ. 35): In I9IOtwoSwisscitizens,A (male) andB 
(female) married in Salt Lake City, Utah. Without having 
obtained a divorce from A, the wife B married C, a German 
citizen, in Indianapolis, Indiana, in I 9 I 6. Not until I 9 I 8 was 
the marriage between A and B dissolved by divorce. In I 92 I 
C, who had meanwhile returned to Germany, received knowl-
edge of B's previous marriage to A, and thereupon B and C 
separated. Upon inquiry, C was told by an American Military 
Commission in Germany that his marriage with B was null 
and void. Thereupon, in I924 C went through a German 
ceremony of marriage with D. When the validity of this last 
marriage came up for determination by a German court, this 
court, according to the German choice of law rule, had to test 
the validity of the marriage between B and C by the national 
laws of these parties, i.e., simultaneously by German and Swiss 
law. By article 7f of the Swiss Law on Conflicts, the court 
would have been referred to the law of Indiana~. Under 
Indiana law, the marriage was absolutely nonexistent, while 
German law merely regarded it as destructible ex tunc by 
decree of court. Following the general Continental approach 
of applying to such cases the law establishing the more severe 
sanction, the court should have found the second marriage 
void without any legal process and the third marriage valid. 
By inadvertence, the Reichsgericht overlooked the renvoi of 
the Swiss statute on conflicts and, instead of Indiana law, ap-
plied as B's personal law the law of Switzerland, which it held 
to be identical with that of Germany.187 Hence, the court held 
187 This finding was not entirely correct either. Under German law an 
annulment of a bigamous marriage destroys the marriage ex tunc; it is effec-
tive only ex nunc in Swiss law. The sanction of the German law is the more 
severe and should have been applied. 
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that C's marriage to B was valid when he married D, that the 
marriage with D, objectively considered, was adultery and 
that B would be entitled to a divorce. 
(ii) Let us assume that in 1916 B had married in Iowa 188 
instead of in Indiana; 189 then the infirmity of the marriage 
would have been cured by the divorce of 1918. The same 
would have resulted if they had married in Sweden.190 
(iii) The following situation is quite different. A German 
girl, fifteen years old and domiciled in Switzerland, marries 
somewhere, her age being concealed. Germany claims her as 
a national, Switzerland as a domiciliary. The marriage would 
be considered void ( annullable) in Germany and voidable in 
Switzer land. 
Evasion of directive requirements·. Since the effect of a viola-
tion of a requirement depends on the law establishing the re-
quirement; it follows that the effect is the same whether the 
marriage takes place abroad or at home. Thus, the Dutch 
requirement of parental consent, being merely a directive 
prescription, does not invalidate a foreign marriage, although 
the wording of the Dutch conflicts rule could be understood 
to entail invalidity .m In other words, evasion of directive re-
quirements by a foreign marriage is of no consequence. This 
result is certain. It is obscured only by the usual idea that, in 
a well-ordered system of civil status, even non-mandatory 
rules of domestic marriage laws are securely protected against 
violation. 
IV. CoNCLUSIONS 
The law of the place of celebration, which governs without 
qualification the substantive requisites of marriage in the 
188 Iowa Code (1939) § 10445 subsec. 4, § 10486 subsec. 3· 
189 See Compton v. Benham (1909) 44 Ind. App. sr, 85 N. E. 365; Simms 
v. Kirk (r924) 8r Ind. App. 515, 144 N. E. 146. 
190 Swedish Marriage Law of June r r, 1920, c. 10 § r par. 2. 
191 Dutch Supreme Court, H. R. (May 23, 1919) W.10436, N.J. 1919, 689, 
in opposition to the questionable text of BW. art. 138. 
Likewise, for instance, to avoid nullity Belgian citizens are bound to observe 
only mandatory requirements abroad, i.e., the requirements of age, consent, 
relationship and affinity. See PAGE, 1 Droit civil beige (1933) no. 692.. 
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United States and Argentina, contrasts with the personal law 
observed as a matter of course everywhere else. The contrast 
is striking enough to offer a legislative problem, a problem 
aggravated by the limited knowledge we have of the exact 
reasons at present for the American system. The historic back-
ground is obvious. Those of the statutists who advocated the 
law of the place where the marriage is celebrated, did no more 
than apply the rule they taught for contracts in general, and 
their main impulse in establishing the rule sprang from self-
sufficient territorialism. We may presume the same conception 
to have prevailed in America, while it remained a country de-
pendent on immigration and pioneering. Requirements of the 
old countries were not to impede the marriages necessary to 
new settlers. It was fair to replace them by the demands of an 
honest Christian commonwealth. All this is understandable 
without much research. 
However, for a considerable period, neither immigrants nor 
pioneers have typified the shifting population of this country. 
Nevertheless, while in each of the forty-eight jurisdictions the 
legislature occupies itself with enactments elaborately shaping 
the requirements for marriage, marriages out of the state are 
fairly numerous, and the conflicts rule permits citizens to 
choose at pleasure any one of all these statutes, to which to 
submit both the celebration and validity of their marriages. 
This equation of intrinsic with formal requirements is no 
longer appropriate. While the various forms of secular cere-
monies solemnizing marriage are interchangeable, the very 
different kinds of marriage impediments in the statutes are 
not thought of as equivalent in any way in the mind of the 
legislators. Yet, under the conflicts rule, they are all treated 
in the same way. 
The harm done by indiscriminate application of local law, 
however, involves more than trespassing on the domain of 
foreign state legislation. First, social progr.ess achieved in one 
jurisdiction in the field of eugenics-as respects insanity, 
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medical certificates, etc.-is freely frustrated in others.192 
Granted that some reformers of marriage welcome the un-
bounded multitude of marriage statutes as an immense labora-
tory for social experimentation-an attitude rather question-
able-here freedom is converted into anarchy. Second, if the 
state of the domicil reacts against foreign violation of its policy, 
the great advantage of the principle that a marriage is good if 
valid at the place of celebration, disappears. Nevertheless, the 
implications of the legislative power and of specific marriage 
policies are being more distinctly realized, and the cases where 
a marriage is held void at the domicil of a party grow more 
frequent. 
Under these circumstances, the failure of the Uniform 
Marriage Evasion Act to rally the states to the principle that 
marriages concluded contrary to the domiciliary law should be 
avoided is most regrettable. Could it be that its reforms were 
not sufficiently clear and adequate to be considered worth-
while? Probably, they were regarded as inefficient in the ab-
sence of more effort than the Act dared to require. No machin-
ery for enforcement was provided to prevent false allegations 
by the parties and to effectuate interstate exchange of legal 
requirements and personal records. Nor has the one state that 
adopted the section in the Uniform Act requiring the license 
issuer to ascertain whether the proposed marriage contravenes 
the home statutes of the parties, been interested to prescribe 
investigation of the alleged facts. It may have been premature 
to expect more. Today in many jurisdictions, as a hundred 
years ago, marriage licenses are granted with the greatest 
facility and promptness. While a growing number of statutes 
stress the necessity of proofs of age, parental consent, and 
freedom from dangerous diseases, as well as banns or notice 
192 The marriage of a fourteen-year-old girl from Wisconsin marrying in 
Minnesota was declared in Iowa voidable only according to the Minnesota statute 
of the time (cf. at present Mason's Minn. St. Suppl. 1940, § 858o) despite 
the prohibition and the evasion statute of Wisconsin. See, in contrast, supra 
p. z54, n. 37· 
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of intention to marry, others have repealed the requirement, 
formerly obtained by social students, of a few days' interval 
between the advance notice and the celebration.193 A new 
species of state supervision may be needed to insure to mar-
riage legislation due respect by the state's own officers as well 
as by other states. The development in foreign countries seems 
to suggest, however, that a better interstate understanding 
would not require restrictions on the legislatures, whether 
they perfer ultraradical or ultraconservative policies. 
The chief rule of the civil law countries certainly is in ex-
treme opposition to the American. While codes and treaties are 
pathetically engaged in trying to conciliate clashing policies 
of two or more jurisdictions, the American method of simply 
ignoring the problem by exclusively depending on the law of 
the place of celebration is so far from the European view that 
Diena called it "absurd." But, if simplicity indicates a sound 
law, the American rule is sound, and the European system 
hopelessly "absurd." Still worse than the complications them-
selves is the variety of the attempts to harmonize contradictory 
principles of the national and local laws. The system of apply-
ing the personal laws of two parties and the law of the celebra-
tion at the same time, if carried through as initiated by the 
school of Mancini and embodied in innumerable codes, is im-
practical. A thoroughly informed representative of the Prus-
sian Ministry of Justice told the legal committee of the Diet 
in I 929 that the difficulties of ascertaining the capacity of 
foreigners to marry had increased to a disturbing extent after 
the first world war, strange results were occasioned by exotic 
religious laws, and that the principle of nationality. was far 
from furnishing the certainty it was supposed to guarantee.194 
A remarkable remedy, however, may be noted. By inter-
national conventions, the scope of the requirements that 
should be observed abroad has been narrowed. Further aid in 
193 See VERNIER, Suppl. I o § I 6. 
194 See supra p. 155, n. :u o. 
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the same direction is supplied by modern enactments, such as 
the new Italian Code, which spontaneously reduces the causes 
of nullity of marriage when celebrated abroad. Indeed, if a 
statute insists on prohibiting marriage between first cousins, 
which is allowed in most jurisdictions, why should another 
country yield to this problematic proposition? The state en-
acting such a statute would do better to limit the prohibition to 
domestic ceremonies. The Hague Convention, the Treaty of 
Montevideo, and the C6digo Bustamante agree in the division 
of domestic marriage impediments into two categories, one of 
international and the other of merely national applicability. 
Only the gravest objections, shared by all participant states 
or raised by one state and understood by the others, are con-
sidered sufficient to prevent or nullify a marriage contracted 
outside of the home state. The lists of internationally relevant 
impediments so far established coincide in some obvious in-
clusions-as for instance .consanguinity between ascendent and 
descendent or between brother and sister, or an existing mar-
riage of a party-and in other respects vary in a characteristic 
manner. The religious impediments that had so great signifi-
cance for the Hague Convention on Marriage are excluded 
from consideration in the two Latin American treaties. Under 
that of Habana (art. 40), any minimum age, including that 
of eighteen years for male and sixteen years for female parties 
prescribed in Brazil (C. c;. art. I 8 3, XII), must be observed 
in the other states. The Montevideo Treaty (art. I I) does not 
oblige a state to respect a lower limit than fourteen years for 
men and twelve for women. Although this is unsatisfactorily 
low, the idea of fixing an international age limit is excellent. 
Finally, the existing contrasts suggest a compromise on 
another basis. Suppose Italians visiting the United States. If 
they are well informed, they may walk right from the pier 
into a court house and be married at once. The permissibility 
of their union will be judged exclusively under the law of the 
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state where they happen to stay during a couple of hours. An 
American may be domiciled for forty years in Italy, but his 
capacity to marry at all, or to marry a certain person, will be de-
termined by all Italian authorities concerned, by searching 
the law of some forgotten home of his or of his father or 
grandfather. One system is as abusive as the other. A state 
should not want to join foreigners in marriage utterly dis-
regarding their home laws. Nor should a state, using the 
dubious test of nationality, exaggerate and perpetuate its 
significance for the determination of civil status. 
When is it reasonable to acknowledge the effect of a change 
of circumstances upon the substantive requisites of marriage? 
That the mere presence of parties ought not to suffice to change 
the applicable law, is recognized, at least in theory. But also 
the mere, though actual, change of domicil should not be re-
garded as enough. Evasion will not in practice be eliminated if 
people who contemplate matrimony may choose their mar-
riage law by simple transfer of their domicil. This is the 
danger also in making the first matrimonial domicil govern 
the substantive requisites. 
All this leads to the proposition that the personal law of the 
parties should continue to govern for a certain period after 
the parties change their domicil. Marrying after this time, 
they would be subject to the law of the place of celebration 
alone, with effect also in their home countries. In such a simple 
system, no additional precaution is needed. If it must be com-
plicated by concessions to the actual conflicts law, the method 
of shortened lists of international impediments is unavoidable. 
CHAPTER 9 
Personal Effects of Marriage 
I. EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE tN GENERAL 
I. The Internal Conceptions 
"EFFECTS of marriage" is a modern legal concept cor-
responding to the comprehensive matrimonial legis-
lation which was developed in the course of the 
nineteenth century. Following the model of the German and 
Swiss codes, all recent European codifications of private law 
contain a chapter concerning the operation of marriage on the 
relations between the spouses themselves and between the 
spouses and third persons. The consequences of this arrange-
ment are many and' significant; the European doctrine at-
tributes much importance to the fact of marriage and considers 
many, if not all, the pertinent provisions as a separate com-
plex of rules within the system of law. 
At present, the term "effects of marriage" refers both to the 
personal relations and to the property of husband and wife. 1 
The older codifications, compiled at the turn of the eighteenth 
century, acknowledged certain personal rights and duties of 
spouses but did not contain any extensive body of rules re-
ferring to the operation of marriage on property. They 
customarily treated the problem of property interests between 
spouses as it had been approached by the statutists, that is, by 
discussing the effects of marriage settlements,. at that time 
customary among propertied classes. Characteristically, today 
the settlement is still called in France contrat de mariage and 
in German, Ehevertrag, although it is not a contract of mar-
1 
"Personal" and "property" relations, of course, as used above, do not 
exactly correspond to their meanings in private law. 
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riage but only a contract respecting property relations made 
upon the occasion of a marriage. 
Consequently, these codes and the literature of the period 
treated the entire question of the effects of marriage on prop-
erty as a question of contract. In the French Civil Code and 
codes of other countries influenced by it, the subject is still 
retained in the sections dealing with contracts. Not until very 
recent times have some of these countries, particularly Italy, 
Greece, and Peru, included in their new codes chapters on 
patrimonial relations between the spouses, chapters placed 
along with others dealing with the law of family relations. 
Numerous topics pertaining to the effects of marriage, how-
ever, are still dispersed throughout the codes. 
American law has not developed in this subject a body of 
doctrine similar to that of the German Civil Code. The nearest 
approach to it is a collection of scattered topics connected with 
marriage, brought together under the heading of "husband 
and wife" in the various treatises and casebooks on family re-
lations. By analytical comparison, we find an important dif-
ference in that marriage in itself does not have so many 
peculiar consequences in the present private law of this country 
as it does in Europe. The emancipation of married women, 
particularly as brought about by the equal rights statutes of 
the common law states, has reduced the effects of marriage to 
a comparatively small residuum. 
Gradually, married women have been granted the power to 
own and manage property in their own names and the capacity 
to make valid contracts with and conveyances to third parties; 
transactions between husband and wife have been rendered 
possible; and the peculiar rules on liability for torts committed 
by a married woman and on the husband's liability for the 
wife's prenuptial debts abolished. Indeed, in a few states, the 
old disabilities of married women have been swept away com-
pletely. 
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On the other hand, legislatures and courts of numerous 
states have deemed it unwise to empower a married woman to 
bind her property as surety for the debts of her husband or to 
become his business partner. A considerable number of states 
have found it necessary to protect creditors by forbidding or 
restricting property transfers between husband and wife. In 
several states, the ancient institution of tenancy by the entire-
ties has been preserved. In several states of the Middle West, 
a contract of a married woman does not bind her assets, unless 
she expressly states her intention to do so. With respect to 
torts, the recent family car doctrine has resulted in a revival of 
the husband's liability for certain torts of his wife. In the field 
of property interests, statutory rights have been substituted 
for the ancient rights of dower and curtesy in the majority of 
states, in many cases with elaborated and strengthened pro-
visions. The effects of marriage upon the property relations of 
husband and wife, although no longer so vital as they were 
at common law, are still numerous and important. The 
changes from the old common law have been so recent, how-
ever, so unsystematic, and so different in the various states 
that no general doctrine has thus far been worked out. Con-
sidering the undoctrinal or even anti-doctrinal climate C?f 
American jurisprudence, we can hardly expect the elaboration 
of any such doctrine in the near future. 
2. Reaction on Conflicts Laws 
This is only one of the many differences of structure among 
the municipal laws, having distinct reactions ·on the conflicts 
law. Above all, in the Continental international private laws, 
the national law has come to govern the whole complex of 
relations growing out of marriage. Under the German Intro-
ductory Law, which has been followed by many other codes, 
the non-patrimonial rights and duties of married persons are 
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governed by the national law of the husband as of the time 
when a particular relation is in question; effects on property 
of the spouses are governed by the law of the country of which 
the husband was a national at the time of the marriage. 
The American law of conflicts, on the contrary, contains no 
separate body of rules on effects of marriage. The Restatement 
perfectly reflects the actual law, when it expresses the "effect" 
of foreign marriage in one single sentence(§ 133), saying that 
a state will give it the same effect as "a marriage created by its 
own law." Duty to pay for necessaries, for goods bought, and 
for alimony are treated together with all other alimentary 
obligations (§§ 459, 460, 463). Effects on property of the 
spouses are considered exclusively under the head of interests 
of husband and wife created in each other's property, either 
immovable or movable, and are treated along with property 
in general (§§ 237-38, 248, 289-293). Moreover, the 
capacity of married persons to enter into antenuptial contracts 
(§ 238 comment b; § 289 comment c), separation agreements, 
etcetera, is part of the law of contracts (§ 333); the capacity 
to commit torts, the right of one spouse to sue the other in 
tort, or the right of the husband to sue a wrongdoer for injury 
to his wife, are regulat<:;d by the law governing torts (§§ 377 
ff.). Finally, there are the rules on constructive trusts, living 
trusts, and testamentary trusts, institutions affording the main 
safeguards for the family interests of the wealthy. 
As we must follow here the European division i.nto two 
groups of effects, we encounter uncertainty about the border-
line between them. Again, no substantial argument supports 
the theory that the lex fori, the distinctions of internal law, 
should decide directly the scope of a conflicts rule on personal 
or property effects. 2 The more important points will have to 
be discussed one by one. 
'
2 Still, this seems to be the prevailing opinion, also adopted in Latin America 
by authoritative writers, such as z V1co, nos. sz, 6o. 
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3. Personal Effects of Marriage 
· The conflicts rules to be discussed here refer either to the 
law of the forum, the law of the temporary residence of the 
spouses, of their domicil, or of their nationality. In order to 
understand why these rules differ more than those on status 
in general, we must remember the nature of personal marital 
relations. Every legislator is conscious of the fact that such 
duties as those of mutual fidelity, cohabitation, and obedience 
of the wife, have their foundation in morality or religion. 
Nobody would think today of enforcing such duties through 
specific performance or compulsory execution. All modern 
laws agree that, so long as a marriage is normal, the law has 
no importance in these respects. Modern codifiers, however, 
have decided to lay down rules that give these duties a legal 
character; they wish to emphasize the social importance of 
sound marriages and to grant a spouse as much judicial help 
as possible, short of separation and divorce. That it is insuffi-
cient to speak of "spiritual effects of marriage," as is done 
sometimes in Latin America, probably for the sake of Catholic 
doctrines, is demonstrated by the Codex Juris Canonici, which 
defines the conjugal duties in terms of definite jural rules 
(c. I I Io-I I IJ). 
The more the legal nature of the mutual duties of a mar-
ried couple is stressed, the more it is felt possible to resort to 
a personal law determined either by nationality or marital 
domicil. Where the personal effects of marriage are governed 
simply by the law of the directing court, marriage is thought 
to be ruled essentially by morals, which are naturally evalu-
ated according to local written or unwritten rules. We shall 
see how both ideas are confused in some countries, for instance, 
in France. 
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II. CoNTACTs 
r. Law of the Residence 
The Unit~d States. In the United States, it is not quite clear 
whether purely personal marital relations are governed by the 
law of the forum or by the law of the place where the spouses 
"live," although the equation "place where they live, that is, 
the law of their domicil" a has probably been abandoned. 4 As 
a matter of fact, in case both parties reside temporarily at a 
place, the court of that place apparently will take jurisdiction 
and apply the locallaw.5 Probably, the Restatement (§ 133, 
Comment b) speaks of such a case, stating that "the incidents 
which result from the existence of the status are determined by 
the law of the place where they are sought to be exercised," 
and declares by way of illustration that the law of the place 
where they presently live determines the question whether a 
husband is guilty of battery when he uses force to control his 
wife. Other cases may be too rare to be taken into account. In 
British countries also, including Quebec, 6 the conception seems 
to be that the husband's authority over the person of his wife 
is of a disciplinary nature and to be decided entirely within 
the limits of the lex fori, jurisdiction being predicated upon 
residence, not domicil. This rule embraces the questions of 
what amount of forcible control the husband may use, as well 
as whether a resident foreigner may apply to the courts for 
restitution of conjugal rights. 7 
3 MINOR§ 79; DUDLEY FIELD art. 554· 
4 KuHN, Comp. Com. 144. This point is settled implicitly by the Restate-
ment§§ 54, 133. 
° Cf. 4 PHILLIMORE 359 cited with approval by I WHARTON 365 and KuHN, 
Comp. Com. 144: "If the husband deserts his wife, refuses her maintenance, 
or ill-treats her by violence, she has a right jure gentium to redress in the 
tribunals of the place where they reside." Cf. also LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 343 
no. 310. 
8 I }OHNSON 327• 
7 Connelly v. Connelly (1851) 7 Moore P. C. 438; O'Leary v. O'Leary 
[Alberta, 1923] I D. L. R. 949• 
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Argentina. In Argentina, the test of domicil adopted by the 
Civil Code (art. I 6o) and by the Treaty of Montevideo of 
I889 (art. I2) was suddenly changed by the Marriage Law 
of November I 2, I 8 8 8 (art. 3), which referred to residence; 
hence the courts have been stimulated to apply the law of the 
forum. 8 The literature criticizes this solution as an unjustifi-
able infringement upon the domiciliary principle. 9 
2. Law of the Domicil 
Domicil, as the test chosen for questions of status in general, 
is decisive also in the personal relations of the spouses in Den-
mark, 10 Uruguay/1 if not in Argentina, more recently also 
Peru 12 and Brazil 13 and under the Treaty of Montevideo.14 
Domicil in this connection is the marital domicil. 
In Switzerland, lil<:ewise, in accordance with its general 
rules, married persons domiciled within the country are gov-
erned by the municipal law; 15 Swiss nationals domiciled 
abroad are subject to the law that is considered applicable 
under the law of conflicts of their domicil. 16 
French writers are increasingly inclined to propose legisla-
tion that marital domicil be taken as the test. 17 
8 Even the former text, C. C. art. I 6o, was understood in the same sense by 
DAIREAUX, Clunet I886, 293· ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. I05 explains that 
in almost every case the law of the place where the conjugal rights and duties 
are exercised is deemed relevant. 
9 2 WEISS-ZEBALLos, Manual de derecho internacional privado (ed. 5, I9I2) 
I 59; 2 V1co no. 6o; RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 28I 1 285. 
10 Danish Law on Effects of Marriage of March I8, I925, §53· 
11 No discussion or problem exists as declares V ALLADAO 6 5. 
12 Peru: C. C. Tit. Prel. art. V, agreeing with precedents for which see 8 
APARICIO y SANCHEZ, C6digo Civil 70. 
13 Brazil: Lei de Introduo;ao (I 942) art. 7. 
14 Text of 1889, art. I2, text of I94o, art. I4. 
15 NAG. arts. 2, 32, as inte'rpreted by the Fed. Trib. (May 29, 1908) 34 BGE. 
I 299, 3 I 6; cf. STAUFFER, NAG. 77 Vorbem. no. 7 to arts. I 9ff. The Swiss 
domiciliary law has been emphatically re-emphasized in BG. (April I8, 1942) 
68 BGE. II 9, IJ, adding that the rules concerning the protection of the mar-
ital union belong to public policy. 
16 NAG. art. 28. 
17 GouL:E, "Mariage," 9 Repert. 89 no. 477· 
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3· Law of Nationality 
The problem. In juri~dictions adopting nationality as the 
test of status in general, personal husband-wife relations h~tve 
been controlled by the law of the state of which the husband 
was a citizen. The simple reason for this rule originally was 
that in the countries concerned the wife at marriage regularly 
acquired the nationality of her husband. Yet, although this 
effect of marriage upon the nationality of the wife has been 
modified in an increasing number of countries, the conflicts 
rule has been preserved and is the prevailing rule. This at-
titude may be explained partly by the force of tradition and J 
partly by the fact that both the wife's acquisition of the hus- ' 
band's nationality and the application of the husband's per-
sonal law are founded on the marital power of the husband, 
which in some rudim'entary form still exists under most 
modern codes. 
As a matter of fact, however, the cases where spouses have 
different nationalities, either during the entire marriage or as 
a result of later changes, have become frequent and this has 
had to be taken into account. 
In the United States, the law of nationality has been modi-
fied several times. Under the provisions in force since 1922, a 
foreign wife no longer acquires American citizenship by mar-
riage, and an American woman no longer losesher citizenship 
by marrying a foreigner. These rules also exist in the Soviet 
Union and in Brazil. French enactments after World War I 
provided that a French bride retained her nationality unless 
she filed a declaration to the contrary; an analogous provision 
is now in force with respect to foreign women marrying 
Frenchmen. Other countries have followed these models. 
Along the same line, repatriation of wives who have lost citi-
zenship by marriage is frequently facilitated by reduction of 
the normal requirements. Another source of different nation-
alities of husband and wife is that, subsequent to the marriage, 
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husband or wife may separately acquire new nationalities. 
The cases of split nationality were considered by the Hague 
Convention on Marriage Effects of 1905. 
The rule that the national law of the husband governs the 
personal relations between husband and wife, is expressly up-
held in the case of divergent nationalities in the codes of Ger-
many/8 Italy/9 the Netherlands/0 Spain 21 and lran,22 by the 
C6digo B,;,.stamante/8 and the Treaty of Montreux concern-
ing the jurisdictions in Egypt.24 In other countries, the same 
view still obtains by interpretation. 25 Prominent French 
authorities have also enunciated the rule.26 
The rule is unquestionably applied when both parties ac-
quire a new. nationality by a common ·act. This mutability of the 
applicable law is recognized everywhere (in contrast to the 
immutability of the rules on marital property relations). 
Where the national laws of the spouses are different, the 
following efforts to modify the rule have been made: 
Last common nationality. If the husband alone changes his 
nationality, which until then has been common to both, it 
seems inequitable that the wife should suffer a corresponding 
change in her status. Therefore, the Hague Convention of 
1905 (arts. I and 9 par. 2) provided that the law of the last 
nationality common to the spouses should govern. This solu-
18 EG. art. 14 par. 1, as now usually construed; LEWALD 88; RAAPE 2.75; 
WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 6I n. 35 2., but see infra n. 2. 8; art. I4 
par. z adds that German law applies also if the husband has lost his German 
nationality but the wife has retained hers. 
19 Italy: C. C. ( I8 6 5) Disp. PreL art. 6; C. C. (I 942) Disp. Prel. art. I8. 
20 Hof Amsterdam (June 6, I9I9) W.I0444, N.J. Iop. 
21 Spain: C. C. arts. I 5 and 22. 
22 Iran: C. C. art. 963. 
23 C6digo Bustamante art. 43· 
24 Convention of Montreux of May 8, I 9 3 7 on Egpytian Mixed Tribunals, 
Regulations of Judicial Organisation, art. 29 par. 3, U.S. Treaty Series No. 939· 
25 See for instance for Austria: WALKER in I KLANG'S Kommentar 3 2 5 n. 
I77 and Internationales Privatrecht 742 (doubtful); for Guatemala: MATos, 
no. 2.30; for Portugal: VALLADAO 70. 
:s AUDINET, 1 I Recueil I 926 I 2.I2., considers this rule obvious; BAR TIN, 2 
Principes 2I4 § 2.93, sees no room for hesitation. 
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tion has been followed by Sweden, Poland, Italy, and Greece 
and has been approved by some writers. 27 
Illustration: In Germany (RG. [April 15, 1935] 147 
RGZ. 385) a Dutch husband acquired German nationality, 
his wife remaining a Dutch national. His action for restoration 
of conjugal rights based on German law was denied because 
this cause of action is unknown to Dutch law, which continued 
to govern the duties of the parties according to the Hague 
Convention. 
The rule is understood as meaning that a change of nation-
ality, in order to affect both spouses, must be voluntary on 
the part of both, and not one which is voluntary on the part of 
the husband alone and extended to the wife merely by opera-
tion of law. 
But this solution is useful only in the case where there has 
been at least one common nationality. The Hague Convention 
is limited to this case; no uniform conflicts rule exists for 
any other case. 
Cumulative application of both national laws. To provide 
a solution for every case of different nationality, .an influential 
doctrine advocates the application of both national laws 
cumulatively. Each party, it is argued, may have only those 
rights and duties that are established by his or her own national 
law. Hence, what right the hu;band or wife may exercise 
depends on simultaneous approval by both marriage laws. 28 
27 Sweden: Law of June I, I 9 u, § I subsec. 9; Poland: Law of I 92.6 on 
international private law, art. I4; Italy: C. C. (I942.) Disp. Prel. art. 18; 
Greece: C. C. (1940) art. 14 and previously decision of Epheteion Patron 
(192.2) 33 Themis 92 (Italians, the husband later being naturalized in 
Greece). OLG. Kiel (Jan. 24, 1931) JW. 1932,599 (in relation to England, 
non-member state). Cf. CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue 1910, 59; NIBOYET 736 
no. 626; 3 ARMINJON 17; PouLLET 479 no. 372. Resolution of the Sixth 
Hague Conference, 1928; Rumanian Draft, art. 23. 
28Finland: Law of Dec. s, 1929 on family relations of international nature, 
§ 14 par. r. 
Germany: OLG. Braunschweig (Jan. I9, 1913) 26 ROLG. 232; KG. (May 
2.7, 1927) JW. 1928, 73; KG. (Feb. 24, I936) ]W. I9J6, 2470; cf. OLG. 
Stuttgart (March 31, 1905) II ROLG. 287. 2 ZITELMANN 67o; WALKER 
742; M. WoLFF, 4 Rechtsvergl. H~ndworterb. 408, but apparently no longer 
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It is rather generally felt, however, that such a cumulation 
is difficult to determine and very undesirable. In every 
country, the law regulating the effects of marriage is drafted 
to achieve a certain balance; to take out a single part because 
that part has not been acknowledged by another state's legisla-
tion, destroys the consistency of the marital law and reduces 
its efficacy.29 
Emergency solutions. On the basis of the nationality princi-
ple, relatively the best solution seems that of resorting to the 
last common nationality which the parties may have had, as 
was done by the Hague Convention of r 90 5. Where the 
parties never had any common nationality, the best approach 
seems that of resorting to the law of the husband as of the 
time of the marriage. This solution was suggested in a draft 
issued by the Sixth Hague Conference of 1928. Every other 
solution founded on nationality imposes excessive risks on 
all third persons who deal with a married person.30 
Yet, would it not be preferable to abandon the principle 
itself, at least in this particular field? A tendency toward the 
domiciliary law seems strong; 31 it is of considerable weight 
in his IPR. I 2 3 ; contra: I BAR § I 7 2 and most writers, see RAAPE 2 7 5 (de-
minutia matrimonii). MASSFELLER, }W. I936, 2472; ECKSTEIN, 7 Giur. 
Comp. DIP. 7• The RG. (Feb. I5, I9o6) 62 RGZ. 4oo, has not yet taken 
sides. 
Italy: ANZILOTTI, Corso (I9I3) 250; cf. his arguments as to the parallel 
problem of paternal relations, 2 Rivista (I907) II6; CAVAGLIERI 219; UDINA, 
Elementi I8I; FEDOZZI 432; Bosco 229; contra: CANSACCHI, 3 Giur. Comp. 
DIP. 275, with a good summary. 
29 J. STRELITZ, Die Schltisselgewalt im internationalen Privatrecht, Thesis 
( Giittingen, I 9 3 6) 42, tries, without success, to develop a more satisfactory 
"cumulation." WENGLER, Book Review, I I Z.ausl.PR. ( 193 7) 973, calls at-
tention to the rules in French Morocco, under which the status of each spouse 
is governed by his personal law. 3 FRANKENSTEIN 246 n. 85, suggests apply-
ing the law of the defendant. 
30 PouLLET 479· 
31 CASSIN, 34 Recueil 1930 IV 757; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 269 no. 239; 
FEDOZZI 238; cf. AUDINET, Clunet I9JO, p8. The problem was fully dis-
cussed with respect to the capacity of women to contract by AUDINET and others 
in Travaux du Comite franr;ais de droit international prive, Annee 4, I 9 3 6-
37> 89fi. The revised Czechoslovak draft (Revue I93I, I87) § I7 par. 2, refers, 
in absence of a last common nationality, to the last common domicil of the parties. 
PERSONAL EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE 305 
in Latin America. 32 This development is closely connected 
with that of resorting to public policy with respect to foreigners 
domiciled in the forum, a trend which we shall consider in the 
following section. 
4· Public Policy of the Forum 
Law of the wife. In a number of countries, the rule that the 
governing law is the national law of the parties or of the hus-
band, is reversed, and under certain circumstances the law 
of the wife is applied, at least if it happens to be the law of 
the forum. 
In Germany (EG. art. 14 par. 2), German law is applied 
when the German husband acquires a foreign nationality and 
the wife remains a German national. 
In France, the case of a French bride marrying a foreign 
subject but retaining her French nationality has attracted a 
great deal of attention. While some authors have interpreted 
the amendment of the nationality laws, under which the 
French woman's French nationality is preserved,33 as designed 
to preserve her French private law rights in all cases,S4 others 
limit the application of French law to couples living in 
France. 35 A similar practice obtained in Brazil under the 
nationality principle; Brazilian law was applied when one of 
the parties to the marriage was a national of the country and 
both, or even the husband alone, were living in BraziJ.36 The 
like seems to be true of other Latin American countries as 
welJ.3 7 An attempt to clarify the situation by an express statu-
32 V ALLADAO has devoted his book, Conflicto das leis nacionaes dos con j uges 
nas suas rela<;oes de ordam pessoal e economica e no desquite, to the defense of 
this tendency. See particularly, I 78ff., on earlier views favorable to the law 
of the domicil and conclusions, 205ff. The Brazilian Lei de Introduc;ao of 
I 942 has followed his doctrine. 
33 Law of Aug. Io, I927, art. 8. 
34 LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 390 no. 333; cf. NIBOYET, Revue I929, I93, 
I94> 209· 
35 NIBOYET 734 no. 625. 
36 VALLADAO 136,200. 
37E.g., Guatemala, MATOS nos. 2u, 2I2. 
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tory rule was made in France, in I 924, when the Chamber of 
Deputies voted upon a bill providing for the application of 
French law in all cases where either the husband is a French-
man or where, the husband being a foreigner, the wife is a 
French national and the parties are domiciled in France. ss 
The requirement of French domicil was dropped in the draft 
of the Societe d'etudes Ugislatives (I930) 89 : According to 
this, French law should govern the non-property effects of 
marriage as to both spouses, if one is French! 
French courts. The courts in France go so far in applying 
domestic law that it has been alleged that they would do so 
every time a French party is concerned or any French in-
terest is at stake. 40 However, this does not represent the domi-
nant opinion. For some time, the French courts have been 
wavering between the two poles of national law and public 
policy, the former having been strongly advocated by Andre 
Weiss and his school, the latter appearing as a goal of nation-
alistic post-war trends. At present, it seems that certain effects 
of marriage are regarded as dependent on the national law 
and others on the domestic law. The catalogue of the latter 
group, as drawn up by Weiss himself 41 in I 9 I 2, has pre-
sumably been extended since. In I928, the following prob-
lems were enumerated by Niboyet 42 as governed by the 
personal law: capacity or incapacity of the wife; mutual ob-
ligations of fidelity and assistance of husband and wife; wife's 
duty to follow husband to his residence and the right to bear 
his name; special capacity of the wife to dispose of her salary; 
"putative marriage." 43 
38 Revue 1924, 315 n. I. 
39 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. 1930, 164, art. 19; cf. ibid. 76 • . Cf. NrBOYET, 
Revue 1929, 193, 211; BARTIN, 2 Principes 201 § 288. 
40 Trib. civ. Seine (April 8, 1930) Revue 1930, 461, AuBRY, L'incapacite 
de la femme mariee en droit international prive franc;ais (Paris, 1933) 57; 
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNLERE 389 no. 332, extending public policy to all moral 
conceptions. 
41 WErss, 3 Traite 584ff. 
42 NIBOYET 736 nos. 627, 628. 
43 See infra p. 545· 
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The realm where public policy prescribes the exclusive ap-
plication of French law, was defined as follows: penal pro-
visions; implied authority of one spouse to contract for the 
other; alimentary obligation; desertion of family. 
The same general pattern exists in the other countries fol-
lowing the nationality principle. 44 So many variations in detail 
exist, however, that we shall have to discuss every one of the 
various effects of marriage separately. 
Procedural law. It is a traditional proposition that domestic 
law is exclusively applicable in matters of procedure and penal 
law. Exclusive domination of the lex fori in matters of pro-
cedure is recognized oy the Hague Convention on Marriage 
Relations of I 90 5. After stating as a general principle that the 
rights and duties of the spouses in their personal relations to 
each other are governed by their national law, article I adds 
the following proviso: 
However, these rights and duties cannot be enforced except by 
the means permitted under the law of the country where their 
enforcement is sought. 
According to this provision, the forms of action, judgment, 
and exe~ution are controlled by the local rules of the court, 45 
but the court of the forum does not permit any cause of action 
that is not also recognized by the national law. 46 A German 
husband, for example, is allowed under the German civil and 
procedural codes to sue his wife for restoration of conjugal 
rights, but he cannot bring such an action in Belgium. A Bel-
gian husband, on the other hand, may not bring an action of 
this kind in a German court, since he has no such right of action 
under his nationallaw!7 
"Cf. for Spain: TRiAs DEBEs, 31 Recueil 1930 I 677 and 6 Repert. ~53 
nos. 103, 104. 
~5 See also 1 BAR 481 § 172 par. 3; 2 FIORE ro3ff. no. 598. 
~6 The methods of enforcement must be analogous but not identical: see 
Actes de la Quatrieme Conference de la Haye, 1904, 17 8; German Denkschrift 
in 18 Z.int.R. (19o8) s8o. 
47 Cf. infra n. so. 
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This rule, forbidding a country to grant a foreigner a right 
of action not recognized in his national law, is a strange limita-
tion on local public policy, to which the signatories to the Con-
vention voluntarily submitted. A national of a non-signatory 
country may well be permitted to avail himself of a local 
remedy that is not recognized by his national law, when the 
forum considers the granting of such remedy required by its 
own public policy.48 
III. ScoPE oF THE RuLES 
In this section, we shall note the matters that have been 
claimed either generally or in some legal system as within the 
scope of the conflicts rule on personal marital relations. 
r. Duties of Conjugal Life 
Where the personal law governs the relations between hus-
band and wife, it has been applied to determine the spouses' 
mutual duties of fidelity and personal assistance, the wife's 
duties of obedience and rendering services in the household or 
in the husband's business, and similar matters. 
It depends on the personal law 49 whether the husband may 
forcibly control his wife's conduct, whether he may open her 
correspondence or rescind her contractual obligations of per-
sonal work, and whether one spouse may sue the other for res-
titution of conjugal rights. 50 
48 See, for instance, for Italy: CAVAGLIERI 2I 8; UDINA, Elementi I 82 no. 
I p. It has been contended, however, particularly by 3 FRANKENSTEIN 255, 
that the public policy of the participant states was modified by the Hague Con-
vention. See this contention in another connection, supra p. 279. 
49 Cf. 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 350; NIBOYET 737 no. 627 (z). 
50 Applying the personal law of the parties, German courts have accorded 
this action (provided for in the German Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6) to Czec-
hoslovakian spouses (RG. (June u, I922) Leipz. Z. I922, 5I8) and denied it 
to Belgians (LG. Giessen (Nov. I, I92o) 20 Jahrb. DR. 221), Swedes (LG. 
Stuttgart (April 4, I924) 23 Jahrb. DR. 442), and Dutchmen (OLG. Ham-
burg (Oct. 23, I934) IPRspr. I934> no. 49; RG. (April I5, 1935) I47 RGZ. 
385). A peculiar exception has been made by the RG. (Feb. I7, I936) I50 
RGZ. 283 (an Italian wife domiciled in Germany was granted this action, un-
known to Italian law, because she lacked the remedy she would have enjoyed 
in Italy). 
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As already mentioned, the local law is competent, how-
ever, 51 to bar an action that does not fit in with the local system 
or to refuse a method of enforcement not permitted by its 
procedure; it seems safe to assert also that no forcible control 
by extrajudicial acts is granted unless permitted by the local 
law.52 
Instead of resorting to the personal law, French courts have 
sometimes simply applied the domestic law, especially when 
the court was anxious to compel a husband to support his 
wife. 53 French courts have also enforced the duty of obedience 
to which a wife is bound under French law, irrespective of 
whether such duty was incumbent on her under the national 
law of the spouses.54 The C6digo Bustamante seems to 
abandon the personal law entirely, when it states that the 
obligation of the spouses to live together, to observe mutual 
fidelity, and to support each other, is subject to the local law 
(art. 45). 
Domicil by operation of law. A problem deserving special 
discussion is that of determining the law by which the domicil 
of a married woman is fixed. The conflicts rule on marital 
relations determines, as a matter of course, whether a wife is 
obliged to follow her husband to his place of abode; 55 but 
does it also determine whether her domicil necessarily coin-
51 Supra p. 307. Thus, German courts would not assume the task of Swiss judges 
of admonishing the parties and suspending their life in common, Swiss C. C. 
arts. I 69, I 70. 
52 Only occasionally, the action for restoration of conjugal rights has been 
classified as of imperative public policy; thus RG. (Oct. 6, I927) IPRspr., 
1926-I927, no. 68 (Soviet Russians). 
53 Trib. civ. Seine (May 3, I879) Clunet I879, 489; Cour Paris (April 20, 
I88o) Clunet 188o, 300 (action for goods received at the domicil of the hus-
band); Cour Paris (Jan. 7, I903) Clunet I9o5, 208. 
54 Trib. civ. d'Evreux (Feb. 15, 1861) D. 1862.3.39 and Trib. civ. Seine 
(April 8, I93o) Revue 1930, 46I. Concerning the latter, see infra n. 83. 
55 Germany: OLG. Braunschweig (Jan. 19, 19I3) 26 ROLG. 232 (American 
.wife held obliged to follow her husband from New Jersey to Germany, the 
law of New Jersey being in accord). · · 
France: Cass. (req.) (June 25, 1923) Clunet I924, 462 (in the application 
of German BGB. § 1354 par. 2, it was held that a German wife in Alsace need 
not follow her husband to an inconvenient dwelling place). 
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cides with that of her husband? The municipal laws differ 
widely in answering this question. 56 \Vhile England and Latin 
America still insist upon the ancient rule that the husband's 
domicil is necessarily that of his wife, other countries, for in-
stance, Norway and the Soviet Union, do not recognize the 
wife's domicil as dependent on her husband's at all. 57 
In Germany, prevailing opinion applies the personal law 
(i.e., the national law of the husband) also to the question 
whether the wife necessarily shares her husband's domicil. 58 
The United States courts, as well as the Treaty of Mon-
tevideo, resolve this question, like all other questions con-
cerning domicil, by resorting to the forum's own rules on 
domicil, unified throughout the country, instead of referring 
the problem to the law declared applicable by the forum's 
choice of law rules. Thus the Restatement says: 
"§ 2 7 ... a wife has the same domicil as that of her hus-
band." 
"§ 28. If a wife lives apart from her husband without being 
guilty of desertion according to the law of the state which 
was their domicil at the time of separation, she can have a 
separate domicil." 
Except on the question of desertion, neither the municipal law 
of the domicil nor that of the forum is decisive. 
56 E.g., in America the older rule that a deserted wife is domiciled at the new 
domicil of her husband, has not yet been abolished by the present Treaty of 
Montevideo on international civil law, text of 1889, art. 8, but is abolished by 
the new draft of 1940, art. 9· The Restatement § 28, moreover, permits the 
wife leaving her husband to establish a new domicil if she is not guilty of de-
sertion; statutory law permits the same even if she is guilty. 
57 Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 570 no. 71.. Russia: FREUND, 4 Leske-
Loewenfeld I 340. 
58 Cf. BGB. § 10 and see RAAPE, 1. D. IPR. 191; cf. the recent decision of 
the RG. (Jan. u, 1939) HRR. 1939, no. 376, 159 RGZ. 167, on the child's 
domicil (infra p. 6os, n. 1.61). 
Contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 1.31 1 503. 
Similarly, Belgium: Cass. (March 19, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925.1.179; Trib. 
Bruges (March 4, 1936) Pasicrisie 1937·3.81. Cf. infra Divorce, Chapter n, 
n. 7I. 
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A case decided by the Tribunal civil de la Seine 59 involved 
a citizen of Czarist Russia who had married an American girl 
from Rhode Island before a civil official in Cyprus. Some 
time after the marriage, the husband went to Paris, while 
the wife went to live in Capri, Italy, and never came to France 
at all. The Tribunal, considering the question one of "qualifica-
tion" and following Bartin's theory on this subject, declared 
in conformance with the French law of the forum that the 
domicil of a wife was necessarily that of her husband.60 
It may be observed, however, that this decision, like many 
others, 61 was concerned with domicil as a condition of the 
court's jurisdiction in a lawsuit brought against the wife at 
the domicil of the husband. In this connection, the local con-
cept of domicil clearly has a better claim than in the choice 
of law. 
In line with the general tendency toward the domiciliary 
principle, it has even been advocated that the law of the hus-
band's domicil should decide the legal domicil of the wife. 62 
2. Capacity of Married Persons 
Classification. Under the system of personal law, the ques-
tion has been raised whether a married woman's disabilities 
are part of the status of the wife, and therefore governed by 
her own personal law, or rather whether they are part of the 
specific effects of marriage, and therefore subject to the law 
governing these effects, which may be the law of the husband, 
59 Trib. civ. Seine (April 27, 1933) Revue Crit. 1935, 759, with note by 
NIBOYET. Similar cases: Cass. (req.) (June 21, 1865) S.1865.1.313; Cass. 
(civ.) (March 13, 1933) Revue Crit. 1934, 718, Clunet 1933, 639; Cass. 
(civ.) (Dec. 4, 1935) Revue Crit. 1937, 189. 
60 Cf. NIBOYET, Revue Crit. 1935, 762. 
61 Cf. e.g., OLG. Stuttgart (May 8, 19o8) 17 ROLG. 81, r8 Z.int.R. (19o8) 
453· 
Uruguay: App. Montevideo (about 1938) Rev. Der. Juris. Adm. 1938, 210, 
Clunet 1938, 841 (action for separation between American citizens, the husband 
being domiciled in Uruguay, the wife living in the :United States), 
82 NIBOYET, I Traite nos. 541 1 5541 571. . 
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that of the common nationality, or some other law. All bias 
aside, this problem of classification depends on the specific 
nature of the wife's incapacity. The conflicts rule concerning 
status in general envisages legal incapacities presumed to in-
here in the female sex; the rule concerning personal effects of 
marriage regards such disabilities as may be imposed in con-
sequence of marriage. The principal illustration was the 
former article 2 I 7 of the French Civil Code: A wife, even 
when there is no community or in case of separation of prop-
erty, cannot give, convey, mortgage, or acquire property, 
either with or without consideration, without her husband's 
joining in the instrument or his written consent. This rule, 
imitated in many countries, was abolished in Italy in I 9 I 9, 
in France itself in I 9 3 8, and in other countries/3 but is still in 
force in some other places. The probable motivation of the 
draftsmen of the Code, 64 emphasized by modern commenta-
tors, 65 was not a belief in the "frailty of the sex" but a desire 
to strengthen the leadership of the husband, who was intended 
to enjoy his powers not only in his own interest but in the in-
terest of the family as a whole. Hence, the provision affects 
not so much the status of the wife as the organization of the 
family, i.e., the effects of marriage. An incapacity, such as was 
imposed by the French Code, should be governed by the con-
flicts rules on personal effects of marriage rather than by those 
dealing with personal incapacities. 66 All these observations 
63Jtaly: Law no. 1176 of July 17, 1919. 
France: Law of Feb. 18, 1938, J. OJI. Feb. 19, 1938, :ws8 no. 42, also in 
39 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 145· 
Belgium: C. C. arts. 212-226 bis, as amended by Law of July 20, 1932. 
Rumania: Law of April 19, 1932. 
64 See HERCHENRODER, "The Capacity of Married Women in French Law," 
20 Journ. Comp. Leg. (1938) 197 n. 1. 
65 CoLIN et CAPITANT, 1 Cours elementaire de droit civil fran<;ais (ed. 3) 
6r8; NIBOYET 736 no. 627, and prevailing theory. 
66 Dominant doctrine, see RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 267; M. WoLFF, 4 
Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 408; PILLET, 1 Traite 591 no. 277; FEDOZZI 454· 
Contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIN 232, because of his theory, and some of the Swiss 
decisions because of the confused Swiss legislation. 
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seem equally true in regard to the common law disabilities of 
married women. They were never designed for the protection 
of the wife but were based upon the idea of the merger of per-
sonalities and thus flowed from the marriage relationship.67 
A different characterization of similar incapacities by the 
municipal law of the forum is irrelevant. It is always pos-
sible, of course, that some statute, for instance, that of Florida, 
although on its face similar to the provision of the French 
Code, requires a different construction. 68 
Suppose a woman, a citizen of the United States, is married 
to a Belgian, both being domiciled in England, and she pro-
cures a loan in Nice, France, without her husband's consent. 
A court following the nationality principle (German, Cuban, 
etc.) will apply neither American law (as of her status) nor 
the English (as of her domicil) nor the French (as lex loci 
actus) but Belgian law (as governing marital relations). 
Where the wife has retained a personal law of her own, 
the only consistent solution is to disregard this law. 69 
Finally, personal effects of marriage must be distinguished 
from the effects of marriage on property interests. Numerous 
disabilities of a spouse as regards freedom of contract or con-
veyance result from some matrimonial regimes, for instance, 
from the community property system or the systems accord-
ing to which the wife's general assets are managed by her hus-
band. Prevailing opinion does not link with personal effects 
of marriage the limitation of a married woman's capacity, un-
less it results from the marriage itself irrespective of any 
matrimonial property regime. The Swiss Federal Tribunal 
67 See the most recent writer, JosEPH GINSBURG, "Contractual Liability of 
Married Women in Nebraska," zo Neb. L. Rev. (1941) 191, 19z. 
63 In Florida and Texas, the common law disabilities of married women 
have only partially been removed; cf. 3 VERNIER 36 § 15z; in Florida the 
Circuit Court may grant the wife power "to take charge of and manage her own 
estate and property," if the court is satisfied as to her capacity to do so, Fla. 
Statutes Ann. (1943) §§ 6z.z8-6z.31, 
69 PILLET, r Traite 591; LEWALD 95; doubts have been expressed by M. 
WoLFF, IPR. u4, and RAAPE 2.89. 
MARRIAGE 
formulated this rule once by acknowledging such effects on the 
personal relations, if these effects take place even where the 
wife has no property at all.7° Thus, the capacity to contract 
and to acquire property 71 granted to married women by the 
American equal rights statutes is a general capacity and ought 
to be respected everywhere as an incident of the marriage law 
involved insofar as that law is applied at all to the relations 
between a husband and his wife. Analogous observations apply 
with respect to limitations on married men. 
Married woman's capacity to contract. (a) As a general 
rule, the personal law is applied everywhere in Europe. This 
principle has been stated expressly by a recent Finnish statute 
and seems unchallenged throughout the civil law countries. 72 
It was held in France, for instance, that, in accordance with 
the foreign law of the time, an English wife was capable of 
contracting without her husband's consent,73 that an Italian 
70 BG. (Nov. :u, 1908) 34 BGE. II 738, 742. For an illustration of the 
double task of examining first the personal capacity in general, then the pos-
sible restrictions by matrimonial property law, see the opinion by LYoN-CAEN, 
advocate general, Cour Paris (July 71 1928) Revue 19291 8r (Norwegian 
spouses). 
71 Cf. KG. (Aug. 2, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 44· 
72 Finland: Law of Dec. 5, 1929 on family relations of international nature, 
§ 14 par. 3, capacity of a married woman to act determined by the law of the 
state whose citizen she is, except for art. r 6, relating to third persons, and the 
provisions concerning marital property. 
France: Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 301 1854) S.1854.I.27o; Cass. (civ.) (July 29, 
1901) Clunet 19or, 971; and a great many decisions of the lower courts; see 
WEISS, 3 Traite 588. 
Germany: OLG. Koln (Dec. 5, 1898) Clunet 1905, 396; RG. (Oct. rz, 
1905) DJZ. 19051 II701 Revue 1907, 8oo (German wife contracting in 
Luxemburg, liable under German law); RG. (March 201 1906) JW. 1907, 
328, Clunet 19081 r87. 
Italy: Cass. Roma (May 2, 1908) Giur. Ita!. 19081 1, 941, Clunet 19091 563. 
Switzerland: The national law of the wife, not the domiciliary law, is de-
cisive; see BG. (Nov. 21, 19o8) 34 BGE. II 741, applying Handlungsfahig-
keitgesetz (r88r) art. 10 par. 21 instead of NAG. arts. 321 34; BG. (May 23, 
1912) 38 BGE. II 3; capacity to contract is governed by the national law: BG. 
(April 6, r894) 20 BGE. 648ft, 31 ZBJV. (1895) 173, 4 Z.int.R. (1894) 
390 and 5 Z.int.R. (1895) 310; even if she is a former Swiss citizen: BG. 
(Nov. 21, 1908) 34 BGE. II 738, 742. 
73 Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. ro, r893) Clunet 1893, 5301 obviously protecting 
the French creditors, as the wife had made it clear that she contracted for 
herself alone, not on behalf of her husband. The same is true for other de-
cisions. 
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wife could act upon the basis of a general power of attorney 
from her husband (contrary to French law), 74 and that a wife 
from Wallis, Switzerland, needed an authorization of the 
court in case the husband was interested in the transaction. 75 
The capacity of married women under age to contract de-
pends on whether, under the marital law, any powers are re-
served to her father or guardian. 76 
(b) The law of the forum is seldom resorted to in this mat-
ter. 77 
(c) The law of the place of contracting is applied nowhere 
but in the United States and, perhaps as to mercantile con-
tracts, in England. 78 
Capacity to sue and be sued. A woman's capacity to be a 
party to a lawsuit (persona standi in judicio, capacite d'ester en 
justice) is generally held to depend upon the personallaw/9 
except in the United States, where it is determined by the law 
of the forum (Restatement§ 588). 
The public policy of the forum has hardly ever been ad-
vanced to eliminate the personal law. 80 
74 Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. 5, r88r) Clunet 1882, 617; conf'd Cour Paris (Dec. 
17, 1883) Clunet 1884, 289; Trib. civ. Tunis (Jan. 29, 1908) Clunet 1909, 
745· -
75 Cour Cham\;>ery (Jan. 9, 1884) Clunet r8851 r8o; Trib. comm. Seine 
(May ro, r886) Clunet r887, 183; App. Chambery (Jan. 29, 1934) Revue 
Crit. 1935, 133 (Swiss wife needed authorization under Swiss C. C. art. 177). 
Correspondingly, Cour civ. Geneve (Nov. 171 1933) 56 Sem. Jud. (1934) 
572 (French wife in Switzerland under French law). 
76 RG. (Jan. 10, 1918) 91 RGZ. 403. 
17 France: PILLET, I Traite 588 no. 276; LEREBOUR5-PIGEONNIERE 389 
no. 332; contra: GouL:E, "Femme mariee," 8 Repert. 388 nos. r6, 17, 
78 CHESHIRE 238, advocating the proper law; c/. supra pp. 190, 191. 
79 France: WEISS, 3 Traite 589 n. 1, cites six French decisions and three of 
Egyptian Mixed Tribunals. 
Germany: never doubted. 
The Netherlands: Rb. den Haag (June 24, 1919) W.10566 (Italian law); 
Hof Amsterdam (July q, 1923) W.u163, N.J. 1924, 118 (Swiss law); 
Rb. Amsterdam (March 171 1930) W.12151 and Rb. Arnhem (Jan. 23, 1933) 
W.I271o, first point (German law) and others. 
Spain: Trib. Supr. (Jan. q, 1885) 57 Sent. 45, Clunet r888, 138, cf. 
Clunet 1889, 771 (wife, party to a lawsuit in Cuba, on the ground of her 
capacity under the law of the United States). 
80 0ne case is known: App. Gand (Dec. 24, 1902) Clunet 1903, 980, criti-
cized by STOCQUART, ibid. 977• 
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Right of the wife to carry on a business or engage ina profes-
sion. (a) Whether a wife needs the consent of her husband to 
accept employment or to carry on an independent business of 
her own, is decided according to the law that governs her 
personal relations. For instance, an Italian wife who had en-
gaged in a profession in French Tunisia, was held to have done 
so with her husband's consent, which was presumed to exist 
under article I 3 of the Italian Commercial Code, as worded 
at that time. 81 The rule includes the conditions for a wife's 
carrying on a business as a "sole trader." 82 
The Tribunal civil de la Seine, however, consistently fol-
lowing its tendency to apply French law whenever possible, 
awarded damages of so,ooo francs to an American husband, 
domiciled in Chicago, Illinois, against the managers of a 
theater in Paris who had employed his French wife, a former 
music hall diva, against his prohibition. 83 It would be intoler-
able, the court said, if the wife could publicly challenge in 
France the authority of her husband, even when he is a foreign 
subject. The right of a French husband to forbid his wife to 
engage in separate professional activity has been preserved by 
the reform act of r938, which, however, subjects the exercise 
of this right to the approval of the courts. 84 
(b) The law of the forum simply is applied in the United 
States. 
Prohibition of certain transactions with third persons. In 
former times, a married woman was often forbidden to become 
a surety or to pledge or mortgage her separate property for her 
husband or other persons; her power to do so is still limited 
or denied in some states of the United States. 85 In the Swiss 
81 Trib. civ. Tunis (March 28, 1908)-Revue 1909,227. 
812 Cf. the American statutes collected by 3 VERNIER § r 8 7 and for Europe, 
HARTENSTEIN, "Handelsfrau," in 4 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterb. rs6, on con-
flicts law ibid. 1 61. 
83 Trib. civ. Seine (Aprils, 1930) Revue 1930,461. 
84 Law of Feb. r8, 1938. See supra p. 312, n. 63. 
85 Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania. 
The New Hampshire statute was construed as protecting only married women 
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Civil Code (art. 177 par. 3), the authorization of the court of 
the domicil is required for any obligation to third persons 
undertaken by a wife for her husband. This restriction would 
be applied in a German court, 80 and it has been urged that a 
German court should grant such authorization if the wife has 
her domicil in Germany. 87 
Another prohibition established in Portugal and Brazil 88 
provides that a husband may not without the consent of his 
wife ( outorga ux6ria) alienate immovables, sue or be sued 
(sic) in regard to immovables, make gifts, or (by Brazilian 
. law) become a surety. This prohibition is expressly stated to 
apply irrespective of the property regime and thus comes 
under the heading of personal relations in all courts applying 
the personal law. The Brazilian courts, however, by their 
broad extension of public policy, have applied the prohibition 
also in the case of a foreigner married to a Brazilian wife 89 
and will probably continue to do so under their new law, in the 
case of Brazilian domicil of either party. 
Protection of third persons. Restrictions of the kind de-
scribed above are usually meant to apply also to relations be-
tween the spouses and third parties. If, however, foreign 
restrictions are to be upheld, the conflicts rule may well make 
an exception in the case of a third person dealing in good faith 
domiciled in New Hampshire; see Proctor v. Frost (1938) 89 N.H. 304, 197 
Atl. 813, and Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev. (1938) 1444. On Nebraska see 3 VERNIER 
3 r 5 n. 9· The Roman-Dutch law imposing restrictions on a married woman 
binding herself or her property, was considered a rule of capacity, governed 
with respect to immovables by the lex situs, in Bank of Africa Ltd. v. Cohen 
[1909] 2 Ch. 129, cf. CHESHIRE 541; also UNGER, "The Place of Classification 
in Private International Law," 19 Bell Yard (1937) 3, 14. 
86 For France see WEISS, 3 Traite 590, 591, but he admits two decisions of 
18 31 and 18 3 3 applying the lex fori, ibid. n. 5· 
87 RAAPE 287ff. 
88 Portugal: C. C. arts. 1119, 1191, 14 71. Brazil: C. C. art. 2 3 s; cf. BEVIL-
AQUA, 2 C6digo Civil ( ed. s, 19 3 7) 115. The husband's acting without the 
wife's consent is prevailingly held to be annullable rather than void; see on 
the controversy in Brazil GUIMARAES, Accordiios, 3 supplemento (1939) 476. 
89 See Sup. Trib. Fed. (Nov. 30, 1932), not published, see VALLADAO 124, 
reported by RoDRIGO OcTAVIO, Dicionario no. 986; Sup. Trib. Fed. (May 24, 
192 9) 1 o Rev. J ur. Bras. ( 19 3 1) 3 53 ; for decisions of Siio Paulo, see VALLADAO 
132. . 
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with one of the spouses. The German Code, although contain-
ing two clauses for the protection of domestic commerce (EG. 
arts. 7, par. 3 and r 6, par. 2), does not cover the prohibitions 
discussed here, but analogous application of these clauses has 
been advocated. 90 In France, Brazil, and other countries, the 
vague and omnipresent force of public policy is invoked when-
ever domestic creditors are endangered by the application of 
a foreign law. 
3· Implied Authority: Legal Transactions Between Hus-
band and Wife 
Power to obligate the other spouse. By virtue of her "power 
of the keys," so denominated in the German doctrine as a 
power granted ex lege, the wife is authorized to bind her 
husband by contracting within the sphere of household 
activities (BGB. § 1357). The French courts have gradually 
been reaching similar results on the basis of an alleged implied 
authorization (mandat tacite) by the husband, the presumed 
contractual basis thereof becoming more and more fictitious. 91 
Most countries have rules of either the German or the French 
type, which are sufficiently different from each other, however, 
to cause problems in conflict of laws. The prevailing view holds 
that all these regulations are concerned with the personal rela-
tions between husband and wife, rather than their property 
relations. 92 
Of the same character are the various rules concerning 
liability for household expenses, such as the American family 
expense statutes, 93 the corresponding provisions in Switzer-
90 See RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. 199 and citations. 
91 KARL TH. KIPP, Rechtsvergleichende Studien zur Lehre von der Schliis-
selgewalt in den romanischen Rechten (Berlin, 1928). Nothing was changed 
by the reforms of r 938; cf. Note by VIALLETON in Sirey r 938.x.r 76, 1 79· 
92 See NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 144 and the authors cited by RABEL, 
5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 283; J. STRELITZ, Die Schliisselgewalt in internationalen 
Privatrecht, Thesis (Gottingen, 1936). To the same effect in Switzerland, 
STAUFFER, NAG. 79 no. 9· 
93 3 VERNIER 102 § r6o. 
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land, 94 Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Scandinavia, Guatemala, and 
other countries,95 which declare both husband and wife liable 
for certain acts of the wife, and finally those occasional rules 
which impose upon the wife liability for certain deeds of her 
husband. 
Not only in Germany is the personal law applied with 
respect to all these rules, 96 but also in America the courts are 
in agreement on this point. In Paquin Ltd. v. W esterfelt, 91 the 
family expense statute of Connecticut was applied by the Con-
necticut court to spouses domiciled in that state, while in 
Mandell Brothers v. Fogg/8 the Massachusetts court did not 
apply the statute of Illinois, making the property of both 
spouses jointly and severally liable for expenses of the family, 
as against a wife whose husband had bought goods in Chicago, 
both being citizens of Massachusetts. This latter case illus-
trates a disregard for the seller of the goods, typical of any 
consistent resort to the principle of personal law. , 
German law is less rigorous. The German code has estab-
lished an exception to the rule that the law of the husband 
governs the relations between husband and wife; German law 
applies if the spouses are domiciled in Germany and the 
German law is "more favorable" to the third party with whom 
a transaction has been made (EG., art. 16 par. 2). The awk-
ward form of this sound exception has been properly criti-
cized. 99 
French courts, on the contrary, have been said simply to ap-
ply the law of the forum. 100 What they actually did in a series 
94 Swiss C. C. arts. 207 par. 21 220 par. 2, 243 par. 3; cf. ibid. arts. 163, 206. 
95 See KrPP, op. cit. supra n. 91, at 17; KADEN, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 
205 2 b(a). 
96 Unanimous opinion. The application of the Hague Convention of 1905 
is controversial; c/. WrERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 63 n. 365 and 
contra: 3 FRANKENSTEIW240. 
97 Paquin, Ltd. v. Westerfelt (1919) 93 Conn. 513, ro6 Atl. 766. 
98 Mandell Brothers v. Fogg (1903) 182 Mass. 5821 66 N. E. 198. 
99 See comment by RAAPE 359· 
100 PILLET, r Traite 588 no. 276; BAR TIN, 2 Principes 242 § 3oo, and others 
with regret, as they advocated the national law; NrBOYET 739 no. 628 (2). 
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of cases was to allow fashionable Paris dressmakers to sue the 
husbands of lady customers on the theory that the debt was 
within the rather modest scope of those household expenses 
usually allowed on the ground of mandat tacite.101 In no case 
would the national law of the husband have been more advan-
tageous to the plaintiff; ordinarily the spouses were found to 
have been domiciled in France at the time of both the order 
and the delivery of the goods. Since the allocation· of the debt 
as between husband and wife was not in question, the result 
seems not very different from the German rule. 
The ·failure of the American conflicts rule to accept the 
creditor's claim as defined under his own law, compels him, 
before contracting, either to investigate where the spouses are 
domiciled and what law is in effect there or to ask both spouses 
expressly to consent. The elimination of that necessity is the 
precise purpose of the family expense laws. 
The best solution, so far not in force anywhere, would be 
to hold either spouse liable or free from liability, according to 
the personal law governing the non-patrimonial relations be-
tween the spouses and, further, to grant the plaintiff the pos-
sibility of availing himself of any more advantageous position 
that he may have under the "proper law of the contract." 
Prohibited transactions between husband and wiie. A few 
vestiges of the ancient notion that marriage effects a merger of 
the wife's personality with that of her husband and that hus-
band and wife represent a single unity of body and soul, have 
survived to the present day. In several states of the United 
States, 102 husband and wife either cannot contract with each 
101 Worth c. Rimsky-Korsakoff, Trib. civ. Seine (March 30, r 893) Clunet 
1893, 868; Cour Paris (June 17, 1899) Clunet 19oo, q8; Trib. civ. Seine 
(June 9, 1905) Clunet 1905, 1040; Beer c. Prince Kotschoubey, Trib. civ. 
Seine (April 10, 1907) conf'd Cour Paris (Nov. 5, 1907) Clunet 1908, 478; 
Beer c. Prince Yourewsky, Trib. civ. Seine (June 17, r9o8) Clunet 1909, 476 
(denying liability of husband); Redfern c. the same defendant, Trib. civ. Seine 
(July 13, 1911) Revue 19rz, 385; Cour Paris (April r8, 1929) Revue Crit. 
1935, 149 (English spouses living in France; the husband is not allowed to 
entrench himself behind the English system of property separation). 
102 3 VERNIER§§ 156, 173• 
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other at all or are unable to make certain transactions with 
each other, for instance, to form a partnership, to transfer im-
movables, ·or to make a sale to each other.103 The French 
courts, though they cannot carry the principle through, regard 
partnerships between spouses as null.104 In European conflict 
of laws, the personal law clearly seems to govern the applica-
tion of such provisions.105 
Widely discussed, however, are the choice of law problems 
arising from the prohibition of gifts between husband and 
wife. The controversy originated in the days of the postglos-
sators, when Baldus and Bartolus disagreed on whether the 
Roman prohibition of donationes inter virum et uxorem was a 
statutum reale or a statutum personale.106 Most codes have 
abandoned such prohibitions, but, under some legislations, 
gifts made during coverture are still invalid 107 or revo-
cable. 108 According to prevailing opinion, these rules are 
within the scope of the personal effects of marriage.109 Hence 
103 For sales, see also France: C. C. art. I 595· 
The Netherlands: BW. art. I503, and others. 
104 See LAGARDE, I Revue generale de droit commercial (I 93 8) I 7 5; since 
the alleged prohibition is based on the matrimonial law, Cass. (civ.) (July 3, 
I9I7) S.I92I.I.2or, it is applied to French spouses trading in Italy, App. Lyon 
(April 24, I929) S.1931.2.25 (refusing in consequence enforcement to an 
Italian decree treating the wife as a merchant and, hence, declaring her bank-
rupt) .. 
105 France: Cass. (req.) (Jan. 25, 1938) D.H. 1938. I64 ff. (sale between 
the spouses valid under Mohammedan law, despite French C. C. art. 1595). 
The Netherlands: H.R, (May I], 1929) W.I2oo6, N.J. I929, 1279 (sale 
between German spouses of Dutch immovables, subject to German marital law 
rather than to Dutch BW. art. 1503). Similarly Louisiana: Rush et a!. v. 
Landers (I902) 107 La. 549, 32 So. 95; Note, 57 L.R.A. 353 applies art. 
2446 La. C. C., to an immovable, the spouses being domiciled in Indiana. 
106 Cf. WEISS, 3 Traite 592 n. I; AUDINET, 5 Repert. 668 nos. :u6ff. 
107 1taly: C. C. (r865) art. Io54; the Netherlands: BW. art. I715; Spain: 
C. C. art. I 3 34· 
108 France: C. C. art. r 09 6; Portugal: C. C. arts. II 7 8, II 8 I. 
105 Belgium: PouLLET 6o9 no. 468 n. 2. 
France: WEISS, 3 Traite 592; BAR TIN, 2 Principes 213 § 292; App. Caen 
(Jan. I5, I9I2) Revue I9I4, 147; Cass. (req.) (March 15, I933) S.I9J4.I.393· 
Germany: RG. (March 2, 1894) 4 Z.int.R. (1894) 35r; RG. (Oct. u, 
1907) I9 Z.int.R. (1909) 222, and the general opinion of writers. 
Greece: STREIT-VALLINDAS 350 n. 36. 
Spain: See DE CASTRO, "La cuesti6n de las califi.caciones en el Derecho inter-
nacional privado," 20 Revista Der. Priv. (1933) 265 at 278 n. 167, refuting. 
the argumentation by RAAPE 34I II 3 as to Spanish law. 
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the personal law applied is that of the lucrative transaction, 
irrespective of the time element considered determinative in 
marital property relations. 110 To resolve the uncertainties in 
the case where the spouses have different nationalities,111 the 
Polish statute expressly invokes the national law of the hus-
band at the time of the contract.112 
The French courts exclude immovables, at least immovables 
situated in France, from the rule and apply French law as the 
law of the situs.l13 
Other classifications have been occasionally preferred. The 
Dutch Supreme Court, 114 for instance, once held that the 
Dutch prohibition, although affecting Dutch public policy, did 
not apply to German spouses because the prohibition was said 
to be inseparably connected with the prohibition of postnuptial 
marriage settlements, established in the Dutch legislation 
and Latin Codes, but unknown to the German Code. 
As respects provisions excluding lawsuits between husband 
and wife, the American rule that the law of the forum 115 or, 
in the case of an action in tort, the law of the place of the 
wrong 116 should be applied, is not shared by other countries; 
11° KG. (March 20, 1939) Dt. Recht 1939, 938 (supposing that the husband 
was of Greek nationality at the time of the marriage, a certain contract made 
by him, in view of the Greek matrimonial system of separate property, consti-
tuted a donation;· since he ~ertainly was a Greek at the time of the contract, a 
donation, if any, was void under Greek law, applicable as governing personal 
relations. The court did not, as a Note by REU believes, characterize donation 
under lex fori or lex causae, but simply applied the historic conceptions common 
to all nations concerned). 
111 See, besides the general discussion, supra p. 301, AuDINET, 5 Repert. 669 
nos. 236, 242ff. 
112 Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. 15. 
Germany: Erster Gebhardscher Entwurf (1881) § 19 par. 3. 
113 Cass. (civ.) (April 21 1884) Clunet 1885, 77; Trib. civ. Seine (March 
3> 1891) Clunet I89I, 508, modified by Cour Paris (May 27, 1892) Clunet 
1&921 940, S.r896.2..73, conf'd Cass. (req.) (May&, 1&94) Clunet 1894, 562.1 
D.I894·1·355; Cour Paris (March 5, 1901) Clunet 1901 1 775; Cass. (req.) 
(May 71 1924) Revue 1924, 407. BARTIN, 2. Principes 215, 216, hopes this 
singular treatment of immovables is transitory. 
114 H.R. (May 17, 1929) W. uoo6. 
115 Restatement § I 3 3 implicitly. 
116 Critical STUMBERG 1 &6. 
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such prohibitions are regarded merely as means of regulating 
the marriage relation and preserving domestic harmony. Re-
cent American writers have urged a corresponding application 
of the personallaw.117 
Of the same character are laws that do not permit a hus-
band or wife to levy execution upon the property of the other 
spouse. The Swiss law contains peculiar provisions of this 
kind, which the Swiss Federal Tribunal has repeatedly de-
clared to be no part of public policy and therefore not appli-
cable to the case of a husband domiciled abroad. 118 
Finally, the personal law governing marital effects extends 
to the problem whether spouses during coverture may make 
agreements on such matters as alimony (without or until 
judicial separation), residence, or education of children. In 
modern times, more and more freedom of arrangement has 
been allowed, but the laws differ considerably. The French 
courts, vigorously insisting on their domestic restrictions of 
such agreements, are concerned almost exclusively with ex-
amining whether these restrictions have been observed.119 
/ 
Particular difficulties arise in the case of financial agree-
ments preceding separation or divorce.120 
111 STUMBERG I 86; HANCOCK, Torts in the Conflict of Laws 235; cf. as to 
vicarious liability of the husband, ibid. 255. 
~18 BG. (March JI, I927) 53 BGE. III 33> 37; BG. (Oct. IO, 1930) 56 
BGE. III I 73; contra: BG. (Sept. s, I 9 I 6) 42 BGE. III 342, 348. 
119 Cour Paris (April 29, 1913) Revue 19I3, 879; Trib. civ. Seine {June 
I8, I934) Clunet I935> 6I9, Revue Crit. 1935, 125, criticized by BATIFFOL, 
Revue Crit. I937> 429, for not having inquired into the national (German) 
law of the spouses; App. Lyon (March 26, I934) Revue 1935, 46I; Cass. 
(civ.) {Jan. 26, I938) D.H. I938.I97, and Cour Dijon (March 28, 1939) 
Clunet 1939, 634, neglect the analogous Italian marital law because the agree-
ment was valid under French law. 
120 E.g., a Swiss author, ADRIAN, (according to the review of his book in 38 
SJZ. (I 942), 37I) admonishes Swiss lawyers to be aware in the case of English 
parties, of the hostility of English law to agreements whereby a spouse promises 
financial advantages to the other for obtaining divorce, while Swiss C. C. art. 
I 58 allows agreements as to the consequences of divorce or separation with 
allowance of the divorce court. See moreover, infra, pp. 525, 531. 
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4· Support 121 
Application of the matrimonial law. The husband's duty to 
support his wife or, more generally, one spouse's duty to sup-
port the other is considered in civil law countries as one of the 
principal incidents of marriage, 122 rather than a quasi-
contractual obligation as conceived under an earlier doc-
trine.123 
German courts and writers are in almost unanimous agree-
ment that the national law of the husband, being the law 
governing the marital relation, applies to all questions per-
taining to the conditions and kind of support to be rendered, 
either within the common household or during an extrajudicial 
separation. The only exception to this principle, according to 
German decisions, is that marital property rules govern the 
determination of what property is liable to furnish the means 
of support.124 
French courts have often been said to follow the law of the 
forum, but they too start with the application of the national 
law.125 They think, however, that the French rules on alimony 
present a minimum standard which must be applied on the 
ground of public policy.126 This modification has been rejected 
121 On comparative law and international enforcement see International In-
stitute for the Unification of Private Law, L'Execution a l'etranger des obli-
gations alimentaires (Rome, 1938); "L'abandon de famille et ses sanctions," 
in Travaux de la semaine internationale de droit (Paris, I937). 
122 RocuJN, Traite de droit civil compare, Le Mariage (I 904) 198 ff. nos. 
147, 148; Swiss BG. (May 29, 1908) 34 BGE. I 299, 313; revised Czecho-
slovakian draft of Private International Law,§ I7 par. I, in Revue I931, 189. 
123 1 BAR § 20J. 
124 RG. (Feb. 15, 1906) 62 RGZ. 4oo, I6 Z.int.R. (I9o6) 298, 20 Z.int.R. 
(1910) 404, Clunet I9I1 1 946; Bay. ObLG. (March 3, I9I3) 30 ROLG. I65; 
3 FRANKENSTEIN 26o n. 135; KG. (Feb. 9, I929) IPRspr. I929, no. IS; KG. 
I929, no. IS; KG. (March 9, I93I) IPRspr. I93I, no. 66. 
125 Cour Paris (Oct. 30, I926) Gaz.Pal.I927.1.284; NrBOYET 739 no. 628 
(J). 
126 Cass. (req.) (July zz, I903) Clunet I904, 355; Cass. (req.) (March 
27, I922) S.1923.I.27• Clunet I922, I 15, Revue I924, 401. For many other 
decisions see WEiss, 3 Traite 597 n. 2. Spanish Trib. Supr. (July I, 1897) 8z 
Sent. r8 declares that a foreign married woman is to be protected, if in Spain. 
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by most German authorities, 127 although it might well be ad-
vocated in cases where a foreign married person is left stranded 
in the forum and has become a public charge, because his 
personal law fails to grant him a right to support by his spouse 
under the circumstances. The English and American rules on 
alimony and support in particular are usually construed so as 
to exclude their application by a foreign court; the lex fori is, 
then, the only possible resort to secure support for an indigent 
foreigner. 
Switzerland applies the general rules on marital effects ac-
cording to which foreigners domiciled in Switzerland are sub-
ject to Swiss law.128 
According to section 459 of the Restatement, the duty im-
posed by the state of the domicil to pay for necessaries fur-
nished to a husband, wife, or minor child is enforced in every 
state. To this extent the personal law of the parties has extra-
territorial effect. The Restatement also recognizes an obliga-
tion imposed by the state where the necessaries have been fur-
nished, but only if this state has jurisdiction over the debtor. 
Lex fori. Simple application of the lex fori to the duty of 
support has been adopted in the United States 129 as well as 
by the C6digo Bustamante.180 
127 RG. (Feb. I 5, I 906) 62 RGZ. 4oo, cited supra n. I 24; I BAR § 203 n. 2: 
"arbitrary." LEWALD 91 no. 126; RAAPE .284; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 261, em-
phasizing the force of the Hague Convention on effects of marriage. Contra: 
KIPP-WoLFF, Familienrecht I44 § 39B; NussBAUM, D. IPR. r47, in the case 
where both spouses reside permanently in Germany, or one spouse with the 
consent of the other, in view of the administrative and criminal importance of 
the duty. 
128 BG. (May 29, 19o8) 34 BGE. I 299, 316ff; BG. (Feb. 22, 1934) 6o 
BGE. II 77 (leaving undecided the case where only the defendant lives in 
Switzerland); BG. (April I8, I942) 68 BGE. II 9, 13. 
129 Restatement § 4 58. 
13
° C6digo Bustamante art. 45· It is recognized in community property states 
that the obligation to pay for necessaries arises out of· the marriage and not out 
of the wife's partnership in the community fund. See DAGGETT, Legal Essays 
on Family Law (1935) n6 for California, 123 for Louisiana, 134 for Texas, 
I44 for Washington. 
MARRIAGE 
Law of the debtor. A theory presented by Pillet 131 and 
adopted by the Japanese statute 132 subjects duties of support 
to the law of the debtor, but it is doubtful whether this rule is 
meant to apply to marital duties of support. 
Provisional decrees. If the personal law governs, it does so 
until the marriage is dissolved or some special rule applies. 
The personal law is not supplanted even on the commence-
ment of an action for annulment, for limited or full divorce, or 
for judicial separation; however, the procedural situation may 
give rise to particular needs.133 
J\. few German decisions have assumed that a court, taking 
cognizance of an action for divorce or some similar action, 
could by interlocutory decree grant the wife alimony pendente 
lite, irrespective of the foreign personal law governing the 
marital status of the parties.134 More recent decisions, how-
ever, no longer resort to the German law of the forum even in 
an interlocutory decree unless the personal law cannot be 
readily ascertained; 135 sometimes it is presumed that the 
foreign rule is identical with that of the forum. 136 
5. Wife's lien 131 
Article 2 I 2 I of the French Civil Code grants any married 
131 PILLET, I Traite 599 and Droit international prive, resume du cours 
(Paris 1904-1905). 
132 Japan: Law of 1898, art. 21. 
The similar Swiss provision, NAG. art. 9 par. 2, has no reference to foreigners; 
cf. STAUFFER, NAG. art. 9 no. 7· 
133 See also infra pp. 526-529. 
134 0LG. Hamburg (Dec. 7, 1911) Hans. G. Z. 1912 Beibl. 56 no. 28 II; 
OLG. Hamburg (April 28, 1921) 76 Seuff. Arch. 242 no. 149; OLG. Miinchen 
(Nov. 4, 1921) JW. 1921, 1465; OLG. Koln (Dec. 14, 1928) JW. 1929, 449; 
OLG. Hamm (Sept. 22, 1932) JW. 1932, 3824, IPRspr. 1932, no. 87. This 
practice was approved by LEWALD 91 no. 126 (b); NussBAUM, D. IPR 147 n. 
3; JONAS, JW. 1936, 3578. It does not refer to alimony between spouses in 
general, as an American writer understood. 
l:la The constant practice of the 13th Senate of the Kammergericht (March 9, 
1931 and Oct. 22, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, nos. 66, 67; (Dec. 19, 1932) IPRspr. 
1932, no. 88; (May 25, 1936) JW. 1936, 3577, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 33; 
RAAPE 284; cf. also WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 62 n. 359· 
136 LG. Mainz (Sept. 2, 1925) JW. 1925, 2163; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 262. 
137 CHARRON, "L'Hypotheque legale de Ia femme etrangere," Nouv. Revue 
1937, 29; Note, ibid. 1938, 124. 
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woman, irrespective of her property regime, a general lien on 
all her husband's land for the protection of claims which she 
may have against her husband, particularly claims arising from 
his management of her property. Prevailing opinion in France 
categorizes provisions of this sort despite their pecuniary 
character among personal effects of marriage.138 In recent 
years, however, French courts have refused to recognize a 
wife's lien on French immovables when the wife is neither a 
French national nor enjoys treaty rights, even though her 
national law imposes a lien on her husband's immovables.139 
The theory that the wife's lien is the counterpart of the dis-
abilities of a married woman has been invoked to justify the 
first theory.140 This argument cannot be correct, as the wife's 
lien was not abolished in France 141 when full legal capacity 
was granted to married women by the law of February 18, 
I 9 3 8. On the other hand, the courts transplant the problem 
into the field of the rights of aliens where it does not belong. 
The personal law should govern the problem simply as an 
incident of the marriage relationship. 
138 Trib. Havre (Dec. 29, 1928) Clunet 1929, 1048. WEISS, 3 Traite 649; 
PILLET, I Traite 593ff. no. 278; NIBOYET 741 no. 630; LEREBOURS-
PIGEONNIERE 428 no. 354; on an earlier practice see infra p. 336, n. 15. 
139 Cass. (req.) (Jan. 27, 1903) S.r904.r.81; Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 31 1 
1910) Revue 1911, 369, Clunet 191r, 901; App. Aix (Jan. 20, 1938) Clunet 
1938, 488, Nouv. Revue 1938, 122. 
140 See PILLET and NIBOYET, Zoe. cit. supra n. 138, CALEB, 4 Repert. 196 no. 
176 and authors cited. 
141 C. C. art. 2135, modified by Decret of June 14, 1938, allowing the 
wife, however, to waive her hypotMque legale. 
CHAPTER 10 
Effects of Marriage on Property' 
I. BAsic CoNCEPTIONS 
CORRESPONDING to far-reaching differences in the main conceptions of marital property systems, the con-flicts rules on this subject are split into three groups, 
two of which are illustrated by the American conflicts rules on 
marital property rights in ( r) immovables and ( 2) movables, 
and the third by the European rules on marital property rights. 
1. American Rules on Immovables 
The old rule on immovables, 2 which is preserved in this 
country, applies the lex situs. The underlying idea is that an 
immovable is considered an isolated object of rights. This idea 
can be traced back to ancient Germanic laws and was character-
istic of the feudal system of landholding. If a woman owned 
land at the time of marriage, the interest acquired by her 
husband through the marriage was determined by the law of 
1 On the American conflicts law see STUMBERG, "Marital Property an,d the 
Conflict of Laws," I 1 Tex. L. Rev. (I 9 p) 53; LEFLAR, "Community Property 
and Conflict of Laws," 2I Cal. L. Rev. (I933) 22I; HOROWITZ, "Conflict of 
Law Problems in Community Property," II Wash. L. Rev. (I936) 121, :n2; 
NEUNER, "Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws," 5 La. L. Rev. (I 943) 
I67. For comparative conflicts law: JuLIA JoELSON, Giiterrechtliche Wirkun-
gen der Ehe bei verschiedener Staatsangehorigkeit der Ehegatten im interna-
tionalen Privatrecht (Heidelberg, I 9 3 3). 
2 /mmobilia reguntur lege loci. STORY§§ I58, I86, I88; 4 PHILLIMORE 
no. 476; WHARTON 405 § 191. D'ARGENTRE originated this doctrine in 
polemics ( Commentarii in Patrias Britonum Leges, art. 2 I 8, gl. 6, § 34) 
opposing DUMOULIN's theory of domicil (consilium 53) in case no matrimonial 
convention was made. The doctrine was advocated in the Netherlands and in 
France by Paul Voet and Froland, from whom Story took inspiration. The 
problem was called the "most .famous question" in a decision of the Court of 
Dutch Brabant of November 3, r 693, "Decisio brabantina super famosissima 
questione." See FROLAND, I Memoires concernans la nature et la qualite des 
status (1729) 272, 309, 316; 1 LAINE 234, 334· 
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the place where the land was situated. Therefore, under the 
common law, if the spouses own real estate in ten different 
countries, ten different matrimonial laws must be consulted, 
each applying to its respective immovables only. The point of 
contact is the immovable itself; the place where the spouses are 
or where the assets are managed is irrelevant. This conception 
implies that no problem arises other than that of determining 
the interests of one spouse in the lands of the other. In fact, 
section 237 of the Restatement contents itself with declaring: 
"The effect of marriage upon interests in land owned by a 
spouse at the time of marriage is determined by the law of the 
state where the land is." 
2. American Rules on Movables 
Movables, according to the old rule, follow the person, 
mobilia ossibus inhaerent; rights in movables, created under 
the law of the domicil, have extraterritorial effect. With re-
spect to marital property, this rule is well settled in the United 
States despite occasional inroads made by the law of the situs. 3 
Accordingly, the mutual interests of husband and wife in each 
other's movables are localized at the place of the interested 
parties. 
So far the rule is unassailable. Doubt is cast on the rule, 
however, so soon as we ask whether all the movables belonging 
to a married person are together thought to form a unit, an 
entity, or whether each asset is a separate unit. The conception 
of all the movables constituting one unit seems to obtain when 
the prevailing rule is justified by the "desirability of applying 
a single uniform regime to the entire estate of the parties," 4 
3 It is remarkable, however, as a token of the strength· of the territorial 
theory that the cases that actually or apparently preferred the lex situs are 
continually emphasized by the writers; and this theory was adopted in the pro-
posed Final Draft of the Restatement § 3 II. 
4 Note, 43 Harv. L.Rev. (r93o) 1287; STUMBERG, II Tex. L. Rev. (I9JZ) 
63, supra n. r; LEFLAR, zi Cal. L. Rev. (I933) 233, supra n. r. 
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or when it is stated more precisely in the words of Beale 5 to be 
motivated by the consideration that 
"These (movables) are brought together into an aggregate 
unit, and from the time of acquisition become part of that unit, 
and ... the entire unit is treated by third parties as well as the 
spouses as a unit." 
\Ve should like to think that this idea means that the law of 
the marital domicil thus governs more problems than the 
single problem mentioned above concerning the existence and 
nature of the interests of husband and wife in each other's 
property. But we are warned against any such supposition by 
the language of the Restatement, which again speaks exclu-
sively of "rights or other interests in movables"(§§ 289 ff.) 
and when we find similar expressions used by the writers. We 
shall see, in.deed, that many, although certainly not all, other 
problems regarding the relationships between the spouses, as 
well as between them and third persons, are treated in Ameri-
can common law as belonging to the fields of contract, tort, or 
quasi-contract rather than to that of marital law. Apparently, 
the formulation of conflicts rules in this country has been un-
duly influenced by the narrow scope of the matrimonial law 
believed to remain after the passage of the Married Women's 
Acts. Furthermore, insufficient attention has been paid to the 
problems arising under the community property systems and 
to the regulations of the rest of the world. 
J. Continental Rules on Marital Property Relations 
Quite a different picture is presented by the traditional 
European marital laws, for which Central Europe has most 
fully elaborated the general theories. The tangible and in-
tangible assets of the parties ( activa) are conceived as forming 
one part of a major whole, viz., the estate, while the debts of 
the spouses form the other part. Therefore, inquiry is not 
5 2 BEALE § 290.1. 
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limited· to the determination of those interests which one 
spouse may have in the assets of the other, but it is also directed 
to the obligations that may arise between the spouses, the 
liability of either to creditors, the enforcement and execution 
of claims during coverture and after its termination, manage-
ment of the wife's goods other than those pertaining to her 
separate estate, presumptions as to ownership, and like ques-
tions. All these problems are regarded as forming one complex 
unit, similar to an inheritance treated as an aggregate, to which 
one conflicts rule applies. 
Generally, such a system extends to every asset, but in 
England and Argentina immovables are excepted and assigned 
to the lex situs, just as they are in this country. But even in 
these countries the system is not confined to the mutual in-
terests of the spouses in each other's property. 
The Continental systems, of course, are recognized in any 
common law court in accordance with its conflicts rule; nobody 
would think of refusing recognition because such a property 
regime is "unknown in the lex fori." 6 
4· Scope of the Marital Property Law 
It is important to emphasize the comparatively broad scope 
of marital property law in civil law countries. 
In the American system also, the "effect of marriage upon 
the interests of one spouse," to use the expression of section 
237 of the Restatement, refers to all rules of the applicable 
municipal law under which, by virtue of the marriage, prop-
erty rights or interests are created, modified, or terminated. 
In particular, both in the United States and in civil law 
countries, these rules determine what powers of management 
one spouse may exercise and what control the other may have; 
to what extent freedom of alienation is affected; who is the 
6 See BECKETT, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private 
International Law," 15 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (1934) 46 at 57· 
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proper party to sue and be sued with respect to the property of 
either spouse; 7 and similar questions. 
In civil law countries, marital property law also includes the 
effects of such events as voluntary or judicial separation, di-
vorce, postnuptial agreements, bankruptcy, and abuse by the 
husband of his rights of management. In principle, this is true 
in the United States too, but there are many variations and 
exceptions. 
Although article I9I of the C6digo Bustamante subjects the 
wife's right to recover her dowry to her personal law, a rational 
solution requires that either the matrimonial law of the spouses 
or the general contracts law governs. 8 The former is the right 
solution where the applicable matrimonial law includes special 
rules on dowry, e.g., in Austria and Italy; in France the matri-
monial law has been applied to a dowry constituted under the 
law of Maryland.9 
In community property states everywhere, marital property 
law determines what constitutes the community fund and what 
the separate property of either spouse, and in addition the 
questions of management, possession, and control by the wife 
and the husband, respectively, the actions permissible during 
the community, the termination and partition of the common 
fund, et cetera. 
An integral part of these systems is also the regulation of 
liability of the different estates of the parties for debts either 
of the community or of the husband or wife. Liability of the 
community property for community debts only, as in Wash-
ington, or also for the debts of the husband as in Louisiana, or 
for all debts of the husband and the prenuptial debts of the 
7 See Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Co. (1900) 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 
So. 851 (married woman, domiciled in Mississippi, allowed according to the 
(matrimonial) law of Mississippi to sue in tort in Louisiana, as the tort had been 
suffered there). See also Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Humble (1901) 181 
U.S. 57; Traglio v. Harris (C.C.A. 9th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 439· 
8 Cf. RAAPE 342· 
9 App. Nimes (Dec. 10, 1912) D.1914.2.169. 
EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE ON PROPERTY 333 
wife, as in California, is naturally considered by the lawyers of 
those states as growing out of the marriage. The same approach 
is used in Europe, not only with respect to a system of com-
munity but to any marital system, in classifying the problem of 
the husband's liability for prenuptial or postnuptial debts of 
his wife and vice versa. This does not seem to be the usual way · 
of thinking in this country but should be recognized as the 
actually governing principle.· 
As a matter of fact, if marriage property law is defined in 
the conflict of laws as dealing with problems of title to property 
only, its scope is much narrower than in European countries. 
To visualize the difference and the attendant difficulties, let 
us assume that German spouses are domiciled in Germany and 
that the wife has been charged with a criminal offense but 
acquitted. Under the German Civil Code (§ 1387, No. 2), 
the husband is obliged to pay or to reimburse his wife for the 
. expense of her defense, and as a co-debtor he is personally 
liable to his wife's creditors, e.g., to her attorney. If her hus-
band can be sued in an American common law court, what at-
titude should that court take? Should it classify the problem 
according to the le.~ fori? It might find that no such claim is 
granted to the wife or her attorney by the matrimonial law of 
the forum although sonie claim under another theory may be 
prosecuted. Obviously, the desirable solution is that German 
matrimonial law as the law of the domicil should be applied in 
its full bearing. 
If we change the facts of the case slightly, there would prob-
ably be no doubt at all about an American court's reaching an 
analogous solution where the husband, under the German 
Civil Code (§ 1385), has to pay the taxes, interest on mort-
gages, and insurance premiums for those assets of his wife of 
which he is possessed ex iure mariti during coverture. These 
debts may be compared with the liabilities which are often 
indicated as incidents of community property. 
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Conversely, a German court, applying the essentially 
narrower matrimonial law of a common law state, faces the 
question of what to do about matters considered part of the 
matrimonial law in Germany but not so considered by the gov-
erning foreign law. If, for instance, American parties are domi-
ciled in a common law jurisdiction and the wife borrows money 
with the consent of her husband, the latter would be liable to 
the creditor only upon his assumption of a guaranty. Under 
the German Code(§ 1386 par. 1), however, the husband is 
liable for the interest on the loan, both wife and creditor being 
able to enforce the liability (§ 1388), which extends to the 
reserved property of the wife as well as to the husband's own 
property. If the German court follows the characterization 
appropriate to the civil law doctrine, it has to consider the 
problem as one of matrimonial law and therefore governed by 
the law of the American domicil. The most sensible conse-
quence seems to be to adopt the conflicts rule applied in this 
country to surety contracts. Or, instead of the law of the place 
of contracting thereby indicated, should the German judges, as 
in other contracts cases, apply the law of the place of perform-
ance, as required by the German conflicts rule? The result 
would be that reached neither in Germany nor in the United 
States. 
An analogous question concerning torts was raised before a 
French court. Article 1477 of the French Civil Code provides 
as part of the matrimonial law that a spouse diverting or con-
cealing any effects of the community property shall be de-
prived of his share of such effects. The judge considered 
this provision inapplicable to an Italian couple and granted 
the ordinary remedies common to both French and Italian 
private laws.10 
In conclusion, it would seem that the broad concept of 
marital property law, as developed in Europe, can conven-
10 Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 6, 1897) Clunet 1899,771, criticized by CLUNET in 
Clunet 1899, 740; see also BARTIN, z Principes z84. 
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iently be employed in the United States whenever reference 
to the civil law in this field is to be made, and that, moreover, 
the scope usually allocated to marital property law needs en-
largement. 
5· Relation Between the Marital Property Law and the Lex 
Situs 
As is well known, the law of the domicil or the national law 
governing either movables or all property may clash with a 
divergent law established at the situs. On the one hand, Ger-
man writers have attempted to develop a theory of the rela,-
tion between general conflicts rules (such as the rules on 
marital property or inheritance) and special rules (such as 
those of property referring to the lex situs or of obligations re-
ferring to the lex loci solutionis) .11 On the other hand, fear 
of friction has fostered the broad scope of the lex situs in the 
United States. 
Necessary role of the lex situs. What problems must be 
governed in all systems by the law of the situs? The lex situs 
determines quite naturally the kinds of property interests and 
the modes of their creation, transfer, modification, and termi-
nation, and it decides to what extent, if at all, bona fide pur-
chasers and attaching creditors are protected in their expecta-
tions. 12 In its application to problems of marital property 
rights, the law of the situs may come into conflict with the 
personal law. l;'he personal law may grant one spouse some 
property interest in an immovable of the other, for instance, a 
lien, which is unknown at the situs of the immovable, or the 
personal law may provide that, immediately upon the mar-
riage and without any conveyance, certain assets of the spouses 
are transformed into a community fund, while no such trans-
formation by immediate operation of law is known under the 
law of the situs. In all such cases, the law of the situs prevails 
I! Cf. MELCHIOR 398; M. WoLFF, IPR. sr, sz. 
12 Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev. (1930) u86; cf. LEFLAR, 2~ Cal. L. Rev. (1933) 
:u 1, 235, supra n. x. 
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over the personal law insofar and only insofar as such im-
mediate property questions are concerned. 
Thus, the Montevideo Treaty 13 limits the matrimonial law 
of the domicil insofar as its application is prohibited by the 
law of the place where the property is situated, with the signifi-
cant restriction in the I 940 draft to matters de estricto 
caracter real, i.e., which pertain strictly to real rights. 
Illustration: Before the unification of the German civil law, 
a couple domiciled in Westphalia lived under the system of 
community property, whereby the land owned by one spouse, 
immediately upon marriage, fell into joint tenancy by both 
parties. The wife owned land in Saxony, where, however, no 
transfer of land ownership could take place without a con-
veyance. The Court of Appeals of Saxony held that the wife 
continued to be the sole owner but that she was 'bound by 
reasonable application of the personal law to execute an ap-
propriate conveyance. 14 
In the same sense, ·it has been held in France that restraints 
upon the husband's alienation of his wife's dowry or liens to 
secure claims of the wife against her husband, provided by the 
personal law, are recognized as an interest in French im-
movables only to the extent and subject to the conditions 
under which the analogous rights of French law are estab-
lished.15 An express provision of the former Italian Code was 
understood in the same way.16 The maxim underlying all 
these cases has been formulated by Zitelmann in the following 
13 Treaty on international civil law, text of I889, arts. 40, 4t; text of 1940, 
art. I 6. 
14 0LG. Dresden (Dec. x, I896) I8 A~n. Sachs. OLG. SI3; cf. LEWALD 
178, I79 no. z39; analogous decision of RG. (April zo, I903) JW. I903, 
zso. An interest created under Maltese matrimonial law was dependent on 
publication in Tunis for absolute effect against third persons. Trib. Tunis 
(March IS, I9os) Clunet 19061 444· 15 Trib. civ. Seine (Aug. zo, I884) Clunet I88s, 76; Trib. civ. Seine {Jan. 
u, I889) Clunet 1899, 346; cf. NIBOYET 635 no. 5071 but also 3 ARMINJON 
109 n. z. On a 'different recent practice see above, p. 3z7. . 
16 LEWALD, z9 Recue'il 19z9 IV 53z, n. 11 approved by FEDOZZI 64z, dis. 
agreeing with other writers. 
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sentence: CCDas Vermogensstatut lebt nur durch die Ancr-
kennung der Einz.elstatuten." 11 It has been decided in Canada 
that marriage settlements concerning property situated in 
another country are enforceable "so far as the lex situs does 
not prevent their being carried into execution." 18 
American conc,eption of the lex situs. In comparison with 
the American law of situs, the European property law has a 
very modest function. It does not determine the regime under 
which the spouses shall live, with its innumerable ramifica-
tions, and of course not the requisites and construction of a 
marriage settlement. It merely decides the technical execution 
of the commands of the personal law. 
Under the American system as in feudal times, however, the 
law of the place where the immovable is located determines 
every question relating to the extent and content of the effects 
of marriage on property. Normally, foreign law is applied at 
the situs, neither to determine the property interests which one 
spouse may have in the assets of the other nor, if our assump-
tion concerning the actual scope of American marital law is 
right, to determine what liabilities, if any, exist with respect 
to real property and whether the real property of one spouse 
is liable to the creditors of the other spouse. In contrast to 
movables, the law of the situs, and not the domiciliary law, is 
considered competent to fix the economic purposes of the mar-
riage institution and to formulate public policy concerning ad-
ministration by the husband, control by the wife, and protec-
tion of the creditors. This means, furthermore, that there are 
as many matrimonial laws as there are states where either of 
the spouses has immovable property. 
Even the capacity of married women with respect to all. 
transactions connected with an immovable is governed by the 
17 ZITELMANN in Festschrift fiir Otto Gierke (1911) :155 at 261; LEWALD 178 
no. 239. 
18 In re Jutras Estate (Saskachewan) [193:1] z W.W.R. 533, at 537· 
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law of the state where the immovable is located and, in ac-
cordance with the ordinary rule of this country, not by the law 
of the place of contracting. 
An explanation sometimes offered for the broad rule on 
immovables in the United States is that it is an essential func-
tion of a state to determine the title to interests in land. But 
does it not suffice that the property interest as such be governed 
by local law? Why should the locall~w also try to determine 
the effects of marriage? Moreover, if this proposition were 
correct, the law of the situs would also have to be applied 
to movables. Some American writers have indeed claimed for 
the situs "a sort of primary control over property within ... 
its border," HI a claim quite unknown outside the United 
States. The law of the situs is said to have the power to decide 
what effect, if any, should be given to the law of the domicil, 
and the latter is said to be applicable not on the basis of an 
independent rule of conflict of laws but only indirectly by way 
of reference by the law of the situs. Attempts have been made 
to explain a few decisions 20 in this way, but these appear to 
be inspired rather by considerations of public policy. 21 It 
would be absurd to assume that the courts of the domicil itself 
or the courts of a third state could not apply the law of the 
domicil without the permission of the law of the situs. True 
territorialism, furthermore, would require that the municipal 
law of the situs be applied, not merely its conflicts rule.22 
There exists, however, an important restriction upon the ap-
plication of the lex situs. In almost all American jurisdic-
tions, 23 immovables acquired by assets pertaining to the sepa-
19 LEFLAR., 2I Cal. L. Rev. (I933) 22I, 225, 230, supra n. r. The Restate. 
ment § 8 (I) seems to share this view. 
20 Locke v. McPherson (I9oi) I63 Mo. 493, 63 S. W. 726; Smith v. McAtee 
(I 867) 27 Md. 420, 92 Am. Dec. 64I; c/. Graham v. First National Bank 
(I88I) 84 N.Y. 393, 38 Am. Rep. 528. 
21 Cf. STUMBERG, II Tex. L. Rev. (I932) 53, 6I, supra n. I. 
22 WIGNY and BROCKELBANK, Expose 33I n. I to art. 2·89. 
23 jACOB, "The Law of Community Property in Idaho," I Idaho L. J. (I9Jl) 
r, 36. 
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rate property of one spouse, are his separate property, and 
when acquired with community property are community 
property-the so-called replacement or source doctrine.24 As 
a result, the impact of the lex situs to a considerable extent is 
qualified by the operation of the lex domicilii influencing the 
ownership of assets used for acquiring immovables in another 
state.25 This may be the law of the actual or of the former 
domicil of the spouses. The lex situs, of course, retains its 
power over acquisitions of immovables through earnings, gifts, 
and succession or distribution on death. 26 The courts ordinarily 
also apply the lex situs without hesitation in determining the 
validity and construction of such contracts by the husband or 
the wife as dispose of land, in adjudging the ownership of 
profits and fruits, and in ascertaining the internal relations 
between the spouses with respect to their interests in im-
movables. 27 
Illustration. The husband bought land in Idaho with 
money earned in Michigan, and acquires separate property 
despite the community property system of the former state. 
But, if he deeds the land to his married daughter domiciled in 
New Y ark, there is a presumption, under Idaho law, that the 
property is held in community by her and her husband. 
The 'converse case has been singularly treated. If land is 
sold in the state where it is situated and thus be converted into 
money or a chose in action, the movables so acquired should 
also, under the doctrine of replacement, to be consistent, be 
substituted for the land and remain subject to the law of the 
situs. But in a series of early cases, it was thought in the court 
of the matrimonial domicil that, thanks to the conversion 
effected at the situs, the time had come to apply the lex fori 
24 So named by }ACOB (precedent note). See also In re Gulstine's Estate 
(1932) 166 Wash. 325, 6 P. (2d) 628. 
25 See NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (1943) 167, 169, supra n. I. 
26 See for example the distinctions made in Newcomer v. Orem (I 8 sz) z 
Md. 297, 56 Am. Dec. 717. 
27 See cases collected by NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. ( 194 3) I 7 2, 1 7 3, supra n. 1. 
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of the domicil to the movables acquired. 28 In two other old 
cases, temporary differences of policy with respect to. the 
emancipation of married women caused one court at the domi-
cil 29 and the other at the situs 30 each to apply its own domestic 
law to the proceeds, in order to enforce in the interest of the 
wife the progressive view of the forum against the old com-
mon law principle. Inferences as to the present rules can 
scarcely be drawn from these decisions. 
The lex situs in other countries. The system founded by the 
postglossators, which places the effects of marriage on im-
movables under the law of the situs, has been adopted by 
Great Britain, the United States, and Argentina, and the Aus-
trian courts. 31 A similar situation exists with respect to Swiss 
immovables belonging to Swiss nationals. 32 
In France, Italy, and other Latin countries, this system 
has been applied in a few decisions, 33 though by prevailing 
opinion it has long been abandoned. 34 French public policy 
28 Courts applying their own common law on marital property rather than 
the community property rule of the lex situs: Kneeland v. Ensley (I 8 3 8) I 9 
Tenn. 6:~.o; Newcomer v. Orem (xss:~.) 2 Md. 297, 56 Am. Dec. 717; Castle-
man v. Jeffries (I877) 6o Ala. 380. Court of community property system not 
applying the lex situs of Georgia: Henderson v. Trousdale (Sup. Ct. I855) 10 
La. Ann. 548. 
29 Glenn v. Glenn (1872) 47 Ala. 204, refusing application of the old com-
mon law principle of South Carolina. 
30 Smith v. McAtee (1861) :1.7 Md •• po, 9:1. Am. Dec. 641, rejecting pathet-
ically the old common law principle of Illinois. 
31 Argentine Civil Marriage Law (1888) art. 6. Austria: OGH. (Oct. :u, 
1924) 6 SZ. 778 no. 337· 
32 NAG. art. 28 no. 1. This reservation of the local law is understood to 
cover capacity to contract and acquire by will, STAUFFER, NAG. art. :1.8 no. 14. 
SCHNITZER z65, 133, 243 observes that before the Swiss Civil Code the law of 
the canton of origin and not that of the situs was meant; thus the system was not 
exactly that of the lex situs. 
33 Cass, (civ.) (April 4, r88r) Clunet r88r, 4:1.6; see also OLG. Colmar 
(Dec; 21, 1911), as a German court, DJZ. 1913, 174; CLUNET in Clunet 1907, 
676. Outside of France, it is often not understood that this opinion is obsolete. 
34 France: Principle of indivisibility, NIBOYET 6o1 no. 478; WEISS, 3 
Traite 171, 4 ibid. 195; 2 ARMINJON 465; AUDINET, 40 Recueil 1932 II 289ff. 
Belgium: POULLET 443ff. 
Italy: DrENA, 2 Prine. 148. 
Portugal: CUNHA GoN~ALVEs, 1 Direito Civil 689 (excepting only special 
laws on immovables). 
Spain: Trib. Supr. (Jan. z81 1896) 79 Sent. 125 at 133; Cf. TRiAS DEBES 
no. rJS. 
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even goes so far as to make equal treatment of movables and 
immovables imperative, the nature of the conjugal association 
being said to require that all its effects be regulated by one 
single, immutable law. Hence, it has been repeatedly decided 
in France that the American regime of separation of assets 
applies to French immovables owned by Americans, the 
American rule to the contrary notwithstanding. 35 
In Austria, there was a split of authority on this point. 36 
In the Scandinavian Convention on Family Law (art. 3, 
par. 2), only the right to dispose of immovables is reserved to 
the local law. 
Louisiana rule. In Louisiana, statutes have expressly pro-
vided since I 8 52 that the community property system there 
in force applies to all property, including movables, acquired in 
Louisiana "by non-resident married persons." 37 The courts 
have given effect to this provision in order to grant the out-
standing benefits of the Louisiana community system to the 
wife with respect to real property acquired in the state, 38 but 
have declined to apply this provision to choses in action, 39 while 
their position as regards tangible personal property does not 
seem entirely settled. 40 How this strange rule can be fitted into 
a well coordinated law of conflicts seems not to have been dis-
cussed so far. 
The Civil Code of Latvia also subjects to the lex fori all 
property of spouses not domiciled in the country. 41 
35 Cass. (req.) (July I8, I9o5) Clunet I9o6, 446, Revue I9o6, zoo; Trib. 
civ. Versailles (May IS, I924) Revue I925, 240, 252; Trib. Meaux (May 4, 
I928) Clunet I928, 1223, 1228. 
36 The courts were traditionally for the lex situs; cf. I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ 
Io6. 
37 La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (I932) art. 2400. 
It is doubtful whether art. I64 of the Cal. Civ. C. of I 8 7 z, as amended in 
I9I7 and I923, is to be understood in a similar sense. Cal. Civ. C. (Deering, 
1941) 6SJff., § I64; cf. 10 Cal. L. Rev. (1921) 154; STUMBERG, 11 Tex. L. 
Rev. (1932) 56, 58, supra n. r. 
In Texas no such case has been found, STUMBERG, ibid. 65. 
38 Succession of Dill (1923) 155 La. 47, 98 So. 752. · 
39 Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Co. (r9oo) 52 La. Ann. 141 7> 27 So. 851. 40 DAGGETT, The Community Property System of Louisiana (193 r) 109-II r, 41 C. C. ( 19 3 7) art. 13 sentence 2. 
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Deference of Continental countries to the Anglo-American 
mle of lex situs. The application of the law of the situs to 
marital property interests in immovables in some countries, 
particularly those following the Anglo-American system, has 
been taken into consideration by several other countries, which 
in such cases allow their own personal law to yield to the lex 
situs to a greater extent than usual (see page 335). The out- ,. 
standing provision of this kind, article 2 8 of the Introductory 
Law to the German Civil Code, leaves the determination of 
interests in or respecting foreign immovables or movables to 
such particular local provisions as claim to govern at the situs. 
Thus, all rules applied in Maine or California with respect 
to immovables of a married person-at least insofar as these 
rules are classified in America as rules of matrimonial char-
acter 42-are respected and applied in Germany as well. Arti-
cle 28 of the German law has been followed with respect to 
immovables by the Hague Convention of I 90 5 on Effects of 
Marriage (art. 7) and other codifications. 43 The reservation 
is applied, for instance, to homestead provisions.44 French 
courts, however, profess a radically contrary policy; in their 
eyes unity of the matrimonial regime has the dignity of an 
inevitable dogma. 45 
Rationale. The American system of isolating interests in 
immovables, although it has hardly ever been justified on 
rational grounds, 46 is based on firm traditions and is undis-
puted in its reign. Its principal advantage lies in the simplicity 
with which it enables a court to determine the interests of the 
42 One of the many questions not hitherto discussed, because the fundamental 
difference in scope between the matrimonial laws of this country and Europe 
has been neglected. 
43 Hague Convention on Marriage Effects, art. 7· 
Poland: Law of I 926 on international private law, art. I 6. 
Contra: Denmark: see BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 2I9 no. 44· 
44 CuNHA GoN<;:ALVEs, I Direito Civil 689 with reference to the Portuguese 
Decree no. 7033 of October I6, 1920. 
45 See supra p. 341 and infra p. 359· 
'"On the specious justifications by the ancient scholars, see I BAR § I 8 I. 
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parties. This simplicity exists, however, only so long as the 
court has to deal with isolated legal relationships regarding a 
specific piece of land. Complications similar to those arising in 
cases of succession or bankruptcy arise when assets are located 
in different states and are to be treated as belonging. to a single 
estate, either in the relation of the spouses to each other or in 
their relations with third parties. 
The European system of treating all problems of property 
relations as one single comp_lex, subject to one single law, 
avoids the difficulties that arise when different assets belonging 
to the same persons are subjected to different laws. It creates 
so many.complications of its own, however, that it is problem-
atical which of the two systems should be preferred. The 
greatest practical difficulties are caused by the coexistence of 
two such fundamentally different approaches. International 
cooperation of the type suggested by the Hague convention 
and generous concessions such as those made to the Anglo-
American system by the Introductory Law of the German 
Civil Code, might smooth over some of the friction between 
the two systems. 
II. THEORY oF IMPLIED CoNTRACT 
Another basic difference in views concerns the relationship 
between the matrimonial law and the marriage settlement. 
I. French Practice 
The French courts still follow the theory of Dumoulin, 
who advocated in I 525 that the effects of marriage upon prop-
erty should be determined primarily by the intention ~f the 
parties. This theory is well known in this country too; in the 
famous opinion in Saul v. His Creditors, 47 Porter, J ., although 
rejecting certain elaborations of Dumoulin's theory as de-
47 ( r 827) 5 Mart. N. S. (La.) 569. A mistake by Judge Porter in interpreting 
the Spanish law has been noted by DE FUNIAK, r Principles of Community 
Property (1943) 249. 
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veloped in later French and Spanish practice, adopted the 
principal ideas of the theory. In the opposite doctrine, mar-
riage effects belonged to the domain of the various territorial 
("real") statutes, which were in fact multiple and inconsistent 
customs. To free the relations between husband and wife from 
this entanglement, the parties were declared free to regulate 
their rights and duties by marriage settlement once and for 
all, the extraterritorial effect pertaining to the personal 
"statute." Even in cases where the parties had made no settle-
ment, they were said simply to have tacitly agreed to subject 
themselves to a certain local custom, preferably to the custom 
in force at the marital domicil, identical for practical purposes 
with the domicil of the husband at the time of the marriage.48 
(a) Method and result of French cases. The full liberty 
of the parties to make any settlement they choose is still recog-
nized by the French courts, which continue to imply a tacit 
contract in the absence of a settlement.49 
While once this method resulted in the general application 
of the matrimonial law of the first domicil, it is now employed 
more consistently with the original idea; in order to determine 
the presumed intention of the parties, all facts of the individual 
case are taken into consideration, including the conduct and 
statements of the parties after the marriage. 5° Criticism of this 
method of practical interpretation 51 has been answered by the 
Tribunal de la Seine with the argument that manifestations 
of the parties during marriage, though they cannot modify the 
regime adopted at the time of the marriage, nevertheless give 
48 Cf. CALEB, Essa.i sur le principe de l'autonomie de la volonte en droit 
international prive (1927) 135; NrBOYET 792 no. 684; 3 ARMINJON 87ff. nos. 
88H. 
49 Cass. (civ.) (July u, 1855) S.i855.1.699; Cass. (req.) (July 15, 1885) 
Clunet 1886, 93; Cass. (req.) (May 18, 1886) Clunet x886, 456. See other 
decisions cited by WEISS, 3 Traite 639ff. 
5° Constant practice, as the Repertoires attest; cf. particularly Cour Paris 
(Dec. 71 1887) D.1888.z.z65; Cass. (req.) (June 41 1935) Clunet 1936, 898; 
Cass. (req.) (April 6, 1938) S.1938.1.15I 1 Clunet 1938, 788. 61 NrBoYET 833 no. 716; PILLET, z Traite us. 
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significant support to the assumptions of the court. 5 2 By these 
methods, it has been presumed that the parties have tacitly 
agreed to adopt the law of the domicil of the husband or that 
of their common nationality or that of an intended future 
domicil. 53 But as an after-effect of the old domiciliary tradi-
. tion, the presumption of a tacit agreement to the law of the 
real or intended marital domicil seems to be preferred,54 the 
latter especially when it happens to result in the application 
of French law. Some decisions have aroused amazement. 
Thus, a Swiss married a French woman in New York, went 
with her to Switzerland and many years after to France, but 
French law was presumed intended.55 The same result was 
reached in cases where sixty years after the marriage the 
bodies of the spouses were brought to France 56 and where 
Swiss spouses had stayed in France no longer than three 
weeks. 5 7 
(b) Influence of the French doctrine on other countries. 
The French system has been followed by some courts in other 
countries 58 and hinted at in the statutes of Spain, Portugal, 
52 Trib. civ. Seine (May II 1 I933) Revue Crit. I9341 129. 
53 See the report of 'Brachet in Trib. civ. Versailles (May 15, 1924) Revue 
1925, 241 1 245. See also ]oELSON1 op. cit. supra n. I1 at 9I· 54 CALEB, 4 Repert. I8o no. 69ff.; cf. Cour Paris (Nov. I8, I937) Clunet 
I938, 3IO'; Cour Paris (March z, I938) Clunet I9381 544· In Switzerland this 
was erroneously believed to be the French law; cf, SCHNITZER I97· 
56 Trib. civ. Belfort (June 13, 191I) and Cour Besan~on (March I81 I912) 
Clunet I913 1 I7I• 
56 Trib. civ. Versailles {July I91 I927) Clunet I928, 429; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 
296. 
57 Cour Paris (June 2 8, I 9 3 7) Schar don c. Chavon, Clunet I 9 3 81 53 7; the 
commentator, ibid. 540 is surprised, but the Cour of Cassation affirmed (May 5, 
I938) Gaz.Pal.I938.2.232, cf. 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. uS. 
58 To this effect Belgium: Trib. civ. Anvers (Dec. 26, I925) Pasicrisie 
I9z6.3.24; Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Dec. 2, I925) Pasicrisie I926.3.II7; App. 
Bruxelles (June q, 1931) 18 Bull. lnst. Beige (I932-I933) 53; Trib. civ. 
Bruxelles (March 291 1933) Pasicrisie 1934·3·I9· Similarly PoULLET 478 no. 
372, 573 no. 449· Other decisions, however, followed the national law. See 
' infra p. 349, n. 82. 
Brazil: with respect to marriages anterior to the Civil Code see VALLADAO I 53 
and mor~ recently Sup. Trib. Fed. (June u, 1940) In re Wolner, 140 Revista 
dir. civ. (1942) z81 (submission to the Brazilian general community property 
system, assumed to have been effectuated by declaration in the marriage record, 
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and in the original text of the Treaty of Montevideo.59 The 
Civil Code of Louisiana varies the French doctrine by declar-
ing that "every marriage contracted in this S~ate, superinduces 
of right partnership or community of acquest or gains, if there 
be no stipulation to the contrary"; 60 of course, this is not an 
interpretation of the parties' intention but a statement of the 
legal regime. 
In England, the contractual theory has exercised some in-
fluence. An express marriage settlement is construed according 
to the law presumed to be intended by the parties; ordinarily, 
the effect is that, by a rebuttable presumption, it is governed 
by the law of the marital domicil. 61 Moreover, although no 
longer popular, the doctrine of intended marital domicil has 
not been forgotten. 62 Finally, the inference from a tacit mar-
riage covenant to an immutable law of the first domicil, which 
was rejected in Saul v. His Creditors, was proclaimed in De 
Nicols v. Curlier as late as I 898.63 The case, however, referred 
to a marriage celebrated in France by parties domiciled in 
France; a tacit marriage agreement was assumed, because the 
French courts administering the law of the domicil would have 
proceeded by this method. Neither in England, according to 
the better view,64 nor in Canada, according to the distinctly 
without marriage settlement; per abundantiam the Austrian law, possibly na-
tional law of the parties is understood, with KJ,tASNOPOLSKI, Oesterreichisches 
Familienrecht (Wien, 1911) § 17, as permitting autonomy of the parties (at 
287)). 
The Netherlands: A few older decisions overruled by H. R. (May 17, 1929) 
W. 12006; on a later decision of Hof den Haag (Feb. 6, 1931) W. 12373 see 
VANDER FLIER, Clunet 1933, 1110. 
59 Spain: C. C. art. 1325; Portugal: C. C. art. 1107; Belgian Congo: C. C. 
art. 12; but all these are rather harmless reminiscences, M. WoLFF, 4 Rechtsvergl. 
Handworterb. 410; Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of 
1889, art. 41 (the marital domicil expressly agreed upon by the parties before 
the marriage) • 
60 La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (1932) art. 2399· 
61 /n re Fitzgerald, Surman v. Fitzgerald [1904] 1 Ch. 573; In re Bankes, 
Reynolds v. Ellis [1902] z Ch. 333, etc. CHESHIRE 495ff. 
62 /nre Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan [19oo] P. 211, 239; See WESTLAKE 
72 § 36; DicEY 765• · 
83 [1898] 1 Ch. 403; [19oo] 25 A. C. 21, 
64 CHESHIRE 492, in contrast with 495· 
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adopted opinion, is such construction imitated. In the absence 
of an express settlement and a will, marital property is gov-
erned by the law of the husband's domicil. Hence, the com-
munity system of Quebec was applied in Ontario to spouses 
who had their first domicil in Quebec, because the law of 
Quebec like the French referred to the presumable intention 
of the parties to choose the local regime rather than because 
the Ontario court shared the theory of implied contract. 65 
(c) Influence on America. In the United States, the old 
French doctrine had some influence on Story. 66 
The "intended domicil" appeared in a few decisions 67 but 
has been rejected by prevailing opinion as well as by the Re-
statement. 68 A contemplated domicil which, because of a 
change of mind, does not become a home in fact, may figure 
as an important element in ascertaining the law tacitly chosen 
by the parties in setting up a marriage contract, but it is no 
veritable domicil at all and is therefore neglected in this coun-
try; domicil is the test for the determination of marital prop-
erty rights in movables, independent of any intention of the 
parties. 
In Latin America, while the Montevideo Treaty of I 889 
testifies to the widespread adoption of the theory of intended 
marital domicil, the new text of I 940 evidences a disposition 
to abandon the theory.69 
(d) Opposition to French practice. The literature, includ-
ing the modern French writers, 70 unanimously rejects the old 
65 See Beaudoin v. Trudel (Ont. Ct. App. I936) [I937] I D.L.R. :u6; In 
re Parsons (Ont.) [1926] 1 D.L.R. I x6o. · 
66 STORY§§ I98, 199· 
67 Ford's Curator v. Ford (x8z4) z Mart. N. S. (La.) 574, 578, q. Am. Dec. 
20I; I WHARTON 402. § 190. 
68 Restatement § 289; 2 BEALE § 289.1 n. 3; GOODRICH, "Matrimonial 
Domicile," 27 Yale L. ]. (19I 7) 49 at so (against STORY); STUMBERG, II Tex. 
L. Rev. (I932) 53, 551 supra n. 1 and in his Principles of Conflict of Laws 285; 
cj. CHESHIRE 492.. . 
69 Art. I 6. Supra n. 59; see also I RESTREPO HERNANDEZ no. 2.2.4. 
70 BAR TIN, D.x 898.2.457, BAR TIN, 2 Principes 247 no. 302; PILLET 2 
Melanges 95; VALERY xu8 no. 7941 3 ARMINJoN xox no. 95 bis; NIBO;ET 
833 no. 716; AuorNET, 40 Recueil I932 II 257-259, 265. As is known, Du-
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French practice. The presumed intention is called an ex-
cessively fictitious assumption, and the unpredictability of a 
future court decision ori this intention is considered intoler-
able. 71 Of this system, it was recently said that the matrimonial 
law, whose main reason to exist must be found in the security 
of the spouses and of third persons, fails completely to serve 
its purpose. 72 
It is interesting that French writers advocating reform have 
expressed a preference in certain cases for the domiciliary test 
rather than the nationality principle. 73 The French private 
draft of I 930 favors the first marital domicil. 74 
Ill. CoNTACTS 
I. Domicil 
Domicil is the test of the effects of marriage on property in 
the Anglo-American countries, Denmark, Norway, Argentina, 
Paraguay, and Peru/5 recently joined by BraziF6 in accord-
ance with the general principles of these countries in matters of 
status. Furthermore, domicil, rather than · nationality, has 
been recognized by the courts in Austria, 77 whose marital 
MOULIN's contemporary, D' ARGENTRE, fought against extraterritorial effect of 
a tacit agreement, see WEISS, 3 Traite 29. In Italy, ANZILOTTI particularly 
attacked the doctrine of presumed intention. 
71 LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 407 no. 343, justifies the regard for manifestations 
of the parties subsequent to the marriage as a means of avoiding surprises which 
the courts would otherwise inflict on the parties. 
72 SAVATIER, D.I936.I.7. 
73 3 ARMINJON 104 no. 97; CosTE-FLoRET, Note, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 224 
no. 126. 
74 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. 193o, 82; cf. NIBOYET, ibid. 1928, 336. 
75 Denmark: MUNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 746; BoRUM, 
Personalstatutet 4 55. 
Latvia: C. C. (1937) § 13, extending however lex fori to all property situ-
ated in the country. 
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 575 no. II6. 
Argentina: Civil Marriage Law of r888, art. 5 par. r. 
Paraguay: Civil Marriage Law of Dec. 2 1 1898, art. 5 par. r. 
Peru: C. C. (1936) Tit . .Prel. art. V (for foreigners). 
76 Brazil: Introductory Law of Sept. 41 1942, art. 7 § 4· 
77 Austria: OGH. (Jan. 5, r864) 5 GlU. no. 2701; OGH. (Feb. 27, 189o) 
28 GlU. no. 13176; dictum in OGH. (Oct. 22, 1924) 6 SZ. no. 337; contra: 
most writers, see WALKER. 748. 
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property law has apparently continued in force after 1938. 
The particular system of the Swiss conflicts law extends to the 
property effects of marriage. 78 
The domicil in question has been generally and still is the 
domicil of the husband at the time of the celebration of the 
marriage. This principle, derived from the old ideas of cover-
ture and merger, as in England, is preferred in the United 
States as a simple and unequivocal test to indicate the matri-
monial center, more reliable than the concept of first conjugal 
domicil. Yet another view has been taken in Switzerland and 
increasingly in Latin America, where the law of the first domi-
cil actually established by the husband and wife in common is 
declared applicable. 79 But as this doctrine needs to be supple-
mented when the parties, because of premature death or sepa-
ration or continued migration, never establish a common 
domicil, the husband's domicil at the marriage has to be 
utilized as an inevitable emergency test. 80 The C6digo Busta-
mante (art. 1 8 7) adopts this method also in case the parties 
have no common nationality. 81 
These divergent concepts are obviously part of the marital 
property laws, so as to make characterization of the domicil 
dependent on the applicable law. 
2. Nationality 
In other countries, 82 the nationality of the husband is the 
test adopted and is preferred to the possibly different nation-
78 Switzerland: NAG. arts. I 91 201 32; cf. HUBER-MUTZNER 472. 
'~9 Switzerland: BG. (Sept. I91 I929) 55 BGE. II 2JI. Treaty of Montevideo 
on international civilla w, text of I 940, art. 16. 
Brazil: Introductory Law of 19421 art. 7· 
80 Opinion adopted in Switzerland following TEICHMANN; see STAUFFER, 
NAG. 87f no. 13; BG. (Sept. I91 1929) 55 BGE. II 230. 
81 Similarly, e.g., Guatemala C. C. (I926) art. 174; Law on Foreigners 
(I 936) art. 40; C. C. ( 1933) art. 116, if both parties are foreigners. 
82 Germany: EG. art. I 5, followed by Hague Convention on Marriage 
Effects, art. 2. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June I61 1926) Pasicrisie I927.2.771 Clunet 19:&81 
IIo2; Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Jan. IS, I934) Clunet I935• 682. 
Bulgaria: GHENOV, 6 Repert. 192 no. 68; GANEFF1 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 818. 
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ality of the wife. In this field, unity and clarity of the regime 
to govern the effects of marriage on property are considered 
more important than attempts to satisfy both national laws. 
This contrasts markedly with the controversial literature 
respecting the effect of divided nationality on personal marital 
relations. 83 
Following the general trend from nationality to territori-
ality,84 however, the courts of some countries are inclined to 
apply their own municipal law, if the wife was a national of 
the forum before the marriage or at the time of suit or if the 
first marital domicil was established at the forum. 85 In France, 
China: Law of I 9I 8, art. IO par. 2. 
Finland: Law of I929, art. I4 par. 2. 
Guatemala: Law on Foreigners (I936) art. 40; C. C. (1933) art. II6 (in 
cases of common nationality of the parties). 
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. IS. 
Hungary: 6 Repert. 463 nos. 83, 83 his, 88. 
Iran: C. C. art. 963. 
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Prel. art. 19; as to the former law: Cass. (April 
I6, I932) Foro Ital., 11 Massimario I932, 282 no. I376. 
Japan: Law of I898, art. IS. 
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (June 6, I919) W. 10444; VAN HASSELT 
6 Repert. 6 3 o no. I 70. 
Poland: Law of I926 on private international law, art. I4 par. 3· 
Portugal: C. C. art. I 107, cf. art. 16; CUNHA GoN.<;;ALVES, 1 Direito Civil 689. 
,Rumania: Cass. (Feb. 23, I937) affaire Grigoriou, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 
no. I 89. 
Spain: C. C. arts. 9 and I325 as currently interpreted; see MANRESA, 9 
Comentarios al C6digo Civil Espafiol (I9o8) I99· 
Sweden: Law of June I, I912, §I no. 2. 
83 In this field only isolated voices have protested the dominant doctrines such 
as 2 ZITELMANN 749 who advocated a compulsory system of separate property 
in nationally mixed marriages. 
84 See supra pp. IS Iff., 348. 
85 In Spain, Spanish law has been applied where the marriage is celebrated in 
Spain and the wife is a national; see TRiAs DEBEs, 3I Recueil I93o I 658, 68o. 
Regarding the Brazilian law previous to I 942 (C. C. of I 916, Introduction art. 
8), decisions of the Sup. Trib. Fed., Recurso Extraord. no. 9I9, Weinberger 
(Dec. 20, I9I6) 12 Revista Jur. (1918) 479, (Dec. 30, 1918) and (Dec. 2o, 
1919) 19 Revista Sup. Trib. (1919) 48 (cf. VALLADAO 12.8, 129) modified the 
principles essentially for the benefit of the Brazilian party. They deal with an 
American from New York who married a Brazilian woman and established 
domicil in Brazil. He went bankrupt under the law of New York, and the wife 
claimed her Brazilian immovables under the common law system. The Supreme 
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this trend has inspired a draft proposal of the S oci8te d' etudes 
ze gislatives, basing the property regime on the law of the place 
where the parties "fix" their domicil immediately after mar-
riage, of which the last version significantly limits itself to 
provide for the application of French law in the case of a 
first French matrimonial domicil. 86 
On the other hand, the far-reaching arm of the national 
law is exhibited by the declaration of the Italian Supreme 
Court that a regime of general community of property, under 
which the sp~uses in Argentina believed they were living, was 
inapplicable, because this regime was forbidden to them as 
Italian nationals by article I 4-33 of the Civil Code (of I 86 5). 87 
The disharmony between the Italian nationality principle and 
the Argentine domiciliary principle has attracted attention, in 
view of the millions of Italian immigrants living in Argentina, 
and has resulted, if not in concessions to the domiciliary law, 
at least in the suggestion that the parties should be induced to 
declare a choice of law on their marriage. 88 
Illustration. 89 A German married woman domiciled in 
ZUrich, Switzerland, contracted a loan with a Swiss bank. The 
contract was, without doubt, governed by Swiss law. The ques-
tion, however, whether she could, without her husband's con-
sent, make her nonreserved property liable, was answered 
in Germany under the German law of nationality, while a 
Swiss court would have applied the Swiss law of domicil. 
Court actually applied the law of New York and not the Brazilian general 
community system. But the New York regime could not govern immovables in 
Brazil. Moreover, under the principle of renvoi, Brazilian law was competent 
in every respect. In the cases of Sao Paulo (VALLADAO 133) the law of the forum 
was undisputed. 
86 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. 1928, 339ff., art. 20; definitive text, ibid. I930, 
175ff., art. 20. Cf. NIBOYET, ibid. I928, 3I9ff., 334, Revue I929, I93> 212. 
87 Cass. Roma (April 16, 1932) Foro Ital., I1 Massimario I9J2> 282 no. 
13 76; cf. UDINA, Elementi I 84 no. I 35; FEDOZZI 446. 
88 FEDOZZI 45I; AUDINET, 40 Recueil I932 II 241 at 265. Cf. WEISS, 
3 Traite 643, in view of the uncertain French practice. 
89 Bay. ObLG. (May u, 1929) IPRspr. I929, no. 75· 
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3· Law of the Place of Celebration 
The law of the place of celebration has been invoked but 
rarely. 90 Except within the strict confines of title questions, the 
situs of movables is attributed no importance in any law. 
4· Renvoi 
Divergences between the law of the situs and the personal 
law (for instance, in the case of immovables in the United 
States), or between the proper law (French practice) and other 
principles, make place for renvoi. If two French nationals 
domiciled in the United States are married, under American 
law their movables are governed by the law of the state of their 
domicil; French courts would probably arrive at the same 
result by construction of the parties' intention. 91 German 
courts would follow the presumed French decision under the 
statutory command of renvoi (EG. art. 27 ). 
It is likewise by renvoi that, in Germany, the lex situs 
governs the effects of marriage on immovables owned by 
Americans. 92 German courts have interpreted this renvoi so 
broadly that all questions determined in the United States 
according to the lex situs of immovables are by them decided 
in conformance with the German law applicable to immovables 
located in Germany. 
Illustration: An American wife in New York owned Ger-
man immovables. The law of the matrimonial domicil, New 
~Argentine Civil Marriage Law (I888) art. 5 par. I1 probably presuming 
that the marital domicil is at the place of celebration. Texas Ann. Rev. Civ. 
Stat. (Vernon, I940) art. 4627 declares expressly that removal to Texas subjects 
the marital rights of persons "married in other countries" to Texas law. 
9I See the decisions above, n. 541 and LEWALD, 29 Recueil1929 IV 567. When 
renvoi was followed by OLG. Colmar (Feb. u, I90I) Clunet I903, 6661 .I I 
Z.int.R (I902) 282, it was done under French law, but the court was German 
at the time. 
Spain: see MANRESA1 op. cit. supra n. 82, at zos. 92 OLG. Colmar (Aug. 241 I9I I) 4 Rhein Z.f.Zivil-und Prozessrecht 
295; cf. OLG. Miinchen (March Is, 1913) 30 ROLG. 45 (renvoi by Hungarian 
law); OLG. Breslau (Oct. 311 1929) JW. 19301 IOII. 
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York, did not require the husband's joinder for conveying the 
land. Under German matrimonial law, however, the land was 
a part of those assets of the wife of which she could not dispose 
without her husband's consent. The German court held that 
the American renvoi to the lex situs resulted in the application 
of all the rules of German law on matrimonial property and 
· that, therefore, the husband's consent was necessary. 93 Thus, 
the ordinary German conflicts rule on capacity to contract was 
not applied. Similar arguments have been made in Switzer-
land.94 · -
The French courts are in a different position, as their doc-
trine of renvoi yields to their doctrine that the matrimonial 
property law must be supreme and unqualified. ua 
The problem arising from the different scope of European 
and American marital property laws in the application of 
renvoi has not yet been properly explored. It seems obvious, 
however, that renvoi must be applied when the two foreign 
laws involved agree with 'each other in a certain result. Sup-
pose that Italian spouses are domiciled first in Italy and then 
in Switzerland; a Swiss court would apply the Italian system 
of separate property so far as the mutual relations of the 
spouses are concerned, and Swiss law of "property union" 
with respect to their relations to third persons. In like case, 
an English court would strictly follow the Swiss court, pro-
vided the parties retain their Swiss domicil. Would an Amer-
ican court, disregarding the Swiss partial recognition of Italian 
law, also apply the Swiss principles of "property union" be-
tween the parties? Another question is still more delicate: 
Would an American court introduce its own distinction be-
tween movables acquired before and after marriage? 
93 0LG. Colmar (Aug. z4, 1911) 4 Rhein. Z. f. Zivil-und Prozessrecht z95; 
3 FRANKENSTEIN 401 n. 57 approving. 
84 HUBER-MUTZNER 476 n. 41 7· 
95 See supra n. 35 and infra n. uz. 
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IV. THE PROBLEM oF MuT~BILITY: CHANGE oF 
PERSONAL LAw DuRING CovERTURE 
1. Change in Legislation 
If altered during the marriage, the governing municipal 
law, according to principles generally recognized in Europe, 
rules in its changed form. 96 The same law also determines 
what retroactive effect changes have on the matrimonial rela-
tionship. 91 
In the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment in some 
measure limits retroactive state legislation. 98 
2. Change in Status 
It is an old question whether alteration of the initial domicil 
alters marital relations. The question now comprehends any 
change in the personal law 99 and is of extraordinary impor-
tance in view of the enormous differences of matrimonial 
property systems and the multiplied migrations of our time. 
The former conception in Germanic countries seems to have 
been that t~e legal incidents of property are only. an out-
growth of the personal relations between the spouses. The 
personal regime being mutable, the property system was held 
mutable too. This concept was followed in Switzerland, Eng-
land, and, before the German Civil Code, in the northwestern 
parts of Germany and in Baden. 
Nevertheless, as early as 1265 A.D., the Spanish Partidas, 
which have been so influential in the Americas, declared the 
matrimonial regime immutable in the face of a change in per~ 
sonal status.100 
In France from the times of the postglossators, the prob-
·
96 E.g., Cour d'Aix (April 28, 1910) Clunet 1911, 199 (change from Italian 
to French law by the annexation of Nizza in r86o). 
~7 HABICHT uS and the general opinion in Germany. 
98 See the interesting Note, 1 6 Cal. L. Rev. ( r 9 2 7) 3 9 9. 
99 TEICHMANN, Ober die Wandelbarkeit oder Unwandelbarkeit des gesetzlichen 
ehelichen Giiterrechts, bei Wohnsitzwechsel (Basel, 1879); 2 ZITELMANN 725. 
100 Partida IV, ley 24, tit. XI, a very clear and neat statement. 
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lem was controversial; the victory of the theory construing 
marital property law as a tacit contractual system naturally 
brought with it the assumption of permanence. Moreover, in 
French municipal law itself, the immutability of marital regu-
lation of property was proclaimed so as to prohibit postnuptial 
settlements of any kind, and finally also in the Civil Code 
(arts. I 3 94, I 3 9 5), even in the case of divorce and remarriage 
of the spouses (art. 2 9 5 par. 2), in the belief that, to secure 
conjugal peace and to protect husband and wife against their 
respective maneuvers as well as those of their creditors, the 
system of marital property must be stable. Therefore, the 
principle of immutability was considered imperative. 101 
On the contrary, it is characteristic of modern codifications 
to perll)it marriage settlements during marriage. 102 
3· The Principles 
(a) Full mutability. In England, the House of Lords 
decided in the Hog case (I 804) 103 that parties, acquiring a 
domicil in Scotland after fifteen years of marriage, thereby 
became subject to the Scotch rule of community, and Lord 
Eldon held that the rule applied to all movables which Hog 
possessed. However, the communio bonorum of Scotch law 
was not a true marital regime but only a mode of distribution, 
and hence adequately governed by the law of the Scotch domi-
cil of the deceased at the time of his death rather than at the 
time when he acquired such domicil.104 
101 The entire Latin group followed this model. 
102 The United States: see 3 VERNIER§ 156. 
Denmark: Law on Effects of Marriage of 1925, c. 4 § 28. 
Germany: BGB. § 1432. 
Greece: C. C. ( 1 9 40) art. I 40 5 (for modification of settlements only) . 
Guatemala: C. C. ( 1933) art. I 03. 
Italy: the new C. C. (I 942) Disp. Prel. art. I 9 par. 2, maintains immutability. 
Sweden: Marriage Law of I 920, c. 8 § 1. 
Switzerland: C. C. art. I79 par. I. 
103 Lashley v. Hog (I8o4) 4 Paton (Scotch Appeals Case) 581. DICEY 767 
Rule I 86; CHESHIRE 493· 
104 WESTLAKE 73ff.; FooTE 354 (both concluding for the system of full im-
mutability),. 
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In Switzerland, the principle of mutability, limited to the 
relations of the spouses to third persons, applies to a married 
couple transferring their domicil to Switzedand.105 
(b) Mutability of new acquisitions. In the United 
States 106 and Argentina/07 the principle of mutability is estab-
lished in the sense that only movables acquired after the 
change of domicil are governed by the law of the new domi-
cil. The same principle was adopted by the Scandinavian Con-
vention on Family Law (art. 3) and is sometimes assumed to 
be English law.108 In the United States, the continuing effect 
of law on property once acquired 109 is the more important 
principle, since the interests in movables acquired under the 
former domiciliary law continue in any objects that may re-
place these movables,110 so long as the proceeds of the original 
goods can be traced.111 (In the language of the civil law, a sub-
rogation; pretium succedit in locum rei, and res succedit in 
locum pretii.) Moreover, the authorities emphasize that trans-
fer of movables from the state where they have been acquired 
or from one domicil to another does not alter their condition, 
either as separate or community property.112 This doctrine 
105 NAG. arts. rg, 20. 
106 Matter of Majot (rgro) 199 N.Y. 29, 92 N. E. 402 rejected the doctrine 
of the De Nicols case. The great majority of American courts have adopted the 
law of the domicil at the time of acquisition. Cf. Succession of Packwood ( 1845) 
9 Rob. (La.) 438,41 Am. Dec. 341; Pearl X· Hansborough (r848) 28 Tenn. 
(9 Humph.) 426; Castro v. Illies (1858) u Tex. 479, 73 Am. Dec. 277; 
Snyder v. Stringer (rgn) u6 Wash. qr, 198 Pac. 733· To the same effect the 
statute of Louisiana Civ. Code (1932) art. 2401; Arizona Code Ann. (1939) 
§§ 63-306; and Texas Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1940) art. 4627. Restate-
ment§ 290; z BEALE§ 290.1; DEFUNIAK, 1 Principles of Community Property 
(1943) 250· . 
107 Argentine Civil Marriage Law (r888) art. 5 par. z, followed by Para-
guay: Civil Marriage Law (r8g8) art. 5 par. 2. 
108 FALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws: Examples of Characterization," r 5 Can. 
B. Rev. (1927) u6, arguments on De Nichols v. Curlier [rgoo] A. C. 21. 
108 Brookman v. Durkee (1907) 46 Wash. 578, go Pac. 914; Restatement 
§§ 291, 292· 
~10 SCHOULER, 1 Domestic Relations§ 592; 1 WHARTON 415ff. § 193a. 
111 McAnally v. O'Neal ( r876) 56 Ala. 299, 302. 
112 Restatement §§ 291-293· Brookman v. Durkee (1907) 46 Wash. 578, go 
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is generally thought to be protected by the constitutional 
guarantees against deprivation of property without due process 
of law.113 Only the technical nature of community property 
may have to be construed, after a transfer, so as to agree with 
the new lex situs. The debts contracted by the husband or wife 
likewise retain their nature as enforceable on separate or com-
munity property respectively.114 
Under section 291 of the Restatement, however, control by 
the former domiciliary law ends when "the interests are af-
fected by some new dealings with the movables in the second 
state." The exact meaning of this proposition is in doubt.115 
Beale, in another place in his treatise, 116 referring to Drake v. 
Glover, where it was said that "The lex loci contractus governs, 
'as to the nature, the obligation, and the interpretation of a 
contract,'" 117 remarks only that dealings with movables 
must be carried out in accordance with the law of the new 
domicil. 
How these rules work in practice has been illustrated during 
a century in a few cases only, covering only a part of the situa-
tions imaginable and leaving incertitude in many respects.118 
(c) Immutability. In the field of the law of conflicts, im-
mutability is proclaimed ordinarily by all systems following 
Pac. 914 and many other decisions; see 12 L.R.A. (N. S.) 92I; 57 L.R.A. 353· 
In Europe it goes without saying that these rules apply. 
113 In re Drishaus' Estate (I926) I99 Cal. 369, 249 Pac. 515; In re Thorn-
ton's Estate (1934) I Cal. (2d) I, 33 P. (2d) r. 
114 As to moving domicil from a separate property state to a community 
property state: Hyman Lichtenstein & Co. v. Schlenker (I892) 44 La. Ann. Io8, 
xo So. 623; Clark v. Eltinge (I9o2) 29 Wash. 2I5, 69 Pac. 736; Huyvaerts 
v. Roedtz (1919) I05 Wash. 657, I78 Pac. 8oi. For the inverse situation no 
case is illustrative; see also DE FUNIAK, 1 Principles of Community Property 
(I943) 532. 533· 
115 Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev. (1930) 1286, 1289. 
116 2 BEALE§ 292.1; cf. Restatement § 29I. 
117 (I 8 57) 30 Ala. 3 82 at 3 89 quoting STORY 219 § 263. This distinction is 
universally recognized. · 
118 NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) 176, I 78-I 82, supra n. r, makes an interest-
ing attempt to coordinate the cases. 
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the nationality principle 119 and in addition by some others.120 
Under this principle, the spouses continue under their former 
matrimonial law. 
Switzerland has adopted this conception, so far as the rights 
of the parties between themselves are concerned. The Federal 
Tribunal has observed that rights created under the first law 
survive in such form as is consonant with a new statute. 121 
119 Germany: EG. art. I 5· Following this model: Hague Convention on Mar-
riage Effects, arts. 2 and 9· 
China: Law of I9I81 art. IO par. 2. 
Japan: Law of I898, art. I5 par. I. 
Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. I4 par. 3· 
See moreover: 
Greece: C. C. (I94o) art. I5; formerly by interpretation of C. C. (I856) 
art. 4 § 3; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 346 n. 2.2. 
Guatemala: Law on Foreigners (1936) art. 40 last sentence. 
French Morocco: Dahir of Aug. 30, I9IJ sur la condition civile des Fran~ais 
et des etrangers dans le protectorat Fran,;ais du Maroc, arts. I4, I 5· 
Spanish Morocco: Dahir de la condicion civil de los espafioles y extranjeros, 
art. I3· 
Decisions in the following countries: 
Austria: 1 EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ (ed. I) I Io5. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June I6, I9z6) Pasicrisie I927.2.77, Clunet I9281 
I I02, 
France: App. Alger (Dec. q, I 897) Clunet 1898, 723; Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 
281 I9oo) Clunet I90I 1 568; Trib. civ. Marseilles (July 12, I907) Clunet I9o8, 
83I; Trib. civ. Marseilles (May 8, 19I3) Clunet I9I41 I27I. 
Hungary: ScHWARTZ, 40 Z.int.R. (I929) I7o, I74· 
The Netherlands: applied in the case of a Dutch husband by KG. (Feb. 261 
I925) Z. des Deutschen Notarvereins I927, 58. 
Spain: TRiAs DEBEs, 6 Repert. 253 nos. 1031 109. 
Sweden: Sup. C. (July 31, I9JI) Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv, 193I 1 403 1 7 
Z.ausl.PR. (I933) 934 (Swedish spouses domiciled in the United States). 
120 Quebec: Astill v. Hallee (•877) 4 Q.L.R. 120. 
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 219 no. 44; cf. 10 Z.ausl.PR. 
(1936) 6201 but see for another view MuNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld 
I 746 no. 4· 
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 575 no. n6; SYNNESTVEDT, DIP. Scan-
dinavie 262. This rule was overlooked in Muus v. Muus (1882) 29 Minn. 
II 51 12 N. W. 3431 but probably would not have changed the decision. 
Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of I889, art. 43· 
Rumania: Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 221 1937) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937) 318 no. 267 (interprovincial law). 
121 See NAG. art. I 9 par. 1, as contrasted to par. 2 and art. 31 pars. 2 and 3; 
BG. (Dec. 10, 19Io) 36 BGE. II 619; BG. (Dec. 5, I94o) 66 BGE. II 234 
no. 48. (Swiss spouses having transferred their domicil to a foreign country 
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Under the rigid French notions, this approach leads to 
strange results. In the case of a married couple, first domiciled 
in New Y ark and then in France, the separate property sys-
tem of New York was applied in every respect, even to French 
immovables of the husband acquired after the change of domi-
cil. This was done, although the New York matrimonial law 
does not extend to foreign immovables and, besides, would 
not be applied by a New York court to objects acquired at a 
new domicil. This result was based on the principles of unity 
(assets regarded as an aggregate unit) and of immutability, 
both of which go together: "L'immutabilite et l'unite vont de 
pair; l'une ne peut se concevoir sans l' autre." 122 
4· Exception: New Marriage Settlements 
Assuming immutability as a principle of conflicts law, the 
matrimonial law of the first domicil or first nationality decides 
whether there is mutability in the field of private law, i.e., the 
first personal law decides whether or not the parties may make 
a settlement under a changed personal law. 
General Continental customary law has admitted an im-
portant exception, however, 123 which is formulated by the 
German Civil Code (Introductory Law art. 15, par. 2), 
namely that if a foreign husband acquires German nationality 
after the marriage or if foreign spouses establish their domicil 
in Germany, they are allowed to contract a marriage settle-
retain their regime established in Switzerland, except when the foreign law 
opposes it.) 
122 Trib. civ. Versailles (May 15, 1924) with the conclusions of Counsellor 
Brachet, affirmed by Cour Paris (Oct. 17, 1924) Revue 1925, 240, 254. Easier 
to decide to the same effect was the case of Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 17, 1924) 
Revue 1925, 226 (incommutability and indivisibility of the property separation 
of a naturalized American, former Frenchman, domiciled with his wife first in 
New York and then in France). 
123 RG. (March 9: 19oo) 10 Z.int.R. (19?o) 281; RG. (Sept. 25, 1903) 
13 Z.int.R (1903) 587. ANZILOTTI, Sui mutamenti dei rapporti patrimoniali 
f-ra coniugi nel diritto internazionale privato (Firenze, 1899) 12 r. 
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ment, even if no such agreement would be permitted by their 
former personallaw.124 
The Hague Convention on Marriage Effects accepts this 
result in the case where both spouses acquire a new common 
nationality,125 but not where there is only a change of domi-
cil126 nor where the husband alone changes his nationality. 
The more sweeping German statute has aroused much criti-
cism, 127 which is justified in the case where the husband alone 
becomes a German national after marriage. 
In the case where both parties change their status, it has 
been argued that a former personal law that allows them to 
modify their regime during coverture, invests them with a 
right effective after the parties leave its orbit, whereas, if it 
prohibits such modification, the prior law ceases to have a 
legitimate role.128 This last argument suffices to prove that the 
solution of the question should be reserved to the new personal 
law. Various writers have suggested that, in the event of a 
change of personal law, the parties should be allowed to adapt 
their property relations to their new legal surroundings, ir-
respective of the municipal law of the first state and the 
124 Followed by Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law, art. 14 
par. 2. 
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Prel. art. I9 par. 2. 
Nicaragua: C. C. art. 105. 
Swiss writers have inferred from NAG. art. 20 a similar right of French parties 
to conclude a postnuptial settlement in Switzerland against the national law. See 
STAUFFER, NAG. I02 n. 49· 
125 Art. 9 par. I with art. 4 par. I. 
Sweden: Law of June I, I912, §I no. 9· 
126 KG. (Feb. 26, I925) Z. des Deutschen Notarvereins I927, 58 (settlement 
concluded by Dutchmen after having established themselves in Germany void). 
This restriction by the Convention of the rule of EG. art. I5 par. 2 is·approved 
by LEWALD, I03 no. 144, and others. Contra: under EG. art. I5 par. 2, the KG. 
(June 23, I932) HRR. I933> no. 205, recognized a settlement by Swiss nationals 
who had established their second domicil in Germany, whereby they agreed to a 
system of separate property in accordance with the German Code but not in 
accordance with Swiss C. C. art. I 79 par. 2. 
127 2 ZITELMANN 74I n. 40r; NEUMEYER, IPR. (ed. I) 20; KoSTERS 468;. 
LEWALD I03 no. I44; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 3Ioff. who overrates the nationality 
principle. 
128 KOSTER.S 454• 
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general conflicts rule of the second state.129 Louisiana has in-
stituted such an exception to its otherwise rigid rule of im-
mutability.130 
The draft proposed by the French Societe d'hudes legis-
latives provides that if the marital property was not governed 
by French law and if both parties are of French nationality, 
either by naturalization or reintegration-viz., of both, or 
of the party not a French national-they may adopt a settle-
ment accepting a regime within a year.131 Under the recent 
Brazilian law, a party who is naturalized may require, with 
the consent of the other, that the judicial decree of his 
naturalization should state the acceptance of the Brazilian 
regime of general community property saving (acquired?) 
rights of third persons.132 
5· Classification 
The classific~tion of the problem of mutability is theoreti-
cally easy; there can be no doubt that it belongs to the field 
of effects of marriage on property. 133 Most French writers, 
however, think that immutability in French law implies a 
certain incapacity, characteristic of the French regime, which 
therefore, concerns status and as such is dependent on the na-
tional law. 134 Nevertheless, the French courts 135 place the 
129 Switzerland: NAG. arts. 20, 3 2, 3 6b. 
Italy: ANZILOTTI, op. cit. supra n. ·123, at 65; DIENA, 2 Prine. 153ff.; 
FEDOZZI 453· . 
130 La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (I932) art. 2329, as amended by Act No. 23.6 of 
I910. 
131 Bull. Soc. d'Etudes Leg. I930, I75ff., art. 2r; cf. ibid. I928, 3I9ff. at 
339ff. According to art. 26 as proposed by the French regime replacing a foreign 
system, has an effect retroactive to the day of marriage, this is, however without 
prejudice to the rights acquired by third persons and the validity of ~egularly 
performed acts of the spouses. 
132 Brazil: Introductory Law (I 942) art. 7 § 5. 
133 To this effect in France, BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. I934, 641. 134 2 ARMINJON 465 no. 2I8; BARTIN, 2 Principes I43 § 27I; NIBOYET no. 
7Io; VALERY Io96 no. 768; AUDINET 474 no. 589; CALEB in 4 Repert. 199 
no. I92ff.; SAVATIER, D. I936.1.7, IO. But LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 402 no. 
340 advocates the lex loci actus. 
135 Cour Montpellier (April 25, I 844) D.I845.2.36; Cass. (req.) (June 4, 
I935) D.I936.r.7, Clunet 1936, 898, Revue Crit. 19361 755, annotated by 
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problem in the category of the re g;ime matrimonial in a pecu-
liar way. The Court of Cassation, in adopting the classification, 
emphasized as decisive the unity of the marital property law 
(regime legal)/ 86 meaning thereby that parties who have 
once come to live under the French system of communaute 
legale are bound by it irrevocably, regardless of whether they 
are of French nationality. Parties, however, who have chosen 
or who are subjected to a foreign regime, may change to the 
French community system whenever such change is permitted 
by their first personallaw.137 
Fortunately, no such queer controversy exists in any other 
country. 
6. Renvoi 
The renvoi problem is resolved by including in the govern-
ing law the conflicts- rule respecting variability. For instance, 
two Americans, who have not made a marriage settlement, es-
tablish their domicil first in the United States and then in 
Germany. According to the American rule (Restatement 
§ 290), on the one hand, newly acquired movables would be 
considered subject to the German system of community of ad-
ministration. Under the German conflicts rule, on the other 
hand, the common law system of the first domicil would con-
tinue to apply to all property. The German matrimonial law 
will be applied, however, because its application is induced 
by the American rule of conflict of laws. 
7. Rationale 
Apart from the antiquated historical reasons that have in-
fluenced French developments, the invariabtlity of the govern-
ing law has been explained as being required by the theory of 
BASDEVANT, ibid. 761; Trib. civ. Toulouse (June 8, 1938) Revue Crit. 1939, 
105. Contra: Trib. civ. Strassburg (July 24, 1935) Clunet 1937, po. 
136 Report of Counsellor Pilon, Cass. (req.) (June 4, 1935) D.r936.1.7, 
cited supra, n. IJ5· 
137 This is hailed by LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 402 no. 340. 
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vested rights,138 by the alleged function of the law first apply-
ing to give a definitive solution, 139 by the need of the wife to be 
protected against arbitrary changes, 140 and by other arguments 
equally weak. From a rational standpoint, there is only one 
reason for avoiding a radical change in the regime, the danger 
of confusion and unworkability in maintaining two hetero-
geneous systems at the same time, a danger illustrated under 
the American rules pursuant to which a former regime par-
tially survives with respect to movables acquired before the 
change of domicil or replaced at any time, and makes itself felt 
in other ways. 
These difficulties, it is true, seem not to have attracted much 
attention in this country. For some unknown reason, cases 
dealing with the topic are relatively few. 
On the other hand, the permanence of property relations, 
more completely adopted in Europe than in this country, 
raises problems in connection with other conflicts rules. While 
the law governing marital property is fixed on the day of the 
marriage or of acquisition, the law controlling succession to the 
estate of a predeceasing spouse depends on his nationality or 
domicil as of the day of his death, and the law governing the 
personal relations between the spouses admittedly changes 
with every change of domicil or nationality. In every munici-
pal legislation, these three matters are to a certain degree co-
ordinated. Their harmony may be greatly disturbed by com-
bining in the applicable laws two or more divergent principles, 
one for marital property, a second for personal relations, and 
a third for succession upon death. Difficult problems of charac-
138 In connection with an assumed implied contract, a vested right (jus 
adquisitum) was at the base of the Prussian Allgemeine Landrecht; see Prussian 
Obertribunal (March u, 1873) 69 Entsch. kgl. Ob. Trib. 101. Among the 
modern writers see PILLET, Principes szr no. z89; DrENA "La conception du 
droit international prive d'apres la doctrine et la pratique en Italie," r 7 Recueil 
1927 II 343, at 416: RAAPE 304; WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld 1 64 
n. 373· 
139 1 BAR§ 184; KosTERS 453· 
140 1 BAR, toe. cit.; WEiss, 3 Traite 647. 
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terization, much discussed in recent literature, result.141 Those 
regarding the relation between marital property and inherit-
ance law will be illustrated hereafter. 
The position of third states is particularly delicate. In this 
country, an acquisition by an Italian married couple, after emi-
gration to the United States, will be treated according to the 
law of the state where the parties establish themselves. Italian 
courts, however, hold that Italian matrimonial law continues 
to govern in every respect. What should be done by a court in \ 
Cuba or France r Under the nationality principle there in force, 
these two countries generally agree with the Italian conception, 
although such a decision seems ill-advised.142 
The circumstance, finally, that the German doctrine has 
adopted the principle of mutability in the related field of 
paterf\al rights in the property of a minor child, 143 further sug-
gests that all existing rules are unsatisfactory and that entirely 
new methods should be devised. 
v. MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS 
I. Characterization 
What agreements are covered by the rules dealing with 
marriage settlements, is in practice only to be ascertained by 
comparative law. 144 
2. Permissibility 
In the United States, the ordinary rule respecting contracts 
is applied to antenuptial agreements. Hence, the Restatement 
declares applicable the law of the place of contracting.145 The 
141 Doubt of the advisability of the principle on this ground has been considered 
by NEUNER, Der Sinn 67, 68. 
142 Cj. 3 FRANKENSTEIN 307. 
143 See infra, pp. 55 8, 6o6-6o7. 
144 RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 261 and 283; }OELSON, op. cit. supra n. x. 
145 Restatement§ 238 comment b, § 289 comment c, should be read with a view 
to the criticism by STUMBERG 288, 289 referring to Hutchison v. Ross (1933) 
262 N.Y. 38x, 187 N. E. 65. 
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Argentine Civil Code states the same rule.146 This place, how-
ever, may easily coincide with that of the first marital domi-
cil.ur 
Generally, the conditions under which a marriage settle-
ment is permitted are determined, in the absence of an ante-
nuptial agreement, by the law governing the marital property. 
This law decides questions such as are incident to the English 
doctrine of freedom of contract, to the Italian provisions that 
the parties may choose only between narrowly defined 
regimes 148 (viz., the dowry system or the community of 
gains), or to the German provision that the parties, unless the 
husband is domiciled abroad, may not, merely by referring to 
the foreign law and without expressly stating its rules, incorpo-
rate a foreign regime in thctir contract. 149 The same law also 
controls the question whether the parties may insert clauses in 
146 Argentine C. C. arts. I2.2.0 (new I2S4), 12os (new 1239); cf. 2 VICO 
48 no. 69, ibid. so no. 72; Cam. civ. I Cap. (June 27, I94I) J. A. 1942. I 
926, 937 (explains in a learned comment that the restrictions on community 
property settlements do not apply to foreign-concluded contracts). 
The Brazilian C. C. of I 9 I 6, Introduction art. 8 provided that the spouses 
may choose the Brazilian law. On this unfortunate addition proposed by the 
Senate and approved by the House of Representatives, which has been called 
mysterious, see BEVILAQUA, 6 Repert. I68ff. no. so. 
147 See, for instance, LeBreton v. Miles (N.Y. ~84o) 8 Paige 26r (intended 
domicil in France); Spears v. Shropshire ( r Ss6) I I La. Ann. 559, 66 Am. Dec. 
206; Davenport v. Karnes (I873) 70111. 46s; Mueller v. Mueller (I899) I27 
Ala. 3S6, 28 So. 46s. 
148 Italy: C. C. (I86s) art. I38I; C. C. (I942) art. I6I. 
Spain: C. C. art. 13 I 7. 
The Netherlands: BW. art. I98, contrary to French law, see PLANIOL, RIPER"l", 
et NAST, r Reg. Matr. 47 no. 36. 
1
"
9 BGB. § I433> followed by Italian C. C. (1942) art. I6r. Germans in 
Belgium may by virtue of § I433 choose the Belgian community of gains, RG. 
(March I6, I938) 92 Senff. Arch. no. 96, JW. 1938, 1718. The Reichsgericht 
even extended this benefit to Germans simultaneously citizens of another state, 
beyond the limits of§ I433 par. 2, RG. (March IJ, I924) Leipz. Z. I924, 74I. 
Contra: the Hooge Raad (June 24, 1898) W. 714I; H. R. (Jan. I4, 1926) 
W. I I4S9, and KosTERS 447, have seen in a similar Dutch provision, BW. art. 
I98, a rule on formalities not binding Dutch subjects abroad; bu.t see the criticism 
by HIJMANS Io8; OFFERHAUS, Gedenkboek I838-I938, 707. 
An old decision of Louisiana, Bourcier v. Lanusse (I8rs) 3 Mart. 0. S. S8I 
held that the submission of the parties to the coutume of Paris was invalid, the 
C. C. of Louisiana not permitting parties to choose a law other than of a state of 
the union. 
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favor of third persons or provisions looking to the death of one 
of them. 
The law meant here is, of course, the law of the husband's or 
of the matrimonial domicil in certain countries and the na-
tional law of the parties in the great majority of civil law 
countries. 
In both systems, the validity of the settlement is suspended 
until the celebration of the marriage. In England, the appli-
cable law is considered to be that intended by the parties, 
which, only by rebuttable presumption, is identified as that of 
the matrimonial domicil. 
The French courts again have developed a contrary view. 
Where two Italians marrying in France stipulate universal 
community of asset-s, the contract is prohibited and void in 
Italy but has been held valid in France, either by application of 
the law of the situs or nowadays generally under the doctrine 
of implied contract.150 
On principle, an antenuptial agreement made by foreign im-
migrants before coming to this country will be recognized in 
the United States.151 But they cannot be sure that a settlement 
validly made here will be recognized in their homeland. 
3· Formalities 
The rule locus regit actum governs the formalities of mar-
riage settlements. For this particular subject matter, it is rec-
ognized also in England that this rule as generally under-
stood is optional, that is, it applies in case of noncompliance 
with the formalities of the proper law.152 
150 See Cass. (req.) (May 71 I924) Revue I9241 406 and 2 ARMINJON1 ed. I1 
463, ed. 2, n. 2. 
Cf. Italian C. C. (I86s) art. I433· 
151 See, however, infra n. I 56. 
152 Sir John Romilly in Van Grutten v. Digby (I862) 3I Beav. 561; In re 
Bankes, Reynolds v. Ellis [I9o2] 2 Ch. 333 per Buckley, J.; In re Barnard, 
Barnard v. White (I887) 56 L.T.R. 9 per Kay, J.; In re Fitzgerald, Surman v. 
Fitzgerald [I904] I Ch. 573; cf. WRIGHT, "A Problem of Conflicting Marriage 
Settlements," 44LawQ.Rev. (I928) 85, 93; CHESHIRE 498. 
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The Hague Convention on the Effects of Marriage, article 
6, has adopted some peculiar provisions; either the lex loci 
actus or both national laws of the parties must be observed. 
4-· Capacity 
It is generally held outside the United States that capacity 
to contract an antenuptial agreement is entirely distinguish-
able from capacity as envisaged under the personal or the 
property law relations of husband and wife. In the common 
assumption, it is not affected by the marriage but flows from the 
general status rights of the party. Therefore, capacity to enter 
into a marriage settlement before marriage is governed by the 
law of the domicil or nationality of the party at the time when 
the agreement is made, the same as the capacity of an unmar-
ried person to make any other kind of contract. 
However, in disagreement with this view, the Hague Con-
vention on the Effects of Marriage (art. 3) has referred to the 
national law at the time of the marriage rather than that of 
the contract. By a remarkable coincidence, the English writer 
Cheshire suggests that on principle the law of the matrimonial 
domicil should prevail.153 Although his main impulse derives 
from his peculiar proposal to extend the marital law to capacity 
to marry, it may be argued on another ground that the marital 
law governing the objective permissibility of settlements 
should likewise cover their subjective requirements. 
Nevertheless, in recent times, the dominant opinion has 
been well supported by the emphasis laid on the indep·endence 
of married women. If the wife r.etains her own personal law 
during the marriage, her status deserves to be respected in the 
case of postnuptial settlements-in accordance with their basic 
significance-and the more so in the case of contracts preced-
ing the marriage. 
153 CHESHIRE 235. Other suggestions are made by MoRRIS, "Capacity to Make 
a Marriage Settlement Contract in English Private International Law," 54 Law 
Q. Rev. (1938) 78, 86. 
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5· Mutability 
The right to alter the property regime during coverture is 
determined in the same way as in the absence of a settlement. 
The very origins of the doctrine of immutability in France 
were connected with antenuptial agreements. Because the 
property of spouses was supposed to be governed by such an 
agreement for the whole duration of their union in all jurisdic-
tions, tacit agreements were implied. The doctrine was applied 
in England in the case of a French marriage 154 and is used in 
Canada in the analogous case of a contract made or a marriage 
celebrated without express settlement in Quebec.155 
Also, the American courts basically conside-r express mar-
riage settlements to be valid and unaffected by any change of 
status. But they have construed some agreements as intended 
solely to cover property owned at the time of the marriage or 
acquired while the parties resided at their first conjugal 
domicil. 156 This was done particularly in the case of immi-
grants who had settled their matrimonial property in the old 
country without contemplating emigration. A certain tendency 
in favor of such a presumption may still be observed, 157 some-
times subject to question. According to the English and Con-
tinental point of view, a settlement applies to all assets of the 
parties wherever and whenever acquired. This interpretation 
is certainly convincing, where change by postnuptial agreement 
154 De Nicols v. Curlier r I 9001 A. c. 2 I regarding movables; ln -re De 
Nicols, De Nicols v. Curlier [I9oo] 2 Ch. 4IO with regard to immovables (im-
plied French contract was held enforceable against property in England). 
155 See supra n. 6 5. 
156 Long v. Hess (I895) I54 Ill. '4821 40 N. E. 335 (the parties having im-
migrated many years ago; their settlement made in the grand duchy of Hesse 
was declared not binding); Castro v. lilies (I8S8) zz Tex. 4791 73 Am. Dec. 
277; Fuss v. Fuss (I869) 24 Wis. 256. More recently: Hoefer v. Probasco 
(I92I) 8o Okla. z6I, 196 Pac. 138 (avoiding by mere construction of the 
intention of the parties for clear equitable reasons the interference of the agree-
ment to a homestead acquired in a new domicil). 
157 See the statement of the writers: 2 BEALE 1015; LEFLAR, "Community 
Property and Conflict of Laws," 2.1 Cal. L. Rev. (1933) :ut, 224; GoODRICH 
3.33 n. 40. Cf. NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (1943) 167, r85, supra n. x. 
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after change of status is permitted and there is actually no new 
settlement. 
This contrast and the conflict of policy behind it are sharply 
illustrated by the well-known case of Hutchison v. Ross/58 
where the higher New York courts applied the lex situs to give 
effect to transactions between spouses who were continuously 
domiciled in Quebec and lived under a marriage covenant of-
property separation, immutable under the law of Quebec. 
This leading case in conflict of laws on trusts has been con-
sidered a violation of the marital law of the domicil, and the 
lawyers of Quebec resented the Appellate Division's 159 inter-
preting the covenant as not intended to bind the spouses 
during their whole marriage or to subject them definitely to 
the law of Quebec, a construction which has been called 
fantastic. 160 
6. Settlements Concerning Immovables 
The Restatement declares that settlements concerning im-
movables are to be construed in accordance with the law of the 
situs, excepting the validity of the contract. 161 This statement 
has been criticized as too broad, 162 but it is misleading as a 
whole unless it is remembered that the Restatement recognizes 
renvoi from the lex situs ( § 8, ( 1 ) ) • The "lex situs" in this case 
simply consists of a conflicts rule common to all jurisdictions 
of this country: First, the validity of the contract is ascertained 
according to the law of the place of contracting or whatever 
law is deemed to be applicable thereto. Second, under another 
conflicts rule which is not more "lex situs" than the first, the 
158 Hutchison v. Ross (1933) 262 N.Y. 38I, I87 N. E. 65, Annotation, 89 
A.L.R. I023. 
159 Ross v. Ross (I9JI) 233 App. Div. 626, 253 N.Y. Supp. 87I. The argu-
ment was not adopted by the Court of Appeals (see note I 58, supra). 
160 1 JoHNSON 449, Appendix (devoted to the case). 
161 Restatement §§ 237, 238 comment b; 2 BEALE§ 238.2. 
162 NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) 184, supra n. I, explains that the first part 
of the rule is too broad. 
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agreement is recognized as having full effect in the state of the 
immovable, unless a particular public policy is offended, and 
likewise is to be recognized in all third states. An antenuptial 
contract concluded between residents of Nebraska in that state 
is a.pplicable, beyond any doubt, "to real property situated in 
Kansas owned by the husband at the. time of his death," in 
accordance with "the general rule that antenuptial agreements, 
equably and fairly made are valid and enforceable." 163 
In the great majority of countries, this result is unchal-
lenged, on the premise that immovables and movables are 
parts of a unit. 
7· Obligatory Settlements 
An interesting experiment has been made in Guatemala, 
where a marriage settlement in the form of a public instrument 
must be executed when an alien or naturalized bridegroom in-
tends to marry a Guatemalan woman.164 European authors 
have suggested similar measures for aliens marrying in the 
country or foreign married couples acquiring citizenship.165 
Many uncertainties would be avoided by some cautious pres-
sure in this direction. 
VI. PROTECTION OF THIRD PARTIES 
Opinion is strongly divided concerning the ~dvisability and 
means of protecting third parties. While, according to the 
older conception, the personal law could be invoked against 
everyone, in recent times protection of third parties within the 
jurisdiction results from the system of territoriality or from 
exceptions to the rule of the personal law. 
163 Sanger v. Sanger (1931) 132. Kan. 596, 2.96 Pac. 355> 356. 
164 Guatemala: Law of Foreigners (1936) art. 41; C. C. (1933) art. too no. 
4! cf. MATOS 356 no. 241. 
165 See authors cited supra n. 88. See, in particular, the detailed requests that 
marriage officers should address to the parties, as proposed by RoGUIN at the 
Hague Conference of 1 9oo, Actes de la Troisieme Conference de la Haye 
(1900) 2.31· 
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I. No Exception to the Personal Law 
No exception to the application of the personal law is 
granted to third parties in France, Poland, and a few other 
countries. French courts, when they actually recognize that 
foreign law governs the property regime, consider it the duty 
of anyone dealing with the husband or wife to inform himself 
about the legal background.166 
2. Exception with Respect to Third Persons 
Conversely, in a system historically rooted, 167 Swiss law 
distinguishes sharply between the relations of husband and wife 
to each other and their relations with third persons. Irrespec-
tive of the law applying to the former, the latter are governed 
by the matrimonial law of the conjugal domicil, which deter-
mines especially the legal position of the wife in relation to the 
husband's creditors in the case of his bankruptcy or of an execu-
tion levied upon his property.168 This proposition sounds at-
tractive, but its application is complicated 169 and, as the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal itself was compelled to admit, results 
in certain curious consequences.170 It was criticized by Meili 
asearlyas 1902.171 
The C6digo Bustamante declares in article I 89 that the 
forum's provisions on the effects of marriage as respects third 
166 Trib. civ. Seine (May 29, I90I) Clunet I9o2, 36I. For Greece see 
MARIDAKIS, II Z.ausl.Pr. (I937) 122. 
167 See in particular Prussian Allg. Landrecht, II Tit. I §§ 3SI, 352 declaring 
the law of the first domicil immutable except in relation to third persons. The 
code referred only to the case where married persons, without a marriage 
settlement, move from a country of separate property to another of community 
property, but the courts extended the rule to the converse case; see Obertribunal 
(March 28, I 846) I 3 Entsch. kgl. Ob. Trib. 297 no. 24 where it is stated that 
the continuance of the original regime should not harm third parties acting in 
good faith. · 
168 NAG. art. 19 par. 2. 
169 ScHNITZER I94ff.; HuBER-MUTZNER 469ff.; BG. (July Io, I907) 33 
BGE. I 6I7, 6221 BG. (July I4, I9o9) 35 BGE. II 463, 470; BG. (Dec. 10, 
I9Io) 36 BGE. II 6I6, 6I8; BG. (Oct. I7, I9I8) 44 BGE. II 333· 
170 BG. (July u, I929) 55 BGE. III 732; cf. also BG. (Dec. 17, 1908) 34 
BGE. I 734, 737· 
171 I MElLI§ 75; see JoELSON, op. cit. supra n. I, at 1o8-xx6. 
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persons belong to the sphere of public policy of the forum, i.e., 
that they apply even where a foreign personal matrimonial 
law otherwise governs. 
3· Exception in Favor of Third Persons in Good Faith 
Under the German provisions, a person may rely on the 
results of German matrimonial law when he contracts with a 
married foreigner domiciled in Germany, if he is ignorant of 
the fact that the spouses are governed by some foreign regime 
and this fact is not recorded in Germany in the proper public 
register; likewise a married woman who carries on an inde-
pendent business enterprise in Germany with the consent of 
her husband is purported to have capacity as under German 
law/72 although she may otherwise be governed by a foreign 
regtme. 
Illustration: Suppose an American married couple domi-
ciled in Germany. Nothing has been entered in the public 
record respecting matrimonial property rights. The husband 
sold a crop of grain owned by his wife to a buyer who was 
ignorant of the fact that the husband and wife were living 
under the American system of separation of assets, under 
which, contrary to the German law, the husband had no power 
to sell and transfer his wife's crop. The German rule granting 
the husband such power is to be applied. 
Other countries also prescribe that a foreign regime must be 
publicly recorded 173 and establish consequences for the par-
ties' failure to do so. 
In effect, the German system is not much different from 
the Swiss, because parties living under a foreign system of 
172 EG. art. 16, art. 36 par. 1. Also the German presumptions of ownership 
of the husband ( praesumptio Muciana) and of the wife ('§ 1362 BGB.) are 
declared applicable if they are more favorable to the third party, EG. art. 16 
par. 2. 
173 Switzerland: Justice Dept. Oct. 2 s, 19 3 3, see I I Z.ausl.PR. (I 9 3 7) 6 58. 
Sweden: Law of June I, I912, § 2. 
Denmark: see HoECK, Personalstatut 30. 
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 7 5 par. 2, and Nicaragua: C. C. art. 154, which pre-
scribe that changes of regime must be recorded in the appropriate registers to be 
effective against third parties, may be applicable by analogy. 
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matrimonial property law very rarely take the trouble to have 
this fact recorded. 
The international relation between these two systems has 
been described by the Swiss Department of Justice,174 to the 
effect that a Swiss married couple living in Germany have to 
observe the German prescriptions of registration to make their 
marriage settlement effective, even in cases where otherwise 
Swiss law would be applicable under the conflicts rule of the 
court. Thus, a Swiss national domiciled in Switzerland, who 
contracts with a Swiss husband or wife domiciled in Germany, 
must inform himself concerning the property system valid in 
Germany. In addition, Swiss legislation has given such spouses 
opportunity to publish their property regime with the registrar 
of their home canton, effective for transactions in Switzerland. 
In the United States, no particular provisions exist for such 
protection. Sometimes it has been assumed that the applica-
tion of the lex situs to the marital property in immovables has 
the purpose of giving third parties the legal position they are 
likely to suppose/ 75 or that, for the benefit of a bona fide 
purchaser or a creditor, movables are occasionally treated as if 
they were not brought from a former domicil. 176 But the cases 
do not seem to give such assumptions any considerable support. 
VII. QuESTIONS OF CLASSIFICATION 
I. Composition of Community Property 
Two cases of the German Reichsgericht undertake to deter-
mine whether the community fund includes certain rights 
which taken by themselves are governed by a law other than 
that of the community property. In the first case, German 
parties were married under a German ·contract of community of 
174 See 29 SJZ. (I932-33) 25 no. I8. 
175 See NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) I7:z, supra n. I. 
176 HARDING, "Matrimonial Domicil and Marital Rights in Movables," 30 
Mich. L. Rev. (I932) 859; LEFLAR, 2I Cal. L. Rev. (I933) 235, supra n. I; 
NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (I943) I8o and n. 49, supra n. I, 
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acquests. The wife having acquired a tort claim under Belgian 
law, the court properly applied German matrimonial law to 
the problem whether the claim belonged to the community. 
But the preliminary problem whether the claim was alienable, 
so that it could fall into the community fund, should have been 
decided under Belgian law.177 
In the second case, German spouses, living abroad, had 
validly settled their community regime under Belgian law. In 
the proceedings for partition of the community fund, the ques-
tion arose whether the rights of the husband in a German part-
nership were a part of the community fund. The court cor-
rectly inquired into the alienability of the right, applying the 
German law governing the partnership and deciding that the 
right was not alienable in the precise sense in which alienability 
is required in the Belgian and French law of community prop-
erty.178 
A comparable case in this country is where the husband buys 
a chattel outside the domiciliary state. Thus, in Snyder v. 
Stringer, 179 the husband, domiciled in Washington, acquired 
an automobile in Iowa with earnings made in Montana and 
Iowa. Under the laws of these two states, the earnings and 
the automobile purchased therewith would have been acquired 
as the husband's separate property, but they were deemed to 
be community property by the law of the domiciliary state, 
Washington. 
2. Marital Property and Inheritance 
(a) Importance of defining limits of each field. To draw 
the proper line of demarcation between marital property law 
and the law of succession upon death is important in defining 
177 RG. (May 301 r9r9) 96 RGZ. 96. Comments in various sense by MEL· 
CHIOR I 87; RAAPE 309; 3' FRANKENSTEIN 400 n. 52. 
178 RG. (March r6, 1938) JW. 1938, r7r8. For another interpretation 
RoBERTSON, Characterization rsz n. 6o. 
179 (r92r) rr6Wash. 131,198 Pac. 733; cf. LEFLAR, zr Cal. L.Rev. (1933) 
232, supra n. r. 
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the scope of conflicts rules. 180 In the United States, Great 
Britain, and Argentina, the law governing movable marital 
property is determined differently from that governing in-
h-eritance of movables; in most countries, the difference also 
includes the rules on immovables. 
It has been asked, for instance, in England whether the 
English rule that a will is revoked by marriage is to be classi-
fied as a rule of matrimonial or testamentary law. As the rule 
has been held to be essentially connected with the marriage 
relationship, 181 its effect is measured by the law of the matri-
monial domicil, "i.e. in most cases by the lex domicilii of the 
husband at the time of marriage," 182 rather than by the lex -
domicilii of the testator at the time of his death. This reason-
ing is unsound, and the decision ought to be overruled.183 
Many international treaties contain special clauses provid-
ing rules for the distribution of estates upon death. For 
instance, one of the oldest bilateral treaties on jurisdiction, that 
between France and Switzerland of I 869/84 provides that the 
assets of a Frenchman or a Swiss dying within the territory of 
the other country should be distributed by the court and under 
the law of his last domicil in his home country. The Swiss 
Federal Tribunal held in a recent case that the question 
whether certain assets belonged to the wife's separate property 
or to the acquisitions of marriage is a matter of marital law 
and does not come within the treaty.185 
180 Cf. particularly, BARTIN, Etudes s, 68; SILBERSCHMIDT, 3 Z.int.R. ( 1893)~ 
132 at 143, 8 Z.int.R. (1898) 97 at 109,48 Z.int.R. (1933) 313; RABEL, 5' 
Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 283; NEUNER, Der Sinn (1932) 6off. and in 5 La. L. Rev. 
(1943) 167 at 186, supra n. 1; M. WOLFF, IPR. 37; BECKETT, "The Question 
of Classification ('Qualification') in Private International Law," 15 Brit. Year 
Book Int. Law (1934) 46; cf. also RoBERTSON, Characterization IS8-t68. 
181 Vaughan Williams, L. J., in the case of In re Martin, Loustalan v. 
Loustalan [1900] P. 2n, 240. Cf. CHESHIRE 523. 
182 CHESHIRE 523. 
183 FALCONBRIDGE, 15 Can. B. Rev. (1937) 227:-230, supra n. 108. 
184 Treaty on the jurisdiction and execution of judgments in matters of pri-
vate law of June 15, 1869, ;trt. 5 par. x. 
185 BG. (Dec. 4, 1936) 62 BGE. I 235, Praxis 1937, 61, 
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The two fields of marital property and inheritance are not 
separated in the systems of municipal law by a uniform or in-
variably clear line. This fact has given rise to various useless 
theories that have greatly overburdened the so-called problem 
of characterization. The only acceptable method of treatment 
has proved to be that based on general principles. Repeated 
comparative research has revealed a basic criterion that more 
or less obviously underlies all legislations, namely, that matri-
monial law determines the interests of husband and wife dur-
ing the marriage, including the specification of the assets of 
either spouse on the dissolution of their conjugal life. In the 
e~ent of one spouse's predeceasing the other, the law of inherit-
ance regulates the distribution of those assets which belonged 
to the deceased in accordance with the matrimonial law. This 
distribution is particularly significant where the matrimonial 
regime is a community property system. On the death of one 
spouse, two partitions take place, either actually or at least for 
the purposes of an accounting or a fictitious liquidation. First, 
all property of husband and wife is examined to ascertain what 
constitutes the community fund and which part of it continues 
to be owned by the surviving spouse, while the other part, to-
gether with the predeceased spouse's separate. estate, forms 
the inheritance. Second, administration and distribution of the 
assets designated by the matrimonial law as the separate prop-
erty and the part of the community fund belonging to the de-
ceased, are governed by the law of inheritance according to the 
will or the rules of intestacy, as the case may be.186 
This distinction is adequate to satisfy the theoretical needs 
of all legislations and therefore to serve the needs of inter-
national application as required by the law of conflicts. Of 
course, the distinction is so general that it leaves occasional 
186 See RoGUIN, Droit civil compare, Regime matrimonial ( 1905) 9; KADEN, 
"Eheliches Giiterrecht," z Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 705. Cf. also FALCON-
BRIDGE, "Characterization in the Conflict of Laws," 53 Law Q. Rev. (1937) 
537> 54°· 
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doubts as to classification. In fact, in determining which rule 
of conflicts is applica:ble, uncertainty may arise fvom two 
sources. On the one hand, some municipal systems have institu-
tions of mixed or obscure character. On the other hand, marital 
and inheritance regulations, forming integral parts of munici-
pal legal systems, should logically be applied concurrently, 
and not separately as necessitated by the dictates of two dif-
ferent conflicts rules. We must explain these two difficulties. 
(b) Rights and expectancies· distinguished. Ordinarily, in-
terests in assets of one spouse, which by marital law or marriage 
settlement have been conferred upon the other, come into 
being or, in the usual language, acquire the quality of vested 
rights before the dissolution of the marriage. At common law, 
for instance, a wife by virtue of the marriage has a dower in-
terest in every parcel of real estate of which her husband has 
been seised at any time during coverture. This interest can be 
defeated neither by a conveyance of the husband nor by his 
will. On the other hand, where testamentary or intestate suc-
cession entitles a surviving spouse to participate in the distribu-
tion of the predeceased spouse's estate, the surviving spouse 
receives no more than a mere expectation, strengthened at the 
most by provisions for forced shares; viventis hereditas non 
datur. 
It follows that where a legal system grants to a spouse a 
genuine right to be acquired upon and during the marriage, 
this right is always to be classified as matrimonial. Such a right 
will therefore be acquired under the applicable matrimonial 
law, irrespective of the inheritance law of the last domicil or 
the last nationality. By a marriage settlement, in England, 
"the law of the testator's domicil may be ousted from its regu-
lation of a will." 187 In this country, much discussion has cen-
tered around the question whether, in all ten of the community 
187 BENTWICH, The Law of Domicil in its Relation to Succession (London, 
1911) 133ff. 
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property states, the wife has a present interest in the com-
munity fund during the marriage, sufficient for a separate in-
come tax return.188 There seems to be a growing tendency to 
affirm the existence of an actual right for all purposes.189 In 
France, Germany, Switzerland, as well as in the Latin Ameri-
can countries, all regimes, except that of complete property 
separation, undoubtedly give actual rights during marriage. 
Antenuptial or valid postnuptial settlements have a clear 
precedence over intestate distribution also in this country.190 
Where, conversely, a right of a spouse is recognized as exist-
ent only at the time of the dissolution of marriage, the right 
by no means necessarily originates in the law of inheritance. 
Death of one spouse is ordinarily only one of several possible 
causes of dissolution and the regimes that are usually called 
systems of community upon death are in reality meant to con-
fer some interest also in cases other than death.191 For this 
reason alone, such systems cannot be characterized as constitut-
ing successions on death. Moreover, although the nature of 
the benefits granted to a surviving wife is uncertain in such 
systems, analyses undertaken in recent years for the purpose of 
applying conflicts rules have shown that in almost all such 
institutions the widow is entitled to an interest upon marriage 
rather than upon inheritance.192 
Still, some legislations contain veritable mixtures of ele-
ments which resist satisfactory classification. Thus, certain 
188 See DAGGETT, "Wife's Interest in Community Property," Legal Essays 
(I935) Iodf. For the construction of the law of Idaho see ]ACOB, "The Law 
of Community Property in Idaho," I Idaho L. J. (I 9 3 I) I, z 5. 
189 See STUMBERG, I I Tex. L. Rev. (I932) 53, 65 n. so, supra n. I; DAG-
GETT, "Division of Property upon Dissolution of Marriage," 6 Law and Cont. 
Probl. (I939) 225, 233· 
190 Ford's Curator v. Ford (1824) 2 Mart. N. S. (La.) 574; Estate of J. B. 
Aubichon (1874) 49 Cal. I8. 
191 KADEN, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. I. 
192 The Austrian community on death is to be classified with matrimonial law; 
see RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I931) 26I; likewise the Danish community of goods, 
see PAPPENHEIM, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (I9JZ) uo; and the Hungarian community of 
gains, see ALMAS!, 1 Ungarisches Privatrecht (Berlin, 1922) I97ff., RAAPE 344• 
An interesting example of a matrimonial institution clearly preserved from 
ancient ideas is the continued community property of the German Code (§§ 1483 
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American institutions of mixed character, such as the widow's 
right of election between dower rights and testamentary be-
quests under the law of Pennsylvania,193 or between dower and 
intestate share in Florida, 194 or between statutory portion and 
legacy under New York law,195 have been objects of discussion 
in the European conflict of laws. 
The name that an institution bears in its legislative home 
country cannot be decisive. Nor should the law of the forum 
influence the analysis of foreign institutions.196 
(c) Coordination of the two fields in municipal legislation. 
In some municipal laws, the connection between the matri-
monial property law and the law of inheritance is particularly 
strong. Recent authors ha~e drawn attention to the purposeful 
balancing of provisions in th.e two fields, disregard of which has 
caused unfortunate results. 
-r 5 r 8), by which the community which existed between the spouses is continued 
after the death of one spouse between the survivor and the children of thel 
marriage. The children step into the place of the predeceasing parent through 
the operation of marital law rather than the rules of inheritance. See RG. 
(Oct. 25, r895) 36 RGZ. 331, 334· Hence, German courts and other courts 
having a similar set of conflicts rules apply the said provisions whenever the 
husband was a German national at the time of the marriage. 2 ZITELMANN 
694; RAAPE 343; KADEN, 3 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 500; contra: 3 
FRANKENSTEIN 391. 
In Switzerland, an exactly analogous characteriza~ion of the existing con-
tinued community property system of the canton of Bern was made on the basis 
of federal law, viz., general notions and the nature of things, by the BG. (June 
30, 1905) 31 BGE. I 287, 294; cf. ScHOCH, "Conflict of Laws in a Federal 
State: the Experience of Switzerland," 55 Harv. L. Rev. (r942) 738, 767ff. 
193 Classified as part of the matrimonial law by Cour Paris (Jan. 6, r862) 
S.r862.2.337, discussed by BARTIN, Etudes 70; NEUNER, Der Sinn 6o. 
19-1 Cf. NEUNER, Der Sinn 64-66. 
195 Classified as part of succession law by .French Cass. (civ.) (Aug. r6, r869) 
S.r 869.1.41 7• . 
On the question whether or to what extent provisions of a marriage settlement 
are offset by the provisions of distributing statutes establishing forced shares, 
see BRESLAUER, "Conflict of Laws in Restrictions on Freedom of Testation," 
27 Iowa L. Rev. (1942) 425, 441; NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (1943) 187, supra 
n. r. 
196 This method has in fact been observed by the Reichsgericht since early 
times; see its decision RG. (Dec. 19, 1887) 43 Seuff. Arch. 288 and (Nov. 25, 
1895) 36 RGZ. 33 r, 334· The French courts have also followed it, as NEUNER, 
Der Sinn 6o has demonstrated in opposition to HARTIN's thesis of classification 
according to the lex fori. 
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Thus, for instance, under the Massachusetts statute, a 
widow has a dower interest in the property of her late husband, 
while no community property is recognized. A husband, who 
shortly before his death had transferred his domicil to Cali-
fornia, would not leave any community property, nor would 
the widow have any dower right. "That result would de-
feat the spirit of both of the dower laws of Massachusetts and 
of the community property laws of the distributary estate; yet 
it would be reached none the less." 197 If the husband had 
gone to Louisiana, the widow would receive nothing if there 
are "heirs." 198 Conversely, where the husband removes his 
domicil from California to Massachusetts, the widow enjoys 
simultaneously her community share acquired under Califor-
nia law and the dower interest under Massachusetts law. 
Similarly, in Sweden the wife is granted a share in the com-
munity fund and for this reason is excluded from participation 
in the inheritance,. if there are descendants of the husband. 
Where a German married couple, not having concluded a mar-
riage settlement, acquire Swedish nationality and the husband 
dies, the widow has no claim under German matrimonial law, 
which provides no benefits for the wife, nor under Swedish in-
heritance law; 
Where, conversely, a wife is not given any matrimonial 
right (except, of course, through an express marriage settle-
ment), she may be granted under modern legislation a gener-
ous and indefeasible portion in her deceased husband's estate. 
If, for instance, the spouses were of Swedish nationality at the 
time of their marriage and later became German nationals, in 
the courts of both countries the widow would receive, under 
the Swedish matrimonial law, half the husband's property as 
community part and, in addition, under the German law of suc-
cession on death, half or a quarter of the rest as heir. 
187 LEFLAR, 2.1 Cal. L. Rev. (1933) 2.2.1 at z:z.6, 2.2.7, supra n. r. 
198 La. C. C. (Dart, 1932.) art. 924; NEUNER, 5 La. L. Rev. (1943) at 176, 
supra n. r. 
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Thus, coordinations carefully worked <?Ut within a domestic 
statute are badly disturbed when different systems of law are 
called into play by the choice of law rules on matrimonial prop-
erty and inheritance. Ingenious remedies have been sug-
gested, 199 but so far with little success. The problem is ag-
gravated by the double fact that in most systems of private 
law the relation between the two groups of provisions is hid-
den, and that the factual situations are far from suggesting 
that radical change of the conflicts rules, or enlargement of the 
scope of the law at the last domicil, is in equity required. We 
may take for illustration the American cases in which the hus-
band transfers his domicil from a separate property state to a 
state where community property obtains. Apart from the hard-
ship imposed by the former common law doctrine upon the 
wife, which it was not the task of conflicts rules to remedy, it 
seems not inequitable to apply the law of the first domicil. 
Bruggemeyer/00 a lawyer, earned almost all his money in Illi-
nois as his separate property and then stayed for years with his 
wife in California where she died. There was no reason why 
this change of domicil should have shifted half of his earnings 
to the heirs of his wife. The spouses Latterner 201 lived three 
years in Boston, Massachusetts, and fifteen in Los Angeles, 
until they separated. No equitable argument challenged the 
character as separate property of the husband's earnings as a 
physician in Boston. 0'Connor 20!l married in 1925 in Indiana, 
but the spouses separated within "a few days"; there was no 
ground why the husband's later moving to California should 
give the widow half of the husband's premarital land in 
Indiana. 
The easiest practical way to assure that matrimonial and in-
. heritance statutes in the same legal system preserve their 
199 See RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I 9 3 I) z 8 3; NEUNER, Der Sinn 66 and 5 La. 
L. Rev. (I943) I9o, supra n. I; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 3z6; RAAPE, z D. IPR. I97· 
200 In re Bruggemeyer's Estate (I93I) II5 Cal. App. 5z5, z P. (zd) 534· 
201 Latterner v. Latterner (1932) u1 Cal. App. z98, 8 P. (zd) 870. 
202 In re O'Connor's Estate (1933) z18 Cal. 5I8, 23 P. (zd) 1031. 
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natural balance, is simply more circumspect drafting of these 
statutes. In this country, a federal Union where a part of the 
population is inclined to change domicil, statutes of descent and 
distribution should not blindly envisage only cases where both 
the first and the last domicil happen to be in the state and, 
moreover, no marriage settlement was established. In a com-
munity property state, the possibility that the surviving spouse 
may fail, for any cause without his fault, to enjoy the regular 
matrimonial share, should be considered. Vice versa, in a sepa-
rate property state, there should be an appropriate provision to 
adjust the ordinary distribution in the case where the surviving 
spouse is amply provided with a matrimonial property interest. 
True, theoretically the matter belongs to conflicts law, but con-
flicts rules suitable to all situations are scarcely available at this 
time. 
PART FOUR 
DIVORCE AND ANNULME~T 
CHAPTER 11 
Divorce 
I. THE PRoBLEM OF FoREIGN DrvoRCE 
T HE conflicts rules concerning divorce are generally applicable not only to absolute divorce, i.e., dissolu-tion of the bonds of marriage, but also to limited di-
vorce, such as 'Separation from bed and board and similar types 
of judicial separation, not merely temporary. Nevertheless, 
we shall confine our discussion in general to absolute divorce. 
Judicial separation has some particular features; for example, 
there are special rules in the United States respecting the 
recognition of foreign separation decrees.1 
r. Aspects of the Problem 
Divorce is to be studied here in three aspects. We have to 
consider first the connection that the parties to a divorce suit 
(or corresponding proceedings of a non-contentious nature) 
are required to have with the forum and, in the case where 
persons, not subjects of the forum, are permitted to be parties, 
the law applicable to the suit. In the second place, it will be 
presupposed that a divorce decreed in one jurisdiction is being 
examined for the purpose of recognition in another. Third, the 
extraterritorial effects of non-recognized and of recognized 
divorce decrees will be analyzed more precisely. 
The subject to be discussed in this chapter has been some-
what neglected in comparative_ surveys and international dis-
cussions. Particularly in this country, endeavor to improve the 
actual situation in case a marriage may be regarded as existent 
in one state and dissolved in another, with all its tremendous 
1 Restatement § 114 and comment. 
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consequences for the parties and their issue and third persons, 
has chiefly centered around the recognition of foreign decrees. 
In the highly spirited debate under the headline of Haddock 
v. Haddock,2 or now of Williams and Hendrix v. North 
Carolina,S it has been asked what position should be taken by 
a state whose court is requested to recognize another state's 
divorce decree, rather than what attitude might be suitable to 
that state whose court is to take cognizance of the original ap-
plication for divorce. 
Every state of the Union has the unquestionable power to 
·determine by itself all of its divorce policy; on the other hand, 
by the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as developed 
by the Supreme Court of the United States, recognition of 
divorce decrees is compulsory under certain conditions. Hence, 
not unnaturally, scrutiny of the more or less anomalous decrees 
rendered by the courts of about fifty jurisdictions and selec-
tion of those decrees that deserve recognition, has appeared the 
chief problem. The complement of the problem is, what limits 
every state ought to observe in opening its courts to divorce, so 
as to facilitate reciprocal recognition. Perfect mutuality has 
been reached by this method in such treaties as those of Monte-
video and the Scandinavian states. The drafters of the succes-
sive uniform acts in this country 4 also distinctly perceived the 
problem and found, in the writer's opinion, an adequate solu-
tion; yet these acts have encountered an amazingly unfriendly 
reception.5 The restaters of the law of conflicts, too, saw the 
2 (I906) ZOI U.S. 56:1.. 
3 (I94Z) 3I7 U.S. z87. 
4 Draft of a Uniform Divorce Law, I4 Harv. L. Rev. (I9oi) szs; Resolu-
tions, adopted by the National Congress on Uniform Divorce Laws in Wash-
ington, D. C., Feb. I 9-zz, I 906; Proposed Uniform Statute relating to Annul-
ment of Marriage and Divorce submitted by the Subcommittee on Resolutions 
to the Divorce Congress of Philadelphia, Nov. I3, I9o6. This statute was 
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
in I907 and adopted in Delaware, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, but was replaced 
by the Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act of I 930, 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 
(I93Z) I33• 
5 See especially VREELAND so. His own propositions were called politically 
impossible by STUMBERG, Book Review, z La. L. Rev. (I939) zo7. 
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goal when they started to define "jurisdiction for divorce," 6 
apparently as an absolute notion, good for the use of all courts 
concerned. But what they have stated can hardly be meant to 
bind the courts granting divorce; it has useful reference only 
to the problem of deciding in which cases the jurisdiction ex-
ercised by a divorce court should be recognized by a court of 
another state, i.e., the problem of jurisdiction in the inter-
national sense. 
2. Diversity of Divorce Legislation 
Comparative research in divorce legislation has revealed 
staggering diversity. However, for writers to claim for this 
reason alone that in cases of conflict of laws every state must 
stick to its own policy without regarding the outside world, is 
an overstatement. Certain contrasts are fundamental indeed; 
others are not. 
The doctrine of the Catholic Church that marriage cannot 
be dissolved except by death, although having lost its force in 
many countries, actually prevails in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ireland, Italy, Paraguay, and Spain, and 
with respect to Catholics in some parts of Eastern Europe and 
the Middle East. 7 Absolute divorce is excluded also in South 
Carolina. 8 Next to this group, we must place the laws of New 
York and formerly of the District of Columbia, admitting 
divorce only on the ground of adultery.9 
Looking to the opposite end of the line, we notic~ several 
institutions of a very diverse nature. There are remainders 
of the old patriarchical repudiation by which, for instance, an 
Egyptian Moslem may divorce his wife without any alleged 
cause. There is the ultramodern view of the Russian Soviet 
Republics allowing each spouse to terminate the marriage by 
6 Restatement§§ IIO-II3; cf. ibid. at§§ 431 77· 1 See infra p. 430. 
8 S. C. Constitution, Art. I 7 § 3. 
9 D. C. Code (I929) tit. I4 § 641 was repealed by the Act of August 71 19351 
49 Stat. 539> c. 453, §I. 
Laws of New York (Cahill, I937) C.P.A.§ II47· 
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unilateral declaration. Neither state nor church influences this 
act. Again, we may add a few American and Mexican juris-
dictions where the dissolution of marriages is offered, as the 
current expression goes, 10 on a commercial basis; also, in ad-
dition to these open divorce markets, some states are disgraced 
by abusive practices. The Old Testament right of a sovereign 
head of a household, the Soviet emphasis on freedom of mar-
riage, and the readiness of American courts to provide divorce, 
are certainly heterogeneous phenomena, but in common they 
result in permitting indiscriminately what the legislations of 
the first group refuse indiscriminately. , 
We may well call both groups of legislations radical and set 
them apart for the major purposes of conflicts law. In the rest 
of the world, divorce regulations form a block of kindred 
systems. To be sure, they are very far from being homogen-
eous. The old conception that divorce is a remedy given to an 
innocent against a guilty party vanishes more or less slowly; 
modern social aims are gaining acknowledgment here and 
there; private interest and public welfare are differently 
evaluated; many historical remainders and arbitrary predilec-
tions of local lawmakers increase the number of varieties. 
Vernier lists eight major and thirty-one minor causes for di-
vorce in this country alone, irregularly distributed over fifty 
jurisdictions.11 Defences, principles of procedure, authorities 
empowered with granting divorce, are diverse. Nevertheless, 
the basis'is a common one: marriage can be dissolved, if dis-
solution appears to be the minor evil, and whether it is must be 
controlled by an agency of the state in appropriate proceed-
ings. A really basic difference occurs respecting the question 
whether a mutual agreement of the parties should be accepted 
10 Hatton, J., of Tonopah, sitting during the vacation of a judge in Carson 
City, Nevada, "asserted that the State Legislature, with commercial intent and 
under pressure, had legislated the present divorce law," in the cause of Mrs. de 
Forest Payne, N. Y. Times, Sept. 2.9, 1942., p. u. 
11 :r. VERNIER § 6:r.. 
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as a self-sufficient ground for divorce decrees, but, strangely 
enough, this point has not been much emphasized as a con-
sideration of public policy in conflicts law. On the whole, 
soberly examined, a modern statute on divorce is usually on 
the middle road, a product of compromise with an increasing 
admittance of social-hygienic ideas. There is little need for con-
juring up the vision of bridgeless gulfs between conceptual 
antitheses. . 
There 'is something more to tone down the contrasts. A 
statute such as that of Nevada or of a Mexican state embodies 
the normal terms and provisions, at the most indulging in 
some clauses that promise secrecy or allow unnamed grounds 
for divorce at the discretion of the judge, while the experiences 
of other countries, we may discover, again and again reveal an 
average practice laxer than the official language indicates. 
Lawyers know this well, each with respect to his own state; 
probably it is a universal tendency. A few illustrations: When 
before the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, adultery was the 
only divorce ground in England, scandalous maneuvers were 
in semi-official use to simulate evidence of adultery. The same 
revolting practice is said to be frequent in New York. Courts 
where desertion is not recognized as a cause, find a cause in 
cruelty and vice versa; in the numerous countries following 
the CodeN apoleon, "injures graves" is an elastic notion. Ger-
man courts were never seriously embarrassed by the p'rovision 
that the defendant spouse must have caused the breaking ~p of 
the marriage by his reprehensible conduct. A reform of the 
law was demanded and finally accomplished, with the effect of 
legalizing the liberal practice and obviating the conventional 
lies of the parties, rather than of introducing a new rule. 
Why are these practices admitted? In large centers of popu-
lation, courts are unable to examine the individual circum-
stances as they might wish to do. As has well been observed in . 
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this country/2 collusion between the parties or abandonment 
of the cause by the weaker party characterize the over-
whelming majority of cases. A divorce judge in any such 
country has the feeling of gliding down an inclined plane; no 
stop anywhere is firmly assured, once divorce has been per-
mitted. Of course, there will always be judges more conscien-
tious, or conservative, or formalistic than the average. But it 
is the geqeral trend that counts. And even the general pro-
hibition of divorce does not work without exception.s. Courts 
without absolute divorce at their disposal are inclined to grant 
annulment of marriage where in other systems divorce would 
be expected. 
In addition, there are geographical limitations on legislative 
control. Italian couples went to Fiume for divorce, Argentines 
continue to go to Montevideo, citizens of South Carolina to 
Georgia and North Carolina, and the answer to New York is 
given in Reno. That only wealthy people are able to escape 
their home laws aggravates the moral aspects of the situation. 
Paradoxes reach a climax in the field of recognition. Foreign 
decrees are irregularly recognized in this country and en-
counter prohibitive defences in Continental Europe, especially 
in the country to which a party belongs as a national. How-
ever, if "invalid" divorces are not a simple "myth" within 
the United States/3 the contention that they are to a large 
extent in fact recognized is true with respect to all countries. 
3· Pivergence in Method 
In approaching the problem of the interstate and interna-
tional treatment of divorce, we must be aware of a funda-
12 HARPER, "The Myth of the Void Divorce," 2 Law and Cont. Probl. (1935) 
335; }ACOBS, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 Mich. L. Rev. (1936) 749, 
959; SAYRE, "Divorce by Judicial Process," 18 Iowa L. Rev. (1933) 493, so8; 
Note, 36 Col. L. Rev. ( 1936) I 121; cf. JACOBS, "The Enforcement of Foreign 
Decrees for Alimony," 6 Law and Cont. Probl. (1939) 250, 251. 
13 GoODRICH§ 128 n. 46. 
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mental difference between the American method and that 
followed in the principal civil law countries. 
In this country, it is a matter of course that every state 
grants jurisdiction for divorce without asking what extra-
territorial effect the forthcoming decree will enjoy in other 
states. Moreover, so soon as jurisdiction is assumed by a court, 
there is no doubt that the case will be decided in exclusive ac-
cordance with the municipal statute of the forum (lex fori), 
irrespective of any qualifications of the parties; no choice of 
law therefore is involved. 
The most representative legislations of the civil law, how-
ever, take into consideration the position of the law of the state 
whose nationals the parties are, with regard to one or both of 
the following points: 
( i) Jurisdiction in the case of foreign nationals is not as-
sumed unless the national law of the parties is willing to 
recognize this jurisdiction. 
(ii) Divorce is not granted, unless it is agreeable to the in-
ternal law of the national state of the parties. 
In the heyday of the principle underlying these ideas (the 
so-called principle of nation~lity ), many writers went fur-
ther, applying the pure national law of the parties.14 But with 
the Introductory Law to the GermanCivil Code (1896) and 
the Hague Convention on Divorce and Separation (I 902) as 
models, it is now generally required that both the foreign and 
the domestic laws must concur in permitting divorce in the 
particular case. Hence, the law of the forum, although not ex-
clusively governing, as in the common law c0untries and 
others, has more to say than in almost any other field of con-
flicts law. Its importance is further increased where one party 
is a subject of the forum and the other a foreign national. 
1
' GIERKE, I Deutsches Privatrecht 2 3 6; REGELSBERGER, I Pandekten I 7 8; 
5 LAURENT 244, 276, 285, and others. 
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4· Predominance of Lex Fori 
Why in divorce involving foreign aspects, the law that a 
court must apply _in purely domestic matters should have such 
an abnormal influence is usually explained by a general ref-
erence to the nature of the institution. It is said that divorce is 
permitted or refused in every state according to its tradition, 
religion, ethics, logic (or what is believed to be logic), and 
in conformity with hygienic and other considerations of popu-
lation policy. This general reasoning is not adequate to the 
subject. Consideration of the three groups of divorce legis-
lations set out under (ii) above, taken as a basis to measure 
affinity of divorce policies, suggests the following. 
The standards of each of the three groups are basic. We may 
be astonished indeed by the grouping of states in which the 
Hague Convention of I 902 undertook to unify the rules for 
granting divorce and for recognizing foreign divorce. There 
were, on the one hand, the states which had normal modern 
legislations and, on the other hand, Austria, Italy, Portugal, 
and the Czarist Russian Empire, where at that time divorce 
was either left to the ecclesiastical authorities of the various 
denominations, or forbidden at least to Catholics. Italy has re-
mained a member and retained its ban on divorce; the Con-
vention has prevented Italian nationals from being divorced 
in any participating state. This has been praised as a great 
progress in international cooperation, 15 but it has resulted in 
the final withdrawal from the Convention of France, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden successively. It is quite as 
prejudicial to combine legislations of contradictory character 
for the purpose of reciprocal respect, as it is to exaggerate 
minor varieties of policy. In federations that guarantee mutual 
recognition of state acts between the single states, it should 
be presupposed that the aims of the several legislations, varied 
15 LEWALD, "Haager Konventionen zum lnternationalen Privatrecht," in 
STRUPP, 1 Worterbuch des Volkerrechts und der Diplomatie 466. 
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as they may be, are not fundamentally hostile to each other. In 
a Union including legislations of New York and Nevada, the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause cannot work smoothly. It is the 
writer's conviction that it is not so much the multitude of 
regulations in the United States as the extremes to which a 
few of them go that creates difficulties in the mutual recogni-
tion of divorce decrees. 
On the side of the majority group, no such prominent dif-
ferences obstruct mutual understanding. All these systems 
strive, through an institution controlled by the state, to assure 
sound domestic relations within the limits to which the as-
sistance that law and legal machinery provide is subject. To 
apply the law of the forum among states of this group to 
foreigners as well as to citizens presumes a claim to a stringent 
public policy that cannot be obj.ectively justified by the ac-
customed standards of comparative law. Whether considera-
tions pertaining to the field of conflicts rules better support 
that claim, will be asked later. 
5. "Migratory" Divorce 
Our subject includes divorces described in the United States 
as "migratory" and probably best defined as divorces obtained 
in a state by persons who have just completed the minimum 
time of residence required by the local statute for granting 
jurisdiction over divorce. Technically, it is required that a 
bona fide domicil be established and, in the prevailing opinion, 
that the person must have had actual residence during this 
time. Hence, it is presumed by the law "of the books" that the 
newcomer has intended to transfer the center of his entire 
life to the state for an indefinite time. In contrast, it is not 
sufficient to take residence within the jurisdiction merely for 
the purpose of obtaining divorce, although the circumstance 
that the domicil is changed with the motive of securing a 
divorce is not prejudicial. The minimum requirement of "resi-
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dence" is generally understood to evince the required mental 
purpose, which, to put it simply, is that of establishing a real 
and permanent domicil. 
The actual picture looks so different from this legal structure 
that migratory divorces are currently identified with those 
obtained in evasion of the domiciliary statute, i.e., by a falsely 
pretended domicil. The rate of migratory divorces in the first 
sense, i.e., upon completion of minimum residence require-
ments, has been appraised for the year I 929 as constituting 
only 3 per cent of the total number of divorces in this country, 
a much smaller percentage rate than had been feared. 16 The 
absolute numbers, however, are highY The total of divorces 
was over 200,000 in I 929 and, after the drop caused by the 
depression, reached 250,000 in I937 and about 264,000 in 
I 940. In the two counties in Nevada, Clark and Washoe, 
where Las Vegas and Reno are situated, divorces totaled I 7 s6 
in 1929, 4769 in I9JI, and 3629 in I9J5.18 The rate of 
divorce for IOo,ooo population has been estimated with 
respect to the year 1940 as 200 in the United States, 90 in the 
Middle Atlantic states, and 4 71 o in Nevada. More serviceable 
than many arguments used to moderate the apprehensions that 
must be aroused by the rapid increase in these rates is com-
parison. Although in Europe, excluding Soviet Russia, no 
country reaches even half of the American percentage, the 
highest percentage of divorces occurs in Switzerland,19 despite 
16 CAHEN, Statistical Analysis of American Divorce (I932.) 78. The ap-
parently optimistic views of this writer have influenced most sociological ob-
servers. 
17 U. S. Bureau of the Census, Vital Statistics, Special Reports, U. S. Dept. 
of Commerce, Vol. IS, No. I8, p. I93 (March zo, I942.). Estimated number 
of divorces by states, United States I 9 3 7-I 940. 
18 According to a newspaper correspondence in I 943, there were 59 I o divorces 
in Washoe County and 2.72.0 cases in Clark County, an "all time high" rendering 
$2.oo,ooo in fees in these counties. The total of seventeen county courts in 
Nevada is given with II,399 divorces against 8,6I6 in I942., the fees amounting 
to more than $soo,ooo. 
19 This fact has been observed by Swiss authors. GMUR, 2. Familienrecht I so, 
with respect to the decade of I 900 to 1909. It is confirmed by the following 
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the repugnance to divorce in the Catholic inner cantons and 
the conservative character of the population in the entire coun-
try. In I 93 I the rate of divorce for IOo,ooo population was 70 
in Switzerland as against I4 7 in the United States. \Ve may 
conjecture that the spirit of advanced democracy and industrial 
enterprise has some influence on the frequency of divorce. Yet, 
obviously, every divorce marks a regrettable failure even for 
a childless couple, and lawyers cannot fail to be moved by the 
inadequacy of their machinery. The divorce mills complete 
the evils of familial maladjustments; not only do they work 
against the intentions of sister state legislatures, in itself a sign 
of unsound relations, but they also enable legislatures, courts 
and attorneys to destroy homes for the sake of local profits. 
6. Ex Parte Proceedings 
The many cases in which, under modern statutes, a spouse 
can sue for divorce while the other party is resident in another 
state, need particular care by legislatures and courts. Not only 
do almost all legislations of the world allow in such cases sub-
sidiary use of service by publication and the grant of divorce 
despite the absence of the defendant, but often the procedural 
guarantees are handled unsatisfactorily. 2° Facts alleged by the 
plaintiff are not sufficiently verified. Even fraudulent maneu-
vers-for instance false indication of the defendant's address 
designed to prevent due notice of the trial-are not efficiently 
figures regarding the year 19 2 7: divorce rate per IOo,ooo population: England 
and Wales, 7.3; Belgium, 31; France, 45; Germany, 57.6; Denmark, 55; 
Switzerland, 62; Japan, 79; United States, 16o; Leningrad, 983; Moscow, 959· 
REUTER and RUNNER, The Family (193I) 2Io; HANKINS, "Divorce," 5 En-
cyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (I 9 3 5) 1 7 7. Higher figures in similar pro-
portion have been indicated for I 9 35, omitting Switzerland, see JACOBS, Cases 
on Domestic Relations (ed. 2, 1939) 352. The relation to "married persons" or 
"existing marriages" would be more instructive, but this is not available. 
20 Very conveniently, SAYRE, "Recognition by Other States of Decrees for 
Judicial Separation and Decrees for Alimony," 28 Iowa L. Rev. (I943) 321 
3 3 9 suggests "more effective substituted service than is required now" as pa~ 
of the process. 
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counteracted, whatever the law of procedure may be.21 No 
wonder that the international attitude is simple mistrust. 
Easily gained divorces may be attacked in the courts of other 
states, if enforcement is sought or, alternatively, annulment is 
asked. And this, despite the fact that everywhere, by customary 
law or statute or express clause of international treaty, proper 
service and a decent opportunity for defence are made primary 
conditions to the recognition of foreign divorces. Any observer 
will note that all those states whose courts indulge in routine 
service by publication, are among the severe censurers of the 
same act by foreign courts. 
We have, however, to limit our survey to the two main 
questions of jurisdiction and choice of law. 
II. JuRISDICTION 
A divorce suit is considered to belong to a court either by 
virtue of some domiciliary connection or the nationality of 
both, or possibly one, of the parties. 
Other grounds for assuming divorce jurisdiction have 
sometimes been deemed to include the place where the mar-
riage has been celebrated or the place where an offence against 
the marriage has been committed. The first conception is 
derived from regarding marriage as a contract and dissolution 
of marriage as a rescission thereof; the second reflects the idea 
that divorce is of a penal nature and therefore govemed by the 
law of the place of the wrong. These conceptions no longer re-
tain roots in the present legislations; their after-effects may 
be discerned in certain rules of choice of law and, in this coun-
try, in some additional provisions relative to jurisdiction over 
divorce, rather than in the main principles. 
21 Among the endeavors to help the victims of divorce, the activities of the 
International Migration Service are particularly deserving. See WAINHOUSE, 
"Protecting the Absent Spouse in International Divorce," 2 Law and Cont. 
Probl. (1935) 360. . 
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The existence of a third ground for jurisdiction is quite un-
certain. Generally, it is emphatically denied that in matrimo-
nial causes the parties may agree on a_ court. 22 Nevertheless, 
sometimes openly, courts are induced to take jurisdiction with-
out close scrutiny, when the defendant consents to the suit. 23 
In any event, jurisdiction is quite frequently assumed every-
where on undisputed false allegations of domicil, without 
any inquiry by the court, which is equivalent to making the 
parties domini litis as to jurisdiction, and-more legitimately 
-a separate domicil of the wife is recognized when the hus-
band consents. 
I. Nationality as Basis 
The faculty offered by .most civil law countries to their 
nationals to bring suit for ~ivorce even when the plaintiff is 
domiciled in another country may be briefly mentioned. 24 
A few countries go so far as to reserve all matrimonial suits 
involving a national to their own courts exclusively, even if 
the parties are domiciled abroad and in the most distant 
22 There are exceptions such as the permission by Mexican state laws to grant 
jurisdiction in divorce when both parties submit to the court. The Federal Su-
preme Court holds recognition due in the Federal District and Territories in 
the case of express submission as contrasted with tacit agreement, on the basis of 
art. 602 of the Cod. Fed. de Proc. Civ. See decisions (April 2, 1935) 44 Seman. 
Jud. 72 as to the state Chihuahua, and (Dec. 7, 1934) 42 Seman. Jud. 3596 as 
to the state Morelos. 
23 Submission to divorce jurisdiction is treated as actually effectiye in Greece 
by 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 379· 
It has been considered but rejected in Argentina, see LAZCANO, 57 ].A.(1937) 
463ff. n. 128. 
The Brazilian Supreme Court, however, seems to have construed arts. 3 I 8-
323 of the Codigo Bustamante, allowing submission to a court, so as to include 
jurisdiction in divorce; Fed. Sup. Ct. (July 17, 1940) 58 Arch. Jud. 83. 
In the English case of Hussein v. Hussein (1938) 54 T.L.R. 632, marriage was 
celebrated in England but the husband was not even a resident. The court took 
jurisdiction on the undefended suit by the wife, a decision presented as model 
to Scotch courts in so Jurid. Rev. 195. 
24 For details see French Cass. (req.) (April 29, 1931) S.1931.I.247· 
German Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. 2. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7g. 
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regions. Once the Czarist Russian and the Austrian Empires 
were in this group. Today the list includes-after many doubts 
are discounted 25 and leaving Austria aside 26-Czechoslova-
kia,27 Hungary/8 the former Austrian and Hungarian parts of 
Rumania, 29 Poland, 30 and Turkey. 31 On the other hand, such 
25 In Greece exclusive jurisdiction is no longer claimed by the courts except 
for Greeks domiciled in Greece. See STREIT, 20 Recueil I927 VI 5 I; FRAGISTAS, 
7 Z.ausl.PR. (I93J) 297; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 382; cf. Trib. Athens I933, 
no. I676, Clunet I934, I04I; Trib. Athens (Ist inst.) I935 no. 8250, 47 Themis 
582, Clunet 1937. 597· TENEKIDES, Clunet 1937. 598. 
Portugal: 1 BERGMANN 551. 
26 Austria: § 81 no. 3 of the "Jurisdiction Law" (Exekutionsordnung) was 
understood as reserving divorce jurisdiction over nationals to the Austrian courts, 
see WALKER 724. It was (or isf) controversial whether this rule survived the 
annexation of Austria in 1 9 3 8 ; two Swiss decisions applied it to Austrian emi-
gres: Kantongericht St. Gallen (Jan. zo, 1939) 37 SJZ. 73 no. 15, and App. 
Bern (March 12, 1940) 37 SJZ. 32 no. 6; also BECK, "Zur Frage der Schei-
dung von Oesterreichern in der Schweiz," 38 SJZ. (I941-1942) 57· 
27 § 81 no. 3 of the Austrian Jurisdiction Law was maintained in Czecho-
slovakia. Nevertheless, the exclusiveness of jurisdiction was in controversy be-
tween the Supreme Court and the government and was finally settled tentatively. 
See for details German RG. (Oct.z6, 1933) 143 RGZ. 130; R.MAYR, 1 Z.ost-
europ.R. ( 1 9 34) 1 7 7. In the later period, most German courts refused to exercise 
jurisdiction over nationals of Czechoslovakia; see KG. (Oct. 17, 1930) IPRspr. 
19 31, no. 62, and the decisions ibid. nos. I 34-I 41 ; RG. (Feb. 1 8, 19 3 7) I 54 
RGZ. 92. Contra: OLG. Jena (May 11, 1934) JW. 1934, 2795, IPRspr. 1934, 
no. 124. Similar result in Switzerland: App. Zurich (April 21, 1937) 34 SJZ. 
(1937-1938) 282 no. 51, Bl.f. Ziirch. Rspr. 1937, 353, 12 Z.ausl.PR. (1938) 
587. 
28 Hungarian Marriage Law of 18941 § II4; cf. 11 Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 187. 
29 See 1 BERGMANN 590. 
80 A contrary liberal doctrine was clearly adopted by the Polish Law of I926 
on private international law, art. 1 7 par. 3, on which a great many German 
decisions were based, see RAAPE 397· It was the declared intention of the ju-
dicial commission of the Polish Sejm, as the Polish Ministry of Justice recog-
nized, to facilitate the divorce of Polish emigrants before foreign courts. See 
documentation of the decision of App. Danzig (Oct. 21, 1 9 3 7) 4 Z.osteurop.R. 
(I937) 304. Yet, the tendencies were reversed, and by a rather surprising in-
terpretation of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure of 19321 § 528, recognition 
of any foreign divorce decree was refused except for the reciprocity provided 
by treaty. See ZoLL, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (I934) 716; Polish Supreme Court (Feb. 
51 1931) Z.f.Ostrecht 1932, 383i Polish Supreme Court (April 231 I936) Clu-
net 1937, 6I7; and Polish Supreme Court in Plenary Civil Chambers (May 29, 
1937) published in Dt. Justiz 1938, 251; cf. RABEL, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (I 934) 7I 8; 
9 ihiJ. (1935) 290. MASSFELLER, "Einzelfragen aus dem deutschen interna-
tionalen Ehescheidungsrecht," JW. I935> 2465. Correspondingly, jurisdiction 
was denied by RG. (Feb. 24, 1936) 150 RGZ. 293; RG. (July 31 I939) 160 
RGZ. 396, 3991 OLG. Stettin (Sept. 23, 1938) JW. 19391 249. 
31 Turkey: Art. IJ no. 6 of the Law of April u, 19241 amending§ 18 of the 
Code of Civ. Proc., see 1 BERGMANN 768. 
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exclusive jurisdiction is not claimed by the vast majority of 
states, and, although at one time nationality of the husband 
was considered the only generally sufficient condition for di-
vorce jurisdiction, 32 in some countries nationality alone, with-
out domicil or at least residence, of one party in the state is 
considered insufficient for suing ~r being sued. 33 Even so, 
many conditions attach to recognition of foreign divorce 
decrees by the national states, including such powers of re-
examination as approximate exclusive jurisdiction. 34 
The conflicts between the claims of the national and the 
domiciliary jurisdictions have attracted a great deal of atten-
tion. Generally, the only remedy envisaged has been in con-
cessions by the states of domicil to those states to which the 
parties involved belong. Not only has the Hague Convention 
sanctioned this trend, but, more moderately, even an English 
authority has suggested that divorces rendered at the com-
petent court of the national state should be recognized in Eng-
land the same as decrees of the matrimonial domicil. 35 
2. Domicil as Basis 
By common law, coverture effects a merger of the personali-
ties of husband and wife. The wife necessarily shares the 
domicil of the husband. This "matrimonial domicil" is, if any, 
the most suitable place for the dissolution of the marriage or, 
in the terminology of the common law, to locate the "re,;" that 
constitutes the object of the action in rem, as the action for 
divorce is commonly regarded. It happens that under com-
mon law the private relations of individuals are generally 
governed by the law of their domicil, and this, of course, is 
32 See Gebhardsche Materialien 1 84. 
33 E.G., Czechoslovakia: see S. Ct. nos. 1449, I 5 34, 2 746; The German Law 
on Divorce of January 24, 193'5> § 1; Swiss NAG. art. 7g par. 1 also involves 
restrictions; see BG. (Oct. to, 1930) 56 BGE. II 335, at 341. 
34 See infra pp. 474, 478-480. 
35 GurrERIDGE, "Les confiits de competence jurisdictionnelle en matiere de 
divorce et de separation de corps," Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1938) I, 7> 
16, 28. 
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interrelated with the domiciliary principle of jurisdiction. But 
the idea that the domicil of the parties, even of one party, in 
a state suffices to give that state jurisdiction for divorce, be-
cause divorce is a matter of "status"-this "generally accepted 
doctrine," in the words of Beale 36-may be questioned after 
a glance at the rules of the civil law countries. In most of these, 
status and capacity of an individual are governed not by the 
law of his domicil but by that of the country whose national he 
is (principle of nationality). Nevertheless, also in these coun-
tries, jurisdiction for granting divorce is ordinarily assumed at 
the matrimonial domicil or at the domicil of one party. Cer-
tainly, divorce alters the family status of a person, and, there-
fore, the states following the nationality principle have partly 
opened their courts to non-domiciled nationals also. But the 
reasons why jurisdiction is given at the "domicil" and the 
more precise determination of domicil for this purpose are not 
to be found in any doctrine. They are policy considerations 
that we shall subsequently try to analyze. 
(a) Common domicil. Where, under the conception of the 
court applied to for a divorce, both spouses are domiciled, in 
the full sense of this word, within the forum, jurisdiction is 
granted in all states acknowledging the dissolution of marriage 
inter vivos. There are two groups. 
The matrimonial domicil is sufficient everywhere for as-
suming jurisdiction. However, in Great Britain since the sub-
ject was clarified in 1895/7 in the British dominions,38 and 
under the present Treaty of Montevideo, 39 the matrimonial 
domicil has remained the sole test of jurisdiction for the pur-
36 I BEALE§ I 10.1. 
37 Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [1895] A. C. 517· 
38 An exception for a wife living separately is made in the New Zealand Di-
vorce and Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act, New Zealand Statutes, zi Geo. 
V, Session III (I 930) No. 43, p. 2.48 sec. 3, in consequence of the English cases 
in misericordia, see below, n. 1 2 8. For particulars, see READ, Recognition and 
Enforcement zoo, zor, zz3. 
39 Treaty of Montevideo, text of 1889, art. 62; text of I94o, art. 59· 
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pose of divorce. The wife has her domicil with that of the 
husband by operation of law. It is the most certainly recog-
nized case of divorce jurisdiction also in this country.40 
This simple system of conferring jurisdiction also provides 
an appropriate test to determine the applicable law, since the 
· statutes of the state where the marriage is located work in the 
double function of lex fori and lex domicilii, and moreover, 
among the states adopting this system, mutual recognition of 
divorce decrees is easy. 
In countries acknowledging a separate domicil of the wife 
or ignoring the institution of legal domicil, the principle has 
to be modified. Jurisdiction is exercised when both spouses 
have their domicil within the state, either together or sepa-
rately. 41 Naturally, this rule obtains in the United States. 42 
The reasons supporting these rules and underlying the 
"res" theory are obvious. A community in which the spouses 
have centered their lives may feel competent to adjudicate 
the continuation of their marriage. Insofar as the conduct of 
private persons may deserve consideration in determining 
jurisdiction, an element of submission to the state activity may 
be implied. On the other hand, it appears a superfluous hard-
ship to send the parties away to their distant homelands; this 
would sometimes mean their ruin. 
(b) Presumption of common domicil. If in the eyes of the 
forum the parties have their domicils in different states, an 
attempt has been made to maintain the original system in one 
of two ways. 
One way is this: The last matrimonial domicil of the parties 
is held competent for the purpose of divorce, even though it 
40 Haddock v. Haddock (1906) 20I U.S. 562; Atherton v. Atherton (1900) 
181 U.S. 155; Restatement§§ uo, II4. 
41 Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art. 5 no. 2 §I: "· •• before the 
competent authority of the place where the parties have their domicil." 
Under the Scandinavian Convention, art. 7 par. I, this is the main ground for 
jurisdiction. 
42 Restatement § I I o. 
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has been deserted by the husband. Thus, the ancient construc-
tion is superseded, whereby the husband would transfer the 
matrimonial domicil to his new place. This progress was made 
in the United States as the earliest step to improve the situa-
tion of married women as against offending husbands. 43 The 
same step has been made in British countries 44 and, as late as 
1937, in England.45 The draftsmen of the recent revision 
(I 940) of the Montevideo Treaty added a similar clause to 
their text, 46 after the Argentine practices had taken a kindred 
view. 41 Analogous clauses in the Hague Convention and the 
Swedish law permit divorce at the former common domicil in 
case the defendant has deserted his spouse or has left the 
country after a cause for divorce arose,48 and, more generally, 
the Scandinavian Convention gives jurisdiction to the state 
where both spouses "had their last common domicil and one 
of them is still domiciled." 49 Traces of this stage of the 
development are frequent in this country. 5° 
The other way has been demonstrated by the German pro-
cedural code. Where both parties are of foreign nationality, 
the actual domicil of the husband within the state is sufficient 
43 See I BEALE § z8.z. 
44 Canada: Divorce Jurisdiction Act (I93o) zo-z1 Geo. V, c. 15 § z. Aus-
tralia and New Zealand: see the detailed statements by READ, Recognition and 
Enforcement zz4. 
45 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, 1 Edw. VIII & 1 Geo. VI, c. 57,§ 13· 
46 Treaty of Montevideo, text of r 940, art. 59 par. z. 
47 Cam. civ. z Buenos Aires (March 24, 1933) 41 J. A. 4zo; the law of the 
matrimonial domicil determines also the question whether the husband has de-
serted his wife, Cam. civ. z (Oct. 7, 1935) 5z J. A. 144. 
48 Hague Convention on Divorce of 1902, art. 5 no. z par. I sentence 3; 
Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of 1904 with subsequent amendments, c. 3 §I par. I 
sentence z. 
49 Scandinavian Convention art. 7 par. I. 
60 In particular, venue exists in the county where the parties lived as husband 
and wife, if the defendant still lives there, cf. Mass. Gen. Laws (I93z) c. zo8 
§ 6, or if the plaintiff lives there, cf. Miss. Code Ann. (1930) § I417>. or with-
out such conditions, cf, Ala. Code Ann. (I94o) tit. 34 § z8; Va. Code Ann. 
(Michie & Sublett, I936) § 5I05; W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1937) 
§ 4709· 
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and necessary for suits of either party, without regard to the 
domicil of the wife,51 whether or not it be r~cognized else-
where or for other purposes. 
(c) Admission of separate domicil for married women. 
During the second third of the nineteenth century, the courts 
in the United States successively began to acknowledge the 
capacity of a married woman to acquire a separate domicil in 
a steadily increasing number of situations. Ultimately, even the 
most conservative courts acceded to this for the purpose of 
bringing a suit or being sued, for divorce. 52 Consequently, 
American courts and statutes no longer distinguish, for this 
purpose, between husband and wife but treat them equally 
as parties. Despite the diversity of the clauses-there are 
seventeen different kinds 53-in all jurisdictions, suit for 
divorce can be brought by the plaintiff at his own domicil. 5 ~ 
Optionally, it can be instituted in most states also at the domi-
cil of the defendant by a non-resident plaintiff. 
The theoretical basis of all this is traditionally attributed to 
the conception that every state has an eminent interest in the 
status of its domiciliaries and is thereby entitled to alter the 
married status of a person domiciled in the state, even though 
the other party may be domiciled in another. 55 Thus, the mar-
riage status of one spouse is treated in the same manner as 
the marriage of a married couple was under the older doctrine. 
In the words of a New Jersey decision of 1934, the husband's 
or the wife's domicil "carries with it the complete (marital) 
51 Germany: Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. I; cf. the Netherlands: BW. 
art. 262 par. I. 
52 I BEALE § 28.2. 
53 2 VERNIER§ 8I. 
M Haddock v. Haddock (I9o6) 20I u.s. s6z; Stevens v. Allen (I9I6) I39 
La. 658, 7I So. 936; Perkins v. Perkins (I9I6) 225 Mass. 82, I 13 N. E. 84I; 
Re Ellis (r 893) 55 Minn. 4oi, 56 N. W. ws6; Jones v. Jones (I889) 67 Miss. 
I95> 6 So. 712; Blakeslee v. Blakeslee (1917) 41 Nev. 235, 168 Pac. 950; · 
Hubbell v. Hubbell ( 18 54) 3 Wis. 662. 
55 See 1 BEALE at§ Io.8, 110.1. 
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res or a part of it," so as to give the state court jurisdiction. 56 
How can this be? Vreeland may well ask: 
"Since the status is that of two persons, and not one, does the 
wife upon acquiring a new domicil take half of the res with 
her and leave half with the husband, or does it all stay where 
it last was, or do they both have a sort of tenancy by entirety in 
the res ... ? " 57 
On the practical side, we are made aware by Goodrich that, 
merely as a matter of logic, the out-of-state spouse would not 
be affected, but consistency compels the courts to assume 
further that the divorce destroys also the married status of the 
non-domiciled party. 58 In counterpoise to this convincing 
reasoning, we may remark that the Michigan statute allows 
its courts to divorce, in their discretion, any party who is a 
resident of the state and whose husband or wife has obtained 
a divorce in another state, whether the foreign divorce is valid 
or not. 59 The explanation given by the Michigan Supreme 
Court is that the courts of both domicils possess jurisdiction 
to grant divorces only "so far as the party resident within its 
own limits is concerned; if one proceeds first, there is no legal 
impediment to the other's taking like steps afterwards." 60 
The fact is that the American divorce law has outgrown the 
doctrine of jurisdiction in rem. From the time that the wife 
acquired the power to assume a domicil of her own, duality of 
domicil as a basis for divorce jurisdiction has been possible, and 
all conceptions born of the ancient idea of marital unity have 
lost their sense. Domicil has remained an essential prerequisite 
of jurisdiction only insofar that, according to the best settled 
56 Webb v. Webb (1934) 13 N.J. Misc. 439, 178 Atl. 282. 
67 VREELAND 28. 
5S GOODRICH §§ 124, 125. 
59 Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) § 12?28 [Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.86]. Related 
but perhaps not identical statutes are in force in Florida, cf. Fla. Statutes 
(1941) § 65.04 and Ohio, cf. Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) § 11979. 
60 Wright v. Wright (1871) 24 Mich. 179; cf. Van Inwagen v. Van Inwagen 
(1891) 86 Mich. 333,49 N. W. 154. 
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rule of this unstable field, no· jurisdiction is granted when 
neither of the spouses is domiciled within the state. The entire 
question depends upon the extent to which a state chooses to 
shoulder the responsibility of entertaining divorce suits, or to 
leave them to other states. Individual legislatures have tried to 
solve the problem in such a variety of ways as to indicate that 
there is no logical necessity to follow any of them. 
Indeed, no exact analogy to the American doctrine exists 
elsewhere, and very few foreign regulations approach it. Even 
these cannot be compared with it without understanding that 
they deal with parties of foreign nationality, while in this 
country the law has been developed with American citizens 
in view and is applied to aliens with very few qualifications. 
The nearest parallel is afforded by the Swiss law. In Switzer-
land, jurisdiction is assumed at the instance of a plaintiff of 
foreign nationality if he is domiciled within the country, ir-
respective of whether husband or wife is suing and whether 
the defendant is a Swiss national or domiciliary. 61 In France 
and other countries, the defendant spouse must be a domicili-
ary, but the husband's domicil determines that of the wife, ex-
cept where she has been judicially separated.62 The Hague 
Convention allows an option for the domicil of the defendant 
where the parties have not the same domicil. 63 The general 
rule of reference to the defendant's domiciliary law is also re-
sorted to by the Federal Supreme Court of Mexico in inter-
state divorces, in case the laws of the Mexican states determine 
jurisdiction for divorce differently (domicil of the husband, 
marital domicil, domicil of the deserted wife). 64 
61 See BECK 404 no. 37, comment to NAG. art. 7h par. I. . 
62 France: GLASSON et TISSIER, 5 Traite de Procedure Civile (ed. 3, I936) 
no. I6o9. ' 
Belgium: Novelles Belges, 2. D. Civ. I44 no. 471. 
63 Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art. 5 no. z par. I sentence z. The 
provision has prevailingly been understood so as to characterize the domicil of 
a party generally under his national law. See German RG. (April 5, 192.1) 
102. RGZ. 8z, 84; LEWALD in 1 Strupp's Worterbuch des Volkerrechts und der 
Diplomatie 469. 
64 Mexico: S. Ct. (Oct. 14, 1940) Seman. Jud. 194I.I.403· 
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Hence.., we find the American law rather isolated. But the 
French practice sheds some light on one motive that is of 
universal validity. The French courts have proclaimed the 
doctrine that they must refuse to entertain jurisdiction over 
parties who are both of foreign nationality, at least if they 
have not their common domicil in France. 65 However, in 
practice jurisdiction is exercised when the defendant does not 
prove that he has maintained a foreign domicil at which he can 
be actually sued 66 or, in another version, when there is no 
foreign jurisdiction in which the suit can be prosecuted with-
out hardship. 67 The desire to avoid what would look like a 
denial of justice, is a legitimate one among the many impulses 
for entertaining causes presented. 
The reverse side of this obliging attitude was well known 
in this country from the wave of divorces of Americans in Paris 
until the decline of the I 9 2o's. 68 
The wider such "hospitality," the more conflicts are likely 
to appear. Conflicts are not even confined to that diversity of 
national and domiciliary divorce laws that has been receiving 
paramount attention in Europe. The different views, for in-
stance, regarding the wife's domicil have the result that a court 
of Uruguay, predicating jurisdiction upon the matrimonial 
domicil, will divorce an American citizen domiciled in Monte-
video from his wife who lives in the United States, 69 while a 
New York court, if the wife lived there, would probably con-
sider her domiciled in the state and protected by certain special 
rules against the Uruguayan decree. A series of Canadian 
65 French Cass. (req.) (June 25, 1918) S.I9I8-19.1.2o6; Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 
to, 1920) S.I923.1.129; Cass. (civ.) (April 30, 1927) S.1927.I.2o8. 
66 GLASSON ET TJSSIER, supra n. 62. 
67 See French Cass. (civ.) (July 29, 1912) S.t913.1.425; Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 
xo, 1920) and Trib. civ. Nice (Dec. 6, 1920) Clunet 1923, 72ff.; Cass. (Dec. 
30, 1930) Revue 1932, III; cf. KUHN, Comp. Com. 170. 
68 See BATES, "The Divorce of Americans in France," 2 Law and Cont. Probl. 
(1935) 324; see also JACOB, "Problems of Divorce in France Incident to the 
Statutes of 1941," 28 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) at 309. 
69 Trib. Ap. Montevideo (Sept. 13, 1935) 36 Rev. Der. Juris. Adm. (1938) 
210, Clunet 1938, 841. 
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decisions has invalidated decrees rendered in this country be-
cause the finding of domicil was in contradiction to the 
Canadian doctrines. 70 Where a Swiss court, assuming juris-
diction because of her separate Swiss domicil, had divorced a 
woman of Belgian nationality, a Belgian court denied recogni-
tion to the decree; not even for the purpose of jurisdiction 
could a Belgian wife have a domicil separate· from her hus-
band. 71 Well known is the number of divorces unrecognized 
within the United States despite the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the Constitution. 
Residence is sometimes taken as a substitute for domicil, 
particularly for the purpose of jurisdiction for limited di-
vorce; 72 as such it may suffice. 
We have now to investigate the additional rules that restrict 
the assumption of jurisdiction. 
3· Restrictions on the Assumption of Jurisdiction 
It is a comforting experience that modern legislatures have 
felt the need to limit their own domiciliary jurisdiction over 
divorce, partly for the express purpose of avoiding at least 
certain conflicts with other jurisdictions, partly with less dis-
tinct intentions to the same effect. However, these additional 
requirements are of a very different nature in this country 
from those on the European Continent. 
(a) Additional requirements. In the United States, the 
prerequisite that one party or the plaintiff be domiciled in the 
state at the time of the commencement of the action, is usually 
accompanied by further qualifications. The statutes have 
varied and mixed the requirements so "as to defy classifica-
tion," Vernier attests. 73 The author must confess that he has 
not succeeded so far in completely understanding the meaning 
70 See infra p. 493, n. 143· 
71 Cass. (March 19, 19z5) Pasicrisie 19z5.1.179; Trib. civ. Bruges (March 
4, 1936) Pasicrisie 1937·3.81. 
72 With respect to the United States see 1 BEALE § I o.8, § I I o.s. 
73 z VERNIER§ 81 and p. 107. 
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of several such combined versions and would most welcome a 
thorough discussion of all these clauses by a more competent 
writer. It seems that there are three main statutory clauses: 
Sometimes it is required that the parties have, at some time 
before suit, both lived in the state. This is obviously derived 
from the idea of the matrimonial domicil, upon return to 
which either spouse is entitled to sue the other. 
A considerable number of various clauses emphasize the 
importance of the place and the time where the cause of action 
accrued. Of this group, certain are important as direct meas-
ures to reject petitions evasive of foreign divorce law and will 
be considered separately. 
In their vast majority, the statutory clauses require a 
definite period of "residence" of that party whose domicil is 
decisive, previous to the filing of the action; almost always it 
is provided or understood that this period should immediately 
precede the suit. The period is from six weeks to two years in 
particular states and varies also in different cases. It may make 
a difference what the cause for divorce is. In linking the ideas 
just mentioned with the minimum residence requirement, the 
length of time is declared unnecessary or reduced, if the party, 
or both parties, lived in the state before, or lived there at the 
time when the cause of action arose, or if the cause occurred in 
the state, etc. A typical formula is presented in the Unifor~ 
Annulment of Marriage and Divorce Act of I 906, whose first 
provision gave jurisdiction: 
"When, at the time the cause of action arose, either party 
was a bona fide resident of the state, and has continued so to 
be down to the time of the commencement of the action; 
except that no action for absolute divorce shall be commenced 
for any cause other than adultery or bigamy, unless one of the 
parties has been for the two years next preceding the com-
mencement of the action a bona fide resident of this state." 74 
14 Proceedings of the Seventeenth Anitual Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, Draft of an Act to Make Uniform the Law Regulating 
Annulment of Marriage and Divorce (1907) § S(a). 
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As this wording shows, no exception is made in the case of 
both parties being domiciled in the state at the time of suit. 75 
Similarly, in the great majority of the statutes no particular ex-
ception seems to be intended to that effect, although the re-
quirement of residence may be released in related situations, 
such as where the defendant is personally served. 76 There are, 
however, a few statutes which state that actual domicil is 
sufficient, if both parties are domiciled in the state. 77 
Disregarding the labyrinth of the statutory details, we may 
take it that the restrictions of the last type counter-balance the 
ruthlessness of divorce jurisdiction at the domicil of one party 
by qualifying this domicil in a possibly very effective manner. 
The requirement of residence previous to the suit is generally 
understood as meaning domicil and, in most jurisdictions, 
actual presence in the state as well, although a temporary ab-
sence is innocuous. 78 The lapse of time guarantees that the 
individual has become a participant in the life of the state and , 
serves as evidence that the change of abode includes a serious 
change of domicil. If applied to the case where both parties 
have come to the state, the requirement is intended to foil 
evasive demands as well as to protect one spouse against the 
other's arbitrary choice of the forum. In both applications, the 
requirement is usually held to be mandatory.79. 
Unfortunately, the great purpose of this restriction has 
often been forgotten. It is buried under the maze of confusing 
details accumulated in the various statutory experiments. 
Moreover, two defects are rightly much criticized. While 
some states formerly demanded a residence of five years, 
76 Statutes formed after this model speak expressly of both parties. 
76 See, for instance, Iowa Code ( 19 3 9) § 104 70 (defendant resident and per-
sonally served). 
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 5181. 
77 See especially Ala. Code Ann. ( 1940) tit. 34 § 29. 
N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 339 § 4· 
In this sense, see also the Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act of 1930, § 1 (a) 
(ed. 1932). 
78 1 BEALE § 10.8. 
19 Hetherington v. Hetherington (1928) 2oo Ind. 561 t6o N. E. 345· 
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an unjustifiably long period, others are content with three 
months, or, since the famous competition of Nevada with 
Idaho and Florida, with six weeks. It has become the only pur-
pose of such a requirement to benefit the local hotels and shops. 
The other evil is lax enforcement of the normal residence 
period; strange stories have been told in the literature in this 
respect. 80 
Could these faults be corrected, this dependence of juris-
diction on a residence period would be calculated greatly to 
inspire legislation in other countries where thus far a minimum 
period of residence has only occasionally been provided. 81 
(b) Conformity to National Law. In Europe, while as a 
rule jurisdiction over foreigners is taken at the matrimonial 
domicil or in some countries at the domicil of one party, 
measures are taken to avoid collision with the national law. 
The Hague Convention. The Hague Convention,82 fol-
lowed by the statutes of Sweden and Poland, 83 has recognized, 
in special clauses, the claim for exclusive jurisdiction of divorce, 
which today is asserted by such countries as Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland. 84 If the jurisdiction of a state over peti-
tions for divorce or judicial separation is exclusive for its 
nationals, such jurisdiction is recognized by the other states as 
the only one competent. The Belgian courts observe the same 
restraint in the absence of an enacted rule and without being 
bound any longer by the ;Hague Convention.8 ;; 
80 BREARLEY, "A Note Upon Migratory Divorce of South Carolinians," 2 
Law and Cont. Probl. (1935) 32-9, 332. 
81 Poland: Law of 1926 on interlocal private law, art. 2 (one year for change 
of personal law). 
Sweden: Law of March 23, 1934, Svensk Forfattningssamling 19341 no. so, 8 
Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 639 (one year in the case of a Swedish plaintiff). 
France: the decree of Nov. u, 19381 requiring a police permit for at least 
a year's residence for recognizing the domicil of a foreigner (supra p. 141) evi· 
dently is applicable to divorce. 
82 Hague Convention on Divorce of 1902, art. 5 no. 2 par. 2. 
83 Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of 1904 with amendments, c. 3 § I par. 2. 
Poland: Law of 1926 on international private law,§ 17 par. 4• 
84 See supra p. 398. 
85 Cour Bruxelles (March 15, 1922) Belg. Jud. 1923, col. 103; Rb. Antwerp 
(Nov. 191 1937) 8 Rechtsk. Wkbl. (1938-1939) col. 547 no. 1u and (March 
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Germany. The German law goes even further. German 
courts may not exercise jurisdiction in divorce cases where the 
national country of the husband would not recognize the re-
sulting judgment because of lack of jurisdiction of the German 
forum. The German provision prescribes that, if both spouses 
are foreigners, action for divorce may be brought at the forum, 
provided that the domestic court has jurisdiction also accord-
ing to the laws of the state of which the husband is a national. 
According to one opinion, this text requires that the national 
country should recognize also the specific court where the suit 
is brought as having jurisdiction. 86 Better authorities, how-
ever, declare it sufficient that any German court, this or 
another, be considered endowed with jurisdiction in the eyes 
of the national law, that is, that German courts have juris-
diction in the international sense. 87 
The prohibition does not extend to the case where the re-
sulting decree of divorce would not be recognized on another 
ground, for instance, because of lack of reciprocity or because 
of service of the defendant by publication. 88 
This prohibition, however, covers many more cases than 
just those of exclusive jurisdiction mentioned above. It extends 
to all situations where one or both of the foreign spouses are 
domiciled in a country that does not recognize the effective-
ness of the German decree within its borders. Similarly, ex-
clusive jurisdiction has been claimed by many American cases 
for the courts of the domicil, and likewise by Switzerland, 
which does not recognize a foreign divorce of two Swiss citi-
29, 1939) 9 ibid. (1939-1940) col. 1373 no. 28x; App. Bruxelles (May 20, 
1939) 9 ibid. (1939-1940) col. 42 no. 7 (Hungarians). 
86 STEIN-}ONAS-POHLE, 2 ZPO. (ed. 16, 1939) § 6o6 VI; RG. (Nov. 21, 
1929) 126 RGZ. 353, ]W. 1930, 1309; KG. (Oct. 25, 1937) JW. 1937, 3249, 
but cf. MASSFELLER, }W. 1936, 3579· 
87 SCHONDORF, 75 Jherings }ahrb. 66; ~UHL, }W. 1930, 1310; 3 FRANKEN-
STEIN 505; PAGENSTECHER, II Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 480. 
88 RG. (Nov. 21, 1935) 149 RGZ. 232; cf. KG. (Dec. 19, 1932) IPRspr. 
1932, no. 76. On the application of the provisions to religious divorce forms, 
see below, p. 413· On the case of subjects of a country where divorce cannot take 
place except by bill of parliament, see NIBOYET 506 no. 417; ibid. 744 no. 636; z 
BERGMANN 79i RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 262. 
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zens, one of whom is domiciled in Switzerland. 89 Befo~e as-
suming jurisdiction to divorce an American husband, a Ger-
man court must therefore ascertain, among other points: 90 
(I) where the husband is domiciled, under the American 
definition of domicil, requiring in particular the animus 
manendi in the American sense; ( 2) if he thus is found to be 
domiciled in Germany, whether the American conflicts rule 
recognizes the jurisdiction of the domicil, and as of what time. 
This subject needs more discussion m connection with 
renvm. 
Switzerland. Still broader is the scope of the former 
Swiss 91 and the Hungarian 92 provisions that require not only 
the jurisdiction but also the decree to be recognized by the na-
tional law, insofar as the acting court is able to predict. 93 Also, 
the Court of Appeals in Zurich was denied jurisdiction, be-
cause personal service on the defendant was impossible and 
German courts, under the German-Swiss treaty on mutual 
recognition and execution of judgments, 94 therefore, would 
not have recognized the decree. 
89 BG. (Oct. 10, 1930) 56 BGE. II 335; BG. (May 13, 1938) 64 BGE. II 74, 
78; cf. for more difficult situations, BEcK, NAG. 363 nos. 112-115. 
90 Cf. in particular RG. (Nov. 21, 1929) 126 RGZ. 353, IPRspr. 1930, no. 
136. 
91 NAG. art. 7h par. r. 
92 Hungarian Marriage Law of 1894, § II6: ... if the judgment has force 
in the state whose citizens the spouses are. 
93 App. Zurich (Jan. II, 1936) Bl. f. Zurch. Rspr. (1936) 359; the treaty 
is that of Nov. 2, 1929. App. Zurich (1937) 38 Bl. f. Zurch. Rspr. (1939) 78 
no. 36 denies jurisdiction to the wife, because, under the applicable Polish law, 
she shared the domicil of her husband who lived in Antwerp, Belgium. Similarly, 
in the case of a wife suing her British husband domiciled in Canada, 37 SJZ. 
(1940-1941) 31 no. 5· 
94 Examples regarding American citizens: Bez. Ger. Zurich (June r8, 1930) 
27 SJZ. (193o-1931) 87, no. 14 (wife under medical treatment in Zurich, in-
tending to stay "permanently" in order to study there). Jurisdiction was granted 
in view of the husband's submission to the court and the certainty that the decree 
would be recognized in Minnesota). Same court (Nov. 3, 1931) 28 SJZ. (193 1-
1932) 250 no. 217 (the wife paid taxes and attended classes at the University. 
The husband in Boston consented to the separate domicil. The divorce ground 
would also be recognized in Massachusetts). In both cases the assumption of 
domicil was questionable, but the husband's consent to its establishment would be 
termed decisive. The same observations are true for a case of British subjects, 
Bez. Ger. Zurich (Oct. 25, 1935) j2 SJZ. (1936) zoz, no. 41. 
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There is some uncertainty in applying either of these self-
imposed restrictions, due to the difficulties of knowing exactly 
the position of the foreign law. The possibility that the national 
court in reviewing the decree will even re-examine the juris-
dictional facts further aggravates the problem. The Swiss law 
was therefore significantly changed in the wording of its pro-
vision. Former article 56 of the Swiss Law on Civil Status 
required proof that the future judgment would be recognized 
in the homeland. As this was found to be an impossible task, 
the actual text (NAG. art. 7h par. I) demands proof only 
that the Swiss jurisdiction would be recognized. But it is not 
clear whether by this change the evidence has been made easier 
to produce. Once, a Swiss court tried to consult the Supreme 
Court of the United States on the "American" divorce law but 
was informed that neither courts nor administrative agencies 
in this country are prepared to give advice. 95 At any rate, the 
court can only guess at the chances of recognition, if it does 
not want to refuse to assume jurisdiction in virtually every 
case, and experience shows that no court wants that. 
In some cases, it may be suspected that Continental courts 
have too lightly presumed American and especially English 
willingness to recognize a domicil at and, therefore, jurisdic-
tion of, the forum. 
4· Religious Divorce 
When a court applying the rule of nationality finds that 
under the national law of a party divorce can be pronounced 
only by an ecclesiastical authority (as in the countries in-
fluenced by the Greek Orthodox Church and by Islam), the 
court faces the problem whether it may exercise jurisdiction 
or must refrain from it. The German courts feel prohibited 
from assuming jurisdiction by the provision that jurisdiction 
must be in accordance with the national law of the husband, 
95 BuRCKHARDT, 4 Schweizerisches Bundesrecht 142 no. 1674 II. 
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for a national law giving exclusive po~ers to the churches is 
deemed to exclude any judicial activity of temporal tribu-
nals, 96 even abroad. 
In France, jurisdiction was likewise denied, especially by 
the Supreme Court in the famous case of Levin~ on, 97 a Rus-
sian Jew. Since the Russian law at the time left divorce pro-
ceedings to the religious authorities, a French court was held 
unable to apply the national law of the party in its true form 
without injury to the religious feelings of the parties. This 
example was followed by many other French decisions, most 
of which had to deal with subjects of the former Russian parts 
of Poland and Lithuania. 98 
In France, however, some courts and writers have expressed 
contrary opinions, mainly because of the hardship imposed on 
the parties but also because of two legal arguments. First, 
public policy is invoked on the ground of the declared neu-
trality of the French state toward the churches and the im-
propriety of granting more prerogatives to foreign churches 
than to its own. 99 Second, religious divorce rules are analyzed 
as composed of substantive rules, concerned with the permis-
sibility and the causes of divorce, and procedural rules giving 
way in a French tribunal to the French rules of procedure.100 
96 KG. (Dec. 19, 1905) 14 ROLG. 241, aff'd RG. (Oct. 4, 1.9o6) 19 Z.int.R. 
(1909) 263; RG. (Feb. 21, 1925) Clunet 1925, 1055. This is also the meaning 
of the Hague Convention on Divorce, and Actes de la Troisieme Conference de 
la Haye ( 1900) 21 1. An analogous position was taken in Switzerland by the 
Trib. Zurich (Sept. 22, 1936) 34 SJZ. (1937-1938) 313 no. 591, although in 
the instant case jurisdiction was assumed because the marriage was void under 
the national (Palestine) law. 
97 Cass. (civ.) (May 29, 1905) D.1905.1.353, S.19o6.1.16x, Clunet 1905, 
1oo6, Revue 1905, 518. 
98 Cass. (civ.) (Oct. 30, 1905) S.1911.1.581; Cass. (req.) (July zo, 1911) 
S.1912.1.132; about ten decisions from 1920 to 1927 cited by J. DoNNEDIEU DE 
VABRES 485; Trib. civ. Seine (Oct. I5, 1936) Nouv. Revue 1936, 541· Similarly 
in Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 25, 1930) Pasicrisie 1931·3·36; see 
also POULLET 489 no. 378; Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Dec. 6, 1939) J.d.Tr. 1940, 
col. 120 (Spanish Catholics). 
99 Trib. civ. Seine (June 11, 1921) Clunet 1921, 525 (Greek Orthodox Rus-
sians); Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 24, 1921) Clunet 1922, 117 (Russian Jews). 
1oo See in this sense BAR TIN's note to the decision of Cour Paris (March r 7, 
1902) D.r9o3.2.49 and (implicitly) Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 25, 1937) Clunet 
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A recent Belgian critic of the dominant doctrine remarks that 
neither the consistories of the Orthodox Church nor the rab-
binate tribunals use any formule sacree, prayers or depreca-
tions; they exercise purely judicial functions. 101 Courts of other 
countries, too, are divided on the question.102 
The role of the religious element under the national law, 
however, may be less important. The Austrian Civil Code, 
still in force in some countries, prescribes that Jews are to be 
divorced in c.aurt but that in the case of a mutual divorce agree-
ment a preliminary attempt at conciliation must be made by 
the priest or teacher.103 The Marriage Law of 1836 of the 
Warsaw District requires as a preliminary to court proceedings 
a certificate of a rabbi on the ecclesiastical aspect of the case.104 
French and German courts have considered such regulations 
no obstacle to litigation at the forum.105 They find it more dif-
19371 523 (Lithuanian Jews); PILLET, 2 Melanges 3591 373; NIBOYET 867 
no. 7 52· App. Alger (March 71 1898) Clunet 1898 1 1102 (separation of Spanish 
Catholics); Trib. civ. Toulouse (June 8, 1938) Revue Crit. 1939, 105 (Russian-
Polish Jews). . 
101 JOFE, n Revue Inst. Beige ( 19 3 6) 140. 
102 Belgium: for exercising jurisdiction under application of substantive Bel-
gian law: Trib. civ. d'Anvers (May 30, 1936); cf. 65 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) 
(r938) 295, and Cour Bruxelles (June 22, 1938) J.d.Tr. 1938, no. 3550 
col. 646 (Polish Jews); JoFE1 "Divorce de Polonais en Belgique," 45 Pand. 
Per. (Jan. 1938) 5· ' 
For denying jurisdiction: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 25, 1930) Pasicrisie 
19 3 1.3 ·3 6 (Spanish Canon marriage-no divorce possible) ; App. Bruxelles 
(July 9, 1932) Revue 1933, srr; Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 25, 1930) Clunet 
1932, 487, 489; Trib. civ. d'Anvers (March r, 1939) Pasicrisie I939·3·76; 
also PoULLET 489 no. j78; VAN HILLE, 65 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I938) 
295· 
Italy: for exercising jurisdiction: Trib. Roma (June 22 1 1898) Giur. Ital. 
1898, I, 2, 647 (separation of Spanish Catholics married according to canonic 
formalities); for denying jurisdiction: App. Roma (June 6, I899) La Legge 
I 899.2.45• 
103 Allg. BGB. §§ I3 3. I 34· 
104 Marriage Law, Kingdom of Poland, art. I 89, as generally interpreted. Al-
though art. I 9 6 of the Code requires ecclesiastical jurisdiction also for Catholics 
and Protestants, the German LG. Bremen (May 8, I934) JW. I934, 2353, 
IPRspr. I 934, no. 551 concluded from the Polish international private law of 
I 926 that jurisdiction should be assumed, and tried to apply the rules of both 
these churches to a mixed Catholic--Protestant marriage. 
105 France: Trib. civ. Strasbourg {Oct. :u, 1930) Clunet I9JI 1 x661 Revue 
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ficult to adjust their own procedure to the singular presup-
positions of the foreign laws. But some courts have even agreed 
to recognize the activities of local religious authorities cor-
responding to the foreign customs.106 
The sacrifices involved in such concessions to foreign claims 
are admirable instances in the development of international 
cooperation. But they originated from such a superstitious 
belief in the legitimacy of the nationality principle, that the 
most unreasonable of all its claims, that for exclusive juris-
diction over emigrated married couples, was not questioned. 
Foreign law must not be recognized, unless it is fit for inter-
national use. 
III. CoMMON ScoPE OF THE Lex Fori 
To evaluate the domain of choice of law in the countries 
observing the personal law, it is necessary to go beyond the 
question of jurisdiction and to realize that important questions 
are everywhere governed exclusively by the law of the forum. 
I. Procedure 
Procedure, of course, is the concern exclusively of local 
rules. The law of the forum determines the necessity of con-
Crit. 1935, 753; Trib. civ. Metz (May 20, 1931) Clunet 1932, 16s, 644, 
Revue Crit. 1935, 754 (Russian-Polish Jews). 
Germany: RG. (Feb. 15, 1926) 113 RGZ. 38; RG. (May 20, 1935) 147 
RGZ. 399; KG. (Dec. 11, 1933) JW. 1934, 619, IPRspr. 1934, no. so 
(Russian-Polish Jews), overruled see infra n. 106. 
Of Greek Jews, the Greek laws do not speak; cf. CARABIBER, 6 Repert. 430 
nos. 95, 96; but in view of the entirely judicial and temporal procedure in Greek 
legislation following Law no. 3222 of August 2&-30, 1924, the Cour Paris 
(Dec. 29, 1925) Revue 1929, 25& has granted jurisdiction. 
106 France: Cour Paris (Jan. 15, 1925) Revue 1925, 358; Trib. civ. Metz 
(May zo, 1931) Clunet 1932, 165, 644, Revue Crit. 1935, 754· Contra: Cass. 
(req.) (July zo, 1911) 8.1912.1.132; App. Rabat (May 9> 1933) Revue Crit. 
1934, 125 (whether a French Algerian Jew has to give a religious bill of 
divorce); AuDINET, Revue Crit. 1935, .756. 
Belgium: App. Liege (June 26, 1934) Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ., Divorce 371 
no. 1715 (certificate of the Grand Rabbi of Belgium accepted). 
Germany: OLG. Koln (Jan. 20, 1932) JW. 1932, 2304, IPRspr. 1932, no. 
78; KG. (Dec. u, 1933) JW. 1934, 619, IPRspr. 19341 no. so. Contra, over-
ruling this practice, RG. (May zo, 1935) 147 RGZ. 399· 
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tested and the permissibility of uncontested proceedings, as 
well as the acts constituting procedure.107 Provisional decrees 
for separate residence or maintenance rendered during a 
divorce suit also follow the procedural rules.108 
2. Decrees 
The law of the forum controls the form in which a divorce 
is granted, if at all, including the choice of the persons or 
authorities entrusted with granting divorces. 
In certain countries, divorce is granted by the king or an 
administrative authority/09 in others by the parliament,110 
often by ecclesiastical tribunals, 111 or it. is a private agreement 
between the parties either with or without some religious 112 
or public control. 113 Whatever form divorce has in a country 
for its own subjects, is also permitted between foreigners. 
Divorce, conversely, if allowed at all, must not be granted to 
foreigners according to formalities nor by persons, other than 
those prescribed for subjects of the forum. Hence, religious 
107 Deviating from this principle, the Appeal Court of Paris in Affaire Chiger, 
Cour Paris (April 30, I926) Clunet I926, 943, Revue I927, 243 declared that 
a French court could appropriate the power to determine causes for divorce in its 
discretion, a power provided for by the Soviet Russian law of the time, with 
respect to a controversial divorce between Soviet Russian nationals. This decision 
was much criticized; cf. BAR TIN, 2 Principes 302, 303. 
108 Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 6; Poland: Law of I926 on inter-
national private law, art. I 7 par. 4 sentence 2; for comment, see KAHN, 2 
Abhandl. 36o ff. 
109 Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia in limited cases, police judge in 
England. 
1!0 Only way for the inhabitants of Newfoundland: also those of Eire and Que-
bec, but divorce is known to be unobtainable in both these countries. Judicial 
decrees replaced Parliament bills in Ontario by the Divorce Act (Ontario) 1930, 
20-21 Geo. V, c. 14 of the Statutes of Canada, I930; Northern Ireland by 
Matrimonial Causes Act (Northern Ireland), I939> 2 & 3 Geo. VI, Publ. Gen. 
Acts of I939, c. I 3; and in the Isle of Man by Act of I93 8. 
lll Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece {since Law no. 3222 of 1924 for 
Mohammedans only and perhaps Jews), Lithuania. With respect to limited 
divorce: Italy, Spain, and Colombia. 
112 Jewish law as mostly in use in Palestine and some eastern European coun-
tries. The rabbis assist in varying degrees, but under the provisions of the Austrian 
Allg. BGB. of r8rr, § I 34, and the Marriage Law of the Kingdom of Poland 
of I836, art. I89, the final decrees are rendered by the courts. 
113 Soviet Russian and Mussulman countries excluding Turkey. 
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and private divorces are out of the question in the United 
States,114 as well as in Western and Central Europe. French 
and German courts annulled scores of divorce decrees 
rendered in their territories by religious authorities, especially 
in cases of Czarist Russians of various denominations, Polish 
Jews, members of the Orthodox Church, and others.115 For 
instance, a divorce of a Yugoslav and a Russian of Greek 
Orthodox faith by the Orthodox diocesan council in Paris was 
annulled by the Tribunal de la Seine in I 930.116 
This, of course, is a purely negative proposition, leaving 
unsolved the dilemma whether such persons should be granted 
divorce according to the formalities of the forum or denied 
divorce on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction because their 
personal law requires religious proceedings.117 
114 Chertok v. Chertok (I924) 208 App. Div. I6I, 203 N.Y.S. 163 (divorce 
decree by the rabbi of Brooklyn granted to a husband in New York against his 
wife living in Russia, held invalid despite recognition by the Russian Govern-
ment); In re Spiegel (S.D.N.Y. I928) 24 F. (zd) 6o5. 
115 Belgium: Trib. Liege (March 21, 1929) Belg. Jud. I929, col. 428 (decree 
by rabbi in Louvain). 
France: Circular of the Garde des Sceaux of April, I 909, prohibiting the 
recording of divorces granted in France by any judge without civil powers, 
an abuse then often committed; Cour Paris (June 21, 19Io) Revue I91o, 837; 
Cour Paris (Oct. 31, 19ro) Revue I9II, 82; Cour Paris (Dec. 26, 1912) 
Revue 1913, 424; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 20, 1920) Revue 1921, 226 at 236; 
Cour Paris (March 23, 1922) and (May ro, 1922) Revue 1923, 425; Cour 
Paris (Jan. xs, 1925) Revue 1925, 358; Cour App. Nancy (June 17, 1922) 
Revue 1922-23, 435; Cour Colmar (May z3, I93I) Clunet 1933, 97· 
Germany: Law of Jurisdiction of r S 77 ( Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) RGBl. 
r 877, 4I, § r s par. 3 declares that the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in 
temporal matters is without civil effect. This applies especially to marriage and 
divorce. RG. (April 2I, 1921) 102 RGZ. 118; RG. (Feb. I5, I926) 113 RGZ. 
4I; KG. (Dec. 16, I92o) Warn. Rspr. 192I, no. 35; RG. (Feb. 2I, 1925) 
Warn. Rspr. I925, no. 133; KG. (Dec. 21, 1931) IPRspr. '93'• no. 143; KG. 
(March 21, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 77 (privilegium Paulinum recognized by 
the Marriage Law of Warsaw (Kongresspolen) of 1836, art. 207); OLG. Kiel 
(Nov. 30, I926) 91 Schlesw. Holst. Anz., N.F. (1927) 145 (repudiation under 
the law of Russian Jews); LG. Berlin (Oct. 19, I 93 7) JW. I 938, 2402 (sending 
of divorce bill by a Russian Jew from Germany to Russia ineffectual under 
German law). 
Switzerland: Justice Dept., BBl. 1937, III 141 no. 9 (divorce by the Council 
of the Russian Orthodox Church in France, invalid in France and Switzerland). 
116 Trib. civ. Seine (June 2, 1930) Clunet 1931, 1078. 
117 See supra pp. 413-416. 
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Exceptions to the principle of exclusive municipal formal-
ities are very rare.118 Even a consulate of a foreign power is 
not usually allowed to grant divorces; apparerttly, the only 
exception is contained in the German-Russian Treaty of 
October 12, 1925, which permitted Russians married before 
a Russian consulate in Germany to divorce by mutual agree-
ment in accordance with Soviet lack of formalities but with 
recordation thereof at the same or another Russian consulate 
in Germany.119 
Domestic law also defines the wording of a divorce decree. 
German courts have often considered, however, whether they 
should insert in a decree divorcing foreign parties the state-
ment required by the German Civil Code declaring which 
party is in fault. The Reichsgericht finally decided that the 
judgment should omit this statement only when it is either 
prohibited by or would be of no significance under the personal 
law.12o 
3· Validity of the Marriage Prerequisite 
Apart from some confusion between divorce and annul-
ment/21 a universal prerequisite for divorce is that the mar-
riage be considered valid at the forum or, if voidable, at least 
provisionally valid. When, in the eyes of the court, the mar-
us For Russian subjects of Armenian origin and faith, the Rumanian Cassation 
Court recognized a divorce rendered by the Bishop of the Gregorian Church in 
Bucharest, Cass. (May 13, 1935) Pand. Romane 1936.!.57; contra: PossA, 5 
Giur. Comp. DIP. 359 no. 134, in view of the secularization of divorce by the 
Rumanian constitutional laws. 
ug See Final Protocol of the German Russian Treaty of Oct. u, 192.5, German 
RGBI. 1926, II 6o at 8z. 
120 RG. (April 18, 1918) Warn. Rspr. 1918, no. 189; RG. (Feb. 2.41 192.8) 
Warn. Rspr. 1928, no. 64. KG. (March 131 1931) IPRspr. 1931 1 no. 8q KG. 
(June 2.71 1932) IPRspr. 1932.1 no. 86, etc., confirmed as steady practice, KG. 
(May 30, 1938) JW. 1938, 2750; and after the Matrimonial Law of 1938 
went into effect, see KG. (Aug. u, 1938) referred to in JW. 19381 2750 n. 1. Cf. for Dutchmen, KG. (April 91 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 47, but also OLG. 
Dusseldorf (Nov. 2.1, 1933) JW. 1934,'4371 IPRspr. 19341 no. 48. Correspond-
ingly, Switzerland: BG. (June 13, 1912) 38 BGE. II 43 advised Swiss courts 
to state culpability in the case of German spouses. 
121 See infra p. 5 35. 
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riage never existed or has already been dissolved, there is no 
subject matter for the proceeding to dissolve the marriage 
tie. On the other hand, if the marriage is recognized in the 
forum, it is immaterial whether it is recognized in the country 
to which the parties belong. 
A significant application of this principle is the case of a 
so-called matrimonium claudicans (limping marriage) cele-
brated either at the forum or abroad under circumstances war-
ranting its recognition as valid at the forum, which is con-
sidered invalid under the personal law because of formal or 
intrinsic defects. If, for instance, without a religious ceremony 
a Bulgarian married a French woman in Paris before a civil 
official, the marriage, valid and dissoluble in France, would 
be null and therefore indissoluble in Bulgaria.122 In such case, 
the countries that ordinarily take the personal law into con-
sideration disregard it. When the parties marry within the 
forum, consistency and dignity of the jurisdiction require that 
the forum stand upon the validity of the marriage.123 
Thus, a marriage annullable in the home country of the 
party involved may be dissolved in the country of its cele-
bration, each court taking the only way available for the 
termination of the marriage ties. 
The German courts have made it clear that in these cases 
the law of the forum alone is to be applied and the personal 
122 Cf. J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 450. 
123 Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (May 21 1923) Pasicrisie 1923.3.133, Clunet 
1924, 1098 (Russian-Polish Catholic). 
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 19, 1920) Clunet 1921, 184, Revue 1922-
1923, 306; cf. also 6 Repert. 431 no. 97 (civil marriage of an Orthodox Greek); 
Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. rs, 1922) Clunet 1922, 396' (Polish Jew married to 
Catholic French woman before registrar in Brussels). 
Germany: RG. (Dec. 17, 1908) 70 RGZ. 1391 143; RG. (Nov. 16, 1922) 
I05 RGZ. 363 (Czarist Russians married in conformance with temporal for-
malities in Germany); RG. (Oct. I, 1925) JW. I926, 375, Warn. Rspr. 1926, 
no. 15 (Orthodox Greek married to, a Norwegian girl in Norway, the marriage 
being recognized in Germany under the law of the place of celebration, EG. 
art. II par. I sentence 2); OLG. Dresden (Nov. 9> 1933) JW. 1934, 1740, 
IPRspr. 1934, no. 46; RG. (Nov. 7, 1935) Warn. Rspr. 1935, no. 192; KG. 
(Jan. 14, 1937) JW. 1937, 961; LG. Berlin (Nov. z, 1937) JW. 1938, 395> 
Clunet I938, 824; and other decisions, see infra n. 124. 
Switzerland: App. Bern (May 301 1923) 6o ZBJV. (I924) 40. 
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law entirely ignored.124 It is not feasible, for instance, to 
apply to the divorce by analogy foreign rules of separation. 
The cases also have required adjustment of the ordinary juris-
dictional rules 125 to meet the needs of the party interested 
in dissolution rather than annulment of the marriage. 
In this latter respect, an analogous doctrine developed in 
England in cases ex misericordia. In Stathatos v. Stathato~, 126 
a Greek, having married an Englishwoman at a registry office 
in London and taken her to Athens, sent her back to England; 
at his instance, the marriage was declared null in Athens, while 
it was undoubtedly valid in England. In this and another 
case,127 English courts affirmed their divorce jurisdiction 
despite the lack of an English marital domicil. This doctrine 
of an exceptional domicil of the wife for the purpose of 
divorce was embodied in a st~tute of New Zealand 128 but is 
now deemed overruled in England.129 The main remedy to 
124 RG. (Dec. 17, 1908) 70 RGZ. 144, cited supra n. 123; RG. (May 41 1933) 
JW. 1933, 2582 (the decisive passage was published by LEWALD, Revue Crit. 
1934, 663); KG. (Dec. 11, 1933) JW. 1934, 6r9, IPRspr. 1934, no. so; KG. 
(April2o, 1936) JW. 1936, 2464; LG. Berlin (Nov. 2, 1937) JW. 1938, 395; 
LG. Berlin (Feb. 3, 1938) JW. 1938, 1273; OLG. Konigsberg (Feb. r, 1937) 
Recht 1938, 22 no. 194. This theory was advocated by LEWALD 111 no. 158, 
and Revue Crit. 1934, 661; SCHONDORF, 7 5 Jherings Jahrb. 53, 74; 1 FRANKEN-
STEIN 233 n. 1891 3 ibid. 425. Contra: RAAPE 401; also Hans. OLG. (Oct. 25, 
1933) JW. 1934, 242, r6 Hans. RGZ. (1933) B. col. 683, Revue Crit. 1934, 
661, and the French Cass. (civ.) (Oct. 30, 1905) Revue 19o6, 730. See on the 
broader problem of "limping marriages," supra p. 233. 
125 According to the Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 5 no. 2 in fine, the 
foreign jurisdiction exists (even in the case of an exclusive jurisdiction claimed 
by the national courts) over a marriage with respect to which action for divorce 
or separation cannot be brought before the competent court of the national state. 
Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of 1904 with subsequent amendments, c. 3 § 1 par. 2 
final words. German OLG. Karlsruhe (June 13, 1933) JW. 1933, 1669. 
126 [r9IJ] P. 46. 
127 Montaiguv. Montaigu [1913] P. 154. 
128 New Zealand: Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act, New 
Zealand Statutes, 21 Geo. V, Session III (1930) No. 43 p. 248 sec. 3; cf. Worth 
v. Worth [1931] N. Z. L. R. 1109. , 
129 H. v. H. [1928] P. 2o6; Herd v. Herd [1936] P. 205, 105 L. J.P. 
D. & A. 108 (the husband abandoned his English domicil of origin and lived in 
the United States; divorce denied the wife on ground of lack of jurisdiction of 
English court); cf. CHESHIRE 357; for Canada: Hocc, "Domicile of a Married 
Woman in Relation to Divorce," 6 Can. Bar Rev. (1928) 655, 666; FALCON-
BRIDGE, Annotation [1932] 4 D. L. R. 37· 
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free the parties from a marriage void in the homeland is now 
usually found in the recognition extended by English courts 
to any annulment decree that may be granted by the competent 
authority of the husband's domicil.130 The same attitude has 
been recommended to the courts of Canada, 131 and a similar 
position was taken in a recent Scotch case, in which a marriage 
with a Hindu was held valid in Scotland, though invalid in 
India. The Scotch court denied the application of the wife, 
who was living in Scotland, on the ground of lack of jurisdic-
tion, although the court knew that she would be unable to pros-
ecute litigation in India.132 The entire proposition seems very 
unsatisfactory. At the instance of the foreign- party, a foreign 
annulment is recognized to the disadvantage of the wife, while 
the bond of marriage created by the law of the forum is dis-
owned and the wife is denied on a purely formal ground the 
right to divorce.133 
IV. CHOICE OF LAW 
I. Lex Fori 
United States. The principle in the United States is that a 
divorce court applies the law of the forum to determine 
whether divorce is admissible, as well as whether the party's 
conduct or other event complained of constitutes a ground for 
divorce.134 
This system was shared, a century ago, by general European 
theory and practice. Savigny 135 supported the system by the 
belief that divorce law is imperative in nature, because it 
expresses moral conceptions purporting to be of absolute value. 
130 Unanimous opinion following the Salveson case, infra p. 543· 
lal 2. JoHNSON 36-40. 
132 Watson-Mangrulkar v. Mangulkar [I939] S.C. 2.39 (Session Case). Cf. 
Thomson v. Thomson (I9JS) Sc. L. T. 2.4 (Outer House of Ct. of Sess.). 
133 See KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," I 6 Bell Yard (I 9 3 5) 
I 5 and supra p. 2. 34, n. I 42.. 
134 Stewart v. Stewart (I 9 I 9) 3 2 Idaho I So, I So Pac. I 6 5; Restatement § I 35· 
135 SAVIGNY § 379 no. 6. 
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Many writers and courts advocated the same idea.136 This 
doctrine slowly disappeared, however, until, at the Hague 
Conference, it was found to have almost no proponents.137 
In this country, application of the lex fori seems to have 
been justified by the merely statutory nature of divorce, the 
effect of statutes being believed to be necessarily territorial-
a theory going clearly back to such fathers of territorialism as 
D'Argentre and Ulricus Huber. It has also been advanced 
that divorce remedies are special or equitable and therefore 
cannot be exercised except by the courts of the state establish-
ing the remedy. Sometimes there is invoked the general 
motivation for territorialism that, the "res" being located 
within the state, the state's interest prevails. It may be hoped 
that nowadays nobody cares seriously for all these artificial 
and worn-out assertions. 
Neither are we any better served, when it is argued, es-
pecially in the Restatement, that "the law of the forum gov-
erns the right to divorce not because it is the place where 
the action is brought but because it is the domicil of one or 
both of the parties." 138 Story 139 and his contemporaries could 
properly propose such a theory with respect to the matrimonial 
domicil, whereby they had simply the husband's domicil in 
mind. To identify the law of the forum with that of the 
domicil is correct when divorce is rendered exclusively at the 
136 BuRGE (ed. 2), 3 Colonial and Foreign Law 923; LAURENT, 5 Principes 
no. x8·s; I BReCHER 297; OLJVI, Revue I885, 55; AssER-coHN 67, French tr. 
by RIVIER (x884) II6; UNGER, I System I93 § 23 n. 126. This was the pre-
vailing opinion in Germany before the Civil Code, see RG. (June I9, I883) 
9 RGZ. I 9 I; NIEMEYER, Positives Intern. Privatrecht §§ 99, 10o, and in I 
Z.int.R. (I89x) J6I, 2 Z.int.R. (I892) 473> 5 Z.int.R. (I895) I67, I68 n. J; 
in former Austria, see OGH. (March 27, I935) 8 Jahrb. Hiichst. Entsch. nos. 
I564, I565; OGH. (May 27, I935) 8 Jahrb. Hiichst. Entsch. no. I04I; WALKER 
722, 728, and I KLANG'S Kommentar 324; in Czarist Russia, see MANDELSTAM, 
Clunet I902, 490; in former Turkey, see Clunet I9o3, 86, 96. 
137 The learned Norwegian delegate Beichmann, Actes de la Deuxieme Con-
ference de la Haye (I894) 73, was the main advocate of the lex fori, but 
presented it as identical with the law of the domicil. Likewise, I BAR § I 73· 
138 Restatement § I35 comment a. 
139 STORY § 229 a. 
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matrimonial domicil. The predication is manifestly wrong so 
soon as there are two domicils of the parties. 
The reasonableness of the rule appears never to have been 
questioned. This alone, the unvarying application of the local 
statute in every American court, makes it clear that the prin-
ciple of territorialism with its strong roots in the past common 
law has in fact here found one more expression. The spirit of 
independence and the need to sever an immigrant or settler 
from his former associations may have contributed to per-
petuate this indifference to the outside world. As the story 
goes,140 it was almost half a century before the potentialities 
of the N ev:ada statute of I 8 6 I, with six months' residence, for 
affording easy divorces on a large scale was grasped by a 
former New York attorney. Those early legislations were 
simple documents of pioneers. If so, we may wonder why 
under changed circumstances the application of foreign divorce 
law never has been taken into consideration, while the choice 
of law problem is so prominent in Europe and while also in 
this country the main purpose of conflicts law is perfectly 
acknowlydged as being the achievement of uniformity in es-
tablishing the solution of a legal question irrespective of the 
forum.141 There may be, indeed, no positive reason at all 
but only a negative explanation for this result. At any rate, we 
cannot overlook the fact that the actual doctrine has no clear 
conceptual basis and that this lack of foundation has greatly 
contributed to the much deplored confusion and anarchy in 
this field. 
Other countries. The law of the forum is openly applied to 
any person in Soviet Russia 142 and in some Latin American 
countries, 143 upon the basis of the territorial principle. Also 
140 INGRAM and BALLARD, "The Business of Migratory Divorce in Nevada," 
2 Law and Cont. Probl. (r935) 302, 305. 
141 See supra p. 8 7. 
142 MAKARov, Precis 396 attests a uniform doctrine. 
143 E.g., see the declaration of the Colombian delegation in signing the Codigo 
Bustamante, 86 League of Nations Treaty Series (1929) 374; Venezuela: Cass. 
(June rs, 1914) Memoria 1915, 17I, 172; Cass. (Feb. u, 1921) Memoria 
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in Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, traditionally the law of 
the forum is applied, although the writers doubt whether it 
is not rather the law of the domicil that is applied, because 
usually divorce is not granted unless both parties are domiciled 
within the forum or both parties had their last domicil and 
one continues to live, within the country.144 It might be ad-
visable to construe soberly all these rules on the basis of 
territorialism and lex fori rather than in terms of the principle 
of domicil. 145 The manner in which specific problems are 
solved by prevailing practice is more in accordance with the 
lex fori principle. Also, the application of the American rule 
by Continental courts, resulting from the nationality principle 
and renvoi, is much simplified, if we understand it as based 
on the law of the forum. 146 
Latin American treaties. On the other hand, the Treaty of 
Montevideo has unequivocally declared domiciliary law to 
determine not only jurisdiction for divorce 147 but also, in a 
provision correctly separated, 148 the right to divorce. The 
problem, it is true, appeared in its simplest form, since juris-
diction is exClusive for the court of the present or last matri-
monial domicil. 
I922, I62, I63. The recent law of Brazil (I942) does not mention separation 
in Brazil, but includes it in the "domiciliary" law applicable according to Lei de 
Introdu~ao art. 7· EsPINOLA, 8-B Tratado I o66 asserts that in the case of dif-
ferent domicils, both laws must be attended concerning permissibility and causes 
of separation. 
144 Denmark: BoRUM, Personalstatutet 490 n. 5; BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Re-
pert. 2 I 4 no. 8; ibid. at 220 nos. 48ff.; MuNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld 
I 747· 
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 57 5 no. I I 8. 
Iceland: EYJOLFSSON, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 762; LONING in 9 Z.ausl.PR. 
(I935) 407; see also German RG. (April 6, I936) I5I RGZ. Io3. 
The Scandinavian Convention arts. 7, 9 starts from a primary rule that divorce 
is rendered at the matrimonial domicil, but states exceptions, and finally declares 
the law of the forum applicable. 
145 FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [I932] 4 D. L. R. 36 prefers the domiciliary 
angle but concedes doubts on this point. 
146 Infra pp. 446ff. 
147 Treaty on international civil law, text of I 889, art. 62; text of I 940, art. 
59· On restrictions of the principle, see supra n. 46. 
148 Treatfof Montevideo, text of I 889, art. 13b; text of I 940, art. I sb. 
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In the same way, the C6digo Bustamante clearly isolates 
the choice of law question and with one exception subjects the 
right to divorce to the law of the marital domicil.149 This 
is a remarkable victory for the domiciliary principle, as usually 
the Havana Code does not decide which is the personal law. 
2. Diverse Contacts 
As an aftereffect of former conceptions, 150 divorce some-
times has been assimilated to the dissolution of ordinary con-
tracts; as a matter of fact, all requisites of marriage in this 
country are considered governed by the law of the place of 
celebration, indicated by the historic rule for contracts. This 
idea has also played a role in determining the dissolution of 
marriage 151 and continues to do so in a few countries. In 
particular, the Marriage Law of Argentina provides, in a 
section known for the incessant complications and doubts it 
has provoked in the world, that a foreign divorce of a mar-
riage celebrated in the Argentine Republic does not entitle 
either of the spouses to remarry, if the divorce is inconsistent 
with the Code.152 This means, in the prevailing though con-
149 Codigo Bustamante art. 52 {for the exception of art. 54, see infra p. 430). 
150 See supra p. 396. 
151 PuTTER, 3 Rechtsfalle, part I, So, 85, quoted by 1 BAR 486 §I 73 n. 6, tr. by 
GILLESPIE 384 § I73 n. 10; Austrian Imperial Decree of Oct. z3,. I8ot, 
Justizgesetzsammlung no. 542; cf. WALKER 727 n. 14; D'OLIVECRONA in Clunet 
I883, 343 at 359· For criticism of this theory, see STORY § 23oa, and WEISS, 
3 Traite 6 8 2. But it is the basis on which BARTIN, 2 Principes 3 2 3 § 3 I 8 advocates 
application of the national law of the husband at the time of the marriage. 
Peru: The Supreme Court of Peru, in a series of decisions declared that a 
foreign marriage could not be dissolved for causes not recognized in the country 
of celebration. See Ej. (July 2, 1929) 25 Anales Jud. (1929) 78 (Japanese 
marriage) and cases cited by APARICIO y SANCHEZ, 8 Codigo Civil, Con-
cordancias 70. Contra Ej. (June 20, I936) 32 Anales Jud. (1936) Ioo (consent 
divorce.) The C. C. of Aug. 30, 1936 seems to eliminate this practice. 
152 Argentine Civil Marriage Law of x888, art. 7, cf. art. 82. Divorces of 
Argentine marriages and foreign marriages must be distinguished, apart from 
the ordinary distinction of domestic and foreign divorces. Cf. the clear survey by 
ROMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 3 I 3-320. A related provision of the Chilean 
C. C. art. 120 was adopted also by Ecuador: C. C. art. II 6; El Salvador: C. C. 
art. 170; Uruguay: C. C. art. 103; and refers to all divorces granted abroad 
which the municipal law would not permit. 1 
See infra n. 178. 
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tested opinion, that a foreign, e.g., Uruguayan, divorce of a 
marriage celebrated in Argentina is invalid in Argentina. 
The Treaty of Montevideo of 1889 implying this interpre-
tation 153 invalidates such a divorce in all member states/54 
although Uruguay departs from this rule on the ground of 
public policy.155 It is a fortunate concession to international 
needs that, in the new I 940 draft of Montevideo, Argentina 
acquiesced in the elimination of this extraterritorial effect of 
the law of the place of celebration; the proviso was changed 
into a mere rbervation allowing the state of celebration to 
deny recognition to foreign divorces.156 
The Polish Supreme Court resorted to the law of the place 
of celebration to solve the problem arising from interpro-
vincial conflicts, 157 while the Rumanian Supreme Court re-
jected this test.158 The Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia 
seems to .have returned to the idea.159 
Any reference to the place where the offence to marital 
duties was committed has long been abandoned in all 
countries. 160 But reference to the law of the place where the 
cause for divorce accrued is found in America in sporadic at-
tempts to limit jurisdiction for divorce. 161 
3· National Law Cumulatively Applied with the Lex Fori 
In most civil law countries, the two questions of jurisdiction 
and applicable law are distinguished as a matter of course, and, 
with respect to the latter, consideration is given to the lex fori 
in conjunction with the lex patriae. However, the approach 
vartes. 
153 2 VICO nos. 107, 108, 
154 Treaty on international civil law, art. 13b. 
155 See infra p. 480, 
156 Art. I5b. 
157 Polish S. Ct., Plenary decision (Oct. 9-1 6, 19 3 7) 5 Z.osteurop.R. ( 19 3 8-
1939) 459· 
158 Rumania: S. Ct. (March 3, 1937) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1937-1938) 320, 
159 See Sup. Ct. (Feb, 28, 1929) no. 8745 and (March 1, 1934) no. 13328, 
10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 171; 1 BERGMANN 746. · 
160 STORY § 230a; I BAR 487 § 173 n, 9a, tr, by GILLESPIE 385 § 173 n. 16. 
181 See infra p. 454· 
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France and others. In France and the majority of other 
countries following the French Code, 162 grant of divorce must 
accord with the national law of the parties and not contravene 
the forum's public policy understood in its broadest sense. 
The observance of the national law is the rule, and public 
policy intervenes as a basis for exceptions, the determination 
of which is left to the discretion of the courts and which there-
fore remain measurably uncertain. 163 In fact, they cover many, 
if not most, cases.164 
The Dutch courts, which started with this basis, seem now to 
apply exclusively Dutch divorce law, disregarding the per-
sonal law where they are not bound by the Hague Convention 
to consider it. 165 For the Netherlands, this is extraordinary. 
In the German legislation, and those following its lead, 
viz., those of Sweden, China, and Japan, and by the unwritten 
law of Greece, divorce depends directly and concurrently upon 
conformity with the national law and the law of the forum. 166 
162 France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Rumania, Portugal; and with respect to 
separation from bed and board, Brazil (until I 942), Italy and Spain and the 
more recent enactments of French and Spanish Morocco. See subsequent footnotes 
for cases. This system has been adopted by numerous Latin American writers, 
e.g., MATOS no. 258, cf. also no. 264. 
163 See NIBOYET 746; PouLLET 49Iff. no. 379; KoLLEWIJN, Het beginsel der 
open bare or de (I 9 I 7) 90. 
164 NI'BOYET, Notions Sommaires (I937) I87 no. 3IO bis, even formulates a 
simple principle of cumulative application of the personal and the French laws, 
parallel to the German system. 
165 The decision ofthe Hooge Raad (Dec. q, 1907) W. 8636, Clunet I9It, 
I 3 34 had attracted attention, as it applied Dutch law to American citizens 
domiciled in the Netherlands, not by renvoi but as the lex fori. Cf., for instance, 
the criticism by KoLLEWIJN, Het beginsel dcr openbare orde 87. See the later 
decisions Rb. Amsterdam (Jan. II, I924) Clunet 1925, II2o; Rb. den Haag 
(April 7, 1932) W. 1266I; Hof den Haag (June 22, I933) W. I27I5; Hof 
Amsterdam (June 27, 1935) W. I2956; Rb. Almelo (Jan. 22, 1936) W. I937, 
no. 54 (Lithuanians); Hof den Haag (June 5, 1936) W. I936, no. I052 (Ger-
mans, after Germany had left the Hague Convention). 
166 Germany: EG. art. t 7 par. 4· Divorce cannot be pronounced in this 
country upon the ground of a foreign law, unless it is permissible according to 
both the foreign law and the German laws. 
Sweden: Int. Fam. Law of 1904 with amendments, c. 3, § 2. 
China: Law of I9t8, art. II. 
Japan: Law of I898, art. I6. 
Greece: App. Patras (I936) no. I7I, clunet I937> 369; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 
372· 
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This system of cumulation was adopted by the Hague Con-
vention.167 Although in this group the domestic divorce law 
does not operate merely by way of exception, the rule refers, 
here too, to the national law in the first place, with the internal 
law controlling permissibility and causes for divorce. Hence, 
also under these statutes, the divorce decree is founded on the 
foreign law. 
Under the Swiss statute, however, the roles are reversed; 
if both laws consent, divorce is "pronounced according to 
Swiss law." 168 The courts have concluded from this provision 
that Swiss law must be applied to all legal effects of divorce, 
such as ali.mentary obligations and guardianship over chil-
dren.169 
v. APPLICATION OF THE NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE 
I. Permissibility of Divorce and Grounds for Divorce Dis-
tinguished 
The disposition of the Hague Convention relating to Di-
vorce and Separation, that the granting of divorce or separation 
must conform with the national law of the parties as well as 
with the law of the forum, is in two parts: 
"Art. I. Married persons may apply for a divorce provided 
the law of the state to which they belong (national law) and 
the law of the place where the application is made both permit 
divorce. 
"The same applies to separation from bed and board. 
"Art. 2. Divorce may be granted only if obtainable in the 
particular case under both the national law of the spouses 
167 Hague Convention on Divorce of I902, art: I:" .•. provided their national 
law and the law of the place where the application is made both admit divorce." 
168 Swiss NAG. art. 7h last paragraph. Similarly, Belgian Congo: C. C. book 1 
art. I 3 par. 2. 
169 BG. (June I3, 1912) 38 BGE. II 43, 49; BG. (May 28, 1914) 40 BGE. II 
305, 308; BG. {Nov. 27, 1918) 44 BGE. II 453, 454; BG. (Feb. 2, 1921) 47 
BGE. II 6; BG. (Dec. 1o, 1936) 62 BGE. II 26.5. 
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and the law of the place where the application is made, though 
on different grounds. 
"The same applies to separation from bed and board." 
There is nothing in the Convention to justify such a di-
vision of the rules, but this division had been established by 
the discussions of the Institute of International Law 170 and 
during the Hague Conference 171 for the purpose of a dif-
ferentiated regulation. The distinction has regained signifi-
cance in the C6digo Bustamante; under article 52, the right to 
separation or divorce is governed by the law of the matri-
monial domicil, while under article 54 the causes for divorce 
or separation are subject to the hw of the place of suit, pro-
vided that the parties are domiciled in the forum. It is difficult 
to understand this provision. 
Generally, such distinctions are me1:de for the purpose of 
analytical discussion but without any intended contrast. 172 
2. Permissibility of Divorce 
(a) Under the law of the forum. Complete dissolution of 
the marriage bond is at present prohibited in South Carolina, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ireland, Italy, 
Paraguay, and since 1938 again in Spain; also for Catholics 
in the countries observing the Austrian Civil Code-Liech-
tenstein, parts of Poland and Yugoslavia-and for Catholics 
under Czarist Russian law in other parts of Poland; and under 
canon law in Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, 
and parts of Lithuania. 
170 Annuaire I887-I888, 125, the national law should govern the question 
whether or not divorce is allowed at all, and the law of the forum decides the 
grounds for divorce. 
171 See Actes de la Troisieme Conference de la Haye, I9oo, I93; KAHN, z 
Abhandl. 3 z I. 
172 In the Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of I889, art. 
13 b, it is required that "the alleged cause" be agreeable to the law of the place 
of celebration. This is too narrow an expression, as it must have been intended to 
include permissibility of divorce in the first place. This mistake was not corrected 
in the I 940 draft. 
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Although legislators generally do not envisage persons other 
than subjects of the forum, a divorce not granted to domi-
ciliaries or nationals is not granted to foreigners. Religious 
and ethical reasons, as well as respect for the judicial institu-
tions of the forum, motivate this rule. The rule, which was 
observed in France until divorce was reintroduced in r 8 84,173 
is in force in Spain, 174 Italy (with short interruption, how-
ever, much noticed during the preparation for the Hague 
Convention) / 75 Brazil, 176 Argentina (though with consider-
able opposition),177 and probably everywhere in the countries 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
By an analogous rule, foreigners cannot obtain any form of 
limited divorce unknown to the forum. Whatever type of 
judicial separation short of complete dissolution of the mar-
riage ties may be prescribed by the national law, no form of 
separation not provided by the law of the forum is granted. 
Where, for instance, no divorce other than absolute divorce 
is allowed, it is not possible to obtain any limited kind of 
separation. These principles, not so natural as they sound, as 
173 WEiss, 3 Traite 689ff. 
174 TRiAs DE BEs, 6 Repert. z55 no. II x. 
175 Following the contemporary trend toward permitting divorce of foreigners 
whose national law did not oppose it, divorces were granted to foreigners by 
App. Ancona (March zz, 1884) Monitore 1884, 365, Giur. Ital. 1884, II, Z471 
App. Genova (June 7, 1894) Monitore 1894, 784, Giur. Ital. 1894, I, z, 554, 
Clunet 1898, 4IZ; Trib. Milano {June z, 1897) Monitore 1897, 514 and 
{June 30, 1898) Giur. Ital. 1898, I, 2, 765, aff'd App. Milano {Nov. 24, 1898) 
Monitore 1 8 99, 64. But the last-mentioned decision was reversed by Cass. 
Torino (Nov. zt, 1900) Monitore 19oo, 981; similarly, Cass. Firenze (Dec. 6, 
19oz) Clunet 1903, 91o, and all later decisions, applauded by the writers; see 
Bosco, z2 Rivista (1930) 461, soo; FEDOZZI 466 n. 3· On the sensation caused 
at the Hague meetings by this temporary liberalism, see KAHN, z Abhandl. 31 3ff. 
Among the other literature see z FIORE no. 689, generally followed in Latin 
America; see e.g., MATOS, no. 564. 
176 Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. {Sept. 18, 1920) App. civ. no. z, 755, z3 Revista 
Jur. (1921) 496; Distr. Fed. {Sept. 1, 193z) per EDMUNDO DE OLIVEIRA 
FIGUEIREDO in 23 Arch. Jud. 478, cf. 0CTAVIO, Dicionario, Divorcio absoluto 88 
no. 4o8ff.; 2 PoNTES DE MIRANDA 8o and 6 Repert. 166 no. 44· 
177 Argentine Civil Marriage Law of 1888, arts. 81, 82. There is opposition 
now to the rigidity of excluding divorce for foreigners; cf, ROMERO DEL PRADO, 
Der. Int. Priv. 314. 
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we shall see, may create real hardship. Nevertheless, the 
maxim is universal and fully adopted by the Hague Con-
vention·on Divorce (art. I). 
(b) Undet the national law. By virtue of the nationality 
principle, divorce a vinculo is denied if the national law does 
not permit dissolution of a marriage during the lifetime 
of both spouses. If, for instance, an Italian subject were mar-
ried to an Argentine bride in Argentina, 178 divorce cannot .be 
obtained in Germany, because the husband's national law 
forbids it, 179 nor in France because neither national law allows 
it.180 
The question has been raised, however, whether, in a 
country having the institution of divorce, the public policy 
that regards the institution as based on, morality and social 
sanity is so strong that it must oppose foreign prohibitions. 
When the temporary Spanish Republic had solemnly intro-
duced dissolution of marriage, it seemed unbearable to refuse 
its benefits to any category of persons, even foreigners. 181 
178 Case of Trib. civ. Seine (May I I, I 9 3 3) Revue Crit. I 9 34, 129. It is 
disputed in Argentine literature whether under the Argentine Civil Marriage 
Law of I888, art. 82, a marriage celebrated in Argentina can be dissolved in a 
foreign country that has not signed the Montevideo Treaty, so that remarriage 
abroad is legal. The negative answer, presented by the decision in I oo Gac. 
del Foro (I932) 78 col. 2, and RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der Int. Priv. 3I9 (with 
CALANDRELLI, WE!SS-ZEBALLOS, LLERENA) has been approved also by the 
Camara civil de Apelaciones de la Capital (March 14, I 9 3 5) 49 ].A. so s, Clunet 
I937> I24; see also SCHLEGELBERGER, 4 Z.ausl.PR. (I930) 756. The opposite 
view (GoNZALEZ, MACHADO, LAFA!LLE, ALCORTA, Vrco, REBORA) has been 
said to be the prevailing opinion by a mistaken German author GoTTSCH!CK in 
JW. I930, I827, who has been followed by numerous German decisions, such 
as those enumerated by 2 BERGMANN 8 n. I and KG. Berlin (Feb. 9, I 9 3 I) 
IPRspr. I93 I, .no. 68. 
179 EG. art. I 7 par. 4· It makes no difference whether the marriage was 
celebrated in Germany, OLG. Hamburg (Sept. 2, I936) Hans.RGZ. I936, B 
486 no. I 71. 
180 Trib. civ. Seine (May 2, I9 I 8) Clunet I 9 I 8, I I 82; Cour Paris (April 30, 
I926) S.1926.2.89, D.1927.2.1. Correspondingly, in Trib. civ. Seine (May u, 
1933) Revue Crit. 1934, 129 (see supra n. 178) a divorce granted to the parties 
in Uruguay was not recognized in France, Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. civ., nos. 6787, 
9079; but cf. S. Ct. (March I, 1934) no. 13328. 
181 Republican Spain: Trib. Supr. {Jan. z7, I933) 207 Sent. 56; cf. Revue 
I933, 533, '1.4 Rivista (I9JZ) 567. 
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Analogous decisions have occasionally occurred elsewhere. 182 
But prevailing opinions have preferred strict application of 
divorce prohibitions imposed on the parties by their national 
law.183 It must be admitted that by this strict application the 
policy of permitting the dissolution of marriage appears 
weaker than its counterpart, the policy of inseparability of 
spouses. 
(c) Separation. A further consequence of the nationality 
principle is that separation from bed and board, or judicial 
or administrative separation of any other kind, except pro-
visional measures, depends upon the approval of such an 
institution by the national law of the parties.184 Since, accord-
ing to present general opinion, 185 the kind of separation 
granted must also conform with the law of the forum, doubts 
arise when each law has a form of limited divorce, but the 
forms are not identical. The varieties are numerous indeed. 186 
But, apart from the very complicated problems caused in 
Germany by the creation of a particular type of "dissolution 
of the marital union" in the Civil Code of 1896/87 problems 
which disappeared in 1938 with the abolition of this un-
182 Rumania: PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 68 no. I92 notes decisions both ways. 
Belgium: Divorce to two Catholic Austrians was granted by App. Liege 
(Nov. 2, I937) J.d. Tr. I937> col. 672 no. J5I2, 23 Bull. lnst. Beige (I937) 
7 6; 24 ibid. ( 1 9 3 8) 52; this decision joins several other Belgian manifestations 
of a liberal policy stronger than the usual; cf. infra. ns. 217-219, 222. 
183 See, for instance, German RG. (Jan. IJ, 1936) 150 RGZ. 61, Nouv. Revue 
I937, 109; Belgium: Cass. (March 9, 1882) Pasicrisie 1882.1.62; cf. POULLET 
487 no. 377 and the foregoing notes 179 and I 8o. 
184 See for the late law of Brazil: Jos:E F. MANSUR GUERIOS, "Desquite por 
mutuo consentimento," 53 Rev. Jur. Bras. (1941) ItJ, 114. 
185 Under the former pure theory of national law, the Trib. civ. Bruxelles 
(May 8, I9o8) Pand. Per. I9o8.6o4 granted a separation on the mutual agree-
ment of the parties according to the foreign law unsupported by the Belgian law. 
186 See for comparative legislation, ROGUIN, I Traite de droit civil compare, 
le Mariage (I9o4) 237; BERGMANN, 2 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 723. 
187 Cf. RAAPE 381; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 474; cf. also 3 FRANKENSTEIN 
468. See LEWALD, 57 Recueil 1936 III JI3 on the decisions of the highest 
Dutch and Swiss courts. 
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fortunate institution, few difficulties seem to have been en-
countered.188 
A much deplored result 189 of the double legal require-
ments concerning separation occurs in the numerous inter-
national situations where one of the legislations involved pro-
vides only for absolute divorce and the other only for sepa-
ration, or where the spouses loyal to their faith or to their 
nationallegislati~n do not want the absolute divorce available 
at the forum. In these cases, neither form of relief can be 
conferred under the system of nationality.190 The conse-
quences are apt to include special inconveniences, especially 
when the parties, faced with barred doors at their domicil, 
are refused jurisdiction even in their homeland.191 A court 
having only absolute divorce, besides merely provisional 
orders, at its disposal, such as the Rumanian or the German 
tribunals, 192 is unable to give any relief to parties for whom 
Italian,193 Brazilian/91 etc., law is considered applicable, al-
188 Italians are separated in Switzerland; see decisions in 6 Z.ausl.PR. (I932) 
836; 7 ibid. (I933) 644; II ibid. (I937) 656. In France, it was decided that 
the effect of a French separation of Italians should be determined by Italian law 
rather than French; see Cour Dijon (March 28, I939) Clunet I939, 634. 
Portuguese nationals before I9 3 I could be separated but not divorced in France; 
see Trib. civ. Seine (June I2, I8 8 8) Gaz. Pal. I8 88.1.902. Nationals of countries 
recognizing judicial separation may likewise obtain separation in Portugal; see 
CuNHA GoN<;ALVES, Direito Civil 696 (where also conversion of separation 
into divorce is treated). 
189 Cf. especially KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 330, 339, 342 (more violently than is 
justified by his strong position against the law of the forum) and WALKER 702. 
190 OLG. Kiel (May r6, I934) JW. I934, 2349, IPRspr. I934, no. 59 
(Danish law) ; RG. (Nov. 4, I9 3 7) I 56 RGZ. I o6. Austrian separations from 
bed and board have been transformed, according to the Law of July 6, I938, 
§ I I 5 by a simple procedure and without instituting a new suit, into full German 
divorces between persons who have become German subjects, RG. (Dec. 15, 
I938) 159 RGZ. 76. 
191 Compare, for instance, Rumanian C. C. art. 2 I 6, and KAHN, 2 Abhandl. 
339· But see WALKER 703. 
192 Since I 9 3 8, no limited divorce has existed in Germany, but the situation 
was materially the same before, according to the opinion prevailing in the court 
decisions. See OLG. Breslau (Sept. 8, 1933) JW. I933> 24oo, IPRspr. 1933, 
no. 33· 
193 Compare PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 68 no. 195, and FEDOZZI 461. 
194 Just. Fed. Nictheroy (Oct. 3I, 1922) 66 Revista Dir. Civ. (I922) 314; 
cf. OcTAVIO, Dicionario no. 319ff. 
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though these legislations allow separation from bed and board. 
Inversely, Italian courts deny such separation to Rumanian or 
German nationals, because the parties' national law does not 
provide separation. For the latter case, it was suggested that 
this hardship should be alleviated on the ground that the 
larger remedy is agreeable to the personal law, and some 
Brazilian courts have proceeded in consequence, 19.5 while 
others have been opposed.196 Yet at the Hague Conference, 
it was answered that limited divorce is not a "minus" which 
may be subtracted from absolute divorce, but a different 
thing.197 
The Brazilian practice, previous to the law of I 942, was 
interesting. The courts in principle required agreement of 
the national laws of both parties for granting separation by 
mutual consent (desquite amigavel) but granted it also in 
three exceptional cases, viz., the case just mentioned of the 
national law allowing absolute divorce, the case of renvoi,198 
and the case where one party is of Brazilian nationality.199 
These decisions seem to retain authority in cases where for-
eigners are not domiciled in Brazil. 
195 The cases of this note and notes 196 and 198 have been kindly pointed out 
by Miss Magdalene Schoch, Harvard Law School. Rumanian spouses or husband: 
Ap. Pernambuco (1938) ll5 Rev. dos Trib. 745; Ap. civ. Sao Paulo ( 1938) u6 
ibid. 157; 126 ibid. 171; German spouses: Ap. civ. Sao Paulo (1941) 131 ibid. 
243; Ap. civ. Rio de Janeiro no. 8260 (Jan. 13, 1942) 61 Arch. Jud. (1942) 
314; Japanese husband: Trib. Sao Paulo (Dec. 4, 1931) cited by 2 PoNTES DE 
MIRANDA 83. -
196 The Appellate Court of Parana in Plenary Meeting of its chambers (June 6, 
1941) 34 Parana Jud. (1941) 59 adopting the nationality principle denied 
separation by consent to German parties. Sao Paulo (1941) 133 Rev. dos Trib. 
152 (German husband, Russian wife; no desquite in Brazil, as both German 
and Russian law, in case she should have retained Russian nationality, do not 
provide separation). 
197 See documentation in OLG. Kiel (May r6, 1934) JW. 1934, 2349, IPRspr. 
1934, no. 59· 
198 Sup. Fed. Ct. (1937) 112 Rev. dos Trib. 334 (obiter dictum); Ap. civ. 
Sao Paulo (1938) u8 ibid. 715; Ap. civ. Sao Paulo (1939) 123 Rev. dos 
Trib. 597 (Czechoslovakian law of husband applied as the German law of the 
wife refers also to that law) . 
199 See infra n. 2 3 6. 
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3· Grounds for Divorce 
Under the principle of lex fori or lex domicilii as well as 
Utider that of nationality, applied exclusively, the right to 
divorce is governed by one law. The English courts demon-
strate how seriously they accept this doctrine by applying, on 
the one hand, only English law in any divorce suit in England 
and, on the other hand, by recognizing foreign divorce decrees 
of the matrimonial domicil without inquiring into what law 
was applied in the qse. Similarly, when French courts adhered 
to the pure nationality rule, they granted divorce for reasons 
found in the national law but not in French law. 200 This point 
of view still exists in some countries. 201 Of course, causes re-
pugnant to the public policy of the forum are always excepted. 
At present, however, courts in France and many other 
countries are disinclined to apply a foreign ground for divorce, 
unless it corresponds with a ground acknowledged in the 
forum. 202 Absolute identity, it is true, is no~ demanded. For 
instance, in the relations among the countries following the 
Code Napoleon, divorce for injures graves is granted without 
regard to the varying meanings of this term, which term is 
also held to correspond to gross insults, cruelty, or desertion, 
200 See SuRVILLE 440. 
201 The Polish Law of I 926 on private international law, art. I 7 par. I 
declares the national law applicable without any qualifications. 
Greece: Court of Athens (I 9 3 7) no. I 9 p, 49 Them is 4 7 3, Cl unet 1 9 3 9, 46 3 
granting separation from bed and board to Italian nationals according to Italian 
law on a ground unknown in Greek law. 
In Portugal: CUNHA GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 692 thinks that outside of 
the Hague Convention a cause of the national law unknown to the Portuguese 
law suffices in principle. 
202 Belgium: Trib. civ. Verviers (March 7, 1932) I9 Bull. Inst. Beige (I933) 
74 (Swiss parties; grave injury required by Belgian law must be proved, as well 
as disruption of the marriage by a lesser injury, ground for divorce under Swiss 
law). 
France: Trib. civ. Seine (April 27, 1933) Clunet 1934, 900, Revue Crit. 1935, 
7 59 requires identity of grounds in both laws, while LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 
394ff. no. 336 suggests that equivalence should suffice. 
The Netherlands: Cf. VAN DER FLIER, Grotius 1937, 155. 
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constituting grounds for divorce under American statutes, 203 
and even covers adultery as a foreign requisite. 204 
The result of this system is, of course, that divorce is denied, 
if the personal law includes no ground to support the action. 
Englishmen (except where renvoi was applied) were refused 
divorce in most cases because of the narrow limits of the right 
to divorce in the English matrimonial law before the re-
forms. 205 The same is still true of citizens of New York, 
domiciled in New York. ~oa But the internal conceptions of 
what are sufficient grounds for divorce also play a large role, 
although a certain elasticity in their application rests in the 
discretion of the court. 207 
A more definite position is taken by the German Code, the 
Hague Convention, and the codifications following them. 208 
Divorce must be supported in this system by the lex fori as 
well as by the national law. 
This group, however, divides on the following point. In 
some of the texts involved, it has been made clear that, al-
'
203 E.g., Trib. civ. Seine (April 6, I922) Clunet I922, 674 (equation with 
gross insults under California law); Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. I9, I926) Clunet 
I926, 663 (equation with desertion under the Indiana statute). 
204 PoULLET, no. 3 79; NIBOYET 746. Adultery may be defined very differently 
(cf. SATTER, 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. I I), but the differences are not considered 
material. 
205 Cour Paris (March I, I933) Gaz.Pal.t933·1.884; App. d'Aix (March 23, 
I936) Rec. Somm. I936, no. I736; Cass. (req.) (April 20, I937) Gaz. Trib. 
I937.1.87: "injures graves" no cause for divorce under English law. Switzerland: 
BG. (Feb. 2I, I935) 58 Sem. Jud. (I936) 209, II Z.ausl.PR. (I937) 656 
no. 2 (facts insufficient to constitute "injures graves" under French law, C. C. 
art. 2 3 I). 
206 Trib. civ. Havre (Nov. I7, I923) Clunet I924, Iooo. 
207 A Dutch observer, KoLLEWIJN, Het beginsel der openbare orde 90, thinks 
Belgian courts are more inclined than French judges to recognize foreign divorce 
grounds unknown to the lex fori; the most authoritative writer on Belgian 
conflicts law, POULLET, no. 3 79 makes no such distinction, but he seems to favor 
a liberal interpretation of the similar ground theory. 
208 Hague Convention on Divorce, art. z. 
Germany: EG. art. I7 par. 4· 
Sweden: Law of July 8, I904, with subsequent amendments, c. 3, § 2. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7h par. 1. 
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 16. 
China: Law of I9I8, art. II. 
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though divorce must be justified by some ground under each 
of the two laws, the ground need not be the same in both.209 
Hence, the Swiss Federal Tribunal declared it sufficient if 
the facts of a case supported, at the same time, disruption of 
the marriage according to Swiss law and injures graves within 
the French meaning 210 or disruption in the Swiss sense and 
violation of the marital duties under the then unmodified 
German Code.211 And if the national law of Polish Jews al-
lowed divorce by mutual agreement, German courts granted 
it, provided that, in addition to satisfying the lex fori, a valid 
reason, such as adultery or fault in disrupting the marriage 
existed. 212 The case of mutual agreement. of Soviet Russian 
nationals has been treated in the same way. 213 The statutes of 
Japan and China 214 by their wording seem to exclude such 
interpretation and hence to require in fact that the same or 
a similar ground exist in both laws. · 
Cumulative application of two laws of any sort results in 
dismissal of a divorce suit when, according to only one of the 
two legislations, such events as condonation, recrimination 
209 Hague Convention on Divorce, German and Swedish statutes (see supra 
n. 208). The Swiss statute is interpreted the same way. Cf. German RG. (April 
s, 19ZI) 102 RGZ. 82; OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 21, 1914) Hans. GZ. 1915, BBl. 
no. 45; OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 5, 1915) ibid. no. 46; OLG. Rostock (Dec. 16, 
1921) 77 Seuff. Arch. 174; OLG. Frankfurt (July 11, 1929) JW. 1929, 3507; 
OLG. Koln (Jan. 20, 1932) JW. 1932> 2304. The Netherlands: Rb. Haarlem 
(Oct. 29, 1935) W. 1936, no. 756 (under the Hague Convention). 
210 Swiss BG. (May 26, 1932) 58 BGE. II 183, 188. 
211 Swiss BG. (June IJ, 1912) 38 BGE. II 43, Erw. 3, 4· 
212 OLG. Frankfurt (July 11, I929) JW. 1929, 3507 (supra n. 209) and 
constant practice, despite some controversy in the literature whether divorce by 
agreement is opposed to German public policy and, if so, whether it may be taken 
as a basis for a German divorce decree; the dominant opinion interprets EG. art. 
I 7 par. 4, which is less well drafted than art. 2 of the Hague Convention on 
Divorce, as satisfying all the exigencies of German public policy, irrespective of 
logical relation to par. 1 of art. I 7· Cf. PRETZEL in JW. 1928, 3030; LuTTER-
LOH, JW. I929, 4I9; HoLLANDER, JW. I929, 1863. 
213 KG. CSept. I4, 1936) JW. 1936, 3579; cf. RG. (April 4, I928) 121 
RGZ. 24. 
214 China and Japan, supra n. 208. 
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(compensation of causes)/15 or lapse of time negates the 
right to divorce. 
Moreover, the double requirement opens a strange gap 
when divorce cannot be granted according to the national law, 
because the forum would grant another type of relief. Laws 
that leave the right to divorce without any limitation, like the 
Soviet Russian law, or which broaden the right, like the 
Belgian law, may eliminate or closely limit, respectively, the 
right to sue for annulment of the marriage. For instance, a 
marriage may be annulled under German law, because the 
husband was ignorant of an incurable serious illness of the 
wife at the time of the marriage, but it would not be voidable 
under Russian or Belgian law, as divorce takes the place of 
annulment there. Couples of these n~tionalities married in 
their respective countries and coming to live in Germany 
would not obtain either relief at their new domicil.216 
Perm;ysive policy. Divorce laws are sometimes quaint, even 
if they do not equal the Chinese rules before I 9 3 I, under 
which the husband could divorce his wife because of her gar-
rulity and the wife had no right of divorce. The tribunal of 
Brussels, in fact, reacted against the latter provision 217 and 
recently also reacted against barring divorce to Catholics of 
the former Polish kingdom/18 as well as against the religious 
distinctions of the law of lran.219 The basis for its opposition 
is that it is contrary to the Belgian public order to investigate 
215 Cour Paris {July 71 19zo) Clunet 19z1, 518 states that evidence is l:icking 
for compensation of grounds according to the American law; cf. BARTIN, z 
Principes 3 o 5 § 3 14. 
216 Annulment was denied where the national law of the party who was in 
error does not regard the mistake as an impediment by RG. (Oct. 6, I 9 z 7) 
Warn. Rspr. 19z8, no. I31 IPRspr. 19z6-19z7, no. 68, Revue I9301 u9; the 
prevailing opinion is in accord. See however, RAAPE1 z D. IPR. I 79 and 
infra p. 54z. 
217 Trib. civ. Bruxelles {Jan. 31 I9Z3) 9 Bull. Inst. Belge (19z3) I46. See 
also App. Liege (Nov. z, 1937) J.d. Tr. I9371 col. 67z no. 35u, supra n. I8:z. 
218 Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June :u, I938) J.d.Tr. I9381 col. 646 no. 3550. 
219 Trib. civ. Bruxelles (March 301 1938) 53 J.d.Tr. I938, col. 3z9 no. 3534• 
440 DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 
the religious denomination of the parties. In all these cases, 
Belgian divorce law was substituted. 
But German courts have not considered the wife's definitely 
inferior position in suing for divorce under the legislation ot 
Austria and Italy as contrary to public policy.220 Nor has the 
former English law, allowing only the husband to sue on the 
ground of adultery, ever been repudiated on the Continent. 
More doubt has been expressed about the Jewish laws pro-
hibiting the wife from suing even on the ground of adultery 
or attempt on her life, but they have been applied; the wife 
of a Mohammedan Persian was similarly treated. 221 Again, 
the·court of Brussels once granted divorce in such a case.222 
According to the prevailing opinion, it is considered undesir-
able to increase the number of unfortunate cases where mar-
riage exists with geographically limited force. 223 So even 
bizarre foreign institutions are admitted. 
4· Different National Laws 
National law of the husband. Upon the same historical 
basis of coverture as in England, the national law of the hus-
band alone is applicable, without regard to that of the wife, 
in Germany, Portugal, China, and Japan; 224 according to 
part of the French doctrine, the national law of the husband 
is said to govern the causes for divorce. 225 Independently of 
the historical background, this system has been appraised as 
220 OLG. Dusseldorf (July 6, I9 I I) I I o Rhein. Archiv I 58; OLG. Kiel (Feb. 
28, I923) 78 Seuff. Arch. 267, Clunet I925, I053· 
221 Germany: RG. (May 26, I930) 43 Z.int.R (I930-:-3I) 39I; RG. (Sept. 
29, I9JO) JW. I93I, I48; LG. Niirnberg (Jan. 22, I932.) IPRspr. I932., no. 
8I; KG. (May I I, I9JI) IPRspr. I93I, no. I42.. 
France: Cass. (civ.) (Oct. 30, I905) Clunet I9o6, 4IO. 
232 App. Bruxelles (June 8, I899) Clunet I899, 859· 
223 RAAPE 435· 
224 German EG. art. I7 par. I; followed by Japan: Law of I898, art. I6 
and China: Law of I 9 I 8, art. I I. This is also the rule adopted in the Treaty 
of Montreux, Egyptian Mixed Tribunals, Regulations of Judicial Organisa-
tion, art. 2.9 par. 3, publ. in U. S. Treaty Series, No. 939· 
225 BAR TIN, 2. Principes 3 2 3 § 3 I 8 states that this rule in the French system is 
not doubtful, but the decisions are not homogeneous; cf. infra pp. 44Iff. 
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the simplest and most convenient in practice. 226 In the last 
decades, however, such preference for the husband has found 
less and less favor, in conformity with the increasing tendency 
to allow a married woman to retain or resume her original 
citizenship. 227 
Last common nationality. In the Hague Convention on 
Divorce, the law of the last common nationality of both 
parties was adopted. 228 The Sixth Conference added in its 
non-ratified drafts that where the parties never had a com-
mon nationality or where they changed from one common to 
two different new nationalities, divorce and separation depend 
on both laws cumulatively. The recent Greek Code more con-
veniently calls in such cases for the application of the national 
law of the husband as of the time of the marriage cele-
bration. 229 
Both laws cumulatively. According to another theory, the 
granting of divorce must be permitted by the laws of both 
spouses. 230 
The law of the plaintiff. 'In contrast, the French courts 
usually pronounce divorce at the instance of a party whose 
226 RoLIN, 2 Principes no. 591. 
227 There is no advocate in France any longer,]. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 474 
n. 2 asserts, in ignoring Bartin's recent book supra n. 225. 
228 Hague Convention on Divorce, arts. I, 2, 8; followed by Poland: Law on 
international private law, art. I 7 par. I; Rumanian Preliminary Draft of C. C. 
art. XXIV. 
229 Greek C. C. (I 940) art. I 6. 
23
°Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I929, art. IO. 
Belgium: App. Liege (July 7, I938) Pasicrisie I938.2.I29 (particularly 
exacting, as the wife had resumed Belgian citizenship); Rb. Antwerp (May II, 
I939) 8 Rechtsk. Wkbl. I938-I939> IS52 no. "JI2. 
Italy: UDINA, Elementi no. IJ6; SALVIOLI, I9 Rivista (I927) 354 (admits 
difficulties); and some decisions in France. Only Trib. civ. Seine (April 27, 
I 9 3 3) Revue Crit. I 9 3 5, 7 59 states that the grounds for divorce must agree 
with the foreign laws of both parties as well as with the French law. NIBOYET, 
Note ibid. 762 declares regard for the defendant's law unnecessary. 
Portugal: Sup. Trib. de Just. (Jan. 5, I9I8) 50 Direito 250, cited by CUNHA 
GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 693. 
Switzerland: BG. (June 23, I933) 59 BGE. II IIJ; App. Zurich (June 23, 
1934) 34 Bl. f. Zurch. Rspr. (I9JS) 72 no. 27; and App. Zurich (June I2, 
1937) 37 Bl. f. Zurch. Rspr. (1938) 304 no. 151. 
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national law as such permits it. Although occasionally under 
this system foreign law has been applied, 231 the usual result 
is a resort to French law. 
This conforms to a general trend. Suppose that the ap-
plicable conflicts rule calls for the municipal law of the hus-
band, he a foreigner and the wife a national; or suppose that 
the last common nationality law should be applied, the wife 
alone having acquired the nationality of the forum during 
marriage,-courts are tempted to abandon the conflicts rule 
for the sake of the wife. The same development that has 
fostered favor for the wife's separate nationality induces the 
courts to permit the wife such rights of divorce as the law of 
the forum, which is also her national law, permits. Hence, 
early examples of exceptions made for nationals in some 
European and particularly in Latin American jurisdictions, 
have been multiplied in recent times. 
From about I 906, French courts have granted divorce ac-
cording to French law to the French wife of a mixed mar-
riage.232 If the husband were of Italian nationality, however, 
they were bound by article 8 of the Hague Convention on 
Divorce to observe the last common national law of the parties. 
But precisely for this reason, France renounced her par-
ticipation in the Convention in 1913, and in 1927 a French 
woman ,marrying a foreigner was allowed to retain her French 
nationality. These two events reinforced the trend of the 
French tribunals. In the outstanding case of the Marquis .de 
Ferrari, a French woman who, by marrying an Italian, had 
become an Italian national and had been judicially separated 
from her husband in Italy, recovered French citizenship. She 
was granted a divorce a vinculo in spite of the prohibition of 
Italian law which had controlled her marriage and was still 
the law of the Marquis. The basis was surprisingly simple: 
231 Cour Paris (March I 1 I933) Gaz. Pal. I933· I. 884, Revue I9331 629 
(English law applied against English husband in favor of his French wife). 
232 Trib. civ. Seine (Oct. z6, I9o6) Revue I9071 590; Cour Paris (Oct. 3I1 
I91o) Revue 1911, 82; etc. 
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the Court of Cassation declared that French law Is an In-
dispensable attribute of French nationality. 233 This decision 
attracted world-wide attention; its exact scope remains ob-
scure, except where the application of the French law is in 
issue.234 Much criticism has been aroused by the inconsistency 
with which the foreign prohibition has been discarded in cases 
analogous to those in which, before dissolution of marriage 
was allowed in I 8 84, the French courts refused to recognize 
foreign divorces of a French national married to an alien, and 
the further inconsistency with the theory of fraud, which 
the French courts were fostering at the very time of the Fer-
rari suit.235 Nevertheless, the precedent of the Ferrari case 
has been followed. 
In addition to France, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, 
and Sweden successively left the Hague Convention to avoid 
the divorce prohibition of the member state, Italy; in all these 
countries, migratory Italian workers had married and de-
serted native women. Except for the little influence the Con-
vention has preserved, it has become a habit in most of the 
European countries to allow divorce to a national party of a 
mixed marriage according to the lex fori. 236 In Germany, 
233 Affaire Ferrari no. t, Cass. (civ.) (July 6, 1922) D.t922.1.137> S.t923.t.5, 
Clunet 1922, 714, Revue 192.2.-1923, 444; no. 2, Cass. (civ.) (March 14, 
1928) S.t929.1.92, Clunet 1928,383. 
234 BAR TIN, 2 Principes 308 concludes that these are purely French solutions, 
of mere French interest, which we have no reason whatsoever to apply to foreign 
couples; he does not even want to suggest recognition of an analogous decree of 
a foreign--say, a Brazilian-tribunal. 
235 See PILLET, Revue 1922-1923, 464 frankly regretting the decisions as a 
break with international private law; AUDINET, 11 Recueil 1926 I 230; DE-
GAND, 5 Repert. 555 no. 83; SALVIOLI, "Confl.itto di leggi personali in materia 
di divorzio," Rivista 1927, 354· NIBOYET, NoteS. 1929.1·9· As to the theory 
of fraud, J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 480 has answered that fraud is relevant 
only if committed against the law of the forum. 
236 Brazil: (Before the law of 1942) Sup. Trib. Fed. (Nov. 6, 1918) Recurso 
Extraordinario no. 587, 20 Revista Sup. Trib. (1919) 246; Ap. civ. Rio de 
Janeiro (Jan. t6, 1942) no. 8oo, 62 Arch. Jud. 58. Cf. Ap. civ. Rio de Janeiro 
(Oct. 25, 1934) no. 4.332, 121 Revista Dir. Civ. (1936) 322 (the constitutional 
provision that Brazilian law is to be applied to the dissolution of a marriag'e 
even if only one of the spouses is of Brazilian nationality applies also in cases of . 
judicial separation if nationality is acquired by naturalization). 
France: Cass. (civ.) (May 7, 1928) S. 1929.1·9> Revue 1928, 653 (con-
version of separation into divorce after naturalization); Cass. (civ.) (Feb. s, 
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the enacted law was adjusted to this end.237 
In Belgium, however, the courts have been thus far in dis-
agreement. Their decisions are significant. In a series of cases, 
divorce was denied to a woman who had married an Italian 
and later recovered Belgian nationality, and to wives of 
Austrian origin and Catholic faith who had acquired Belgian 
nationality, on the unmodified rule that divorce must agree 
with the national laws of both spouses and on the consideration 
that at the time of the marriage both parties knew that their 
bond would be indissoluble. 238 It has been argued, further-
more, that, logically, to free the party who belongs to the 
forum by application of his or her national law, would leave 
192.9) Clunet 192.9, 12.58; Cass. (req.) (Feb. 4, 1931) Clunet 1932, 451; 
Cour Colmar (Feb. 13, 1937) Nouv. Revue 1937, 2.40; Cour Paris (Dec. 2.1, 
1937) Revue Crit. 1938, 2.51, and decisions of lower courts; cf. PERROUD, Clu-
net 192.6, 2.4 n. 19; J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 475; Note, Trib. civ. Seine 
(Jan. 19, 192.6) Clunet 1926, 663 (through renvoi, applying French law as the 
personal law of an American woman domiciled in France); Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 
zo, 193 7) Nouv. Revue 1938, 324 (granted divorce to the wife who had resumed 
French nationality, while under the husband's Dutch law adultery would have 
been required); Cour Colmar (Jan. 7, 1938) Clunet 1938, 797, Nouv. Revue 
1938, 326 (French wife granted divorce without regard to the German law of 
the husband). 
Rumania: Cass. (Sept. q, 1876); Trib. Ilfov (April 8, 1935) Clunet 1937, 
625. The contrary rule obtains because of the Hague Convention in the case of 
an Italian wife naturalized in Rumania: Cass. Bucarest (Oct. 2.5, 1928) Revue 
1930, 517· 
Spain: (during republican times) Trib. Supr. (July 10, 1934) 214 Sent. 
642., Clunet 1936, 2.10 (Spanish wife, Italian husband). 
Switzerland: BG. (June 5, 1901) 2.7 BGE. I 180 proclaimed that a Swiss 
spouse could apply for divorce notwithstanding the prohibition of divorce by 
the national law of the other spouse; BG. (June q, 1907) 33 BGE. I 355 (one 
spouse a naturalized Swiss former Austrian Catholic); BG. (July 9, 1914) 40 
BGE. I 418, 428; BG. (March z, 1922.) Clunet 1922., 752. (one party a natu-
ralized Swiss, former Orthodox Russian); BG. (May 3, 1932.) 58 BGE. Il93, 
Clunet 1932, II 51, Revue 1932, 710 (Swiss nationality resumed by wife of an 
Italian after Switzerland had left the Hague Convention). 
237 German Law on Divorce of Jan. 2.4, 1935, RGBI. 1935, I 48. 
238 App. Bruxelles (July 9, 19 3 z) Revue Crit. 19 3 3, 5 II (sees the ideas of 
·the Hague Convention transferred to the Belgian common law) ; App. Gand 
(July II, 1935) 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 302. no. 136; App. Liege (July 7, 1938) 
Pasicrisie 1938.2.12.9, Belg. Jud. 1939, 303 (the more severe of the two national 
laws must be applied); App. Liege (Jan. 12, 1939) Belg. Jud. 1939, 401 
(the wife "submitted" to the indissolubility of the union). 
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the other party married. 239 As a matter of fact, this is the 
Swiss practice and the prevailing opinion in Germany,240 so 
far as remarriage is concerned. The Belgian authorities 241 
to the contrary, who admit divorce, have replied that if the 
non-Belgian spouse remains married under his or her national 
law (not by Belgian law), it should be realized that this un-
desirable result is due to the fact that the unity of the law 
governing the marriage has been broken by allowing the wife 
a separate nationality.242 This consequence is not strong 
enough "to prevail over the absolute and unconditional right 
that the wife derives from her national status and entitles her 
to break up a union the continuation of which might damage 
her." A Belgian writer has added that attitudes of high in-
difference to the misery of others are repugnant to the 
basic tendency of public life in Belgium. 243 
The analogy to the granting of divorce by the courts of 
the domicil of one party in the 1United States is the more 
striking, as in these Continental cases the plaintiff is gen-
erally domiciled at the forum. Niboyet suggests, however, 
that a wife should not be allowed to sue for divorce under her 
separate national law, unless the matrimonial domicil was es-
tablished in France by both parties at the marriage or later. 244 
Th1s means a step toward the exclusive dominance of the 
domiciliary jur_isdiction, desirable in all respects. 
239 Thus, LABBE, Note in S.I878.1.195· Cf. also DEGAND, 5 Repert. 553 
no. 76, with earlier French decisions rejecting divorce; Trib. civ. Mons (April 
8, I 927) Bel g. Jud. I 927, 508 (applying exclusively the foreign husband's law 
"to avoid inextricable complications and eminently wrong situations"). 
240 See infra p. 5 I 8. 
241 Trib. civ. Bruxelles (June 27, I928) Belg. Jud. I928, 635 (despite the 
"bizarre and absurd" consequence that one party is not allowed to remarry) ; 
Trib. civ. Mons (May 8, 1930) and Trib. Bruxelles (May 20, I93I) J.d.Tr. 
I9Jl> cols. 462, '673 cited by JoF.E, 22 Bull. Inst. Belg. (I936) I32; App. 
Liege (Feb. 2, I 931) Clunet 1932, 489. 
242 Trib. Arion (April 23, 1937) Pand. Per. I9J8, JI no. 8. 
243 }OFE, 22 Bull. lnst. Belg. (I9J6) IJJ. 
244 NIBOYET 749 no. 641. 
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VI. RENVOI 
The problem of renvoi is presented when, according to the 
principle of nationality, the divorce law of the state to which 
a party belongs should be applied, while, according to the con-
flicts rule of the foreign state, this law is not to be applied. 
The Hague Convention on Divorce 245 denied renvoi between 
member states, all of which followed the nationality principle, 
but renvoi is observed, as usual, in most countries following 
the principle, particularly by the French/46 German/47 and 
Swiss 248 courts. 249 The situation in German and Swiss divorce 
245 See RG. (Nov. 8, 1922) 105 RGZ. 340; KG. (Nov. 27, 1933) IPRspr. 
1934, no. II6 and KG. (April 9, 1934) IPRspr. I934, no. 47· 
246 France: Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. I9, I926) Clunet I926, 663 (American 
wife); Trib. civ. Fontainebleau (June 24, I932) Clunet I933, 666; Cour Paris 
(Dec. 24, I935) Nouv. Revue I936, Io8; Cour Paris (July 24, I937) Nouv. 
Revue I937, 772 (two English parties; the English law even declares itself 
incompetent); and finally Cass. (req.) (May 10, I939) Gaz.Pal.x939·1.962, 
Nouv. Revue 1939, I53, Revue Crit. I939, 472 with a note by NIBOYET de-
claring that now he renounces his opposition to renvoi, although he construes it 
merely as a theory of national interest in cases not regulated by the national 
law. Among the four decisions against renvoi listed by J. DoNNEDIEU DE 
VABRES 472 n. 3, and now overruled, the fourth, Cour Paris (March I, 1933) 
Gaz.Pal.I933.I.884, Revue I933, 629, Clunet I935, 99, decided against the 
English husband, plaintiff, in favor of the French wife, defendant; the third, 
mentioned by KuHN, Comp. Com. I72 n. 66, Trib. Basses-Pyrenees (May 28, 
1930) Clunet I93I, I092, was a curious mistake. 
247 Germany: as to American citizens: RG. (March 2I, I904) 48 Gruchot's 
Beitrage (I904) 8oi; OLG. Frankfurt (June 20, I9Io) cited by LEWALD IIo 
no. IS6; LG. Miinchen (July I, 192I) JW. 192I, I47I; LG. Berlin (April 24, 
I928) JW. I928, 3128; OLG. Stuttgart (Dec. 4, 193o) JW. I932, 6oi; RG. 
(Nov. 21, I929) JW. I93o, I309. As to British subjects: KG. (Sept. zo, 190I) 
3 ROLG. 365; OLG. Darmstadt (May I8, I9o6) DJZ.· I9o7, 1327; RG. 
(Jan. 7, I907) JW. I907, 127; OLG. Hamburg (Nov. 6, I9I2) Hans. GZ. 
I9I3, Beibl. 84 no. 52; OLG. Hamburg (March 3I, I927) Hans. GZ. I927, 
Beibl. 139 no. 99; KG. (March 30, I936) JW. I936, 3572; OLG. Hamburg 
(April22, I937) Hans. RGZ. I937, B 222 no. IOI; LG. Berlin (May 2I, 1938) 
JW. I938, 1916. Argentine nationals: (where marriage is celebrated outside of 
Argentina) OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 2, I929) and (May I6, I930) IPRspr. I93o, 
nos. 75, 76; KG. (Feb. 28, I938) JW. 1938, 2748. Danish nationals: dictum 
in RG. (April 6, I936) I5I RGZ. Io3, 106, correcting RG. (Feb. 24, I928) 
Warn. Rspr. I928, no. 64. 
Iceland: RG. (April 6, 1936) IS I RGZ. I03. 
Norway: OLG. Celie (Oct. IS, I925) JW. I926, 388. 
Nicaragua: KG. (March 30, 193I) IPRspr. 193I, no. 70. 
248 Switzerland: BG. (June I5, I928) 54 BGE. II 225, 231; cf. ScHNIT-
ZER I 74• 
249 Belgian courts have refused to accept renvoi by English conflicts law be-
cause the laws of both parties must agree with the law of the forum in permitting 
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courts, however, is further complicated by the provisions for-
bidding them, as we have seen above/50 to assume jurisdiction 
unless recognition of their jurisdiction appears fairly certain 
in the national country of the parties. Generally, it seems, 
these courts have not been aware of all the intrinsic difficulties 
in this matter; however, most of their decisions can probably 
be justified. We must here distinguish the questions of choice 
of law and of jurisdiction. 
The problem of the law of conflicts is rather simpler in this 
case than in status questions generally.251 It,is quite easily set-
tled, if we understand the position of English, American, 
Danish, and Norwegian lawyers in the sense that they recog-
nize the jurisdiction of the domicil under certain conditions 
and that, as they themselves apply the law of the forum at 
home, they are not interested in what substantive private law 
would be applied by a foreign divorce court. 252 Hence, a 
French or German divorce cout"t is permitted (though not 
directed, as was so often believed in Europe) by the national 
law of a British subject to apply the law of the forum. It does 
not matter that by another mistake 253 European courts have 
often referred to the common law country where a British or 
American national was last domiciled instead of to the general 
principles of British or American law. Recently, German 
courts have realized that they are applying German law as the 
lex fori 254 (and not qua lex domicilii) with the blessing of 
that national law. This was a new realization, as observers in 
Germany had thought that there never is a renvoi referring to 
divorce. See Rb. Antwerp (May u, 1939) 8 Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1938-1939, col. 
1552 no. 312. 
250 Supra,;pp. 411-413. 
251 Cj. supra n. 146. 
1152 This seems to agree with KuHN, Comp. Com. 171 ; it is true that KuHN 
concludes just contrary to the text that renvoi is particulary unsound with re-
pect to common law countries: 
253 For instance, OLG. Stuttgart (Dec. 4, 1930) ]W. 1932, 6o1, and BERG• 
MANN in the note ibid. assume a renvoi from the California law because the 
• party had formerly been domiciled in California. See supra p. 134. 
254 See e.g., KG. (March 30, 1936) JW. 1936, 3570 in fine. 
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the law of the forum. 255 With national laws such as that of 
Argentina, the situation is theoretically different; the law 
govet:"ning at the domicil of the husband is applicable.25 fl 
The entire problem, otherwise almost desperate, is reduced 
in this manner to the question of determining in which cases a 
Continental court may assume jurisdiction for divorce with 
the expectation that the decree will be recognized in the na-
tional country. As a matter of fact, the answer must be dif-
ferent with respect to the individual jurisdictions where rec-
ognition is sought. 
It is easy to answer the question when the husband is a 
national of a country such as England or Argentina, where the 
domicil of the husband is the matrimonial domicil and the law 
of this domicil governs the right to divorce (possibly also after 
one party has deserted the matrimonial domicil). German 
courts have scrupulously investigated whether a Brit~sh hus-
band was domiciled within their territory, making certain that 
domicil at the forum exists not only in the German sense but 
also in the British sense.257 
If one or both of the parties are of American nationality, the 
solution is simple where both have their effective domicil, 
common or separate, in the country of divorce. But if not, 
which of the approximately fifty individual American ter-
ritorial laws should be considered? It is incorrect to assume 
that the last domicil within the United States, now abandoned, 
should control, and the Continental court would scarcely be 
justified in speculating before which court in the United 
States the matter could probably be brought on the grounds 
of the situs of property, the residence of children, etc. 
255 MELCHIOR 215 § 143· 
256 This was overlooked by LEWALD, 29 Recueil 1929 IV 565, who uses the 
Argentine law as an argument against renvoi. 
257 See the detailed instructions about what a German court ought to ascertain 
concerning the American requirements for recognition of divorce decrees in RG. 
{Nov. 21, 1929) JW. 1930, 1309, and the careful statements as to the domicil 
under English law in KG. {March 30, 1936) JW. 1936, 3570. 
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The requirements of full faith and credit to divorce decrees 
under the Constitution as developed by the Supreme Court 
of the United States would not be directly decisive, since they 
do not include foreign nations. Recognition seems to be 
granted in virtually all American jurisdictions to alien decrees 
of divorce, however, if no party is domiciled within the forum 
to which such a decree is presented for recognition and one 
party was domiciled at the divorce forum, while the other was 
personally served with process or appeared and litigated on 
the merits. Hence, it would be safe to assume jurisdiction in 
such a case in Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Hungary et 
cetera. Although not certain, it is probable that these condi-
tions have been fulfilled in most, if not all, cases of admitted 
renvoi. And there is no necessity of allowing more divorces to 
foreigners. 
VII. CHANGE OF DoMICIL oR NATIONALITY 
" Conditions on which the granting of divorce depends may 
change in different respects, viz., ( 1) domicil or nationality 
as the foundation of the court's jurisdiction may be altered 
while the lawsuit is pending; ( 2) domicil or nationality as 
determining the applicable law may be modified during the 
proceedings; and (3) the status may have been changed after 
the occurrence of the circumstances on which the divorce 
action is based. 
1. Change of Factor Determining Jurisdiction 
As the three questions just mentioned have sometimes been 
confused, it has not always been clear that the first is de-
pendent simply on the definition and the effects which the 
rules of civil procedure give to the commencement of an action 
for divorce. Generally, so soon as the action is considered 
instituted according to the conception of the forum, the juris-
diction established at this moment remains fixed for the dura-
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tion of the suit-forum perpetuatur-jurisdiction con-
tinues.258 That, conversely, the ground for jurisdiction can be 
supplemented later, is not universally affirmed. 
2. Change of Factor Determining the Choice of Law After 
Beginning of Litigation 
The second question may be illustrated by three German 
cases, which result in the following paradigm. An American 
citizen, at the time domiciled in Germany but formerly of 
California, instituted a divorce suit in the German court of his 
domicil but afterwards during the proceedings moved to 
Copenhagen, Denmark. There was no doubt that by Amer-
ican principles (or, as it was construed, by the law of Cali-
fornia) German family law was to be applied by way of renvoi, 
so long as the domicil of the husband was in Germany. But 
did American law, after the change of domicil, refer to Ger-
man or to Danish law, and was this reference still decisive for 
the German court? The Court of Appeals of Stuttgart thought 
the question solved by the principle of perpetuation of the 
forum mentioned above.259 But, although this reasoning may 
seem consonant with the conception, prevalent in this country, 
that the lex fori governs divorce, in Germany the matter is 
undoubtedly part of the choice of law problem and cannot 
be answered by procedural rules. The Reichsgericht, in an-
other case also, in inquiring whether reference should be 
made to the new domicil, refused to consult the national law 
but based its solution on the deliberate wording of the German 
conflicts rule/60 invoking the law of the state to which the hus-
band belonged at the time of the commencement of the ac-
258 See, for instance, Restatement § 76; German C. of Civ. Prov. § 263 par.z. 
259 OLG. Stuttgart (Dec. 4, 1930) JW. 1932, 6o1. Contra: RG. (April 6, 
1936) 151 RGZ. IOJ. 
260 EG. art. 17 par. 1; RG. (March 19, 1936) 150 RGZ. 374; RG. (April 
6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103, 108 (husband of Icelandic nationality served with 
process in Germany returned to Iceland; in this case the Icelandic law, investi-
gated as to its position on the question, revealed that it did not contain any rule 
concerning the effect of a change of domicil upon the law applicable). 
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tion. The same rule seems to prevail in France 261 and 
Belgium 262 as a matter of course. As the question is not identi-
cal with the procedural problem, the German courts permit 
the choice of law to be that of the time when the defendant is 
served in the action 263 or when the ground for divorce is 
pleaded in court; 264 a subsequent unilateral change of status 
by the husband is disregarded. 265 
The Polish statute (art. I 7 par. I) also declares applicable 
the law of the state to which the spouses belong at the time of 
the action; the Polish Supreme Court has understood this 
to mean, however, the country to which the parties belong 
when judgment is rendered.266 In fact, the danger of arbitrary 
changes made by one party is eliminated by this statute, since 
it refers to the law of the common domicil. 
3· Changes of Factor Determining Choice of Law Before the 
Divorce Suit Is Brought 
To understand the problem in question, suppose that the 
domicil of the husband is the test in two states, X andY, and 
that adultery is the only ground for divorce in X (e.g., New 
York), while desertion is a sufficient ground in Y (e.g., New 
Jersey), and suppose that: 
(i) The husband changes'his domicil from X to Y, suing 
his wife in Y on the ground that she deserted him when he 
resided in X; or 
(ii) The husband leaves his domicil in Y, suing his wife 
in X, alleging that she deserted him in Y. 
~61 LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 3 19ff. no. 2.80 and 393 no. 335· 
262 However, Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Dec. 6, 1939) J.d.Tr. 1940, 12.0 rejects 
the action for divorce of Spaniards, divorce having been prohibited by the gov-
ernment of Franco during the pendency of the trial. 
263 RG. (April6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103, 108; cf. HABICHT 135; WALKER 685. 
264 RG. (April 21, 1902) 46 Gruchot's Beitrage (1902) 959; RG. (April 
6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103; cf. KG. (Dec. 17, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 58. 
265 RG. (April 6, 1936) 151 RGZ. 103, 1o8; against RAAPE 378 and 3 
FRANKENSTEIN 438. 
266 Polish Sup. Ct. (Dec. 9> 1935) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1938) 742.. 
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Three solutions have been advanced: 
(a) The court should consider the ground for divorce ex-
clusively under the law ordinarily applicable, irrespective of 
whether the facts occurred before or after the acquisition of 
the new personal law. 
Hence, desertion in X in case (i) is sufficient for divorce in 
Y; desertion in Y in case ( ii) is insufficient in X. 
(b) Conversely, the facts which happened when the per-
sonal law was not yet changed should be evaluated by the 
personal law of the party at that time. 
Hence, desertion in X is no ground; desertion in Y is a 
sufficient ground for both courts in both cases (i) and (ii). 
(c) Divorce should be granted only if the facts warrant 
divorce under both laws, the former personal law of the time 
when the facts occurred and the present personal law. 
Hence, action is dismissed in both cases (i) and (ii). 
The first'view-(a)-is naturally taken by courts applying 
the lex fori. Under this theory, decisions were formerly 
rendered by the German courts, as by the great majority of 
American cases.267 It is also applied by the French courts in de-
termining grounds for divorce according to the lex fori when 
the applicant is a French national; in the leading case, the 
Ferrari case, the Court of Cassation justified the granting of 
divorce under French law by events preceding the re-
naturalization of the plaintiff wife by declaring that the action 
was to be based not so much on the material events as upon 
the harm done by them to the conjugal life. 268 It is remark-
.able that this view was accepted by the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
in a case analogous to the Ferrari case, so that the court applied 
267 Germany: RG. (June 19, 1883) 9 RGZ. I9I, 193. 
England, see WESTLAKE § 52• 
United States: MINOR§ 84; I BEALE§ IIo.s. 
~68 Cass. (civ.) (March I4, I928) Clunet I928, 383; see particularly App. 
Limoges (Feb. 26, I929) and App. Nimes (April IS, I929) Clunet I93o, 368. 
Contra: AUDINET, Note to Cass. (civ.) (Feb. s, I929) S.1930.1.8di., criticiz-
ing the retroactive effect given to a naturalization; but see LEREBOURs-PIGEON-
NIERE 40I no. 339· 
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only Swiss law, although for this purpose a strictly contrary 
statutory provision had to be daringly interpreted as referring 
to foreign plaintiffs only.269 French courts, however, seem 
to extend the retroactive force of the lex fori to divorce actions 
of foreigners. 270 
The second view-(b )-agrees with a literal construction 
of the Japanese statute providing that divorce is governed by 
the national law of the husband at the time when the facts 
causing divorce occurred. ~ 71 This method avoids in a radical 
way any attempt at evasion by the husband but is highly im-
practical. . 
The third opinion-( c)-goes far back and was strongly 
advocated by an editor of Story's work, Judge Redfield, claim-
ing that: 
"It would be an intolerable perversion that an act which by 
the law of the State where committed was no cause of divorce 
should, by the removal of the parties to another State where 
the law was different, become sufiicient to produce a dissolution 
of the married relation." 272 
In this assertion, the words "State where committed" are 
evidently a mistake. That the state where the act was com-
mitted should be of any importance was sharply denied by 
Story. 273 Redfield plainly meant the state where the party 
was formerly domiciled; an act or conduct should not warrant 
divorce, if insufficient in the state where the party was domi-
ciled at the time when it occurred. 274 The rule as formulated, 
however, was adopted by many statutes and even by the Amer-
ican Uniform Draft of 1900 and 1907, that of 1900 running 
as follows: 
269 BG. (May 3, 1932) 58 BGE. II 93· 
270 LAURENT, 3 Principes 53 7ff. no. 306, and many decisions, particularly, 
Cass. (civ.) (May 7, 1928) S.1929.1·9· 
271 Japan, Law of 1898, art. 16. 
272 REDFIELD in STORY (ed. 6) § 2JOC. 
273 STORY§ 23oa. 
274 REDFIELD in STORY (ed. 6) § 23oc speaks of the transfer of the domicil. 
§ 23od, however, sounds again perplexing. 
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"No divorce shall be granted for any cause arising prior to 
the residence of the complainant or the defendant in this state 
which was not a ground for divorce in the state where the 
cause arose." 275 
This confusion of the time when, and the place where, the 
offence occurred, makes the interpretation of the various 
American statutes difficult. 
The sanction that Story himself would have had in mind 
was certainly the refusal of jurisdiction. 276 Correspondingly, 
the actual statutes possess two kinds of clauses. On the one 
hand, jurisdiction for divorce is often denied, with or without 
statutory provision, when the cause of action occurred outside 
of the state and the spouses were domiciled at the time out 
of the state. On the other hand, in many statutes the required 
time of residence preliminary to the action is prolonged, if 
the cause took place outside of the state. Whatever the exact 
sense of these clauses may be, their tendency is to prevent or 
to render it difficult for a fact to be appreciated by a court 
under a law other than would be relevant if the party in ques-
tion had stayed at his domicil. Apparently the draftsmen of 
the statutes have felt bound to the law of the forum, if once 
jurisdiction is assumed, and therefore have thought that the 
only remedy is to deny jurisdiction. A connected provision 
of the Uniform Act of I 906 277 seems to follow this concep-
tion. The wording of the draft that had preceded in I 900,278 
however, reproduced in the preceding paragraph, may pos-
sibly be understood as involving a choice of law, meaning 
that the divorce ground is governed by the law of the domicil 
275 Draft printed in 14 Harv. L. Rev. (x9ox) 525, sec. x. The explanation at 
52.6 is rather confused. 
276 See STORY's own quotation § 2.3oa of Gibson, C. J., in Dorsey v. Dorsey 
(1838) 7 Watts (Pa.) 349; and see WHARTON § 2.31 on the later events in 
Pennsylvania. 
277 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra n. 
4, at§§ 8(b), xo(b) adopted in Del. Rev. Code (1935) §§ 3505(b), 3506 
(b); N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) vol. 1 §§ 2..5o-xo(b), 2..5o-II(b). 
278 Draft of Uniform Divorce Law, loc. cit. supra n. 4, cf. Ky. Civil Code 
of Pract. (Carroll, 1938) § 42.3(2.). 
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as of the time when the facts complained of happened. A con-
sequence would be, that where the alleged cause fails to agree 
with such foreign law, the suit ought to be dismissed as to the 
merits, and not only quoad instantiam. 
The same idea was to be found in Europe in the early 
nineteenth century and is now frequent. 279 The German 
statute, after providing that (EG. art. 17, par. 1) divorce 
is governed by the law of the husband as of the time of the 
commencement of the action, prescribes that (ibid., par. 2) a 
fact that has occurred while the husband belonged to another 
state cannot be claimed as a ground for divorce, unless the 
fact is ground for divorce or separation also according to the 
laws of that other state. 
Correspondingly, the law of a former common nationality 
of the parties is to be consulted according to the Hague Con-
vention and the Polish, Swedish, Swiss, and Hungarian stat-
utes, 280 and the law of the former domicil is influential in 
the Scandinavian countries 281 and under the C6digo Bus-
tamante. 282 
A special problem arises, if permanent conditions, such as 
mental deficiency, venereal disease, or habits of drunkenness, 
279 App. Liege (April 24, I 826) Pasicrisie I 826. us, 127; for the practice 
of the Prussian courts, compare Gebhardsche Materialien 188. 
280 Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 4· 
Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. I7 par. 2. 
Sweden: Law of I9o4 with subsequent amendments, c. 3 § 2 par. 2. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7h par. 2; cf. BG. (May 3, I932) 58 BGE. II 9H 
ScHNITZER I 7 5· 
Hungary: Marriage Law of I 894, § I I 5 par. I. 
Moreover, the treaties of Czechoslovakia with Yugoslavia (March 17, I923, 
art. 34 par. 2), Poland (March 6, 1925, art. 7), and Rumania (May 7, I925, 
art. I9 par. 2); cf. SVOBODA, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 3I3 n. 186. 
In Republican Spain LASALA LLANAS I40 advocates the same principle. 
281 Denmark: prevailing opinion, see MuNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld 
I 747; BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. z2I no. so; HoECK, Personalstatut 33· 
Norway: see CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 57 5 no. II9· 
Iceland: see EYJOLFSSON, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 762. 
282 Art. 52; cf. art. 54 and BusTAMANTE, La commission des jurisconsultes 
de Rio 12 I, no. I 24. 
Cf. Guatemala: former C. C. art. 209. 
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are recognized reasons for divorce under the new but not under 
the old statute; can desertion be said to begin only after the ac-
quisition of the new status? The American cases are divided. 283 
Suppose a married couple was domiciled in New York, where 
insanity is not a cause for divorce, and later transferred their 
domicil to Norway, where it is, if continued through three 
years. Should a time of lunacy spent in New York be counted? 
This question ought to be affirmed, to avoid an unreasonable 
rule. 284 
The choice of law rule just contemplated, although system-
atically better justified than the refusal of jurisdiction, makes 
the task of the judge delicate. Under the European formulas, 
several legislations must be simultaneously applied; if the 
parties have changed from a foreign nationality to two other 
foreign ones, this makes three, and with the law of the forum, 
four. No judge will like so much complication. All these 
rules may be questioned. Some of them seem practically su-
perfluous. The German provision was designed to prevent 
the husband, whose national law alone is decisive, from chang-
ing his nationality so as to force his new law on his wife, if 
the new law were more favorable for obtaining divorce. 285 
Similar are the purposes of enactments preserving the divorce 
law of a former domicil. But there is no sufficient reason to 
complicate things where the last common nationality or 
domicil of the parties is chosen to govern, just for the reason 
that it renders a change of status of one party harmless. 
As a whole, the contrast of opinions concerns the basic 
theory. Where the law of the domicil dominates ideas, it is 
283 r BEALE 473 § rro.5. The courts of New Jersey are consistent in requir-
ing that the two year period for desertion must have run after the deserting 
party became a resident of the state; see Berger v. Berger (1918) 89 N.J. Eq. 
430, 105 Atl. 496, and citations at 497· The other view was taken by two old 
decisions of New Hampshire, see r BEALE 474 n. 2; Batchelder v. Batchelder 
(1843) 14 N.H. 38o; Hopkins v. Hopkins (1857) 35 N. H. 474· 
284 Contra, RAAPE 3 8 8. 
285 Conversely, it seems that the husband is able to avoid a threatened divorce 
by changing to a more rigid law; LETZGUS, 145 Arch. Civ. Prax. 299· 
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likely that this law will be regarded as determining the ju-
dicial value of the facts occurring during its reign. The Euro-
pean rules descr~bed above are derived in an analogous way 
from the personal national law. On the contrary, the majority 
view in this country is manifestly conce!ved within the sphere 
of territorialism. 
While American courts, at least, are consistent ~n following 
the idea of a territorial law of the forum, some important 
European courts inaugurating a similar theory have rebelled 
against the current respect for the national law. We have 
mentioned above the leading case of Ferrari; the French 
Court of Cassation granted divorce to the wife who was Italian 
by marriage but had recovered French nationality. No new 
facts had arisen since the separation of the parties from bed 
and board, rendered before the wife's re-naturalization. If 
the French Court of Cassation granted the divorce upon the 
anterior facts because the action was based, not so much upon 
the material facts as upon the harm done by them to the con-
jugallife/86 the reasoning certainly is untenable; the different 
legislations determine precisely what kind of facts should be 
regarded as essentially disturbing the marital community.281 
However, in view of the fact that one of the most reliable 
courts in the world, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, followed the 
French example all the way, in the face of the express con-
trary legal provision,288 we must conceive that the application 
of the foreign law appears unbearable to judges. 
Hence, the European courts are coming back to where the 
English and the American courts have remained; the case 
where the plaintiff has changed to the domicil or nationality 
of the forum is the really important one. Of course, there is 
the evident danger of encouraging evasion of foreign laws, 
286 See supra n. z68. 
287 AUDINET, Note to Cass. (civ.) (Feb. s, 1929) S.1930.I.81.83; but cf. 
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 401, 
288 See supra n. 269. 
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and the French courts have been reproached on this ground, 
the more so since they had been extremely sensitive to foreign 
divorce "in fraud" of French law. English criticism of this 
system emphasizes that a husband can, by transferring his 
domicil to England, escape the indissolubility of marriage 
inherent in the law of his former domicil, and thus cause 
hardship to the wife and provoke legal difficulties, since the 
resulting decree, in all probability, will not be recognized in 
other countries involved.289 This case has not been covered 
by the Matrimonial Causes Act of I937· That Act only helps 
the wife to maintain the English home, but even for this it is 
not clear whether the English jurisdiction is exclusive. The 
majority of the American statutes have tried to define the 
jurisdiction of the courts by those various additional require-
ments which we have mentioned before; these clauses are 
complicated and not really effective, except where the mini-
mum residence is seriously upheld. 
The case where both parties change their personal law in 
favor of that of the forum, has always been felt as less shock-
ing than the circumvention of a divorce law by one of the 
spouses to the detriment of the other. Also the means of 
repression need not be necessarily the same. The German 
provision was intended to prevent the husband from arbitrarily 
changing his law, which was the governing law; but the Hague 
Convention avoided this peril by constituting the law of the 
last common national law as governing. Both cases, however, 
ought to be clearly envisaged in future discussions. 
VIII. CoNCLUSIONS 
Three systems are outstanding. The first, the American 
method of applying the lex fori to divorce suits with foreign 
elements, has revealed itself as being unique. In the wide 
domains of the British commonwealth of nations, and under 
~89 CHESHIRE 361. 
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the Montevideo and the Scandinavian Treaties, the litigation 
takes place at the actual or, in certain cases, the last matri-
monial domicil, so that the law of the forum is in harmony 
with the genuine domiciliary principle. The third main 
solution presented by the Continental European and the 
Chinese and Japanese legislations has been derived from the -
doctrine that the national law of the parties must be respected, 
although the domestic law has to be consulted at the same time. 
The courts, in these latter countries, are open to foreigners 
domiciled in the state and in many cases as well to nationals 
domiciled abroad. Nowhere, however, in these two systems 
do courts accept divorce suits at the domicil of the plaintiff 
alone and at the same time apply exclusively the local divorce 
statutes, even though the plaintiff is of foreign nationality. 
This is literally the rule in this country in the case of an alien 
petitioner. But the characteristic point of comparison is that 
where the plaintiff, an American citizen, has by his domicil 
therein become a citizen of the state, this state will assume 
jurisdiction and apply its own statute exclusively, irrespective 
of the past and present legal situation of the other spouse. 
We have seen that no learned doctrine is able to justify this 
principle. We have also alluded to some of the evils to which 
it leads. But we have begun our comparative study for the 
purpose of finding out whether the methods used abroad are 
preferable. 
The answer is, flatly, no. 
The system centered around the matrimonial domicil is 
of tempting simplicity and offers a splendid basis for inter-
national cooperation. However, the United States and the 
states of the nationality principle cannot be expected to re-
store the idyllic conditions permitting such unity of rules. 
Again, it has never been discussed whether it would not be 
feasible and advisable to _have a court, sitting at the domicil 
of one party, apply the law of the last common domicil in-
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stead of its own law, irrespective of the time when the cause 
occurred. 
The system of cumulative application of laws is so com-
plicated that the difficulties connected with it seem out of 
proportion to its usefulness. More fateful still, the precarious 
balance between the foreign and the domestic law achieved 
in the German Code and the Hague Convention has been 
finally destroyed by the judicial and legislative movement 
characterized by the Ferrari case. Such a fervent advocate 
of the nationality principle as Pillet immediately per-
ceived how incompatible with this principle it is to apply the 
domestic law to a foreign husband. This system is in ruins. A 
radical clearing up will be inevitable sooner or later. 
Thus, really, it cannot be contended that the methods used 
outside of this country are superior to the framework of the 
American law of this subject. 
Reforms can consist of a very simple development. The 
requirement of a minimum residence time is today the chief 
vehicle for correcting the scope of divorce jurisdiction. Uni-
form drafts have acknowledged its importance and insisted 
that the minimum should be of one or two years. This re-
quirement ought to be freed from the wild-grown tendrils 
with which it is surrounded, and it should be enforced with 
the utmost rigidity. This method demonstrated by a century's 
history as being suitable to exigencies of life in America, 
brings us nearer to the much spoken of "interest of the state" 
in the married status of its domiciliaries. In the twilight under 
which it is hard to distinguish a freshly acquired actual domicil 
from a fictitious one, that is, a non-domicil, a court that must 
predicate its jurisdiction upon the "interest of the state" so 
defined is in an unenviable position. In order to compete with 
another state in the task of adjudging any status of a person, 
the state should ascertain that the person belongs to the life 
of the state, regularly and definitively. Such competition can-
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not be helped. But at least evasion among the states, and 
evasion by one spouse at the cost of the other, would be 
eliminated. With a two years' residence, or even a period of 
one year, strictly observed, any intention of obtaining divorce 
under the conditions is immaterial. Besides, very few individ-
uals are able to change their local connections completely and 
to maintain their new center of private and business life during 
such a time merely to gain a divorce. Not every necessary im-
provement, of course, can be accomplished by such a measure 
alone; perhaps this is the reason why the uniform drafts have 
not appeared to attract sufficiently active support to accomplish 
a general reform. Where the parties are actually domiciled 
in two different states, the adequate method of dealing with 
the case is not to apply the statute of either state, but rather 
to apply that of the last common domicil. This suggestion . 
should be appreciated by future European legislators. 
Whether it could be brought into the structure of the Ameri-
can statutory systems might be a matter of discussion. 
More important, however, are reforms in the field of 
domestic divorce practice. They are prerequisites also of a 
better and sounder system of reciprocal recognition of foreign 
decrees. 
CHAPTER 12 
Recognition of Foreign Divorce1 
DIVERGENCES concerning recognition of foreign divorces are too great to allow any systematic com-parison. 2 A few texts, representing the three systems 
described in the preceding chapter, illustrate the situation: 
Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, § r 13. A 
state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dissolve 
the marriage of spouses of whom one is domiciled within the 
state and the other is domiciled outside the state, if 
(a) the spouse who is not domiciled in the state (i) has 
consented that the other spouse acquire a separate home; or 
(ii) by his or her misconduct has ceased to have the right to 
object to the acquisition of such separate home; or (iii) is 
personally subject to the jurisdiction of the state which grants 
the divorce; or 
(b) the state is the last state in which the spouses were 
domiciled together as man and wife. 
Treaty of Montevideo on International Civil Law (1940), 
Article rs. The law of the matrimonial domicil governs: 
(a) conjugal separation; (b) dissolubility of marriage; but 
recognition of the dissolubility shall not be obligatory upon 
the state where the marriage was solemnized, if the ground 
invoked for dissolution was divorce and if the local laws do 
not admit of that ground as such. In no case shall the celebra-
tion of a subsequent marriage, in accordance with the laws of 
another state, constitute the crime of bigamy. 
Article 59· Actions for annulment of marriage, divorce, or 
dissolution, and, in general, actions regarding all questions 
1 Comparative literature: LORENZEN, "The Enforcement of American Judg-
ments Abroad," 29 Yale L. J. (I919) I 88, 268; VREELAND, Validity of Foreign 
Divorces (1938); GUTTERIDGE, "Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Matrimonial 
Suits," I 9 Brit. Year Book Int. Law ( 19 3 8) I 9; READ, Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments in the Common Law Units of the British 
Commonwealth (I 938). 
2 See VREELAND, Validity of Foreign Divorces 319ff. 
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which affect the relations of spouses, shall be instituted before 
the judges of the matrimonial domicil. ... 
German Code of Civil Procedure, § 328. Recognition of 
the judgment of a foreign court is excluded: 
I. If the courts of the state to which the foreign court 
belongs are not competent, according to the German laws; 
2. If the unsuccessful defendant is a German and has not 
defended the proceeding, provided that summons initiating 
the proceeding has been served on him neither personally 
within the state of the court of suit nor by means of German 
judicial assistance; 
3· If the judgment, to the detriment of a German party, 
disagrees with the provisions of article 13, par. r, 3 or articles 
I 7, I 8, 22 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code, ... 
4· If recognition of the judgment would violate morals or 
the purpose of a German law; 
5. If reciprocity is not guaranteed .... 
I. INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS 8 
I. England 4 
A foreign final decree of divorce is recognized by English 
courts, if ( 1) it is rendered by the court of any other country, 
which is competent according to its own lex fori/ and (2) if 
(a) the husband was domiciled in the English sense in that 
country 6 at the time of the commencement of the suit for 
divorce 7 or (b) if the decree would be recognized by the 
court of the husband's domicil. 8 
3 With respect to countries not considered here, see: 
For Switzerland, GAUTSCHI, "Die Anerkennung von ausHi.ndischen Ehe-
scheidungsurteilen," SJZ. I9z6, I. 
For Italy: SERENI, "Legal Problems of Divorce in Italy," z8 Iowa L. Rev. 
(I943) z86, Z9I• 
4 FALCONBRIDGE, "Recognition of Foreign Divorces," [I9J2] 4 D. L. R. 39; 
FoSTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," I6 Brit. Year 
Book Int. Law (I935) 89; ELKIN, Clunet I938, 98; CHESHIRE 36I. 
5 Bater v. Bater [I9o6] P. zo9. 
6 Harvey v. Farnie [I88o] 5 P. D. 153, [I8h-I883] 8 App. Cass. 43; Le 
Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [I895] zo App. Cas. 517; Lankester v. Lankester 
[19z5] P. Il4; Simons v. Simons [I939] I K. B. 490 (Massachusetts decree). 
7 Wilson v. Wilson (I87z) [I869-I87z] L. R. z P. & D. 435· 
8 Armitage v. Att. Gen. [I9o6] P. I35 (divorce decree in South Dakota 
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Illustrations: (a) An English married couple went to live 
in Detroit, Michigan; the wife returned to England; by agree-
ment with her, the husband brought action for divorce and ob-
tained a decree by default in the Wayne County Court. The 
High Court of England presumed that both spouses were 
domiciled in Detroit, as the husband certainly was.9 There-
fore, recognizing the Michigan divorce, the High Court dis-
missed an action of the wife for divorce.10 
(b) A husband, resident in Michigan according to Ameri-
can conceptions but domiciled in Canada according to British 
law, obtained a divorce decree in Michigan. The decree was 
not recognized in Canada 11 and therefore not in England 
either. 
English courts are known, however, by courtesy to recog-
nize the finding of domicil by trustworthy foreign courts. 12 
The recent change of legislation (Matrimonial Causes Act 
of 1937) by which a deserted wife may institute suit at the 
last marital domicil would seem to bring about recognition of 
foreign jurisdiction under analogous circumstances; 13 no 
authorities are yet known. 
would be recognized in New York, where the husband was domiciled; hence 
recognized in England). Cass v. Cass (I9Io) I02 L. T. R. 397, Clunet I9Io, 
1259 (South Dakota decree not recognized in Massachusetts, where husband 
was domiciled; hence recognition denied in England) • 
9 Crowe v. Crowe (I937) I57 L. T. R. 557, [I937] 2 All E. R. 723, Clunet 
I938, 97; similarly, Leigh v. Leigh [I937] I D. L. R. 773 (if nothing is 
proved, the court will presume that. the foreign tribunal (again a Detroit court) 
had jurisdiction over the parties by reason of domicil and that the domicil was 
properly and validly established) . 
1° Cf. the reasoning of FALCONBRIDGE in [I932] 4 D. L. R. 41, supra n. 4, 
before the Amendment Act of I 9 3 7. 
11 Rex v. Woods (I903) 6 Ont. L. R. 4I; similarly, Green v. Green [I893] 
P. 89 (Pennsylvania decree). 
12 Information obtained in a Swiss divorce case; see WYLER, SJZ. (I933-34) 
199· 
13 The contrary opinion is expressed by MAGDALENE SCHOCH in 5 Giur. Comp. 
DIP. JOO. 
Before the Act of I937, recognition in England and throughout the British 
Dominions of a divorce rendered in New Zealand under the provision enabling 
a deserted wife to sue at the last matrimonial domicil was anticipated by Mr. 
Justice Denniston in Poingdestre v. Poingdestre (I909) 28 N. Z. L. R. 6o4, 
II G. L. R. 585, but doubted in the case of a Victoria decree by Chief Justice 
Irvine in Chia v_. Chia [I92x] V. L. R. s66. See READ, Recognition and En-
forcement 229, who shared the doubts. 
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE 465 
The English. rule is so exclusively influenced by juris-
dictional considerations that the reasons upon which a foreign 
court bases its decree are immaterial. The grounds of the for-
eign decree need not be in accord with the grounds for divorce 
established in English matrimonial law, 14 provided, of course, 
the decree does not violate good morals. 
2. The United States 15 
While recognition of decrees of foreign countries attracts 
scant attention, recognition of divorces rendered in sister states 
is one of the most discussed subjects of American law. The 
formidable complications ensuing from conflicting social 
policies and constitutional controversies have not been met 
with consistent and purposive judicial methods, in part due 
to the limited federal control exercised over the subject matter 
by the Supreme Court under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
One school of thought, indeed, has seemed to prefer cautious 
case construction to any rules. However, in recent decades be-
fore Williams v. North Carolina 16 re'vived the conflict of 
opinions, it was prevailingly assumed that the recognition 
due under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal 
Constitution depended upon the following requirements: 
(a) Under that Clause as construed by the Supreme Court, 
it was assumed that a state had the duty to recognize a divorce 
pronounced in a sister state X: 
(i) When both parties were domiciled in X; 17 
(ii) (Probably) when the defendant was domiciled in X; 
(iii) When the plaintiff was domiciled in the state and, in 
addition, one of the following three conditions was 
fulfilled, viz., that: 
14 Harvey v. Farnie [I88o] 5 P. D. 153, cited supra n. 6; Pemberton v. 
Hughes [1899] I Ch. 78!; Bater v. Bater [1906] P. Z09, cited supra n. 5; 
Mezger v. Mezger [1937] P. 19, [1936] 3 All E. R. 130. 
15 Selected older literature is listed by 1 BEALE 467 n. 3; GooDRICH 345 n. 
29. For recent literature see supra p. 390, n. u. 
16 Williams et al. v. North Carolina (194z) 317 U.S. z87, 143 A. L. R. 1 i73. 
17 Restatement§ uo; Haddock v. Haddock (19o6) 201 U.S. s6z at 570. 
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X is the state where the parties lived together for the last 
time before they separated 18 or 
The defendant has been personally served with process or 
voluntarily appeared in X 19 or 
(In a disputed opinion) the defendant has caused the parties 
to be separated by his or her marital misconduct.20 
Inversely, no state, in the prevailing opinion, was obligated 
to recognize a divorce pronounced by a sister state, if the 
plaintiff alone was domiciled in the divorce state and none of 
the three additional facts also appeared, particularly when the 
court had assumed jurisdiction only on the ground of con-
structive service of process on the defendant. 21 According to 
the Restatement, 22 such a divorce would be void even in the 
state where it was rendered; this view, however, has been 
generally disapproved.23 
Without the obligation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
the majority of the states also recognize a divorce granted a 
resident plaintiff as valid when the defendant has been served 
by publication only.24 A small minority, however, have re-
fused recognition either generally or when, at the time of the 
decree, the defendant was domiciled within the forum of 
recognition or in a third state which did not recognize the 
divorce.2 :> 
18 Atherton v. Atherton (r9or) r8r U.S. rss; Thompson v. Thompson 
(1913) 2.26 U.S. 551; Crimm v. Crimm (192.4) zrr Ala. 13, 99 So. 301. 
19 Cheever v. Wilson (r87o) 9 Wall. ro8, 19 L. Ed. 604; for state cases, see 
I BEALE 506 n. 7• 
20 Ditson v. Ditson (r856) 4 R.I. 87; "generally accepted as law in the 
United States," }ACOBS, Cases and Other Materials on Domestic Relations (ed. 
z, I 939) 354 n. 2.. 
21 Haddock v. Haddock (I9o6) 2.01 U.S. 562.. 
22 Restatement § r I 3 comment g. 
23 BINGHAM, "The American Law Institute vs. the Supreme Court," z I Cor-
nell L. Q. (1936) 3.93· At present, however, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his 
concurring vote in the Williams case postulates equal treatment of divorce de-
crees in all jurisdictions. 
24 Miller v. Miller ( I92.5) 2.00 Iowa I I 93, zo6 N. W. 2.62.. 
25 New York, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and others which 
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In principle, a divorce rendered in a state in which neither 
of the parties was domiciled is not recognized, irrespective of 
whether the defendant was personally served or put in an 
appearance. 26 This is fundamental. 
(b) This set of rules has been modified by the Williams 
case to an extent still discussed. To an unbiased mind, however, 
the impression made upon most practical lawyers 21 appears 
right; the decision eliminates the alternative requirements 
described under (iii) above altogether, so as to hold it un-
qualifiedly sufficient that the decree be rendered at the domicil 
of the plaintiff. This construction of the case is supported by 
the facts of the twin cases decided, as the Nevada court had 
taken jurisdiction in the one case on service by publication and 
in the other by personal service beyond the jurisdiction: of the 
court. The express declaration of the Supreme Court that 
Haddock v. Haddock is overruled, therefore, should not be 
taken as an obiter dictum or a non-committal announcement 
of a future policy. Not even wrongful desertion of the wife 
by the husband, according to the majority of the Justices, is 
relevant to the jurisdictional question whether the new domicil 
of the husband suffices for the purpose of divorce. A divorce 
pronounced in the state of the plaintiff's domicil ought to be 
recognized in any state including that of the defendant's 
domicil or that of the former matrimonial domicil. Whatever 
criticism may be aroused, it may be justifiably claimed that 
the decision frees courts and lawyers from "hopeless refine-
ments",28 as well as from many extremely difficult fact find-
are variously listed by the writers; cf., for instance JACOBS, "Attack on Decrees 
of Divorce," 34 Mich. L. Rev. (1936) 749, 756 n. 38; VREELAND J2.7, 3z8; 
GooDRICH 348, n. 40. 
26 Bell v. Bell (1901) 181 U.S. 175; Andrews v. Andrews (1903) 188 U.S. 
14; Jardine v. Jardine (1937) Z91 Ill. App. I5Z, 9 N. E. (:zd) 645; Voorhis 
v. Voorhis (1936) 184 La. 406, r66 So. 121; Restatement§ 111. 
27 See in particular the Annotation in 143 A. L. R. 1294ff., as against the 
subtle polemics by BINGHAM, "Song of Sixpence," z9 Cornell L. Q. ( 1943) 1. 
28 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the Williams case, supra 
n. 161 at 307. 
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ings,29 and narrows considerably the number of cases where 
the validity of the divorce and of a remarriage is subject to 
contrary holding in different states. 
An unfortunate feature of the case is due to the fact that 
the majority of the Supreme Court, for certain technical rea-
sons which are approved by learned critics,S0 failed to enter 
into a discussion of the question whether the two plaintiffs, 
Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix, actually were domiciled in 
Reno. The court in Reno established its jurisdiction on their 
residence, during the six weeks prescribed, in the "Alamo Auto 
Court" of Reno. The very fact that awakened the indignation 
of the courts in North Carolina, to which the victorious parties 
brazenly returned immediately as newly married husband and 
wife, remained outside of the decision. Yet the doctrine that 
divorce judgments must be supported at least by bona fide 
domicil of one of the parties within the state of judgment 
should not be regarded as weakened, and it is also to be hoped 
that re-examination by the court of recognition of the facts 
evidencing such domicil will not be further impeded. 
(c) Either under the doctrine of equitable estoppel or 
under the doctrine regarding the invoking of jurisdiction, 
several courts, particularly those of New York,31 have de-
veloped a bar to the impeachment of an invalid divorce. A 
person who has been an active party to a divorce suit or a 
person who has in some way profited from a divorce, for in-
stance by remarrying, is not allowed to allege the invalidity 
of the divorce. This doctrine results in consequences which ap-
proach recognition of decrees that would otherwise have been 
29 Note, I 43 A. L. R. I 296ff. 
30 BINGHAM, 29 Cornell L. Q. (I943), supra n. 23, at 3: "few lawyers will 
disagree." But see the dissenting vote in the Williams. case, supra n. I 6, by 
Mr. Justice Jackson, at p. 320 under "III, Lack of domicile." 
31 In re Ellis' Estate (I 893) 55 Minn. 40I, 4I2, 4I 3, 56 N. w. I056, 1059> 
I06o; Kelsey v. Kelsey (I922) I97 N.Y. Supp. 37I 1 aff'd 237 N.Y. 5201 I43 
N. E. 726; Krause v. Krause (I94o) 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N. E. (2d) 29o; Ma-
loney v. Maloney (I94o) 22 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 334· Restatement§ II2. 
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held void or voidable. But the application of the doctrine is 
confused and uncertain. 32 
(d) Another limitation on the right to impeach a foreign 
divorce decree involves the review of jurisdictional facts. On 
general principles, the court where recognition is sought 
would be free to reopen the question whether the plaintiff 
was domiciled within the state .of judgment or whether the 
defendant unjustifiedly deserted the plaintiff, as facts upon 
which the jurisdiction for granting divorce was based. A recent 
decision of the United States Supreme Court, however, seems 
to indicate that the forum is bound to give full faith and credit 
to the finding of the divorce court when the defendant put in 
a special appearance and litigated the question of domicil or 
desertion. 33 · 
Most influential is the tendency of courts, disturbed by the 
inconsistent treatment of divorces in the different states, to 
cover up defects in the jurisdictional justification of divorce 
decrees or, in the apt description by Lorenzen, "to close their 
eyes to the actualities of the situation and to allow juries to 
find the existence of a bona fide domicile in the state of divorce 
on technical grounds." 34 What palpably constitutes a tempo-
rary stay of a plaintiff ready to return to his real home im-
mediately upon rendition of the decree, is dissembled as a 
domicil replacing it for good, first by the divorce forum and 
subsequently by that of recognition. 
32 Cf; JACOBS, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 Mich. L. Rev. (1936) 
749, 771; Note, 40 Col. L. Rev. (1940) 1255 and literature cited therein; Note, 
122 A. L. R. (1939) 1321. Cf. the caveat in Restatement§ II2. 
33 Davisv. Davis (1938) 305 U.S. 32; Case note, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (1939) 
290; Note, 3 U. of Detroit L. J. (1939) 32; Note, n8 A. L. R. (1931) 1524; 
cf. other applications of the theory: Stoll v. Gottlieb (1938) 305 U. S. 165; 
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank (1940) 308 U. S. 371, 
rehearing denied (1940) 309 U. S. 695. See also FARRIER, "Full Faith and 
Credit of Adjudication of Jurisdictional Facts," 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (1935) 
552; and Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. (1940) 652. 
34 LoRENZEN, "Haddock v. Haddock Overruled," 52 Yale L. J. (1943) 341, 
348, 352, 353· 
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(e) A divorce rendered in a foreign country is, of course, 
not covered by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Neverthe-
less, a state will ordinarily recognize such a divorce under the 
same circumstances that it gives credit to a sister state's de-
cree.35 Also the method followed in ascertaining the domicil 
of the divorced party ordinarily is that customary in Ameri-
can courts rather than determination according to the view 
of the foreign divorce court. 36 Yet it has been decided in agree-
ment with the foreign law whether a married woman sh~es 
the domicil of her husband. 37 Differences from the treatment 
of American decrees are most likely to occur in the respect 
that the place of domicil is more easily to be found situated 
in an American state than in a foreign country. 38 But in Gould 
v. Gould, the Court of Appeals of New York, although stating 
that the domicil of the parties had remained in New York, 
held their bona fide residence in France sufficient for recog-
nition of the French decree, in deviation from the doctrine of 
Andrews v. Andrews; 39 it was, however, a special case. Since 
both parties had appeared in the French suit and the decision 
was based on New York law, the court held that "under the 
circumstances of this case, the policy of this state is not offended 
by the recognition." 40 
(f) Judicial separation, granted at the matrimonial 
domicil, has been held by the United States Supreme Court 
35 For recent cases see Note, I 43 A. L. R. at I 3 I 3; cf. HACKWORTH, z Digest 
of International Law (I94I) 38z s. I68. 
36 RG. (Nov. ZI, I9z9) u6 RGZ. 353, JW. I93o, I309 no. I4 (the Ger-
man court, in an Iowa case, respects whatever method is followed in the United 
States). 
37 Torlonia v. Torlonia (I9zo) 108 Conn. z9z, I4Z Atl. 843. 
38 See supra p. 140, n. I 57· 
39 I88 U.S. I4 • 
.w (I9Z3) Z35 N.Y. I4, z9, 138 N. E. 490, 494· STUMBERG z8r n. 8z thinks 
estoppel was the ground of the decision. In the discussion of the American Law 
Institute, 4 Proceedings, Appendix (I9Z6) 348, 354 Judge Page observed that 
the matrimonial domicil was in Paris; Professor Beale declared himself ex-
tremely well satisfied by this statement. The court seems to have affirmed the 
domicil in New York for reasons lying outside of the case. 
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to be entitled to recognition under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.41 
More generally, it has been concluded from the cases that 
whenever a decree for judicial separation is granted under cir-
cumstances such as would have supported jurisdiction for 
absolute divorce in the sense of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, recognition cannot be withheld. 42 
Traditionally, however, where statutes have requirements 
for judicial separation different from those for dissolution of 
marriage, separation may be granted on the basis of personal 
jurisdiction, residence of both parties being sufficient. This, it 
is understood, only "protects the spouse against certain acts 
of the other spouse while they are within the state," 43 with-
out extraterritorial effect. 44 
3· France4'5 
France has no written law on the recognition of foreign 
divorce decrees, but the practice has developed, in addition ' 
to the rules concerning foreign judgments in general, certain 
peculiarities as regards foreign judgments affecting status and 
capacity of individuals.46 It seems, however, that a sharp 
distinction is to be made between divorces in which at least 
41 Thompson v. Thompson (I913) 226 u.s. 55I; cf. GOODRICH 353 n. 59· 
Note, 33 Yale L. J. (I924) 426. 
42 Restatement §.I I4 comment b; STUMBERG 292; GooDRICH 354 n. 6r. In 
the cases concerning extraterritorial effect of divorce decrees, a state may refuse 
to give effect to a limited divorce, while it would recognize a decree of absolute 
divorce, Pettis v. Pettis (I9I7) 9I Conn. 6o8, IOI Atl. I3· 
43 Restatement § I I 4 comment a. 
44 There is no authority, GooDRICH 352, 353· 
45 See DEGAND, 5 Repert. 559 and (with reference to the almost identical Bel-
gian law) PouLLET, nos. soo-504; Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ. Divorce, nos. 
I 76o, I 761. A report was issued by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and reproduced in the decision of the German RG. (March I 9, I 9 3 6) I 50 RGZ. 
374, Clunet I939, I22. 
46 The subject matter of the practice is extended by LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 
360 no. 3IO to all judgments which modify a legal situation (Gestaltungsurteile 
in the German doctrine). 
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one party is of French nationality and those in which both are 
foreigners. 
(a) If both spouses are of foreign nationality, foreign di-
vorce decrees, like other foreign judgments creating or modi-
fying status and capacity, are held effective without exequatur 
by the French courts for purposes not requiring physical ex-
ecution on property or coercion of persons. 47 
Neither the conditions nor the scope of this rule are settled, 
with respect to which the courts seem to enjoy almost absolute 
discretion. One condition certainly is that the decree conform 
to the requirements of both judicial jurisdiction and choice of 
law by the national law or laws of the parties, in respect to 
which points at least a few cases have been re-examined by 
French courts. 48 Often, public policy may intervene, especially 
when a fair opportunity for defense appears to have been 
lacking.49 
Without being made executory by exequatur, a foreign di-
vorce decree has the effect of forming a proper basis for re-
marriage before a civil official 50 and has been held in a much 
discussed decision to mark the beginning of the three months 
during which a divorced wife under French law 51 must claim, 
47 The principle initiated by the Court of Cassation in 186o (infra n. so) 
was confirmed and formulated in Cass. (civ.) (May 9> 1900) S.190l.I.185; 
App. Aix (July 9, 1903) D. 1905.2·73, S.19o6.2.257; cf. WEISS, 6 Traite 4rfi.; 
and with final clarifications in Cass. (req.) (March 3, 1930) S.1930.1.377; cf. 
NIBOYET, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 479· Occasionally, it is true, exequatur is asked 
and granted without apparent necessity; see App. Agen (July 29, 1936) Revue 
Crit. 1937, 721 and the Note ibid. (annulment in Chile). 
48 Cass. (civ.) (May 9, 19oo) S.x9ox.r.r85; Trib. civ. Seine (March 16, 
1935) Revue 1936, 519 (the Supreme Council of the Armenian Church in 
Constantinople no longer had divorce jurisdiction). 
49 Cass. (civ.) (May 9, 19oo) S.x 9or.x.x 85; Trib. civ. Seine (June 29, 1938) 
Clunet 1939, 61 (rejecting a decree of Cuernavaca, Mexico). Cf. App. Aix 
(March 27, r89o) and Cass. (civ.) (Oct. zs, 1892.) S.r893·1·505; Cour Paris 
(July 2, 1934) Revue Crit. 1936, soo (recognizing a decree of the Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island granted by default against the husband who was notified 
of the decree and failed to appeal; the note finds this holding "too absolute"). 
5° Cass. (civ.) (Feb. :z8, 1 86o) S.r 86o.r.21o. The writers base the custody 
of children on the foreign divorce decree. 
51 C. C, art. 1463. 
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or otherwise lose, any participation in marital community 
property. 52 These decisions are understood to express the idea 
that a final foreign divorce decree of foreigners is assimilated 
to a French decree. A foreign judicial separation, if recog-
nized, may be converted into divorce.'53 
Application for exequatur, however, is necessary not only 
if execution is sought, as for alimentary rights or rights of 
restitution, but also if, in litigation between the spouses, one 
of them denies the validity of the divorce. In a case where 
divorce had been granted in the United States at the instance 
of the husband, the wife sued for divorce again in France; 
the mere fact that she challenged the American decree per-
suaded the Court of Cassation to prevent recognition other-
wise than by means of exequatur proceedings. 54 Further, the 
regular record of divorce at the registry of civil status, es-
sential for terminating marital liability of spouses against third 
persons, cannot be obtained without exequatur. 55 
This system has been adopted in several countries ·56 but 
has been criticized by French 57 as well as by Italian writers,58 
52 Cass. (req.) (March 31 1930) S.t930.1.377 cited supra n. 47· 
53 Cass. (civ.) (July 6, 1922) D.I922.1.I37, 8.1923.1.5; Trib. dep. Alpes-
Maritimes (Oct. 25, 1927) Revue 1928, 328. 
54 Cass. (req.) (Nov. II, 1908) Revue I909, 227, Clunet I9091 753, 
S.I909.I.572· 
55 Trib. civ. Seine (May I9 1 I926) La Loi, Dec. 30, 1927. Cf., on the effect 
of omission of transcription, Trib. civ. Seine (May 271 I938) Nouv. Revue 
1938, 326. Marginal entry in the register is allowed but has informational, not 
legal, effect. 
56 See, for instance, for Belgium cases cited in Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ. 
(supra n. 45). . 
For Brazil: App. Civ. Rio de Janeiro (Dec. 91 1922 and April 15, I926) no. 
5405, 81 Revista Dir. Civ. (1926) 174ff.; App. Civ. Rio de Janeiro (Oct. 25, 
1927) no. 2.98o, 86 Revista Dir. Civ. (1927) 389. The problem is discussed, 
however, see J. M. DE CARVALHO SANTos, 9 Codigo .de Processo Civil Inter-
pretado (194I) 21ff.; I. BoRGES DARosA, 4 Processo Civile Comercial Brasi-
leiro (1941) 328ff.; JoA.o M. CARNEIRO LACERDO, 4 Codigo de Processo Civil 
Brasileiro (I941) 373ff. 
57 BAR TIN, I Principes § I90; NIBOYET 952ff. nos. 850-852; PERROUD, 5 
Repert. 384 nos. I471 I48. 
58 ANZILOTTI, I Rivista (1906) 227; 5 i/JiJ. (19Io) IJI; see further cita-
tions in MoRELLI, Dir. Proc. Civ. Int. 289 n. I. 
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who have influenced their courts to the extent that, according 
to the opinion now prevailing in Italy, a foreign judgment 
never has binding effect unless it has been rendered executory 
by proceedings of delibazione. 59 Similarly, a Brazilian tradition 
requires foreign judgments declaratory of personal status to 
be submitted to "homolo gafao" (confirmation). 60 
(b) In cases where a French national is a party, a decree of 
exequatur seems to be indispensable for all purposes, 61 the 
question whether a person is a French national being again re-
served to the French courts. 62 Such a decree must be sought in 
a special proceeding in the same way and under the same con-
ditions as in all cases of foreign judgments. Just what is the 
subject matter of this proceeding is highly controversial, but 
there is no doubt that, despite all contrary theories, the courts 
reserve to themselves the right to unlimited re-examination of 
every point of procedure and substantive law and even of the 
facts of the case, 63 although they may not exercise this control 
completely in every case. Ordinarily, they will investigate 
whether the divorce was based on a ground acknowledged by 
the French municipal law. 64 Where, for instance, a Swiss court 
pronounced divorce on the ground of disruption of marriage 
(C.C. art. 142), the decree was not recognized, the cause not 
59 Italian C. Civ. Proc. art. 94 I (as amended in I 9 I 9). In most of its recent 
bilateral treaties, however, Italy ,has required an action for executory confirma-
tion only for the purpose of forcible execution; see PERASSI in I7 Rivista (I925) 
I 09; UDJNA, Elementi 95· Thus, in relation to Switzerland, no exequatur is re-
quired; see Note of the Italian Government to the Swiss Government, BBl. 
I938, II 499 no. 8. 
60 Sup. Trib. Fed. (July 24, I92o) no. 7I4 24 Revista Sup. Trib. (I92o) 
3 56; BEVILAQUA 446. 
61 Circular letter by the State's attorney of Paris, July 25, I887, Clunet I892, 
644. Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ., Divorce no. r76o. Exceptions advanced by 
AuDINET, r I Recueil I 926 I 240 n. 4, have been very rare. 
62 App. Aix (June 4, I912) S.I913.2.92; cf. Trib. civ. Seine (Referes) 
(Nov. 9, I92o) Revue I92r, 526. . 
63 GLASSON et TrssrER, 4 Traite de Procedure Civile (ed. 3, 1932) nos. Ior5, 
I o I 6 and 5 ibid. Sup pl. no. I o I 5 bis. 
64 This includes at present the statutory provision of I 941 (amending C. C. 
art. 233) that no marriage can be divorced in its first three years; see }ACOBS, 
"Problems of Divorce in France," 2 8 Iowa L. Rev. (I 943) 2 8 6 at 3 I r. 
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being existent under French law.65 But it has rather astonished 
the commentators that the Court of Appeals of Paris, in an 
exclusively foreign case involving an Argentine husband and 
his American wife, refused exequatur to a divorce decree of 
the Court of Monaco on the ground that the husband had in 
fact never resided in Europe, although both parties had been 
fully represented in the suit·and only the parents of the hus-
band wanted to prevent recognition of the divorce in order to 
keep their son from concluding another marriage. 66 French 
courts always feel repugnance to collusive influence on judicial 
acts. 
4· Germany 67 
The statutory provisions laid down in section 328 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure concern the conditions of both recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign judgments in general. This 
regulation is complete and the most elaborate of all, but ques-
tionable in form and substance; it also has a peculiar disad-
vantage in application to divorce, since its principles were 
evolved without regard to the rules of conflict of laws contained 
in EG., article I 7· Questions governed by both sets of rules, 
which are incongruous and over lap, have been difficult to settle. 
The final result, however, may be briefly presented as follows: 
(a) Where both parties are nationals of the country of di-
vorce, a final divorce decree is almost always granted recogni-
tion and enforcement. 68 There is, of course, one self-evident 
65 Trib. civ. Seine (June 10, I 936) D. H. I936. 420. 
66 Cour Paris (March 24, I9Jo) Revue 1930, 272 criticized by NIBOYET, 
ibid. In the decision of Cass. (req.) (Nov. II, I9o8) S.I909.1.572, supra n. 
54, a divorce decree of Pensacola, Florida, was declared ineffective because the 
husband was found to have obtained the decree by declaring under oath false 
facts supporting jurisdiction. 
67 STEIN-JONAS, I ZPO. § 328 II; RAAPE 4I8-424; WIERUSZOWSKI in 4 
Leske-Loewenfeld I 93· 
68 RG. (Feb. 28, I938) JW. I938, I5I8; see also RG. (Jan. 5, 1925) 109 
RGZ. 383, JW. 1925, 765, Clunet I926, 173 (Czechoslovakian decree); KG. 
(Dec. 2I, I935) JW. I936, 2466, Nouv. Revue 1937, 98 {Hungarian decree 
upon a ground of alleged collusion of the parties). The same point of view was 
observed in Austria, see WALKER 729, 730. 
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condition-the decree must not violate German public policy 
(C. Civ. Proc. § 328, par. 4)-but seldom can the matter be 
connected with German interests closely enough to affect 
them. 69 
For a time it was doubtful whether recognition was to be 
extended to the case where the husband is a domiciliary of 
Germany. Now the prevailing opinion is in the affirmative. 70 
(b) According to the system of the procedural code, the 
solution stated above should also govern the case where both 
parties are of foreign nationality but have obtained their di-
vorce in a third country. But, under the principle of nationality 
adopted in the German conflicts rules, a divorce may not be 
recognized unless it agrees with the law of the national country 
of the husband. The second view prevails in the recent liter-
ature. In summary, a decree concerning two foreigners is 
certain to be recognized if it is rendered at the marital domicil 
and recognized by the husband's national country.71 
(c) Where one party is of German nationality, the divorce 
decrees of many countries are not recognized because reciproc-
69 RAAPE 419. A divorce decree validly rendered by the national court of 
the spouses by default was recognized, although not in conformance with Ger-
man divorce procedure, LG. Dresden (Oct. 16, 1935) JW. 1935, 3493· The 
OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 1, 1935) JW. 1935, 3488 held a Mexican decree void 
because obtained in a shocking manner, but this decision has been criticized, 
since the husband was an American citizen domiciled in New Jersey and the 
wife had lost her German nationality by her marriage, JONAS, JW. 1936, 283; 
LoRENZ, 6 Giur. Camp. DIP. 326. The decree would not have been recognized 
in New Jersey, however, if properly attacked, and could be disregarded for this 
reasol) in Germany. Jonas thought that as the husband had remarried in New 
Jersey the divorce was recognized there. 
70 If the husband is domiciled in Germany, either spouse may sue at his domi-
cil, C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. r. Where jurisdiction is granted in Germany, there 
is no recognition without reciprocity, C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. 2. Hence, even 
with respect to foreigners recognition seems to be excluded in most cases, M. 
WoLFF, IPR. 83. This, however, makes no sense; see NussBAUM, D. IPR. 441; 
RAAPE 418 and 2 Dt. IPR. r86; BERGMANN, StAZ. 1935, 104; JoNAS, JW. 
1934, 2555; MASSFELLER, StAZ. 1937, :u6. 
71 1 FRANKENSTEIN 345ff.; RAAPE 4:u; JONAS, JW. 1934, 2555 and ibid. 
1936, 283; MASSFELLER, StAZ. 1937, 227; contra: LEWALD 128 no. 174; 
KIPP-WOLFF, Familienrecht (1928) 148 § 39 n. 47 and IPR. 83; WIERUS-
ZOWSKI in 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 3 8 and ibid. 76. 
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ityof recognition is not guaranteed (C. Civ. Proc. § 328, par. 2, 
cf. § 6o6, par. 2 and the Law on Divorce of Jan. 24, 1935, art. 
2, par. 2 ). The list of countries guaranteeing reciprocity, how-
ever, is not altogether confined to those countries that have con-
cluded treaties on recognition with Germany or to those rec-
ognizing all German judgments; it suffices that German di-
vorce decrees are regularly recognized. Therefore, the list has 
been believed to be rather comprehensive. 72 
However, relations with Great Britain and the United States 
in particular are in doubt. Leading authorities declare that in 
neither country is there any certainty of recognition because 
courts in common law countries are prepared to re-examine the 
jurisdiction of the individual German tribunal and that English 
courts in particular may inquire into the question of fraud. 73 
On the contrary, as a practical matter, one may presume that, 
in most courts of the United States, German divorce decrees 
rendered at the domicil of one party are enforced with greater 
probability of excluding defenses than in Germany.74 
Again, even divorces rendered in one of the countries with 
which reciprocal recognition is assumed to exist, such as Den-
mark, Norway, Rumania (old territory), or the Netherlands, 
must comply with a number of other requirements. Recogni-
tion is denied, if the husband is domiciled in Germany; 75 or 
if the wife is a German national and domiciled in Germany; 76 
or if the losing defendant is a German national and in the 
72 See especially WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 8 8-9 2; and for in-
stance AG. Hannover (Oct. 26, 193I) IPRspr. I9J2, no. 73 (Uruguay); KG. 
(Dec. I 9, I 9 32) ibid., no. 7 4 (Yugoslavia) . 
73 STEIN-}ONAS, 2 ZPO. § 328 (ed. I6, I938) nos. no, I32; RAAPE, 2 D. 
IPR. I 8 5 considers the position of England and Sweden not clear. 
74 See FELLER, "Die Vollstreckbarkeit von Urteilen amerikanischer Gerichte 
in Deutschland," JW. I93I, Iu; Ruo. MUELLER, "Die Anerkennung von 
Urteilen, Beschliissen und Anordnungen auslandischer Gerichte und von aus-
Hindischen Schiedsspriichen im Recht der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika," 
5 Z.ausl.PR. (I93I) 905 (on divorce) 927; KG. (May 3, I935) JW. I935> 
27 so (as to Illinois). 
75 C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I; cf. ibid. § 6o6 par. I. 
76 C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. 2 and Law on Divorce of Jan. 24, I9JS, art. 2. 
DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 
suit was not served personally through the German author-
ities; 77 or if divorce was granted on a ground unknown to 
German law and without stating facts which constitute a suf-
ficient ground for divorce under German law; 78 or if di-
vorce was denied to the disadvantage of a German party, while 
it should have been granted according to German law; 79 
and finally also, if the decree is at variance with German pub-
lic policy. In the case of German parties, this last point includes 
numerous possibilities, most of which are covered by the other 
conditions of recognition.80 In fact, not often is a foreign di-
vorce concerning a German subject recognized except by virtue 
of some international treaty. 
5· Soviet Union 
In consequence of the principle that either spouse is able 
to terminate the marriage at his pleasure, it is presumed in 
Soviet Russia that any act of an authority in other countries 
designed to dissolve a marriage of Soviet citizens is supported 
by the intention of at least one party and therefore valid as a 
nonregistered divorce. A decree of the People's Commissary 
of Justice of July 6, 1923,81 states that every dissolution of 
marriage obtained in a foreign country according to the local 
laws will be recognized in the U.S.S.R., irrespective of where 
and when the dissolved marriage was celebrated, unless the 
marriage of a Soviet citizen has been dissolved or annulled on 
, formal grounds contrary to the will of both spouses. 82 No 
77 C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I no. 2; RG. (June I5, I936) JW. 1936, 2456. 
78 C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I no. 3; cf. EG. art. I7 par. 4· 
79 Same provision as supra n. 78. 
80 RAAPE 4IO, 
81 Sec. 2 of the Decree, which in German translation was reproduced and an-
alyzed together with the Circular letter of the People's Commissary of the Inte-
rior of June 2, I9 2 I, no. I9 and the Decree of the Commissary of Justice of 
Feb. 2I, I927, by H. FREUND, Das Zivilrecht in der Sowjetunion (I927) I, in 
4 Die Zivilgesetze der Gegenwart 7I; H. FREUND, Das Zivilrecht Sowjetruss-
lands (I924) 69; Makarov, Precis 399; see also German RG. (June 24, 1927) 
IPRspr. I926-27, no. 70; Swiss BG. (June I5, I928) 54 BGE II 225, 228, 231. 
82 On the limitation expressed in the last sentence, see German RG. (April 4, 
I928) I2I RGZ. 24, 27. 
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provision has been held necessary in the case where only one 
party is of Soviet nationality. 83 
6. The Hague Convention on Divorce 
By the Hague Conv~ntion on Divorce, article 7, the mem-
ber states agree to recognize a divorce or separation decreed by 
a court competent according to the Convention, provided the 
dispositions of the Convention have been observed, and, in 
case the decision has been rendered by default against a de-
fendant who fails to appear, he has been cited in accordance 
with the special provisions of his national law for the recog-
nition of foreign judgments. 84 
A divorce or separation decreed by an administrative juris-
dictional authority shall likewise be recognized everywhere, 
if the law of each of the spouses recognizes such divorce or 
separation. 
Since under articles 1 and 2 the national law of the parties 
must be observed by the divorce court, recognition depends 
upon a re-examination of facts and motives. 85 
The Convention is understood not only to authorize but 
to obligate the courts to refuse recognition, if the treaty re-
quirements are not satisfied~ 86 
7· Latin-American Conventions 
The Montevideo Treaty provides for reciprocal recognition 
of divorces decreed at the matrimonial domicil, 87 or at the 
last matrimonial domicil, in case the parties have been ju-
dicially separated or, according to the recent draft, the wife 
has been deserted and has not established a new domicil of 
83 MAKAROV, Precis 400 with hypothetical comment. 
84 For comment see MEILI-MAMELoK, IPR. 240 § 45· 
85 LG. Miinchen I (Jan. 17, 19o8) 4 Z. Rechtspflege Bayern (19o8) 295. 
ss App. Milano (Nov. 21, 1906) Monitore 1907, 133, 3 Rivista (19o8) 390, 
Clunet 1908, 1267; KosTERS 528; LEWALD in Strupp, 1 Worterbuch des Vol-
kerrechts und der Diplomatie 470 VII; 3 FRANKENSTEIN 571 n. 104; VREE-
LAND 229. 
87 Treaty on international civil law (1889) art. 13, (1940) art. 15. 
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her own. 88 This simple principle was incorporated in the 
C6digo Bustamante which for once, abandoning its neutrality 
to the criterion of the personal law, prescribes that the law of 
the matrimonial domicil is to apply. 89 Of course, the court 
must have observed the treaty requirements respecting the 
applicable law, which are not quite so simple in the Havana 
Convention as in the Treaty of Montevideo. The reservations 
for non-recognition vary in scope. The C6digo Bustamante 90 
reserves to "each contracting state the right to permit or 
recognize, or not, the divorce or new marriage of persons di-
vorced abroad, in causes which are not admitted by their per-
sonal law." The reservation contained in the new draft of the 
Montevideo Treaty is much more restricted; it covers only 
the case where the country of celebration does not permit 
divorce and grants the right to refuse recognition on this 
ground only to this country. 91 
8. The Scandinavian Convention on Family Law of 1931 92 
This Convention assures reciprocal recognition, without 
confirmation or re-examination, of all decisions rendered in 
matrimonial causes according to the treaty provisions. Actions 
for separation or divorce between nationals of the participating 
states are decided, under the basic rule of these provisions, ac-
cording to the law of the state where both parties are domiciled 
or where they had their last common domicil, if one of them 
is still do"miciled there. 
There are, thus, no defenses to a divorce decree of another 
Scandinavian country, except that the case does not come under 
the Convention or, perhaps, that the matter is pending in the 
forum. 93 
88 Treaty on international civil law (I 940) art. 59_par. z with art. 9· 
89 Art. 56. 
90 Art. 53, see comment by BUSTAMANTE, La commission des jurisconsultes 
de Rio I zx. 
91 (I940) art. IS(b). See supra p. 4z7. 
92 Art. zz referring, among others, to arts. 7, 8, Io. 
93 Art. 7 par. t. 
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE 481 
Other inter-Scandinavian conventions provide for the mu-
tual enforcement of alimentary awards (Feb. IO, I93I) and 
other judgments (March I 6, I 9 3 2). 94 
9· Bilateral Treaties 
Before the first World War, very few conventions existed 
for securing mutual enforce~ent of judgments; the most out-
standing is still in force-the French-Swiss Treaty of June I 5, 
I 869, which, according to present prevailing opinion, is ap-
plicable also to divorce decrees. 95 In the nineteen-twenties, a 
wave of international adjustment in Europe brought about a ' 
series of treaties for reciprocal judicial assistance, especially 
through negotiations of France, Germany, Italy, and the 
states succeeding· the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. 96 
Great Britain, however, while also endeavoring to establish 
a system of reciprocal recognition upon a treaty basis, has con-
cluded only two treaties with foreign countries, the first of 
which, with France, declares itself inapplicable to matters of 
status and capacity 97 and the second, with Belgium, renders 
inoperative its most important provision with respect to these 
matters.98 
94 See BLOCH, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 6z7, 636. 
95 See SECRETAN, Revue 1926, 199; DEGAND, 5 Repert. 574 no. 193. The 
contrary view formerly frequent in Switzerland is maintained by GAUTSCHI, 26 
SJZ. I 929, I. The treaty also covers recognition of measures ancillary to di-
vorce, such as awarding custody of children. See Cass. (req.) (Nov. 3, 1936) 
Clunet I937> 293· The French-Belgian Treaty of July 8, I899, was facilitated 
by the identical codes; see on the content, PERROUD, 5 Repert. 409. 
Also still in force is the Treaty between Colombia and Ecuador of June I 8, 
I 903 on international private law, art. XVI of which deals with divorce, only 
to deny the right of remarriage ifthe divorce fails to agree with the law of the 
other state. 
96 On the French-Italian Treaty of June 3, 1930, see PERRouo, Clunet I 934, 
275; on art. 3 of the German-Swiss Treaty of Nov. 2, 1929, 109 League of 
Nations Treaty Series (I930-1931) 274, see VoRTISCH, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 
17; KG. (May 25, 1936) JW. 1936, 3577; JoNAs, ibid.; LORENZ, 7 Giur. 
Comp. DIP. no. 33· On the application of the Italian-Swiss Treaty of Jan. 3, 
1933, to matters of status, see App. Roma (Nov. 27, 1934) with Note, SCERNr, 
j Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 31 and the cases cited infra p. 483, n. 100. 
97 Treaty of Jan. I8, 1934, art. 2 § 3b, 171 League of Nations Treaty Series 
(1936-1937), 183 at 186. 
98 Treaty of May 2, 1934, art. 4(3), 173 League of Nations Treaty Series 
(1936-1937) 291 at 299. · 
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II. pARTICULAR PROBLEMS 
As the general doctrine of recognition and enforcement of 
judgments ought to be discussed in its proper place, topics 
involved in this problem, such as jurisdiction of the foreign 
court, finality and conclusiveness of the decision, reciprocity, 
opportunity for defense, and fraud, cannot be treated at length 
here. There are, however, a few typical situati~ns found in 
the field of foreign divorces, which permit comparative survey. 
Courts in contemplating such groups of cases may apply dif-
ferent legal categories to obtain the same result; indeed, 
several of the numerous legal requisites for recognition may be 
invoked at once without entirely exact discrimination, if a 
court feels that the foreign divorce decree should not be ac-
cepted. 
r. Scope of Recognition as Contrasted with Enforcement 
Recognition, as contrasted with enforcement,99 has more 
importance in the matter of divqrce decrees than in ordinary 
judgments, but the effects of recognition are not uniformly 
determined. 
(a) Usually, as a minimum effect, a foreign divorce decree 
which agrees with the essentials for recognition can be set 
up as a defense against the alleged existence of the marriage 
in any suit for separate maintenance or restitution of conjugal 
rights, for separation, or for divorce, etc., without bringing 
an action on the judgment or, on the Continent, without an 
application for an executory decree. 100 
99 Cf. Restatement § 42(d); YNTEMA, "L'execution internationale des sen-
tences arbitrales," 2 Memoires de l'Academie Internationale de Droit Compare, 
part 3, 357; Hague Draft of a Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments, arts. I and II, Actes de la Cinquieme Session 193. 
100 France: Cass. (req.) (March 3, 1930) S.1930,1.377; Cour Paris (July 2, 
1934) Revue Crit. 1936, sao; Trib. civ. Seine (March 16, 1935) Revue Crit. 
1936, 519· 
Germany: C. Civ. Proc. § 328; RG. (June 24, 1927) IPRspr. 1926-27, no. 
70. 
Greece: App. Athens, no. 33, (1926) 37 Themis 470 (not recognizing an 
American divorce); but cf. TENEKIDE:s, Clunet 1937, 598. 
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE 483 
(b) Likewise, the decree provides full evidence of the dis-
solution of the marriage before a civil official or other marriage 
officer when remarriage is attempted.101 The conditions of its 
fitness for recognition are to be examined by the officer or any 
authority or court supervising him and not through an action 
on the judgment.102 
(c) The effects of a divorce on the name of the wife, on her 
ability to be reinstated in her former nationality, or on her 
domicil, fall within the scope of mere recognition. 103 
(d) While the decree is entered upon the records of civil 
status without the steps necessary for enforcement, according 
to the German and Swiss regulations, 104 in France, on the 
contrary, transcription in the register of civil status is denied 
unless a -decree of exequatur is obtained.105 
(e) Recognition nowhere covers the enforcement of pe-
Italy: App. Torino (July 25, .I93o) Monitore I93o, 9I I, 5 Z.ausl.PR. 
(I 9 3 I) 844 (see also five Italian decisions, ibid. 843, concerning recognition 
outside the Hague Convention) ; App. Fiume (June I o, I 9 3 7) 29 Rivista (I 9 3 7) 
398, Clunet I938, 932; cf. ScERNI, 9 Annuario Dir. Comp. (I934) 340; but 
see supra p. 48 I, n. 96. 
Scotland: The Court of Sessions, Outer House, by Lord Moncrief£, in Arnott 
v. Lord Advocate [I 932] Scots L. T. 46, in recognizing an Ohio decree, granted 
a decree of declarator for exceptional a,id, while as a rule the grant of a decree 
to give validity to the domiciliary decree which already had universal validity 
would "be a trespass against international comity." 
Switzerland: App. Bern (July 6, I935) 72 ZBJV. (I936) 429; cf. II 
Z.ausl.PR. (I937) 669 (divorce of Swiss nationals in Oregon recognized with-
out action because the award required no enforcement); cf. also BEcK, NAG. 3 78 
no. I 6o. 
However, in Sweden: Law of I 904 with subsequent amendments, c. 3 § 7 
requires a confirmation of the foreign divorce decree for the celebration of a 
remarriage in Sweden. 
101 Belgium: App. Liege (Jan. 29, I924) Jur. Liege I924, 76; cf. PouLLET 
649 n. 4· 
France: Cass. (civ.) (Feb. z8, I86o) S.I86o.I.2Io; see supra p. 472. 
Germany: RAAPE 4I6 VII I. 
Switzerland: BEcK, NAG. 379 no. I6I. 
102 See citations in preceding note. 
103 BEcK, NAG. 3 79 no. I 6 I. 
104 Germany: RG. (May I8, I9I6) 88 RGZ. 244 against former practice 
of lower courts. 
Switzerland: Civil Status Regulation § I I8 par. I. 
105 Trib. civ. Seine (May I 9, I 926) cited supra p. 473, n. 55· 
For Italy, cf. VDINA, I Giur. Comp. DIP. I 5o. 
Portugal: Decree on Civil Status of Dec. 22, I 9 3 2, art. 3 91 § 2. 
DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 
cuniary duties arising from the decree or of rights to exercise 
custody over children, or other provisional orders.106 It has 
been asserted, 1<17 and seems correct, that recognition of a · 
foreign divorce repugnant to the domestic principles of the 
forum may be granted, while executory enforcement would 
be denied. In the Netherlands, foreign divorces may not be 
executed and enforced at all but are capable of being recog-
nized.108 
2. Scope of Res Judicata 
Is full faith and credit due to a foreign decision dismissing 
an action for divorce on the merits? This question has arisen 
on the Continent, because generally defeat in a lawsuit as well 
as victory may constitute res judicata. Nevertheless, it has 
been argued that a subject of the forum should not be barred 
from suing under his own law after having been rejected under 
a foreign law less favorable to him. In fact, in Switzerland 
foreign decrees denying divorce to a Swiss citizen are said not 
to be entitled to recognition. 109 A better considered solution 
is given in Germany; a foreign judgment unfavorable to the 
application of a German national is recognized, if the decision 
is in conformity with German divorce law.110 
In the United States, the binding force of a judgment dis-
missing a suit for divorce on the merits seems to be virtually 
the same whether it is rendered by a domestic or a foreign 
court. It could hardly be otherwise, since the divorce court 
applies its own law, and the forum of recognition does not 
re-examine the merits. 
106 BECK, NAG. 381 no. 168. 
107 }uLLIOT DE LA MoRANDIERE, in Republica de Colombia, Comisi6n de 
Reforma del C6digo Civil (1930-1940) Z17, z18. 
108 See 1 BERGMANN 404. 
109 See BEcK, NAG. 377 no. 157· 
110 See RAAPE 410 V x. 
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3· Divorce Without Judicial Litigation 
Many legislators and even treaty-makers are so accustomed 
to contemplate contentious proceedings and a decree of a state 
court as the only way to obtain divorce, that they overlook the 
possibility of other forms of divorce being used abroad. The 
difficulties of interpreting the pertinent narrowly drafted texts 
are increased in numerous systems, for instance, in the elaborate 
but contradictory and incomplete German enactments, 111 by 
failure to coordinate the procedural rules on recognition of 
foreign judgments with the choice of law rules on the ex-
traterritorial effect of private acts and by failure to regulate 
clearly the recognition of foreign acts of administrative 
justice. 112 
Recognition of foreign forms of divorce unknown to the 
forum ~s traditionally barred by public policy with respect to 
nationals or subjects of the forum, as distinguished from 
foreign married couples. But the general trend is in the direc-
tion of replacing the former reluctance to recognize foreign 
modes of divorce by a broader-minded outlook. 
(a) Decisions of foreign ecclesiastical courts are probably 
everywhere treated as equivalent to decrees of ordinary courts. 
The minority opinion is, however, that religious divorces 
should be recognized even when they are not supported by 
the consent of the state in whose territory they are rendered, 113 
provided only that they are recognized by the state of which 
the parties are nationals-a species of renvoi. The prevailing 
view 114 requires an ecclesiastical court to be authorized by 
m See supra p. 475· 
112 See on the "inchoate" state of the Anglo-American doctrine of administra-
tive acts, YNTEMA, "L'execution internationale des sentences arbitrale&," z 
Memoires de l'Academie lnternationale de Droit Compare, part 3, 348 at 354· 
113 See 3 FRANKENSTEIN 560 n. 70 and the decisions cited by him. 
114 3 ARM!NJON §§ 34> 35; M. WOLFF, IPR. 13Z; NUSSBAUM, D.IPR. 164 
n. 5; this also seems to be the meaning of American cases such as In re Ruben-
stein's Estate (19p) 143 N.Y. Misc. 917, Z57 N.Y. Supp. 637; In re Spondre 
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the state where it is sitting, as well as by the state of which the 
parties are nationals or domiciliaries, according to the principle 
governing status. 
Illustration: Orthodox Russians are divorced by the 
Council of the Orthodox Church in Paris, Polish Jews by a 
rabbi in the Netherlands, divorces not recognized by the 
country where pronounced nor under the prevailing opinion 
in third countries, but recognized by the national law. Suppos-
ing that the domicil was in the home country, the answer 
would probably be negative also in American courts. 
Recognition of a religious decree means giving full civil 
effect to the divorce. Where a Bulgarian national of Orthodox 
faith had been married in the Netherlands to a Dutch woman 
according to both temporal and ecclesiastical ceremonies and 
the Bulgarian Church decreed divorce, the Orthodox tribunal 
of course considered only the religious marriage and ignored 
the Dutch civil ceremony. But a Netherlands court recogniz-
ing this divorce should not have assumed that the Dutch 
civil marriage remained undissolved. 115 
(b) Divorce or separation pronounced by an administra-
tive jurisdictional authority has been expressly declared recog-
nizable by the Hague Convention on Divorce (art. 7, par. 2 ), 
provided that the national law of either spouse recognizes 
such act. This leaves the national laws free to decide. But 
there is no reason why, under any system of nationality or 
domicil, a decree rendered in the name of the King of Den-
mark 116 or by bill of Parliament (if still available) should 
(19 17) 98 N. Y. Misc. 524, 162 N. Y. Supp. 943; Miller v. Miller ( 1911) 
70 N. Y. Misc. 368, 128 N. Y. Supp. 787; Leshinsky v. Leshinsky ( 1 893) 5 
N.Y. Misc. 495, 25 N.Y. Supp. 841; cf. FREEMAN, 3 Treatise of the Law of 
Judgments (1925) 3095 § 1510 formulating the condition "if valid where 
given." 
115 Rb. Amsterdam (March 3, 1930) W. 1930, 12175 approved by 3 FRANKEN-
STEIN 409 n. 2. 
116 On recognition of a Danish royal decree in Italy, see Trib. Roma (April 8, 
1908) Clunet 1910, 670; Germany: KG. (Jan. 23, 1939) Dt. Recht 1939, 1015 
no. 3 8 has pronounced the principle that the Danish Royal decree, as an adminis-
trative decree, is to be recognized but depends on the same conditions as a judicial 
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not be recognized as readily as a court decree; the protection 
against arbitrary dissolution seems greater than in many 
courts.117 
It is true that administrative jurisdiction over divorce is 
usually given upon the basis of a mutual agreement of the 
parties, and this circumstance raises a doubt that we may con-
sider separately. 
(c) In fact, non-contentious proceedings, if followed by a 
decree of any independent authority, need not necessarily be 
regarded as an obstacle to recognition at a forum where mutual 
agreement is excluded by the municipal law. But in such cases 
difficulties have been experienced with respect to subjects of 
the forum of recognition and also with respect to foreigners 
when the forum reviews the grounds for divorce.118 
A particular problem exists with regard to the conversion of 
a foreign limited divorce into a domestic absolute divorce. In 
several countries, a judicial separation may be transformed 
into a divorce a vinculo without proving new grounds, after 
some time has elapsed since the separation. This institution 
usually presupposes conte-ntious litigation, in which the dis-
ruption of the marriage has been examined by a court before 
granting separation. If so, a separation obtained abroad upon 
a mere mutual agreement, as is possible in Chile, Italy, the 
decree and fulfills all requirements of German C. Civ. Proc. § 328 by analogy. 
In the instant case recognition was refused, the husband being a German and 
domiciled in Germany, according to § p8 no. 1. For a Danish husband, Reg. 
Praes. Schleswig (Jan. 23, I9JZ), see StAZ. I9J2> I97> b; for a Danish couple, 
the husband being domiciled in Brazil, see Brazil Sup. Trib. Fed. (Jan. 3 I, I933) 
2I Rev. Jur. Bras. (I 933) 26. Cf. for various opinions, WIERUSZOWSKI, 4 Leske-
Loewenfeld I 78 n. 485. 
117 CHESHIRE 367, declaring inconceivable nonrecognition in such cases, goes 
too far in extending recognition to any· local form. See also KEITH, "Some 
Problems in the Conflict of Laws," I 6 Bell Yard (I 9 35) 4 at I I. 
118 For instance, French courts refuse recognition to a judgment on "acquies-
cence," regarding the procedure as affected by "irregularity," arg. C. C. art. 92 
(new, art. 249); likewise Swiss App. Freiburg i. Ue., IO SJZ. I76, no. 49· A 
divorce by Danish royal decree, if the husband is a German, is not recognized in 
Germany, Pruss. Ministry of Interior (June IS, I928), quoted in StAZ. I932, 
I 9 7. In many countries the matter is in doubt; also under the Hague Convention, 
see 3 FRANKENSTEIN 567. 
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Netherlands, in the countries of Austrian law, and others, 
cannot suffice as the only ground for an absolute divorce at 
the forum; this has been held in Belgium,119 France/20 
Hungary,121 etc. It is also agreed that the Hague Convention, 
in providing that separation ought to be recognized by the 
participant states (art. 7), means a separation pronounced by 
a court upon contested proceedings.122 
Although thes~ limitations are reasonable, the German 
courts took an intransigent attitude in construing the dis-
solution of the conjugal union, which was the only separation 
admitted by the Civil Code, as a unique institution, indis-
pensable for conversion under the Code, and hence irreplace-
able by any foreign type of separation.123 
(d) The forms of divorce permitted by the laws of Soviet 
Russia have engendered special problems. Under the initial 
Soviet legislation of I 9 I 8, a divorce could be obtained either 
by mutual consent and official registration or by application 
of one party to a court, notice to the other party by summons, 
and a decree which the court was bound to give. The marriage 
law of 1926 emphasized still more sharply, by abandoning 
any court action, the nature of divorce as a private declaration 
that may be pronounced by one of the spouses without cause. 
119 Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (July 4, I9I3) KoSTERS-BELLEMANS 218. 
12
°France: Cour Paris (May I4, I9o2) I4 Z.int.R. (I904) Ioo (separation 
in Chile); App. Amiens (March 2 I, I9o6) Clun~ I 9o6, I I 38; App. Grenobie 
(May 23, 1924) Revue I924, 222; Cass. (civ.) (July 6, I922) Clunet 1922, 
7I4 (Ferrari case no. I); Cour Paris (July II 1 I930) Revue I930, 68o. Trib. 
civ. Seine (July 15, 1935) Nouv.Revue I9351 553; Cour Paris (Feb. 4, 1937) 
Clunet 1937, 283 (decree of the Italian Consular Tribunal in Alexandria on 
the basis of Italian law) - all concerning Italian mutual agreements. Cf. 
LEREBOURS-PIGEONNI:ERE 40 I § 3 3 9a, against BAR TIN, I Principes 424 § I 7 r ; 
cf. BARTIN, 2 Principes 32 8 § 3 I 9· 
Of another character is the Argentine separation of a Chilean man and a 
French woman in the case of Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 13, I898) Clunet I92I 
(sic), :2.15. 
121 Hungarian law applied for the province of Burgenland by the Austrian 
Supreme Court (April 25, 1925) 37 Z.int.R. (1927) 393 in the matter of an 
Austrian mutual agreement of separation from bed and board. 
1!22 Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 5· 
123 See supra p. 433, n. 187. 
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It is said that, if the marriage has been recorded, registration 
of divorce is possible but not essential, except under the 
Ukrainian Family Law of May 3 I, I 926, which recognizes 
only registered marriages and divorces, and under the White 
Russian Code (art. 23), if a factual marriage has been ju-
dicially established.124 The Family Protection Law of June 27, 
I 9 3 6 (art. 2 7) orders the registrars to summon the parties 
to appear at the registrar's office but does not change the di-
vorce law.125 
Whether these various forms can be recognized has been a 
much discussed question, especially in Germany. The German 
Reichsgericht finally established the view that all Russian 
types of divorce may be recognized in application to non-
Germans domiciled in Soviet Russia 126 but that the forms now 
in use whereby the private ·dissolution of marriage is not 
declared by any sort of decree, though possibly registered, 
are unable to affect the marriage of a German spouse.127 For 
Russian nationals domiciled and divorced in Russia, recog-
nition seems to be unquestioned everywhere; thus, a seem-
ingly absolute rejection of Russian divorces in Italy,128 for 
instance, cannot be taken literally. But Russian divorces, which 
may be recognized in Switzerland, 129 have been refused recog-
124 This seems to be the thesis of MAURACH, 3 Z.osteurop.R. (I 9 36) 100, I o6. 
I do not assume any responsibility as to the statements on Soviet law. 
125 See WERTHER, 4 Z.osteurop.R. ( I93 8) 437: the official Sovetskaja 
Justicija warned that art. 18 of the Family Law remained in force. 
126 RG. (April4, 1928) 12I RGZ. 24; RG. (Feb. 28, 1938) 92 Seuff. Arch. 
244, JW. I938, I5I8; and the unanimous opinion of writers; see FREUND, JW. 
1928, 88o. 
~7 Leading case: RG. (April 22, I932) 136 RGZ. I42, I46; see also the 
decision of Feb. 28, I938 cited in the preceding note. A Russian divorce decree 
before I926, involving Germans, was recognized in the decision of the RG. 
(April 4, 1928) I2I RGZ. 24, assuming that the wife's adultery which under 
Russian law was not to be stated in the Russian decree, was the real cause of 
the divorce, and this was a sufficient ground under German law, though irrellevant 
under the Russian; this method is no longer applicable to Russian divorces with-
out decree. 
128 App. Milano (June 30, 1927) 19 Rivista (1927) 575; cf. FEDOZZI 472ff. 
129 Switzerland: Just. Dep., BBl. I928, II 3 IO no. I 7; a unilateral divorce by 
declaration of one spouse is excepted as offending public policy by BEcK, NAG. 
391 no. 197. 
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mtton with respect to their own nationals in Poland.180 
Opinions in England are in conflict; the thesis of Cheshire 
that consistency demands recognition of any Russian divorce 
form with respect to a married couple in Russia, irrespective 
of the nationality of the parties or the place of celebration, 131 
results in a perfect parallel to the doctrine of the Reichs-
gericht, nationality being replaced by domicil. It is doubtful, 
however, whether 'a court in America would make use of 
such a doctrine. Since in this country the domicil of one 
party is deemed to support jurisdiction for divorce, analogy 
would result in recognizing a Russian divorce where one party 
is domiciled in Soviet Russia and the other in the United 
States. For the purposes of immigration, the State Depart-
ment recognizes such a divorce.132 
Recent Soviet legislation. According to newspaper notices, 
the Soviet laws concerning marriage and divorce were radically 
modified in the summer of I944· Unfortunately, at the time 
of publication, precise knowledge of this legislation was not 
available. 
(e) The same principles that applied in Germany to Rus-
sian divorce procedures have prevailed in German courts and 
probably els~where, with respect to the arbitrary repudiation 
of a marriage by the husband under old patriarchal regimes, 
such as the Jewish, the Egyptian, or the former Turkish law. 
True, it would be intolerable for a foreign husband to be al-
lowed to send his bill of divorce to his wife from a place 
130 Poland: Supreme Court (Feb. s, 193I) 6 Z.f.Ostrecht (I9JZ) 383. With 
respect to Latvia see the note in 1 Z.osteurop.R. (I934-1935) 82. 
131 CHESHIRE 365. For the actual British cases see infra n. 134. 
KEITH in DICEY, Append. 939 and in 16 Bell Yard (I935) Io-n, supra 
n. I I 7, seems to reject Russian divorce of an "English marriage" because they 
lack a proceeding of judicial character. FALCONBRIDGE, Annotation [I9JZ] 4 
D. L. R. so suggests recognition of mutual agreements in the country of common 
domicil but non-recognition of any decree without due notice to the defendant 
and a fortiori of a unilaterally registered divorce declaration. MAIKAROV, Precis 
404 recommends recognition of registered and judicial unilateral divorces but 
not of non-registered divorces of Soviet citizens. 
112 HACKWORTH, z Digest of International Law (I94I) 383. 
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within the forum. 133 But there is nothing to affect the ter-
ritory of the forum where a customary right to divorce is 
exercised abroad and both parties are members of the same 
creed and nationality which permit such dissolution.134 A 
court, however, may feel interested in the wife's right, iJ 
she is or was until the marriage, a subject of the forum. 185 
4· Jurisdiction 136 and Procedure of the Divorce Court 
(a) E ,"Cclusive jurisdiction. No foreign divorce decree is 
recognized when exclusive jurisdiction is claimed at the forum 
where recognition is sought. This is the case in England, 
Argentina, etc., if the matrimonial domicil is located within 
the forum, in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc., with 
133 LG. Berlin (Oct. 19, 1937) JW. 1938, 2402, cf. supra p. 418, n. 115. 
134 Case of Helene Bohlau, a noted writer, who had married a Mohammedan, 
LG. Miinchen (Sept. 28, 1904) 14Z.int.R. (1904-) 585; OLG. Miinchen (March 
24, I9o5) r6 ibid. (1906) 38; Bay. ObLG. (Sept. 29, 1905) I6 ibid. (I9o6) 
286; OLG. Miinchen (Nov. 22, 1909) 20 ibid. ( 1910) 529, Clunet, I 906, I I 73· 
See also LG. Dresden (Dec. 22, 1931) IPRspr. 1932, no. 72 (Egyptian repudia-
tion). 
The British cases Spivack v. Spivack ( 1930) 46 T. L. R. 243 and Sasson v. 
Sasson [1924] A. C. 1007, although distinguishable by some particularities, 
are arguments for an analogous doctrine; see CHESHIRE 365-367. On the 
problematic case of Rex v. Superintendent Registrar of Marriages, Hammersmith, 
ex parte Mir-Anwaruddin [1917] 1 K. B. 634, 642, see CHESHIRE 363-368; 
FoSTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," 16 Brit. 
Year Book Int. Law (1 935) 91; KEITH, r6 Bell Yard ( 1935) ro, supra n. r 17, 
135 OLG. Dresden (Jan. I8, 1927) StAZ. 1927, 219 and AG. Dresden 
(Oct. 6, 1930) IPRspr. 1931, no. I50 (former German nationality of the wife) 
refused recognition of Egyptian or Turkish tribunals. Where one spouse is a 
German national, the RG. now requires a foreign "judgment" according to BGB. 
§ 1564, RG. (April 41 1928) 12.1 RGZ. 24; RG. (April 22, 1932) 136 RGZ. 
142 (on Russian divorces supra n. 127). The Bohlau case, supra n. 134, and 
that of OLG. Dresden (Jan. 18, 1927) IPRspr. 1926-27, no. ro would probably 
be decided by non-recognition nowadays. 
136 On the subject of jurisdiction with respect to foreign judgments in general, 
comparative studies have been undertaken by LORENZEN, "The Enforcement 
of American Judgments Abroad," 29 Yale L. J. (1919) 188, 268; YNTEMA, 
"L'execution internationale des sentences arbitrales," z Memoires de l'Academie 
lnternationale de Droit Compare, part 3, 348 and "The Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments in Anglo-American Law," 33 Mich. L. Rev. (1935) 112.9; 
NUSSBAUM, D.IPR. 1611f., 441 and his Principles 229ff.; GUTTERIDGE, "Le 
conflit des lois de competence judiciaire dans les actions personnelles," 44 Recueil 
19 3 3 II u I. As to the special field of recognition of divorce decrees, see the 
conclusions of VREELAND's book, Validity of Foreign Divorces 3z61f. ' 
492 DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 
respect to nationals of these countries, 137 and in many countries, 
if the parties are domiciled in and nationals of such countries. 
(b) · International jurisdiction.138 Despite the many con-
fusing differences relating to the jurisdictional requirements 
of recognition in the enactments and doctrines of the world, 
there is one condition universally observed, viz., that the,court 
of judgment must have had jurisdiction in the international 
sense, i.e., according to the conceptions of the forum where 
recognition is sought. A better considered formula demands 
only that courts of the state of judgment, not just the court 
of the instant case, be competent in the eyes of the law of the 
forum. 
The most firmly established ground for defense to a for-
eign decree in this country is that neither party was domiciled 
at the divorce forum.139 This, in general, or even the absence 
of the matrimonial domicil/ 40 is a defense everywhere,141 
with the important exception, however, that under the na-
137 Supra p. 39 8; see for Austria OGH. (Feb. 26, 19 35) Oest. Anwalts Zeitung 
1935, 297, 8 Jahrb. H. E. (1936) no. 1563. 
138 On the conception see NEUNER, lnternationale Zustandigkeit ( 1929) and in 
I3 Annuario Dir. Comp. (I938) part 1, 349· 
139 Restatement § I I I. See I BEALE § I I I. I. For decisions invalidating for 
this reason Mexican divorces see Note I43 A. L. R. I313ff. 
140 Apart from the English and Argentine materials, see, for the Brazilian 
practict! under the former law, Sup. Trib. Fed. (Oct. 6, 19o6) 2 Revista dir. 
civ. (I9o6) 373 (a Portuguese court was incompetent to render a divorce, the 
defendant husband being domiciled in the Federal District of Brazil). In the 
case Sup. Trib. Fed. (July 24, I92o) 64 Revista dir. civ. (I922) sos, the 
husband was both domiciled and naturalized in Brazil. 
141 See for instance German C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. I in connection with 
§ 6o6 par. I; France: Seine (April n, I935) mentioned by BATES, "The 
Divorce of Americans in France," 2 Law and Cont. Probl. (I935) 322 at 325 
n. IO (Reno decree, neither party residing in Nevada). 
Both this rule and the American principle were egregiously ignored by OLG. 
Hamburg (Oct. 1, 1935) JW. 1935, 3488 and its critics, JoNAS, JW. 1936, 
283 and LoRENZ, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 322 no. 253, discussing a strange "new 
way" believed necessary by the court to justify not recognizing a frivolous 
Mexican divorce granted the husband, an American domiciled in New Jersey, 
against his wife, who had been formerly and afterwards became a German 
national but was an American at the time of the decree. 
Switzerland: NAG. art. 7g par. 3; a divorce of a Swiss domiciled in the 
United States is recognized if rendered by the judge of the domicil but not if 
rendered in Mexico, Just. Dept., BBl. 1938. II 499 no. 9· 
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tionality principle divorce may be. decreed by the national 
state without the fulfillment of domiciliary requirements.142 
This is the foremost consideration in the struggle against the 
"divorce mills," but it also has a much less desirable effect on 
the various cases where the wife is considered by the divorce 
court to have a separate domicil but is not so considered in the 
forum where recognition is sought.143 
(c) International treatie.s. A remarkable advance has been 
conceded to the principle of domicil in recent international 
treaties. The Codigo Bustamante (art. 52) proclaimed inter-
national jurisdiction for divorce to be at the matrimonial 
domicil, in contrast with the general policy of the Convention 
not to specify the personal law (art. 7) and despite the pro-
test of Brazil, which then followed the nationality prin-
cipleY4 The Franco-Itali~n Treaty of June 3, 1930, on the 
enforcement of judgments (art. II, par. I) secured recog-
nition for the decisions of the court of the domicil or, in their 
142 France: Cass. (req.) (April 29, 1931) S.I931.1.247· 
Germany: Code of Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. 2. 
Brazil: S. Ct. (Jan. 31 1 1933) 21 Rev. Jur. Bras. (1933) 26. 
English courts generally are not supposed to recognize such jurisdiction. They 
have recently been said, however, to give effect to a decree rendered by a court 
of competent jurisdiction dealing with its own nationals, both of whom had 
agreed to submit their dispute to that tribunal "as a clear, final and binding 
decision upon all the world." See Mezger v. Mezger [1937] P. 19 at 28 per 
Langton, J. This would mean that the parties can dispose of the question of jur-
isdiction. 
143 There is a line of decisions rejecting American decrees for this reason in 
Canada: see Thompson v. Crawford [1932] 2 D. L. R. 466 (Ont. 1932), aff'd 
[1932] 4 D. L. R. zo6, 41 0. W. N. 231 (Nevada decree with consent of the 
husband), cf. FALCONBRIDGE, r Giur. Comp. DIP. 37; Wyllie v. Martin (1931) 
44 B. C. 486, [1931] 3 W. W. R. 465 (California decree); MacDonald v. Nash 
[1929] 4 D. L. R. 1051 (Manitoba court did not recognize the Nevada decree); 
Gilbert v. Standard Trusts Co. [1928] 4 D. L. R. 371. 
Italy: App. Trieste (July 19, 1933) 25 Rivista (1933) 469 and citations 
(on the occasion of a Swiss annulment of marriage). 
Belgium: supra p. 407, n. 71. 
144 See Reservation of the Delegation of Brazil in signing the Treaty of Habana, 
and the law enforcing the treaty, Diario Off. (Jan. xr, 1929); see also 
EsPINOLA's letter to the Conference of Habana of January 27, 1928, and the full 
statement by ESPINOLA, printed with the judgment of the Federal Supreme 
Tribunal May 14, 1937, App. Civ. no. 683r, 26 Rev. de Critica Judiciaria 361, 
364. 
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absence, decisions at the residence of the defendant, without 
excepting status matters, and the same devices have been 
adopted in other European treaties, 145 despite the fact that 
all the countries involved are traditional followers of the na-
tionality principle. 
(d) Opportunity for defense. Due notice of the divorce 
suit, whether considered an independent requirement or a 
requisite of jurisdiction is often qualified to exclude service by 
publication, as was done until I 942 in a minority of states of 
the United States.146 It is not a new experience that "every 
country claims for its own courts wider extraterritorial author-
ity than it concedes in return to foreign tribunals." 147 This 
position is also taken in countries which allow service by pub-
lication in their own rules of procedure. 
Lack of due notice may be cured, according to many rules, 
by the personal appearance of the defendant. But it is the 
second most used ground of defense to a foreign divorce decree 
rendered by an ill-reputed court. Another typical case is that 
in which the husband in suing abroad causes the notice to be 
sent to a false address of the wife to impair her defense; this 
case has also been handled in the category of fraud or public 
policy.14s 
140 153 League of Nations Treaty Series (r934) 135, 141. It is interesting 
to see how vigorously the Italian Supreme Court, leading the judicature of the 
country of Mancini, in interpreting the Italian Treaty of April 6, r 922 with 
Czechoslovakia, emphasizes the importance of the husband's domicil for juris-
diction in matrimonial causes; Cass. (April z6, 1939) Giur. Ital. 1939, I, r, 
879, affirming App. Roma (July 19, 1938) Foro ltal. 1938, r, 1314, Giur. 
Ital. 1938, I, 2, 452, Clunet 1939, 177. 
146 VREELAND 328 enumerates with some doubts: District of Columbia, Mas-
sachusetts, Montana, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming. 
147 Cave, J. in Heinemann & Co. v. Hale & Co. [r89r] 2 Q. B. (C. A.) 83, 
87; cf. YNTEMA, supra n. 136, at 396. 
140 Drastic illustrations: 
England: Rudd v. Rudd [1924] P. 72 rejects a decree of the state of Wash-
ington of the United States, the plaintiff husband having mailed a copy of his 
application to an English address where his wife had never lived, and by 
advertising the suit in a Seattle newspaper which she never read. 
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Other particulars of the proceedings of the judgment 
court are not re-examined as a general rule, 149 except under 
the French system of unlimited control. But when the defense 
is believed to have been obstructed, for instance with respect to 
evidence, 150 some way is usually found to protect the offended 
interest; modern regulations contain express clauses for this 
purpose.m It may be quoted, incidentally, that the Federal 
Supreme Court of Mexico has, in repeated decisions, de-
clared divorce statutes of such states as Yucatan and Cham-
pecha unconstitutional on the ground that they impair the 
right of defense.152 
Switzerland: BG. (May I3, I938) 64 BGE. II 74, 79 refused recognition 
to a Spanish divorce because the husband, knowing that his wife lived in 
Switzerland, did not notify her of the proceedings; in this case not even the 
judgment was served on her. / 
Canada: Delaporte v. Delaporte [1927] 4 D. L. R. 933, 6I Ont. L. R. 302. 
France: Cass. (req.) (Nov. I I, I 908) S.I909.I.572, Revue 1909, 227 
(United States decree; the husband had falsely pretended not to know the 
wife's residence). See also infra n. I 5o. 
149 England: In Crowe v. Crowe (I937) I57 L. T. R. 557, [I937] 2 All 
E. R. 723 it is expressly stated that the defense based on fraud, as authorized 
in Bater v. Bater LI9o6] P. 209, is limited to fraud in affecting jurisdictional 
facts. 
150 The United States: In Bethune v. Bethune (1936) 192 Ark. 8u, 94 S. W. 
(2d) I043 a Mexican decree was refused recognition on several grounds among 
which insufficient evidence is mentioned. 
Belgium: Trib. civ. Antwerp (June 19, 193I) Clunet 1932, I I04 (fraudulent 
statements to make the defense impossible). 
France: Trib. civ. Seine (June 3, 1938) Clunet 1939, 87 and (June 29, I938) 
Clunet 1939, 61 (both regarding Mexican decrees and fraudulent manoeuvres 
of the husband to impair the defense of the wife). 
In the Argentine case, Cam. civ. 2 de la Plata. (Nov. 21, 1939) 68 J. A. 
577 a Mexican decree was rejected because no contact whatever with. the divorce 
state existed. 
m Hague Convention on Divorce, art. 8 and all recent treaties on enforcement 
of judgments. 
German C. Civ. Proc. § 328 par. 2, etc. 
In France "freedom of defense" is always considered an essential and in some 
decisions indicated as :fl.owing from natural justice, quite as in England; see 
PERROUD, 5 Repert. 377 no. II8. 
152 SeeS. Ct. (May 9, I934) 41 Seman. Jud. part 1, 191; S. Ct. (May u, 
1936) 48 ibid. part 2, 2290; S. Ct. (July 8, 1933) 38 ibid. part 2, I442; S. 
Ct. (Nov. 29, 1933) 39 ibid. part 3, 2547. 
On the American reaction to Mexican divorces see HACKWORTH, 2 Digest of 
International Law (1941) 384. 
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5~ Anti-Divorce Policy of the Forum_ 
l (a) NationaLs of the forum. If absolute divorce is for-
bidden by the municipal law of a country, it is perfectly under-
standable under the principle of nationality that the subjects 
of the forum are also prohibited from divorcing abroad. This 
interpretation seems obvious to the Italian courts, which will 
not recognize a foreign absolute divorce where both, or even 
only one, of the parties have been of Italian nationalityP.a 
T_he same point of view obtains in Spain 154 and was held in 
' France before divorce was reestablished in r 8 84.155 All the 
recent French divorces of Italians, like that in the Ferrari case, 
are naturally regarded as invalid in Italy and have been criti-
cized in France also, precisely because they are inconsistent 
with former practice as well as with the fraud theory of the 
French courts. r.fia 
: But this attitude is not the only one possible. In Brazil the 
matter is in doubt and has formed the subject of the most 
diverse decisions involving the submission of foreign divorce 
decrees for homologa(ao, i.e., confirmation for the purpose of 
enforcement. Some _authorities had considered a foreign di-
vorce as capable of full recognition in case the wife was of 
Brazilian nationality, the personal law of the husband being 
decisive for status questions.u7 The prevailing opinion, how-
e~er, held for a long time by a majority of the Federal Su-
153 Cass . .Torino (June 6.1. 1919) Revue 19Zo1 498; Cass. Roma (Nov. x3, 
t919) Revue 19zo, 498; App. Milano (Dec. 71 1916) Clunet 19181 312; App. 
Milano (March 3> l9Zl) Monitore l9ZI, soo; Clunet l9U, 194; App. Firenze 
, (March xo, 19z3) Monitore 19z3, 401, Clunet 19Z31 xozx; App. Genova 
(Feb. z8, 1938) Rivista 19391 331 1 Clunet 19391 171 (English divorce of two 
Italians having married in England). 
154 Unanimous opinion, see MANRESA, 1 Comentarios al·C6digo Civil Espafiol 
99; INGL01T, IISRevistaGen.Legisl.yJur, (1909) zs8, z88. 
155 Ca8s. (civ.) (Feb. z8, x86o) S.186o.1.:uo. 
~56 Seesupra p~ 443· . 
: 
1~7 See RoDRIGO OerAvro; Le droit .international prive dans la legislat~on 
bresilicmne no. 6x; BEVILAQUA 3zz n. 19 and in 6 Repert. 167 no. 4I·.W:~t;re. 
t1te ~usband was of Brazilian nationality and domicil, the Sup. Trib. Fed;,(J'~y 
24, 192o), 64 Revista dir. civ. (1922) sos spoke of lack of jurisdiction pl:~e:, 
Portuguese court. , ' '' 
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preme Court and adopted by Rodrigo Octavio · when he 
joined the Court/J>8 was that the foreign husband may re-
marry abroad, but that homologafao with respect to effects 
of divorce in Brazil is to be limited to property effects which 
a Brazilian judicial separation can :also produce. Such partial 
enforcement was also 'granted when both parties were of 
Brazilian nationality.159 The new law of I 942, despite its 
principle of domicil, provides that a foreign divorce of two 
Brazilian parties is not recognized; if one of them is a Brazil-
ian, the divorce is recognized with respect to the othe! who, 
however, may not remarry in Brazil.160 This provision seems 
to place husband and wife on an equal footing; it probably 
does not interfere with the enforcement of pr<;>perty effects.161 
Still another solution was given by a surprisingly liberal-
construction of the Austrian prohibition of absolute divorce 
for Roman Catholics. In its last thirty years., the Austrian Su-
preme Court admitted that, if one spouse 162 was a foreigner 
at the time of the marriage or even only at the time of suit; a 
foreign divorce not only hac;:l full effect for him but also freed 
the other party~ although the latter was of Austrian national-
ity and Catholic religion.168 
Courts of third countries facing such contrasts between the 
law of the divorce court and the personal law have sometimes 
felt themselves to be in a dilemma; some have recognized a 
158 Sup~ Trib. Fed. (Aug. z81 192.9) no. 86o, Clunet 1932.1 I Ill! the opinien 
of RODMGO 0CTAVIO is also published in 11 ~ch. Jud. Suppl, (192.9) 197• 
See ten other decisions (1913-1933) in GUIMARAES, 11 Brasil-Acordiios I67 
no. z9.zz91 particularly that of Sup. Trib. Fed. (Nov. 41 I916) also in Clunet 
1919• 402., ' . . 
159 In this sense, the 'most general opinion is summarized in tl,te decision of the 
App. Div. of the Distr. Fed. Court no. 4830 (Jan. 2.9, 1935) I IS Revista dir. 
civ •. (I9JS) ISS, Clunet I936, 975· Sup. Trib. Fed. (July r, I942.) no, i:o3z, 
64 Arch. Jud. (194~) 194. 
160 :Lei de lntroduc;ao art. 7 § 6; EsPINOLA, g...,;B Tratado 1067. · · 
161 ESPINOLA, s-B Tratado 1067 no. 31 however, declares that in the case of 
two Brazilian spouses foreign divorce will not be recognized for any effect. ·· 
162 Divorce of two Catholic Austrian spouses, of course, was not reco~ized, 
OGH. (Nov. 6,11934) Oest. Anwalts Zeitung I935,. 15, 8 Jahrb. H. E. (1936) 
No._619. 
168 Infra notes 2.2.•1-J 22.5. 
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divorce irrespective of the public order of the national law, 
where their own public policy was not offended.164 But actually 
courts generally follow their own principle on status questions. 
An Italian national who has obtained a divorce in the United 
States is not allowed to remarry in France, Germany, Cuba, 
or any other country following the nationality rule.165 Under 
the Swedish statute, however, the exception obtains that, if a 
party's marriage has been dissolved in one country and he is 
prohibited from remarrying under another foreign law, i.e., 
his personal law, his second marriage should not be annulled 
on this ground.166 
(b) Marriage celebrated within the forum. The Argentine 
Civil Marriage Law 167 declares that a party to an Argentine 
marriage cannot remarry after a foreign absolute divorce. 
The prevailing, though contested, interpretation considers 
the foreign dissolution of a marriage celebrated in Argentina 
invalid 168 and the foreign dissolution of a foreign marriage 
valid, even to the extent that the parties may remarry in 
Argentina. Consistently with the principle of domicil, no dis-
tinction is drawn according to the nationality of the parties. 
The situation is still more striking with respect to the Treaty 
of Montevideo on civil international law, which expressly for-
bids the dissolution of a marriage celebrated in a country not 
permitting divorce (i.e., a participant state).169 The courts 
of Uruguay feel authorized, by the clause of the Final Pro-
tocol reserving public policy, to pronounce divorces of Argen-
tine nationals domiciled in Uruguay without any regard to 
164 See, for instance, Trib. Seine (Nov. 18, 1901) Clunet 1902, 103. 
1~ Cj. RAAPE 424; differently 3 FRANKENSTEIN 100, 563. 
166 Swedish Marriage Law of 1904, c. 2 § 2. 
167 Art. 7· 
168 See supra p. 432, n. 178. 
169 The courts are decided on this point; see RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. 
Priv. 319; 2 V1co 87, and recently Cam. civ. 2 de la Cap. (Dec. 30, 1940) 
21 La Ley 440 (marriage celebrated in Delaware, U.S., dissolved in Montevi-
deo) with dicta for the case of marriages celebrated in a country where divorce 
is prohibited. 
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the place of celebration of the marriage. 170 In Argentina, 
while there remains some doubt about the Civil Code, there 
can be none concerning the express provision of the treaty 
(art. I 3), requiring that the law of the place where the mar-
riage was celebrated must concur with the law of the matri-
monial domicil in permitting a divorce. This provision inserted 
in favor of Argentine law leaves the Argentine courts no choice 
in refusing recognition to Uruguayan divorces of parties mar-
ried in Argentina. 171 A second marriage celebrated in Uruguay 
is considered null, 172 i.e., as either adultery or concubinage 
with appropriate effects, 173 the children illegitimate, 174 the 
wife unable to obtain maintenance or, a&er dissolution of the 
second marriage, alimony.175 All this construed under the 
sanction of an int~rnational treaty sounds strange.176 
Under the new draft of the Montevideo Treaty, third 
member states are to recognize any divorce rendered at the 
marital domicil; this, of course, restores the full impact of 
the domiciliary principle, which is otherwise con~iderably re-
stricted by the present treaty.177 
In Chile, the matter is covered by three sections not quite 
consistent, from which it has been concluded that persons 
17° For a recent example see Ap. Montevideo (Feb. I9, I94I) 39 Rev. Der. 
Juris. Adm. 82. Opinion of CALANDRELLI cited and approved by Cam. civ, 2 
de la Cap. (Dec. 30, I94o), supra n. I69. 
111 Recent surveys on the attitude of the Argentine courts: 5 Boletin del 
Instituto de Ensefianza Practica de la Facultad de Buenos Aires (I939) I991 
Note in 39 Rev. Der. Juris. Adm. (I94I) 8z. 
112 Cam. civ. 2 de la Cap. (May 8, I93I) 35 Jur. Arg. 94I; (Nov. 14, I9J2) 
IOI Gac. del Foro too; Cam. civ. I de la Cap. (Sept. u, I932) 39 Jur. Arg. 
371 and (Feb. I9, I934) 45 ibid. 270; and after others (Oct. 24, I938) 35 Jur. 
Arg. 94I, 
173 Cam. civ. 1 de la Cap. (Sept. u, 1932) 39 Jur. Arg. 37I-4o8; Cam. civ. 
2 de la Cap. (Nov. 14, I932) 101 Gac. del Foro Ioo. 
174 2 Vrco 8 I no. I o9b. 
175 Ap. Buenos Aires (March 14, I935) Revista del Foro (Peru) I 935, 952, 
954, Clunet I937, 124. 176 2 Vrco 84. Yet the new draft, art; I5, changes nothing in this particular, 
except that the Argentine courts will not be explicitly compelled by the wording 
of the treaty to maintain the prevailing interpretation of art. 7 of their Civil 
Marriage Law. 
177 Treaty on international civil law, draft of I94o, arts. IS and 59· 
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married in Chile, whether Chileans or foreigners, if divorced 
abroad, may not remarry in Chile, although their foreign 
remarriage would be recognized. 178 
(c) Foreigners. Divorce of foreigners by a foreign decree 
has usually been recognized despite a municipal law hostile 
to divorce, although often after some hesitancy. The forum is 
considered not really interested in the status of foreigners. 179 
Moreover, a foreign divorce has been regarded as creating 
vested rights. 180 
The French Supreme Court, at the time when divorce was 
forbidden in France, held that a foreign divorcee could marry 
a Frenchman in the country.181 Along the same line of think-
ing, Italian courts, after having been divided on the question 
for a long time, are now prepared to grant a decree of ex-
equatur for foreign divorce decrees concerning non-Italian 
parties, including former Italian nationals, 182 and do not ob-
ject to the remarriage of such parties in ltaly.183 This liberal 
attitude suffers an exception, if any, only in the case of a 
marriage celebrated in Italy in accordance with a canonical 
ceremony and with civil effects, 184 for such a marriage is ex-
clusively subjected to the ecclesiastical tribunals and there-
118 Chile, C. C. arts. 120, I2 t; Ley de Matrimonio Civil, art. I 5· See VELOSO 
CHAVEZ, Derecho Interriacional Privado (I931) II7, II8. 
179 See QUADRI, 3 Giur. Camp. DIP. no. 32. 
18° Cf. e.g., NIBOYET, Revue Crit. I936, I3o; ZuLETA (Colombian), Comision 
de Reforma del Codigo Civil (1939-1940) 96; So-ro, ibid. 233 . 
. 
181 French Cass. (civ.) (Feb. :1.8, t86o) D.t 86o.1.57, S.r 86t.t.2 Io; cf. 
Cour Orleans (April I9, r86o) D.186o.z.82 (same case); Cass. (civ.) (July 15, 
1878) D.r878.I.340, Clunet I878, 499· For justification see 3 ARMINJON 44; 
suggesting that the most practical and also most equitable solution is not to 
question what has been done in the domain of another system. 
182 See infra n. 22 I. 
183 App. Roma (Oct. 29, 1884) Clunet I886, 6zo; App. Milano (Nov. 29, 
1887) Clunet 1889, 168; Cass. Torino (Aug. 1, I922) Clunet 192.3, 391; Cass. 
(April 8, 1931) Foro ltal. 1931, I, 546, Clunet 1932, 22.2.; App. Milano 
(Apri123, 1931) Clunet 1932.• 519 (Hungarians divorced in Hungary). 
184 A pure ecclesiastical ceremony does not count here because it is of no eff.ect 
under Italian law. 
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• fore susceptible only of annulment and separation from bed 
and board.185 
While in Italy a canonical ceremony is always voluntary, 
since a secular form also exists, in Spain every marriage of 
Catholics pertains to the Church.180 But even an American 
citizen, not a Catholic, married in Spain and divorced any-
where, is considered unable under Spanish law to remarry in 
Spain.187 Likewise, the Polish Supreme Court held that, under 
the applicable Polish law, an American citizen of Catholic 
faith who had been 'married and d{vorced in the United States 
could not remarry in the former Austrian and Russian part of 
Poland.188 
Particular rigor obtained in Brazil, as the courts, despite 
their former nationality principle, generally denied recog-
nition to foreign divorces not only of Brazilian nationals but 
also of foreigners domiciled in Brazil. 189 This policy may find 
even more support under the new law. 
(d) Bigamy. It must be noted that nonrecognition in the 
185 App. Milano (Dec. z7, I938) Foro Ital. I939, I, IZI6, Clunet I939, 
763, I9 Rivista (I940) 99, on the basis of Cass. (June I I, I934) Foro Ital. 
1934, I, 1o6z. Contra: App. Brescia (Nov. 9, 1938) Foro ltal. 1939, I, 12.u, 
Clunet I939, 763; and App. Brescia (Oct. 2.7, 1938) Rivista I939, 407. Cf. 
Bosco, zs Rivista (I933) 38. 186 Spanish C. C. arts. 42., 75ff.; Trib. Sup~. (March 31, 1911) Revue 1914, 
6J5. 187 In the prevailing opinion, 'the law of Spain is identified with Canon Law 
to the extent that, on principle, no divorce a vinculo is either granted or 
recognized, even to non-Catholics, despite their national law permitting it. Trib. 
Supr. (March 3I, 19I1) Revue 1914, 635; LASALLA LLANAS 139; TRiAs DE 
BEs, Estudios de derecho internacional privado 42.9 n. z and Der. Int. Priv. no. 
143. It is no true exception that a foreign civil marriage of Catholics may be • 
divorced abroad; the marriage itself is invalid in the eyes of Canon Law; See 
CoVIAN, Art. Divorce in 12. Enciclopedia Jur. Esp. 446, 448. For other literature, 
cf. SERIN, Les conflits de lois dans les rapports franco-espagnols en matiere de 
mariage, de divorce and de separation de corps (19z9) 87. 
In Brazil to the same effect Ct. App. Civ. Rio de Janeiro (Oct. z., I919) 55 
Revista dir. civ. (192.0) 52.3, Clunet I92.1, 990; but see supra n. 159. 
188 Polish S. Ct. (Dec. I 7, I 9 3 6) 4 Z.osteurop.R. ( 19 3 7) 4 7. 189 The principle has been stated, although breaking it by majority vote by 
a very cautiously framed exception, in the decision of the Sup. Trib. Fed; no. 
993 (July 17, I940) 58 Arch. Jud. 83 on the ground of jurisdictional considera-
tions that may be questioned. 
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cases discussed under (a) and (c) supra does not mean that 
remarriage following the divorce is bigamous in the criminal 
sense. Even the Spanish Supreme Court, after having de-
clared invalid a German divorce of a German national who 
had undergone a Catholic marriage ceremony in Spain, 
refused to consider his remarriage bigamous because in 
accordance with his national law he could well think his action 
justified.190 As the Treaty of Montevideo has been under-
stood 191 and as its new draft expressly states, 192 entering upon 
a second marriage after divorce at the matrimonial domicil 
does not constitute bigamy under any law in the member states, 
including Argentina. 
6. Requirement of Similar Grounds 
(a) In most states of the United States, at English common 
law, 193 and in many other countries, it is immaterial whether 
the ground upon which a foreign divorce is based is adequate 
under the law of the forum too. 
(b) In a number of jurisdictions, however, domiciliaries or 
nationals, as the status principle may be, are protected against 
foreign divorce decisions, unless there is agreement with the 
divorce grounds established by the lex fori. 
An important example is given by the New York courts, 
whose traditional policy so far has been to refuse to recognize 
190 Trib. Sup. (April 7, I9I5) 12 Revista Der. Jur. y Ciencias Soc. (Chile) 
(I9I5) part 3, 9, Clunet I9I7, 732, Revue I9l9, 6II (the divorce in the case 
was invalidated by Trib. Sup. (March 3I, I9II) Revue I9I4, 635, cited 
supra n. p. 5oi, n. I87). 
191 Argentina: Cam. crim. de la Cap. (July I, I932) 38 J. A. IZJ7· See also 
z V1co 8J no. Io9a. 
192 ( 1940) art. 15b. 
193 The doubt whether the lex domicilii abroad could also govern the case of an 
English marriage was removed by Harvey v. Farnie [I88z-I88J] 8 App. Cas. 
43; Pemberton v. Hughes [1899] 1 Ch. 781; Bater v. Bater [1906] P. zo9 by 
Sir Gorell Barnes at z 1 7; the principle was recently confirmed by Mezger v. 
Mezger [1936] 3 All E. R. qo, [1937] P. 19 (conduct short of adultery 
under§ I568 German C. C.). 
Similarly, Canada: Leigh v. Leigh (Ont. Ct. App.) [I937] I D. L. R. 773 
(Michigan decree on the ground of desertion to Canadian residence). 
Greece: 6 Repert. 430 no. 98. 
• 
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any decree of divorce obtained "upon grounds insufficient for 
that purpose in this state, when the divorced defendant resides 
in this state and was not personally served with process and 
did not appear in1the action." 194 The last limitation, of course, 
was necessitated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
Constitution but also seems to be in accord with Gould v. 
Gould, 195 dealing with a French decree. This practice evi-
dently is affected by Williams v. North Carolina. 
British subjects, domiciled in England or Scotland but 
living in India or certain other British possessions, may obtain 
divorce in the local courts under the Indian and Colonial Di-
vorce Jurisdiction Act of 1926; among other conditions, the 
grounds of divorce must be those recognized by English 
law.196 
An analogous restriction with respect to foreign divorces 
of their nationals obtains in a number of countries following 
the nationality principle.197 
~94 Johnson v. Johnson (1933) 146 N. Y. Misc. 93, 95, 261 N. Y. Supp. 
523, p6; the rule has been steady since Jackson v. Jackson (t8o6) 1 N.Y. 
(Johns. Cas.) 424; cf. Beeck v. Beeck (1925) 2II App. Div. 720, 208 N.Y. 
Supp. 98. 
195 (1923) 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490. 
195 Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. V, c. 
40; 3 &4 Geo. VI, c. 35: Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1940, 
301. 
197 France: Trib. civ. Seine (May 2, i9I8) Clunet 19I8, n82 (even with 
respect to foreigners). Trib. civ. Seine (June to, 1936) D. H. 1936, 420 
.(exequatur denied one spouse being of French nationality and the ground for 
divorce not agreeing with French law). NIBOYET 754 bases the rule on the idea 
that there is no vested interest, 
Greece: Trib. Athens, 47 Themis 582, Clunet I937, 597 (Turkish decree). 
The Netherlands: H. R. (Nov. 24, 1916) W. 10098; Rb. Rotterdam (June 
28, 1935) W. IZ99I (South African decree). Does H. R. (April I, 1938) W. 
1938, no. 989, however, give the judge discretion even over status judgments? 
See VANDER FLIER, Grotius 1939, 204, 208. 
Poland: Law of 1926 on private international law, art. I7 § 3 provides that 
Polish law must be applied; in more recent practice, however, recognition is 
denied unless a treaty assures reciprocity, see supra p. 398, n. 30. 
Portugal: (probably also beyond the domain of the Hague Convention) see 
CUNHA GONC):ALVES, I Direito Civil 692 pars. 1 and 2. 
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. to, 1930) 56 BGE. II 335 and (May 13, 1938) 
64 BGE. II 76 at 78 (if one of the spouses is a Swiss national and domiciliary, 
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In Germany, however, it is sufficient that the foreign decree 
state facts which constitute valid grounds for divorce under 
German law, 198 although the decree may have been based 
upon other grounds or no grounds at all or upon mutual 
agreement. This theory of substitute ground is a concession to 
a more liberal coru:eption of migratory divorce but gives 
meager justification for the fortuitous chances of searching in 
a foreign decree for facts held irrelevant by the foreign court. 
(c) A corresponding regard for the legislation of third 
states is shown by the Swedish law, 199 providing that a divorce 
decree rendered by a foreign authority may not be recognized, 
unless a ground for divorce existed under the law of the state 
whose nationals the parties were. 
7· Evasion 
(a) Fictitious change of personal law. The requirements of 
similar grounds and also in part of jurisdiction result in a bar 
to subjects of the forum who seek dissolution of their mar-
riages abroad under easier conditions than they find at home. 
Indeed, a considerable number of the cases which have been 
termed evasion from or circumvention of the domestic pro-
visions on divorce are sufficiently dealt with under the heading 
of exclusive jurisdiction of the forum or ·lack of international 
jurisdiction of the divorce court. 
the rule of NAG. art. 7g par. 3 that Swiss jurisdiction and law give way to the 
foreign domicil is inapplicable). 
Cuba: Divorce law (Decreto-Ley) 2.06 of May 1o, 1934, art. 58: Foreign 
divorce judgments between Cubans and foreigners are recognized if the basis 
of the judgment was equal or analogous to any of the divorce grounds recogl)ized 
in the above Decreto-Ley 2.06. 
In Peru a similar principle seems indicated by the decision of the Lima court 
of Oct. 4> 1935, Revista del Foro 1935; 913, Clunet 1937, 12.4, recognizing 
dissolution of a marriage celebrated in Peru between a foreign diplomat and 
a formerly Peruvian woman, because the divorce was based on grounds recog-
nized in the recent Peruvian C. C. 
198 C. Civ. Proc. § 32.8 no. 4 in combination with EG. art. 17 par. 4, as 
interpreted by RG. (Apri14, 192.8) 12.1 RGZ. 2.4. 
199 Law of 1904 with amendments, c. 3 § 5· 
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(b) Fictitious change of domicil. Fictitious change of 
domicil occurs in the frequent cases where the parties falsely 
assert that a domicil exists within the divorce forum, as de-
manded both by the divorce court and the court of recognition. 
The British 200 and Swiss 201 authorities consider collusion or 
fraud going to the root of the jurisdiction as a defense against 
recognition. Similarly, all American courts seem to hold that 
recognition is not due to a divorce obtained under a "residence 
simulated for this purpose" or not established "bona fide with 
intention of a permanent domicil." 202 This rule has been 
developed, in contrast to the English doctrine,203 under the 
standard of the state where the judgment is rendered and not 
of the forum of recognition. "With respect to divorce decrees, 
however, the result is hardly distinguishable, and this is true 
also of the five state statutes and various court practices 204 
that contemplate the same factual situation from the angle of 
the evaded domiciliary law. The Massachusetts and Maine 
statutes preceded and the statutes of Delaware, New Jersey, 
and Wisconsin followed and adopted the evasion section of 
the otherwise ill-fated Uniform Annulment of Marriage and 
Divorce Act; 205 they deny force to a foreign decree of di-
vorce if, to use the wording of the Delaware statute: 206 
"Any inhabitant of this State shall go into another State, 
territory or country in order to obtain a decree of divorce for 
a cause which occurred while the parties resided in this State, 
200 Bater v. Bater [1906] P. 209; cf. Mezger v. Mezger [1937] P. 19; Crowe 
v. Crowe (1937) 157 L. T. R. 557· 
201 BEcK, NAG. 359 no. 100 with literature. 
202 See cases in 2 7 C. J. S. ( 1941) Divorce § 3 32 n. 11 ; see also SCHOULER, 
Domestic Relations§ 1983, 2101; 1 WHARTON § 228. 
203 See YNTEMA, supra n. 136, 387. 
204 VREELAND 329 places twelve states in this category. 
205 The Uniform State Law was drafted by the Divorce Congress of Philadel-
phia in November, 1906, and approved by the Commissioners but finally retired 
by them to be replaced by the draft of a Uniform Divorce Jurisdiction Act of 
1930, based on other princieles. 
206 Del. Rev. C. (1935) § 3525, identical with the model. 
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or for a cause which is not ground for divorce under the laws 
of this State." 
This text with its twin clauses, however, is puzzling. 
In the second clause, ''inhabitant" clearly means, as it does 
generally, a domiciliary who has remained domiciled in the 
state. This case, "or for a cause, etc.," may be fairly well 
defined by assuming that the parties were in fact continuously 
domiciled in the state of recognition and that they or the 
plaintiff fraudulently alleged that they were domiciled in the 
divorce forum and, furthermore, that the ground upon which 
the decree was rendered is no cause for divorce in the state. 
The first case, "cause which occurred, etc.," looks mysterious. 
"Inhabitant" must have the same meaning as in the second 
alternative, and this seems to be generally agreed, since the 
statutes, with the possible exception of New Jersey, are not 
applied where the parties move to another state for purposes 
other than to obtain a divorce. 207 If, thus, the first case is also 
concerned with a fictitious foreign domicil, what is left for 
the second case? For, if all causes that occurred during the 
residence of the parties in the state are precluded from con-
sideration by the divorce forum, what other cause can practi-
cally be in question? Perhaps the draftsmen thought that 
even a cause which is legally sufficient in both jurisdictions 
should be averred and decided exclusively by the court at the 
actual domicil; thus, the first clause would favor the juris-
dictional and the second the substantive law of the domicil. 
But there is no confirmation of such an interpretation to be 
found anywhere; Vreeland, the sole critic, contents himself 
with rejecting the entire clause as indefensible on principle.208 
~07 See 1 WHARTON § zz9 for the Massachusetts statute; Note in 7 Minn. L. 
Rev. (19z3) 2.40 and especially as to and against some mysterious decisions of 
the New Jersey Supreme Court, Note, ZI Mich. L. Rev. (19z3) 9zz; GooDRICH 
(ed. t) § IZ7 n. 39i VREELAND IJ51 330. 
208 VREELAND 340. We may presume a connection with the obscure limita-
tions of jurisdiction discussed supra p. 454· 
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It has been held that divorce void under these rules cannot 
be subject to estoppel.2°9 
(c) Fictitious change of nationality. In a less obvious way, 
change of l)-ationality has also sometimes been termed fictitious 
and hence regarded as incapable of supporting recognition of 
a divorc<:: granted under the new national law. For a better 
understanding, one ought to remember the migratory divorces, 
typified by the pilgrimages of Americans to Paris, Reno, and 
Chihuahua. When divorce was forbidden in France, the Bauf-
fremont-Bibesco case discussed below was a celebrated ex-
ample. Austrian Catholics went over the Hungarian border 
for divorce. Italians, whose law still prevents absolute divorce, 
emigrated to Fiume to be divorced, so long as that city did 
not belong to Italy. 
The Bauffremont case was the cornerstone of a French doc-
trine of fraude a la loi, which, enjoying for a time great 
prominence, opposed evasion of the law of the forum by 
agreements, adoptions, and gifts, as well as by divorces and 
judicial separations, the latter, however, being known as the 
classic domain of this doctrine. 210 The princess of Bau:ffremont, 
Belgian by birth and French by marriage, changed her citizen-
ship by naturalization in the then independent German state 
of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and was there divorced under her new 
personal law; then she married the Rumanian prince Bibesco. 
The French Court of Cassation declared the naturalization of 
the woman, as well as her divorce and remarriage, fraudulent 
and void, these acts having occurred for the sole purpose of 
escaping from the prohibitions of the French law.211 This doc-
trine has been followed in other French decisions and by Bel-
209 See JACOBS, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 MichL. Rev. (1936) 749, 
777, n. 127 and n. u8. 
210 DEGAND, 5 Repert. 5 54 no. 8o. 
211 Cass. (civ.) (March 18, 1878) S.1878.L193; see also the similar case 
Vidal, Cour Paris (June 30, 1877) Clunet 1878, :z68, where the fraud was 
agreed upon by both parties. 
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gian, Italian, and Latin American courts 212 but has slowly 
lost its force in France itself.213 The writers are aware that 
the acquisition of a foreign citizenship is an exercise of foreign 
state sovereignty that cannot be denied. 214 Moreover, the con-
ception of fraude ala loi has made way in prevailing theory 
for a more general and elastic idea of public policy. 
In Italy, however, where the subject of forbidden divorce 
remains of particular importance, courts and writers insist 
that a change of ·nationality may well be simulated by the 
parties for divorce purposes, i.e., not seriously intended, which 
is different indeed from acts so intended to evade the law. If 
they intend in reality to remain Italians and formally to re-
gain their Italian citizenship at the first possible moment, 
especially when they have not transferred their domicil to 
their alleged new homeland, according to an express require-
ment of the Italian nationality law, 215 they may have acquired 
a second nationality abroad but not lost the Italian one. Since 
they have double nationality, they are treated, according to 
the rule,216 as nationals.217 
(d) Effective change of personal law. Indeed, the main 
doctrine of divorces in fraudem legis has been abandoned in 
212 Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Aug. 5, 188o) Clunet 188o, so8 (in the same 
affaire Bauffremont); Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 19, 1882) Clunet 1882, 364. 
Italy: App. Torino (July 22, 1912) 6 Rivista (19u) 588, Revue 1914, 187; 
App. Trento (Feb. 26, 1930) 23 Rivista (I93I) 248. 
213 PERROUD, Clunet I926, 19; AuDINET, II Recueil I926 I 226; J. DoN-
NEDIEU DE VABRES 48I; contra: DEGAND, 5 Repert. 555 no. 83. 
214 See especially the Italian writers ANZILOTTI, 6 Rivista ( I9rz) 595; 
UDINA, Elementi no. 137; also FEDOZZI 277, 482, although he retains a distinct 
theory of fraud. 
215 Act no. 555 of June IJ, 1912, art. 8. 
216 See supra p. no. 
217 Cass. Torino (April II, I92I) IS Rivista (I923) I53i App. Brescia 
(Jan. 24, 1923) Clunet 1924, 257; App. Genova (May 24> I923) Clunet 
I924, IIZ9· Cj. the writers cited in note 2I4 mpra. 
In France, LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE I 3 7 no. I I 4 contends that the courts 
are unable to set aside the acquisition of a foreign nationality by an individual 
but are able to restore his character as a Frenchman, if the conditions of natu-
ralization have been proved fictitious, the naturalized person never having. in-
tended to settle outside of France. 
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France. 218 By changing nationality, a party changes his per-
sonallaw automatically. Divorce under the acquired statute is 
said to be not fraudulentagainst the prohibition of divorce but 
against the law of nationality, and consequently the former 
country cannot react through private lawsuits, though it may 
refuse the person's reinstatement to his previous nationality. 
Italian courts have recognized most of the Fiume di-
vorces 219 and similar decrees that came before them. 220 The 
highest court recently confirmed the principle, hitherto pre-
vailing though contested, that exequatur is not denied a 
foreign decree, even if the parties were formerly of Italian 
nationality. 221 
Italy, however, resorts to political measures against former 
Italians divorced abroad. Ordinarily, they are barred from re-
g~ining Italian citizenship,222 and an Italian intending to 
marry such a person is not likely to obtain the governmental 
authorization prescribed by Fascist discriminatory legisla-
tion.223 
The Austrian Supreme Court went so far as to recognize 
not only the divorce of a former Austrian of Catholic faith 
who had become a Czechoslovakian citizen, but also the un-
218 Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 5, I922) Clunet I929, 1258; Trib. civ. Seine (July I5, 
I935) Clunet I936, 867. With respect to the underlying theory, cf. J. DoN-
NEDIEU DE VABRES 48 I n. 4• 
219 The divorce decrees of Fiume granted to Italian nationals have :finally 
been confirmed on the whole by Royal Decree of March 20, I924, no. 352 art. 
4; cf. App. Roma (May 3I, I927) Giur. Ital. I927, I, 2, 400. 
220 E.g. App. Milano (Nov. 24, I92o) Monitore I92I, I8, Clunet I921, 
625; and now in the :first place Cass. (June 8, 1932) Foro Ital. I932> I, I452, 
25 Rivista (I933) 91; App. Bologna (June 4, I936) Giur. ltal. I936, I, 2, 
422 (Hungarjan decree); App. Trieste (April 22, I937) Giur. Ital. I937, I, 
2, 29 8 (Greek decree). There are contrary decisions, however, where the 
Hague Convention does not eliminate the question, see e.g. Cass. Roma (May 
I5, I928) Clunet I93I, 758; App. Roma (Dec. I5, I936) Giur. ltal. I937> 
I, 2, 209 (Turkish decree). 
221 Cass. (July I3, 1939) Foro ltal. I939> I, 1097, Rivista I940, 478, the -; 
court recalls the plenary decision of Cass. Roma (Dec. 30, I 9 I I) Foro Ita!. 
I9I2, I, I48 and others; cf. the note ibid. 
~22 Law of June 13, I912, no. 555 on nationality, art. 9· 
223 Law of November I7, I9J8, no. I728, art. 2; see SERINI, "Legal Problems 
of Divorce in Italy," 28 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) 293. 
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married status of the other party who had remained an 
Austrian national, 224 and to consider unmarried an Austrian 
Catholic woman who had changed to a foreign nationality, 
obtained a divorce, and then resumed her Austrian citizen-
ship.225 
The Tribunal of Amsterdam had recently to decide a case 
which could be regarded as a true prototype of a fraudulent 
divorce.'226 A Dutchman clandestinely acquired Estonian na-
tionality and, on the basis of a brief residence in Riga, obtained 
a Latvian divorce from his wife under the rather scandalous 
procedure of Latvia. The court acknowledged that the woman 
had become an -Estonian citizen without knowing it and 
thereby was subjected to the law of that nationality. Fortu-
nately, the judges found an older agreement of maintenance 
which could be taken as a basis for allocating adequate com-
pensation to the wife. This rule also obtains in Brazil. 227 
An important limitation is contained in the Hague Con-
vention on Divorce (art. 7 in conjunction with art. 4). It may 
be il.lustrated by the following example. Italian spouses ac-
quired Hungarian nationality and obtained a divorce in a 
Hungarian court on the ground of desertion; the time of the 
desertion was calculated by including six months during which 
the parties still had been of Italian nationality. Recognition 
was refused in Italy.228 
224 0GH. (June 30, 1937) Zentralblatt 1937, 814 no. 46o; Clunet 1938, 
354· This liberal practice was initiated by the plenary decision of Dec. II, 
1924, 6 SZ. no. 396, Judikatenbuch no. 18, and continued in numerous later 
decisions, for instance OGH. (May II, 1932) 14 SZ. no. 108; (Nov. 14, 1934) 
8 Jahrb. HR. 1935, no. 28; (Sept. 24, 1935) 8 Jahrb. HR. 1935, no. 2161, 
with the exception, however, of that of OGH. (March 27, 1935) 8 Jahrb. HR. 
1935, nos. 1564, 1565, Clunet 1935, 1028. Cj. WALKER 635. 
225 OGH. (May II, 1932) 14 SZ. no. 108, I Giur. Comp. DIP. 327; OGH. 
(Oct. 8, 1935) J.Bl. 1936, I03; Clunet 1937, 335· Cj. WALKER in r KLANG's 
Kommentar 321, 322. 
226 Rb. Amsterdam (Dec. 22, 1936) W. 1937, no. 47· 
227 BEVILAQUA, 6 Repert. 167 no. 43· 
228 See ultimately App. Firenze (Feb. 25, I933) 25 Rivista (I933) 467; Cass. 
(Nov. 15, 1932) I Giur. Comp. DIP. 391 no. 104; Cass. (Jan. 15, I937) Foro 
Ital. 1937, I, 217, Giur. Ital. 1937, I, 1, uo and the literature cited by MoNACO, 
7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 153. 
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8. Additional Application of Public Policy 
With all the many specific obstacles to recognition of 
foreign divorce decrees, it seldom happens that the subsidiary 
intervention of public policy in its general functions is in-
voked. Just one case may be reported; the Tribunal de la 
Seine rejected the prayer of a French woman for recognition 
of a German decree of divorce which declared her guilty of 
anti-German utterances-a paradoxical treatment of the ap-
plicant. 229 
9· Renvoi 
An interesting regard for the personal law has been intro-
duced into the English and the New York law by a practice 
related to renvoi. In the English case of Armitage v. Attorney 
General/30 a divorce decree granted in South Dakota was 
recognized in England, because it would have been recognized 
in New York where the matrimonial domicil was. It is gener-
ally concluded therefrom that any decree affecting the status 
of husband and wife which is held valid by the private inter-
national law of the domicil, is effectual in England. 231 
New York courts have established an analogous practice in 
connection with their well-known special rule by which they 
refuse to recognize as binding a foreign divorce decree against 
a spouse domiciled in New York, who was not personally 
served with process. Although the rule is said to be for the 
protection of New York citizens, in the case where the de-
fendant is domiciled in another state, the courts of New York 
make their position dependent upon the effect given to the 
decree in the state of the defendant's domicil when ren-
229 Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 231 1922) Clunet 1923, 295 criticized by 3 FRANK· 
ENSTEIN 543 n. x6. For the disregard of penal prohibitions to remarry con-
tained in foreign divorce decrees see SECRET AN, Revue 19261 219, and supra p. 
283, -n. 169. 
230 [x9o6] P. 135. 
231 CHESHIRE 363; cf. FALCONBR!DGE, "Conflict of Laws as to Nullity and 
Divorce," [1932] 4 D.L.R. x, 44· 
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dered.232 Extension of this renvoi has been advocated as a 
vigorous contribution to greater uniformity.233 
In an analogous way, under the principle of nationality, 
as we have seen, consistency requires that a divorce rendered 
in a state other than the national state should be recognized 
in third countries, if recognized in the national state. 234 Thus, 
indeed, some uniformity is achieved. 
Illustrations: (i) (AG. Hannover (Oct. ro, 1931) 
IPRspr. 1932, no. 73.) Both parties were of Argentine na-
tionality; they had married in Argentina. A divorce obtained 
in Uruguay was not recognized by the German court, because 
it was not recognizable under Argentine law. 
(ii) (KG. (Feb. II, 1938) JW. 1938, 870.) The husband 
of Austrian nationality and Catholic faith was domiciled in 
Budapest, Hungary; the wife had acquired Hungarian na-
tionality. The divorce rendered in Hungary was sufficient to 
allow the woman to remarry even under Austrian practice. 235 
This Austrian practice has to be followed, said the Court of 
Appeals of Berlin. 
A further case brings us to a combined application of the 
New York rule and this European rule. 
(iii) (KG. (Oct. 14, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 147.) Both 
parties were Germans who had emigrated to the United 
States, seemingly to New York. The wife established domicil 
~32 Ball v. Cross (1921) 231 N.Y. 329, 132 N. E. 106; Dean v. Dean ( 1925) 
241 N.Y. 240, 149 N. E. 844; Powell v. Powell (1925) 2u App. Div. 75o, 
208 N.Y. Supp. 153; c/.·Restatement, New York Annotations§ 113, 86. 
233 39 Harv. L. Rev. (1926) 640; LoRENZEN, "Renvoi in Divorce Proceed-
ings Based upon Constructive Service," 31 Yale L. J. (1922) 191, 194; Lor-
enzen suggests applying this doctrine to foreign parties; this seems possible with-
out difficulty if we conceive of the New York rule as based on domicil rather 
than on the citizenship of the parties. 
234 Austria: WALKER 730. 
Germany: supra n. 1 6 5. 
In France, a similar result should follow from the two generally adopted 
requirements for recognizing a foreign decree, that it must originate from a 
court having jurisdiction by French conceptions and that the decision should 
agree with that obtainable in application of French conflicts law; but see the 
controversy reported in 10 Repert. 150. ' 
Switzerland: controversy, see BECK, NAG. 396 no. 12. 
235 Supra n. 224. 
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCE 513 
in Reno and obtained a divorce there. The husband lived at 
the commencement of the suit in Brooklyn and later in Man-
hattan. The first condition for recognizing the Nevada decree 
in Germany was (C. Civ. Proc. § 328, no. I) that the courts of 
the state to which the foreign tribunal belongs are competent 
according to German laws, i. e., of the domicil of the husband 
(C. Civ. Proc. § 13 par. I) at the decisive moment of the di-
vorce suit (C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. I). The Court of Appeals 
of Berlin held that the "state" to which the Reno. court "be-
longed" was Nevada and not the United States, an obviously 
correct statement. 236 But the court dismissed the suit for 
recognition for the sole reason that the husband was not 
domiciled in Nevada but in New York. It should have asked 
the question whether a New York court would recognize the 
decree, although the answer might have been in the negative 
on the ground of the special rule of New York. 
· If the domicil of the defendant husband, at the time of the 
commencement of the action had been, for example, in Con-
necticut and later in New York, the Nevada decree would 
have been recognized in Connecticut-upon the mere per-
sonal service of the husband in Connecticut 237-and therefore 
also in New York, since commencement of the divorce action 
is regarded as the decisive moment for fixing jurisdiction. In 
consequence, the German court would have to recognize the 
divorce, whatever the German theory as to the time element 
maybe. 
III. CoNCLUSIONS 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in recent times, has 
evidently found it necessary to smooth out the complicated con-
ditions of mutual recognition of divorce decrees among the 
states. Thus far, the Court has increased the import of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause in two respects. The Davis 
case 238 has declared that a party contesting in the divorce state 
236 Cf. also annotation on the case, I Giur. Cornp. DIP. I 50 no. 39· 
237 Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve (I914) 88 Conn. 689, 9z Atl. 684 (regard-
ing a South Dakota decree). 
238 Supra p. 469. 
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the validity of a divorce on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 
for instance, by appeal, forfeits his right of collateral attack in 
all other states. The Williams case 239 enlarges the domain of 
compulsory recognition by eliminating the defense based on 
lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 
This second step effectuates a far-reaching simplification of 
the rules on recognition. Moreover, and this is a point well to 
be noticed, an ancient remainder is eradicated, to the great 
benefit of rational procedure; the lawyers of this country cus-
tomarily think of "personal jurisdiction" as based on deter-
minate manners of service of process. But the manner in which 
a defendant is cited to attend the trial seems out of relation to 
modern circumstances. What does it practically mean in our 
days, whether a party receives a summons to appear in court 
by the hands of a sheriff or marshal, by Federal mail, or by 
any reliable means of communication at whatever place in the 
United States? A husband or wife, in particular, may very well 
be required to traverse any distance in the country in such a vital 
cause. The costs of travel may make a difference, but, at that, 
the matter of bearing the costs may or may not need a general 
reform. On the whole, the ruling that the domicil of one party 
supports divorce jurisdiction, according to most of the state 
statutes before the Williams case and under the Constitution 
according to this decision, is not so much of an innovation as a 
clarification and simplification of the subject. 
However, this change of law will signify salutary progress, 
only if the domicil of at least one of the parties in the divorce 
state remains a basic postulate, strongly enforced by all courts 
involved. It is not very encouraging that this point was dis-
carded so easily in the decision of the Williams case. The neces-
sity of a serious and honest domicil has become the only remain-
ing protection of deserted spouses and, what is more, of the 
divorce legislations so ambitiously advanced in individual 
239 Supra p. 467. 
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states. Without this last barrier, it would be true that the laxest 
divorce practice would prevail over all others. 
In the light of this experience, the tendency of the Davis 
case or, to be specific, the application of the "boot strap doc-
trine" to divorce, is frankly to be regretted. If divorce juris-
diction be assumed on a fake affirmation of domicil, the mis-
take is not effaced by its repetition. Courts may be inclined to 
construe a defendant's acquies!=ence to allegations of domi-
ciliary facts or to a judgment as effective waiver of the right 
of collateral attack, although this clearly runs against the old 
established principles prohibiting parties to a matrimonial 
cause from disposing of their rights. But to treat a protesting 
party like an agreeing one, in conflict with the principle that a 
party specially appearing for the purpose of denying juris-
diction should not lose thereby his analogous defense in 
another state, is particularly bad law in a field where truth 
should prevail. 
The most effective weapon to fight evasion would be the re-
quirement of a "minimum residence," if sternly observed in 
granting jurisdiction by the court of divorce and likewise in 
other courts when they re-examine the existence of a bona fide 
domicil in the divorce state. Quite recently, Lorenzen also has 
suggested that residence should extend over a reasonable pe-
riod of residence, "say six months" and seriously considers 
that the Supreme Court or Congressional legislation should re-
quire such period as a requisite of due process. This cor-
roborates my postulate, with the difference that Lorenzen 
admits mere residence as sufficient, on these conditions, as a 
fair basis for jurisdiction in divorce.240 In my opinion, juris-
diction in these cases has been stretched as far as it may 
reasonably be, if it is to be grounded in the domicil of only 
one party. That such domicil should be replaced altogether by 
240 LoRENZEN, "Haddock v. Haddock Overruled," 52 Yale L. J. (1943) 341, 
352· 
516 DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 
a mere temporary residence of one party is an idea that is 
becoming familiar through the operation of the divorce mills 
but which grievously encourages the evil of migratory divorce. 
As to international relationships, the present chaos can be 
remedied only by thorough reforms of the domestic and con-
flicts laws. The claims of countries following the national 
law principle must be decisively relaxed; on the other hand, 
the irresponsible attitude with which lex fori is applied in 
other countries ought to be renounced. 
CHAPTER 13 
Effects of Divorce 
I. EFFECTs OF NoN-RECOGNIZED FoREIGN DIVORCEs 
I. View of the Country of Divorce and of Third States 
I N the United States, it is possible that a divorce pro-nounced in one state may not be recognized in a sister state, because the court did not possess the jurisdiction re-
quired under the Constitution. In such cases, it is disputed 
whether the divorce is valid in the state where it was decreed.1 
But if so, as is commonly agreed, both parties to the dissolved 
marriage are undoubtedly able to remarry in the state of di-
vorce, although not in every other state. 
Yet, in comparable situations in countries following the 
nationality principle, other solutions have been reached. In 
France 2 and Switzerland/ an Italian (or a Spaniard, a Chil-
ean, a Colombian), whose national law forbids the dissolution 
of his marriage, is not permitted to remarry, despite his di-
vorce in a French or Swiss court. Such a divorce may have been 
granted either by inadvertence or on a theory like that of the 
Ferrari case, whereby one party of French nationality is en-
titled to divorce irrespective of the national law of his spouse.4 
In Germany, the question whether an Italian divorced in a 
German court for some exceptional reason-for instance be-
1 For invalidity, Restatement §§ I II, I I 3 comment g. Supra p. 466, n. :u. 
2 Trib. civ. Seine (May 5, 19I9) S.192.1.2..9, Revue 1919, 543; cf. NIBOYET, 
S.192.1.2..9; DEGAND, 5 Repert. 557 no. 92.. It is notable, however, that the 
reporting judge at the Cassation Court in the Ferrari case considered remar-
riage in France quite possible for the Italian husband~ see Bull. Soc. d'ttudes 
Leg. 1930, 104. LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 400 no. 338 is of the same opinion, 
although he thinks the husband would be unable to sue for divorce. 
3 Swiss Circular Letter {June 2.9, I92.9) Clunet I9JO, 539 advises civil offi-
cials to refuse remarriage to an Italian whose marriage has been dissolved in 
Switzerland. 
4 Supra PP• 442.-445· 
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cause the wife was of German nationality-could be permitted 
to marry in Germany, has been difficult. In such case, which 
should prevail: the authority of res judicata owing to a 
domestic judgment, and in consequence the man be considered 
unmarried, or compliance with the Italian family law ordained 
by private international law, and the capacity of the man to 
remarry be denied ( EG. art. I 3) ? While the older decisions 
followed the first, procedural, line of thought, 5 numerous 
writers have insisted on the requirement-allegedly posited by 
the principle of conflicts law 6 and by this construction have 
impressed several courts. 7 Opposition to this view exists8 and 
is justified. It is well-nigh absurd to regard a person divorced 
at the forum as married. Should he succeed in having the new 
marriage celebrated, not even those who recognize the foreign 
impediment presume to regard it invalid. 9 
Dutch and Belgian courts have realized that divorce should 
never mean dissolution of the marriage for one party and 
continuance of marriage for the other. A Spaniard of Catholic 
faith, mistakenly divorced in a Netherlands court, was per-
mitted to remarry in the jurisdiction in view of the formally 
binding force of the Dutch decision and of the record in the 
register of civil status.10 In Belgium, as we have seen, courts 
for the same reason either deny divorce to a couple of mixed 
5 KG. (March q, I9II) 23 Z.int.R. (I9I3) 33I, aff'd RG. (March 2I, 
I912) JW. I912, 642. 
6 LEWALD u8 no. I631 STEIN-JoNAS, I ZPO. § 328 F n. I34, 2 ZPO. 
§ 6o6 n. 221 RAAPE 4041 M. WoLFF, IPR. I331 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 
40I 1 and particularly 3 FRANKENSTEIN IOI n. I591 ibid. I02. MELCHIOR 25I 
reaches the same result on his theory of the preliminary question. 
7 OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 3, I923) 43 ROLG. 347; AG. Hannover (I928) 
IPRspr. I929, no. 7I and especially KG. (July II, I924) StAZ. I924, 3061 
KG. (Oct. I7, I93o) IPRspr. I93I, no. 621 KG. (March 7, I938) JW. I938, 
1258 no. 27. 
8 BAR, 8 Z.int.R (I898) 4631 REICHEL, Auslanderscheidung, 124 Arch. Civ. 
Prax. 200; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. I63 n. 2, and cf. 4391 WIERUSZOWSKI in 4 
Leske-Loewenfeld I 77 n. 4791 MASSFELLER, JW. I938, 1259. 
9 KG. (March I 3, I 9 I I) 24 ROLG. I 9, approved on this point by RAAPE 
4041 KG. (March 7, I938) JW. I938, 1258 no. 27. 
10 Rb.Rotterdam (April I4, 1930) W. 12197. 
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nationality, when the personal law of one party is hostile to 
divorce, or grant dissolution with effect for both parties.11 
A similar problem arises in a third state when a foreign di-
vorce decree is not recognized by the personal law. Again, the 
opinion classifying the question as concerning capacity to 
marry rather than the effects of divorce, has found favor. 12 
In fact, in this case, refusal of remarriage is not in open con-
flict with the authority of the forum, so that the primary rule 
for questions of status may have free play. 
2. View of the Personal Law 
The country to which a party belongs will normally deny 
any legal effect to a foreign divorce which it does not recog-
nize; maintenance will be granted as by virtue of a valid mar-
riage. Thus, remarriage or further marriages of either party 
will be considered invalid, the issue illegitimate, et cetera. A 
maintenance order, predicated on the assumption of jurisdic-
tion in rem by a foreign divorce court, even though issued in 
personam, has been regarded as void in England, because the 
foreign court was considered incompetent to grant divorce and 
the order was ancillary to divorce. 13 
In actual fact, of course, any divorce subjects the conjugal 
union to a most severe shock.14 The facts that one party has 
instituted an action for divorce, that this party has remarried 
and cohabited with a new spouse, may each constitute a ground 
for divorce by the other party, if divorce is allowed at all in 
11 Supra pp. 444-445· 
12 See for France: AuDINET, II Recueili92.6 I 2.36; DEGAND, 5 Repert. 557 
no. 9I; for Brazil: Trib. Sup. Fed. (Nov. 4, I9I6) Clunet I9I9, 401; for 
Germany the authors supra n. 6. 
13 Simons v. Simons [1939] I K. B. 490. 
14 3 ARMINJON 44 thinks indeed that a prohibition of divorce by the law of 
the forum should be directed exclusively against a second marriage, the marital 
union being hopelessly destroyed by the foreign divorce. Cf. DEGAND, 5 Repert. 
556 no. 88. Refusal to restore conjugal community after a foreign divorce is 
not considered desertion in Denmark; see MUNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewen-
feld I 748 n. 96. 
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the home country.15 The same result is reached through those 
statutory provisions in the United States whereby the pro-
curing of a divorce outside the state by one party gives the 
other party a ground for divorce, although these provisions 
also cover other cases. 16 
A foreign decree, however, may be partially recognized in 
the country of the personal law. Thus we have seen that in 
some cases a foreign spouse has been regarded as released from 
the bonds of marriage, while the spouse who is a subject of 
the forum remains bound. Under the Ohio statute, this particu-
lar case entitles the latter to a divorce.11 The outstanding 
example of one-sided effect ascribed to divorce is presented in 
this country by the special rule in New York that, in the ab-
sence of personal jurisdiction, a foreign decree of divorce ob-
tained against a spouse domiciled in New York is good by 
estoppel as to the libelant but not good as to the respondent.18 
Under the Brazilian practice mentioned above, 19 the .Brazilian 
party to a mixed marriage dissolved abroad remained married 
15 England: Adultery, at that time the only ground for divorce, was found in 
Clayton v. Clayton [1932] P. 45; in Lankester v. Lankester [1925] P. 114 
a similar result. would have been adjudicated but for connivance of the appli-
cant in the foreign divorce. 
Germany: ObLG. Bayern (May 24, 1924) 2 Jahrb. FG. 148; OLG. Konigs-
berg (Oct. 29, 1914) Pos. Mschr. 1914, 157, cited by NussBAUM, D. IPR. 164 
n. 2. LG. Berlin {Jan. 9, 1937) JW. 1937, 1307 (adultery committed by cele-
bration of a marriage "by dispensation" in Austria~. Doubts in other decisions 
were concerned with the requisite of fault for divorce, which is no longer in-
dispensable under German law. 
16 Florida: Stat. ( r 941) § 6 5 .o4, No. 8 : "that the defendant has obtained a 
divorce from the complainant in any other state or country." 
Michigan Stat: Ann. (1937) § 25.86, No.6: "And the circuit courts may, in 
their discretion, upon application, •.. divorce from the bonds of matrimony 
any party who is a resident of this state, and whose husband or wife shall have 
obtained a divorce in any other state." Cf. supra p. 404. 
Ohio: Code Ann. (1940) § 11979, No. ro: "the procurement of a divorce 
without this state, by a husband or wife, by virtue of which the party who pro-
cured it is released from the obligations of the marriage while they remain 
binding upon the other party." 
17 See preceding note. 
18 People v. Baker (1879) 76 N.Y. 78, 32 Am.Rep. 274, consistently fol-
lowed; see Restatement, New York Annotations§ r 13 at 85. 
19 Supra pp. 496-497. 
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in the eyes of Brazilian law, but the non-Brazilian spouse was 
capable of remarrying even in Brazil. 20 The new Brazilian 
law seems to reverse the latter rule. 21 · 
Moreover, a foreign divorce a vinculo, though not recog-
nized in Brazil, is given the same effect upon the property of 
the spouses as a Brazilian separation from bed and board; this 
concession has been termed the only possible compromise.2.2 
II. EFFECTS OF vALID DIVORCES 
The effects of divorce or, pursuant to another conception, 
the continued effects of marriage after "dissolution" 23 are 
usually discussed in the United States with respect to (I) ali-
mony, ( 2) dower, and (3) custody of children. 'In recent 
times, civil law lawyers have used broader categories for each 
of these subjects; they distinguish the influence of divorce 
upon ( 1) personal relations between husband and wife, ( 2) 
marital property, and ( 3) parental rights. 
For the purpose of conflict of laws, further division of the 
subject is necessary. On the one hand, we must distinguish the 
inquiries: (a) whether the divorce court has power under its 
own law to decide upon those effects or some of them; (b) if 
it has power so to decide, which law it must apply; and (c) 
whether its decision is recognized and enforced in other juris-
dictions. On the other hand, there are analogous problems in 
case a divorce decree has been rendered in one jurisdiction and 
a related suit, as for alimony or custody, is brought in another. 
20 BEVILAQUA, 6 Repert. 167 no. 41. 
21 Brazil: Lei de lntrodw;ao ( 1942) art. 7 § 6. 
22 Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. {Nov. 4, 1916) Clunet 1919, 402. 
23 NEUMEYER, IPR. ( ed. 1) 21. It need hardly be mentioned that no problem 
exists with respect to the fact that every divorce decree, if recognized, determines 
the time, the extent, and the conditions for terminating the bond of marriage. 
E.g., a Belgian court grants exequatur to a French divorce without requiring 
that the d~cree be recorded within two months, as is necessary for a Belgian 
decree, by a different interpretation of art. 264 of the Civil Code common to 
both countries; Trib. civ. Termonde {Oct. 17, 1936) Rechtsk. Wkbl. 1936-
1937' 1634, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 183. 
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Not all these diverse problems have been dealt with ex-
plicitly, although some have been vividly discussed in a few 
countries and others are engulfed within other topics. There 
is no point in subjecting all these questions to one sole conflicts 
rule. Earlier writers in Europe contended that all effects of 
divorce are governed by the national law, whereby ordinarily 
the law presiding over the divorce was meant. 24 But the con-
flicts rules derived from the nationality principle have been 
differentiated; there are different rules for personal relations 
of the spouses, for property relations, for parental rights and 
duties incident to the granting of divorce, and, moreover, 
th~re exist problems peculiar to marriages of mixed nation-
ality. The prevailing tendency, briefly reported below, favors 
in each topic application of the rule that is called for by t;.he 
most nearly related sphere of family life. 
We still find rules of broader scope in a few regulations, 
characterized by the preponderance of the last matrimonial or 
common domicil. For instaR.ce, a Danish court will recognize 
not only the limitations on the right of remarriage resultant 
from a divorce decree of the foreign matrimonial domicil, but 
also its legal effects on the property of the parties.25 By article 
55 of the C6digo Bustamante, "the law of the court before 
which litigation is pending" determines the judicial conse-
quences of the action and the terms of the judgment with 
respect to the spouses and their children. It seems that this 
court is ordinarily that of the matrimonial domicil. Particu-
larly elaborate is a provision of the Scandinavian Convention 
on Family Law, in which divorce jurisdiction with certain ex-
ceptions is fixed at the last common domicil. It seems instruc-
tive to reproduce this provision: 
In connection with petitions for separation or divorce, the 
same or another authority of the divorce state may decide also 
24 See e.g., 2 FIORE no. 695; also though more careful, WEiss, 3 Traite 7oz. 
25 MuNCH-PETERSEN, 4 Leske-Loewenfeld I 747 n. 94· 
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on the provisional suspension of conjugal rights to property 
division, damages, alimony, and parental rights. (Art. 8, 
par. r.) 
Claims later instituted concerning alimony or parental 
rights are decided in the state in which the defendant spouse is 
domiciled. This applies also to modification of awards ren-
dered in another of the participant states. If, by the law of the 
state in which separation or divorce has been pronounced, 
alimentary sums for a separated or divorced party may not be 
awarded or increased, no such decision can be made in the 
other participant states. (Art. 8, par. 2.) 
In rendering decision under articles 7 and 8 in each state, 
the law there in force is to be applied. Decisions, however, on 
division of property or on damages always must be based on 
the law applicable to the conjugal property relations according 
to article 3· (Art. 9, par. r.) 
For civil law countries, it should be borne in mind that 
jurisdiction is a matter entirely different from choice of law; 
the former is not here involved. 
I. Effects on Personal Relations between Husband and Wife 
(a) Name, capacity, gifts, etcetera. What law determines, 
for instance, whether a divorced wife ought to resume her 
maiden name, to retain that of her husband, or to have her 
choice as under the common law? Should a divorce court 
determine this question according to its own family (or other) 
law, or according to the same family law that was applied in 
granting the divorce, or according to the law that governed 
the personal relations of the parties during coverture? The 
subject matter includes, among other things, alimony, a topic 
presenting peculiarities. 
( i) The law of the forum. The application of the domestic 
law seems natural within systems that make the matrimonial 
domicil the exclusive basis for jurisdiction and choice of law 
in granting and recognizing divorce. But also in Switzerland, 
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although divorce is not granted unless the foreigners' national 
law accords, Swiss law determines every divorce decree and 
its ancillary effects. 26 
In the United States, probably the law of the divorce forum 
governs. Except for alimony, however, the question seems 
not to have been discussed. 
(ii) The law of divorce. To control the effects of divorce, 
the decidedly prevailing opinion on the European Continent 
has selected, among the various possibilities offered by the 
nationality principle, the law under which the marriage was 
dissolved. 27 In Germany, this is the national law of the hus-
band at the time when the divorce suit was instituted (EG. 
art. I 7, par. I); in France, the national law of the party at 
whose instance divorce is granted. This rule refers to prob-
lems such as: 
What name the wife ought to bear; 28 
26 See supra p. 429 and ibid., n. 169. 
OG. Zurich (Dec. 8, '937) 38 Bl. f. Ziirch. Rspr. '939> 105 no. 42 therefore 
states that even if in the national courts the effects of divorce would not be 
expressed in the divorce decree itself and established by rules different from the 
Swiss rules, a Swiss divorce decree always causes Swiss law to be applied to all 
problems of damages and moral compensation, support, property, etc. 
27 France: for status and capacity see DEGAND, 5 Repert. 555 no. 86; NIBOYET 
nos. 642, 753 pars. 6 and 7· 
Germany: RG. Plenary Decision (June 25, 1898) 41 RGZ. 175, 9 Z.int.R. 
(1899) 382, Clunet 19oo, 161; KG. (May 30, 1938) JW. 1938, 2750 (explains 
in agreement with the dominant opinion that EG. art. I 7 par. I also governs 
the effect of divorce on personal relations such as name and alimony, while the 
reservation in par. 4 for-German law is inapplicable). 
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. II, I9II) 37 BGE. I 400 (foreign divorce of Swiss 
nationals) ; cf. BEcK, NAG. 398 no. I6; ibid. 37 5 no. 148. 
:Similarly Guatemala: C. C. (1926) art. 218. 
The Hague Convention on Divorce contains no rule on the effect of divorce, 
see LEWALD in Strupp, 1 Worterbuch des Volkerrechts und der Diplomatie 471 
VIII. 
~8 France: Cour Paris (Dec. 15, 1936) D. H. 1937. 72 (the national law of 
the foreigner); Cour Paris (June 16, 1904) Revue I9o5, I46 (French law 
applied to the name of an American ex-wife because of renvoi) ; Trib. civ. 
Seine (Dec. 22, 1923) Gaz. Trib. I924.2.204 (Frank Jay-Gould, after his 
divorce [see the New York case of Gould v. Gould cited supra p. 503], sued his 
former wife and the Alhambra Theater in Paris to enjoin them from adver-
tising her performances under the name of Edith Kelly-Gould; the injunction 
was granted under French C. C. art. 299 because the defendant had submitted 
to French law in the divorce suit with the collateral argument that New York 
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Whether restrictions on the wife's capacity to contract dis-
appear automatically with the end of the marriage; 29 
Whether gifts between the spouses may be revoked; 30 · 
Whether confidential communications between the spouses 
remain privileged in testimony. 31 
In addition, agreements between the spouses concerning a 
future divorce, since not operative during coverture, do not 
pertain to the law of marital relations but to that of divorce. 32 
According to this law, such agreements may be licit; if so, 
resort to a divergent public policy of the forum seems un-
necessary to German courts.33 French judges, however, 
always suspicious of an intention to facilitate divorce by con-
sent, are inclined to assume that such agreements constitute 
an offense to the French public order. 34 
(b) Alimony following a foreign divorce.35 In accordance 
with an old conception, in England divorce still ends any 
law permitted the same right to the plaintiff). For literature see PILLET, I 
Traite Pratique 627; TAGER, Chinet I933, 96. 
Germany: law of divorce, not the personal law of either spouse: KG. (Oct. 
13, I9I6) 33 ROLG. 343; LG. II Berlin (May 2o, I927) IPRspr. I926-27, 
no. 75; cf. KG.,(Dec. I7, I926) IPRspr. I926-I927, no. 74· 
Switzerland: controversial; see STAUFFER, NAG. art. 8 no. I5; BEcK, NAG. 
373 no. I45, ibid. 466 nos. :u6, 227; cf. ibzd. 398 no. I6, ibid. 4I4 no. 67. 
A Swiss divorced woman must resume her premarital name, but if a woman 
after a foreign divorce recovers Swiss nationality, she is entitled to the name 
she has according to the foreign law. See Just. Dep., BBl. I924; II 24 no. 2; 
GAUTSCHI, 26 SJZ. zz; Government of Bern, 27 SJZ. I37, no. 23. 
29 RAAPE 430 no. 6; M. WoLFF, IPR. I32 n. I4· In France: BARTIN, who 
had advocated the law of the forum, now suggests with WEISS, 3 Traite 702, 
the personal law of the woman; see BAR TIN, 2 Principes 3 I I § 3 I 6. 
30 RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. I87. 
31 This point familiar in American law is not expressly mentioned in the 
European literature. 
32 Germany: KG. (Sept. 25, I933) IPRspr. I933, no. 32 (Hungarian law); 
OLG. Naumburg (Feb. 26, I936) JW. I936, I798; cf. RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. I87; 
LoRENZ, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. I02. 
33 C/. also KG. (Dec. :z.x, I935) JW. I936, 2466. 
34 See Cass. (req.) (July 29, I929) Revue I93I, 334; Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 26, 
I938) Nouv. Revue I938, 567 (where the decree was rendered in France) and 
the decisions cited in Nouv. Revue I938, 570 n. I, and contra: COSTE-FLORET, 
7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 2I5 no. IZI. 
35 See especially HARWOOD, "Alimony after a Decree of Divorce Rendered on 
Constructive Service," 24 Kentucky L. J. (I936) 24I. See }ACOBS, "The Enforce-
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duty of support between former spouses. Therefore, no ac-
tion can lie to obtain alimony after a divorce a vinculo, whether 
pronounced by an English or a foreign court. A recognized 
foreign decree of divorce even terminates a former English 
maintenance order. 36 
In the United States, many difficulties have been en-
countered. Although the English conception that the duty of 
support does not survive the dissolution of the marriage has 
not been maintained in this country, only this English back-
ground seems to explain a certain opinion that has proved 
very strong in the past, viz., that the rendering of the divorce 
decree 1s the last moment for alimony to be recovered. \Vhere 
such a doctrine is invoked against a suit for alimony, un-
desirable situations may arise. Thus, a divorce court in one 
state may refuse to order the defendant to pay alimony, be-
cause it knows that according to the prevailing opinion, it does 
not have the necessary jurisdiction in personam.37 Yet, the 
court of another state having the required personal jurisdic-
tion, regards a suit for support after divorce has been pro-
nounced as impossible. The result is the same when the foreign 
court awarded alimony but did not have proper jurisdiction. 
The diversity of jurisdiction in rem and jurisdiction in per-
sonam presents a second source of difficulties. Paradoxically, 
it follows from the historical development, that the require-
ments for service of process on the defendant in such ancillary 
actions in personam, as enunciated by the Supreme Court, are 
greater than in divorce suits. It seems a neglected fact that 
ment of Foreign Decrees for Alimony," 6 Law and Cont. Probl. (1939) 250; 
Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. (1940) II8o; Note, 40 Mich. L. Rev. (1942) 596; 
SAYRE, "Recognition by Other States of Decrees for Judicial Separation and 
Decrees for Alimony," 28 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) 321. On the enforcement of 
alimentary decrees throughout the world, see International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law, L'Execution a l'etranger des obligations alimen-
taires (Rome, r 9 3 8) . ' 
36 Pastre v. Pastre [r93o] P. 8o, 82 (French divorce); Mezger v. Mezger 
(1936) 155 L. T. R. 491, [1937] P. 19, Clunet 1937, 138 (German divorce). 
37 This has been contested but is now treated as settled. See 2 BEALE 1435· 
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the social importance of marriage and its dissolution surpasses 
the significance of any alimentary orders. 
A third unexpected complication arises from interference of 
the estoppel idea. In cases where a wife sued for divorce in a 
jurisdiction powerless to grant alimony but where the right 
thereto was at issue, she has been deemed to have waived her 
claim to alimony once and for all by choosing such a divorce 
court. This all too technical idea, which has not been ade-
quately criticized, is so faulty that its influence should not 
go far. 
Finally, difficulties of another kind are encountered when 
an alimentary order is sought to be enforced in another juris-
diction. In particular, orders which may be altered have been 
considered to lack the finality necessary for enforcement. 
It would not be helpful to discuss all these disturbances at 
length. Recent writers assure us that the entire doctrine is in 
an evolutionary stage, and that extraterritorial effect is given 
to decrees for alimony "with very great completeness." 38 
Courts and statutes show themselves more and more anxious 
to overcome formalistic obstacles, to help deserted wives and 
children. The indigent ex-husband has also found more favor 
than before. Through such an evolution, the American doc-
trine approaches the views of the European laws. 
In civil law countries, the nature of the duty incumbent 
upon a former spouse is far from undisputed in theory; does it 
follow from a breach of the marital duties? That it does was 
the leading idea of older codifications, including the German 
Civil Code. Or is the family relation partly conserved despite 
the dissolution of the marriage tie? Modern doctrines are in-
clined in some degree, indeed, to consider the obligation 
imposed by law as an effect of the former family relation and 
therefore as belonging to the field of family law rather than to 
the domain of ordinary obligations e."< ·tege. In any case, the 
88 SAYRE, ~8 Iowa L. Rev. (1943) 333, supra n. 35· 
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existence of such obligations is not doubted; their incidence is 
continuously extended. For instance, the recent German mar-
riage law no longer maintains that only an exclusively guilty 
ex-spouse can be required to support the innocent other party; 
it declares it to be sufficient that the defendant was mainly at 
fault in disrupting the marriage and even allows equitable 
awards beyond this limit. Thus, since alimony rests on the 
same foundations as any family law institution, no technical 
impediment obstructs the application of a foreign alimentary 
regulation. Moreover, litigation for alimony is usually separ-
able from the divorce suit so that nothing prevents an action 
for alimony being brought in another country than that where 
the divorce was pronounced. 
Difficulties arise, however, first, because a foreign divorce 
is quite often refused recognition and, secondly, because of the 
intervention of some distinct local policy at the court where 
the award is sought. 
In Germany, the law of divorce is applied with nicety; it 
signifies the law of the husband at the time when the action for 
divorce was instituted. 39 
In France, it seems that the law governing marital rela-
tions during coverture is preferred, 40 the alimentary obligation 
39 KG. (Feb. x6, 1909) 19 ROLG. xo6, 20 Z.int.R. (x9xo) 227, Clunet 
191I, 286 (without any doubt); LG. Altona (March 19, 1926) JW. 1926, 
1357 (Danish law denying judicial remedy applied); KG. (Feb. 9, 1929) 
IPRspr. 192.9, no. 15; OLG. Naumburg (Feb. 26, 1936) JW. 1936, 1798. 
This practice was in force before the Biirgerliche Gesetzbuch, see RG. (June 
25, 1898) 41 RGZ. 175 (supra n. 27) and RG. (July u, 1898) JW. 1898, 
545, 9 Z.int.R. (1899) II6, Clunet 19oo, 635. In the case of a German hus-
band, a technical difficulty was presented by the requi:rement of guilt of the 
defendant and innocence of the applicant when the foreign decree of divorce 
contained no statement on the matter. But this obstacle could be overcome; 
see KG. (May 3, 1935) JW. 1935, 2750, and also RAAPE 426 II 1; the question 
is certainly not worse under the new law. 
The Italian Court of Cass. (May 3, 1934) Monitore 1934, 889 gives much 
weight to the statements and awards of the foreign divorce decree but seems to 
decide the case according to Italian law perhaps because the plaintiff wife had 
recovered her Italian citizenship. 
40 NIBOYET 753· 
In Portugal, CUNHA GON\<ALVES, 1 Direito Civil 695 seems to advocate appli-
cation of the husband's national law under the same viewpoint. 
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being traced back to the marital duty of support. Bartin, how-
ever, limits this classification to that part of the money award 
that the French courts base on article 301 of the Civil Code, 
while other grants of alimony under the heading of damages 
should be governed by the law of the place of wrong. 41 
Jurisdiction for alimony is assumed in the Netherlands at 
the. instance of domiciled persons on the basis of foreign di-
vorces. Here again the law applied seems to be the lex fori. 42 
The Swiss Federal Tribunal has taken another view in con~ 
sidering the problem of jurisdiction. If the divorce was ren-
dered abroad, even if involving Swiss citizens, jurisdiction for 
ancillary effects is not exercised, unless the foreign courts re-
fuse to assume jurisdiction because of the Swiss domicil of the 
party; 4a in such event, the Swiss court is required to intervene 
in order to prevent a denial of justice, 44 the lex fori being ap-
plied.45 
2. Effects on Marital Property 
If a foreign decree of judicial separation has been recog-
nized, it must be examined, in the first place, to determine 
whether it is intended to terminate the property regime. With 
this purpose in mind, French courts have stated that an Italian 
separation by mutual agreement and judicial confirmation,46 
as well as a Spanish separation from bed and board, 47 does not 
have the effect of property separation (separation de biens), 
41 BARTIN, 2 Principes 313. , 
42 See BW. amended by§ 828a Rv. (law of May 16, 1934, S. 253) and H. R. 
(April 5> 1937) W. 1937, no. 661 declaring that the alimentary duty falls 
under the first book of the Code and also if based on a divorce pronounced in 
Germany. Cf. H. R. (March 8, 1934) W.12752 for a decree of the Netherland 
Indies; see other cases in 11 Z.ausl.PR. ( 19 3 7) 21 o. 
43 BG. (March 29, 1928) 54 BGE.II 85; BECK, NAG. 370 nos. 133ff.; ibid. 
420 nos. 8 9ff. 
44 BG. (Dec. IO, 1936) 62 BGE. II 265, Praxis 1937, 56. On modification 
of a domestic decree, if the defendant is domiciled abroad, see BG. (Nov. 22, 
1935) 61 BGE. II 225, Clunet 1938, 973, and criticism ibid. 974· 
45 Constant practice since BG. (June 13, 1912) 38 BGE. II 43, 49; see BG. 
(Dec. 10, 1936) 62 BGE. II 265, 267. 
48 Cour Lyon (June 3, 1926) S.1928.2.12I. 
47 Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. I 3, I 908) Clunet I 908, 832. 
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which the French separation de corps has under the Civil Code 
(art. 3 I I ) . 48 But a separation from bed and board rendered 
in a Netherlands court necessarily effectuates a separation of 
property under article 298 of the Civil Code; 49 if the parties 
be Germans, therefore, this effect would not be recognized by 
their national courts. 50 
All remaining questions concerning property regimes must 
obviously be answered by the law governing the property re-
lations of the parties during coverture. For instance, after a 
dissolution of community property by an absolute divorce, 
whether a domestic divorce or a foreign divorce recognized as 
valid, the mode of partition of the community fund is natu-
rally governed by the law governing marital property. 5 1 
Often a marital property settlement or a statute provides 
explicitly what must be done in case of divorce. Where such 
provision is lacking, a rule applicable in the event of the death 
of one spouse may reasonably be resorted to, while the lex fori 
of the divorce court is ruled out. 52 
In agreement with this view, in common law countries the 
effect on movables of any divorce, domestic or foreign, and in 
Argentina of a foreign recognizable divorce, is governed by 
the law of the husband's domicil at the time when the movables 
were acquired; the effect on immovables by the law of the 
situs. In accordance with this rule, a wife's claim to dower 
depends upon the law of the situs regarding dower and es-
toppel rather than upon that of the divorce court, unless the 
implications of the divorce decree as to dower be recognized 
at the situs. 53 In France, in conformity with the conflicts rules 
48 BARTIN in 7 Aubry et Rau 402, and NIBOYET 752 are in doubt whether 
this effect belongs under the heading of rules on marital property or those on 
the personal relations of husband and wife. 
49 Rb. Haag (Dec. to, i929) 6 Z.ausl.PR. (19p) 849; Rb. Almelo (June 
24, 1931) W. 12370 and App. Arnhem (June 29, 19p) W. 12627, 11 
Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 209 no. 59· 
50 M. WOLFF, IPR. 132 n. 15; STAUDINGER-ENGELMANN§ 1586 Ill A, c(4). 
51 Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 25, 1882) Clunet 1882, 74· 
52 DEGAND, s Repert. 558 no. 96; NIBOYET 752 II 1; M. WoLFF, IPR. 132. 63 On the effect on the wife's claim for dower, see HARPER, "Effect of Foreign 
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on matrimonial property and in contrast with the conflicts 
rules on inheritance, immovables are not subject to special 
treatment. 54 
The question, too, whether or when an agreement to regu-
late property relations after divorce is valid, has appropriately 
been decided according to the law governing marital property 
during coverture. 55 
A particular position is taken in the United States when di-
vorce courts are empowered to make dispositions of property 
of the spouses or to adjudicate damages between them. It 
would seem that a corresponding order of the court ought to 
supplement the regulation of property between the parties. 
In connection with the unsettled extraterritorial effect of per-
sonal decrees of a court of equity, dispositions of this kind, 
particularly when one party is ordered to convey land in 
another state to another party, have produced interstate dif-
ficulties. 56 
3· Custody of Children 
American courts disagree greatly on the conditions under 
which a court has jurisdiction in divorce proceedings to settle 
a dispute concerning custody of the children. It is disputed 
whether a pronouncement of this sort affecting the children 
Divorce upon Dower and Similar Property Interests," z6 Ill. L. Rev. (1931) 
397; HARPER and TAINTOR, Cases 1079 n. JZ. 
54 App. Monaco (May 7, 1910) S.19IZ-4-25, Clunet 1910, 1p7; App. Mon-
aco (March 16, 19u) Revue 19rz, 789. 
55 KG. {Dec. :u, 1935) JW. 1936, 2466, Nouv. Revue 1937, 98 (agreement 
valid under Hungarian Marriage Law of 1894, § 92, recognized according to 
EG. art. 15, setting art. 17 (law of divorce) aside). Contra: KG. (Sept. 25, 
1933) IPRspr. 1933, no. 32 (applying EG. art. 17 not only to alimentary but 
also to property agreements). 
56 Enforcement was granted at the situs, probably in view of fraud committed 
against the order in Spalding v. Spalding (1925) 75 Cal. App. 569, 243 Pac. 
445; Matson v. Matson (1919) 186 Iowa 6o7, 173 N. W. 127; Mallette v. 
Scheerer (1916) 164 Wis. 415, 160 N. W. 182; refused in Bullock v. Bullock 
(1894) 52 N.J. Eq. 56I, 30 Atl. 676; Fall v. Fall (1905) 75 Neb. 104, IIJ 
N. W. 175. Cf. STUMBERG no. 
532 DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 
is to be treated as a judgment in personam or as a judgment 
in rem. Statutory power conferred on a divorce court to award 
custody, however, seems to be recognized in other states 57 
unless circumstances are changed, provided both parties were 
residents of the divorce forum and the child, therefore, had 
no other domicil. For, in the most widespread and authorita-
tive opinion, jurisdiction to determine the custody of children 
is primarily located at the domicil of the child. 58 
There is concern expressed in the literature, however, that 
the jurisdiction of the forum for awarding custody should not 
be obtained unilaterally by one spouse, drawing the child away 
without the other's consent. 
Every court in the United States applies its own municipal 
law, so that again there is no question of choice of law. In 
England and Argentina, and under the Conventions of Monte-
video and of the Scandinavian States, the forum coincides with 
the conjugal domicil. In France, the lex fori, rather than the 
personal law, is applied, even in cases such as the Ferrari case, 
where only one of the spouses had acquired French national-
ity; 59 but probably not where two foreigners are concerned 
and the child is of foreign nationality too. 60 
In Germany, however, the conflict of law problem has been 
thoroughly separated from that of jurisdiction and extensively 
discussed. The lex fori was applied in a single case where 
the divorced wife of foreign· nationality had later acquired 
German nationality, on the ground that the domestic regu-
57 Restatement§ I46; see 2.7 C.]. S. (I94I) Divorce § 329· 
58 Restatement §§ I I 7, I45· GooDRICH, "Custody of Children in Divorce 
Suits," 7 Cornell L. Q. (I9ZI) I and GooDRICH§ I32.. A disturbing element 
is the view "that a court having jurisdiction to a ward the custody retained j ur-
isdiction to modify its award although the domicile of a child has been changed 
in the meanwhile to another state," LORENZEN, "Developments in the Conflicts 
of Laws I90Z-I942," 40 Mich. L. Rev. (I942) at 798. 
59 Cour Paris (Dec. ZI, I937) Gaz.Pal.I938.I.405, D. H. I938.I86, Clunet 
I938, 482.. 
60 Cf. WEiss, 3 Traite 702. But Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 29, I9o4) Clunet 
I 905, I 87 has applied French law to decide the provisional custody of the 
children in a suit of an American wife against her Turkish husband. 
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lation (BGB. § 1635) was mandatory.61 But this construction 
has been generally rejected as an excessive expression of the 
exigencies of public policy. According to another opinion 
the relationship between the former spouses as respects cus-
tody of the children was considered governed by the law de-
termining the right to divorce (EG. art. r 7 ), while other mat-
ters would fall under the conflicts rule determining the parent-
child relation (EG. art. 19).62 But prevailing opinion now 
holds that every right of a parent to custody, education, or 
visiting affects the children's interest and has to be determined 
by the law that governs legitimate filiation. 63 Where German 
spouses have been divorced abroad by a recognized decree but 
custody was not awarded in accordance with German family 
law, the order is regarded as a temporary measure only.64 
In the Netherlands also, not the law of the forum, now re-
peatedly applied to govern divorce, but the ordinary conflicts 
rule on parental and filial relations is applied. 65 Accordingly, 
the law of the child governs, while in Germany that of the 
father is applicable. The classification is the same, however, 
and would be suitable to any country. 
By this time, it should be understood everywhere that cus-
tody of children or any other incident of parental relations 
is not a matter substantially ancillary to divorce, although the 
divorce court may have power to take care of these matters 
61 RG. (Feb. 2o, 1913) 81 RGZ. 373· 
612 HABICHT 143, 152; LEWALD 1201 137. Another opinion suggested simply 
applying EG. art. 17 (law of divorce), see NrEDNER 54, art. 17 comment 4d; 
NIEMEYER, IPR. des BGB. 157; RGR. Kom. (ed. 8) prel. no. 6 to§ 1616. 
63 KG. (March 6, 1929) 41 Z.int.R. (1929) 413; KG. (Feb. 1o, 1933) JW. 
19331 2065; KG. (May 3, 1935) JW. 1935, 2750; KG. (May 12, 1938) Nouv. 
Revue 1939, 251; OLG. Breslau (May 91 1938) Dt. Recht 1939, 869 following 
RAAPE 482; see also RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. 187; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 164 n. 4· 
64 See decisions of KG. preceding note. 
65 See Rb. Amsterdam (June 24, 1937) W. 19371 no. 970; Hof Amsterdam 
(Feb. II 1 1937) W. 1937, no. 950. 
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (March 1, 1928) Clunet 1928, 482 (personal law 
of Australian parents applied in principle). 
Italy: Trib. Napoli (July 13, 1932) Rivista 1933, 281 (Italian law, the 
parents having, after Hungarian divorce, recovered Italian nationality). 
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and a divorce is a seasonable occasion to regulate custodianship. 
If the court applies its own family law, as it does in this 
country, it should qualify its application in the not infrequent 
cases where the applicant has been able to choose the forum 
at will. Whatever the principle of assuming jurisdiction may 
be and whatever the binding effect of an award of custody, 
the applicable law should be determined in conformance with 
the standard adopted in filiation matters. 
CHAPTER 14 
Annulment of Marriage 
I. ANNULMENT DISTINGUISHED FROM DIVORCE 
CONFLICTS rules determining the extraterritorial effect given to annulment of marriage are concerned in the first place with any decree or judgment declar-
ing a marriage void or annulling it and intended to operate in 
rem throughout the world, i.e., with the effect of res judicata 
for all persons. These rules, however, must evidently also be 
applied to annulments, such as those in certain of the states of 
the United States, that are conclusive only against the parties 
and those claiming under them. All types of void and voidable 
marriages are included. 
Annulment is no longer confused with divorce, as it was in 
former times/ although some American statutes still speak of 
divorce granted for antenuptial causes such as bigamy, incest, 
duress, physical incapacity, or near kinship.2 It is certain that 
a decree of "divorce" in such cases has nullifying effect. 3 In 
exact terminology, nullity cannot be based on grounds other 
than those existing at the moment of the solemnization of the 
marriage, while divorce must have a cause either posterior to 
the celebration or at least continuing during coverture. In the 
law of conflicts, this seems to be accepted. 4 
·Nevertheless, the Restatement mentions annulments, the 
causes of which antedate the marriage but the effects of which 
1 COKE on LITTLETON (HARGRAVE and BUTLER) 235a; BLACKSTONE 440 .. 
2 r VERNIER §§ so, 68, 7o, p, 73; ScHOULER, Domestic Relations §§ 1154, 
1155; Reese v. Reese (1929) 128 Kan. 76z, 280 Pac. 751. 
3 See 27 C. J. S. (1941) 537-538. 
'Restatement§ 115 comment c; Sorenson v. Sorenson (191.4) 122 N.Y. 
Misc. 196, 202, zoz N.Y. Supp. 62o, 625. 
Brazil: App. Civ. Capital Sao Paulo no. 6441 (Aug. 5 and July 27, 1912) 
6o Gaz. Jur. Sao Paulo (1912) 195. 
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operate only from the time of the decree.5 These are considered 
in the Restatement according to the rules of conflicts estab- , 
lished for divorce rather than those relative to annulment. 6 
It is difficult to understand the reason for this treatment. The 
Swiss Code and also the German law as recently reformed con-
tain precise parallels; they provide for rescission of marriages 
on grounds that existed at the time of the marriage celebration 
and with the effect of terminating rather than annihilating 
the bond of marriage. 7 The effect described is similar to di-
vorce. Yet, for the purpose of conflict of laws, the Swiss and 
German institutions have rightly been classified in the category 
of annulment. They are governed by the personal law of 
the person entitled to sue and not by the law which would 
govern divorce. 8 Annulment can never be governed by the 
law of the forum, as divorce is in the United States. The 
. reasons are perfectly understood in this country; 9 an impedi-
ment vitiating the celebration of a marriage must be evaluated 
under the law establishing the req~irements of that celebration. 
5 Restatement § I I 5 ( 2). I BEALE § I I 5.2 asserts that in most states annul-
ment takes effect at the time of the decree of annulment and therefore takes place 
at the present domicil. A contrary statement that such effect is prescribed by 
only a few statutes is to be found in 3 8 C. J ., Marriage § I 3 9 with the citation 
of New York only, for which state the Restatement, New York Annotations, 
§ I I 5 (2) declares that no such annulment exists there. In fact the text of the New 
York Domestic Relations Law§ 7 on marriage "void from the time its nullity 
is declared by the court of competent jurisdiction," has been construed as meaning 
retroactive operation of the judgment and destruction of the marriage ab initio. 
See Matter of Moncrief (I92l) 235 N.Y. 390, 139 N. E. sso; SEALY, Law 
of Persons and Domestic Relations (ed. 2, I9J6, New York) 562; HAMMILL, 
"The Impediment of Nonage," 3 The Jurist (I943) 475, 477 n. I I. 
6 Restatement § 136(a). 
7 Swiss C. C. art. I32. 
German Marriage Law of I938, § 42 par. I which provides that the effects 
of a rescission of a marriage are determined according to the provisions concern-
ing the effects of divorce. 
8 RG. (May 7, I936) I5I RGZ. 226 classified the Swiss action annulling the 
marriage under EG. art. 13 par. I; RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. 145; his assertion that 
the wife does not lose the nationality acquired by the marriage (at I 7 5) is in-
exact; cf. for Switzerland, BECK, NAG. 263 no. I 59· 
9 Cf. on this point, the explanation of GoODRICH 355· 
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II. ANNULMENT oF THE MARRIAGE oF FoREIGNERs 
r. Jurisdiction 
(a) Court of the place of celebration. When marriage was 
conceived of primarily as a contract, 10 jurisdiction for deciding 
on its validity or invalidity was thought to be vested naturally 
in the tribunal of the place of celebration. This is still the 
rule in Argentina/1 and as recently as 1938 a court in Paris 
tried to justify French jurisdiction over a marriage of foreign 
parties by a similar argument. 12 
The English authorities asserted the jurisdiction of the 
English courts to annul English marriages until recent years.13 
The present decisions are understood to say that where the 
parties are domiciled abroad, the jurisdiction loci celebrationi-s 
of the English courts is neither exclusive nor complete; it 
concurs with that of the foreign domicil and is restricted to 
absolutely "void" marriages, such as those vitiated by bigamy 
or the non-observance of formalities. Annulment of "void-
able" marriages on the ground of coercion, essential error, or 
impotence, is considered exclusively reserved to the domi-
cil~ary court, because it effects a change of status. 14 This dis-
10 I BEALE 5 I o professes this conception and strongly advocates the juris-
diction of the place of celebration. 
11 2 Vrco no. 79· 
12 Trib. civ. Seine (June 3, I938) Revue Crit. I938, 668, Clunet I939, 87. 
13 Simonin v. Mallac (I86o) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67; Linke v. Van Aerde (I894) Io 
T. L. R. 426; Valier v, Valier (I925) I33 L. T. R. 830 and the problematic 
cases Ogden v. Ogden [I9o8] P. 46 and Sottomayor v. De Barros [1877] 3 P. 
D. I, [I879] 5 P. D. 94· 
14 Inverclyde v. Inverclyde [I93I] P. 29; see the important comment by 
CHESHIRE 344; Goddard, L. J., in a dictum in Simons v. Simons [I939] I K. 
B. 490, 498, summarizes the law to the effect that since I 748 the court of the 
place of celebration has been regarded as having jurisdiction to pronounce the 
marriage null and void for failure of due celebration. The problem was ignored 
in Easterbrook v. Easterbrook (I944) 170 L. T. R. 26; see Note, 6o Law Q. 
Rev. (I944) us. 
Canada: Fleming v. Fleming (Ont. S.C. 1934) [I934] 0. R. 588, [I934] 
4 D. L. R. 90; W. v. W. (Manitoba) [I934] 3 W. W. R. 230; cf. FALCON-
BRIDGE, Annotation [1932] 4 D. L. R. 2, 28ff.; 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. I90 no. 
88. See also READ, Recognition and Enforcement 243. 
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tinction seems formalistic. It has also been pointed out that, 
in view of the British reluctance to recognize a change of 
domicil, a place where the parties live (without, however, be-
ing there domiciled) and have been married, provides a natural 
forum to try the validity of the marriage. 15 
In the United States many cases have favored the older 
English rule, 16 and some statutes have also preserved it, at 
least under certain circumstances.17 Thus, the jurisdiction of 
the place of celebration has not completely disappeared. But 
it no longer has a significant role-the principle of domicil has 
decidedly won out.18 
(b) Court of the domicil. At present, the regularly com-
petent court is that of the domicil, and this is true, not only 
in the countries which use domicil as the test for determining 
status and consider paramount the interest of the domiciliary 
state in the validity ofthe marriage bond/9 but even in the 
countries generally following the principle of nationality.20 
The motive of the rule is to permit domiciled foreigners to 
bring their matrimonial causes before the local courts instead 
of compelling them to travel to their national countries. 
15 KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," I6 Bell Yard (I9J5), 
4 at I6; MoRRIS, Cases I79 criticizes the entire doctrine. 
16 See I BEALE 5II; GooDRICH 3 57, and, as a recent illustration, Mayer v. 
Mayer (I929) 207 Cal. 685, 696, 279 Pac. 783, 788. 
17 See I VERNIER § 52 table XXI and Supplement. 
18 See McMuRRAY and CUNNINGHAM, "Jurisdiction to Pronounce Null a 
Marriage Celebrated in Another State or Foreign Country," I 8 Cal. L. Rev. 
(I930) I05. 
19 GOODRICH 3 55. 
20 The United States: Restatement § I I5; GooDRICH 357· 
England: Inverclyde v. Inverclyde [I9JI] P. 29, cited supra n. I4. 
Canada: Fleming v. Fleming (Ont. S.C.) [I934] '0. R. 588, [I934] 4 D. L. 
R. 90; Diachuk v. Diachuk (Manitoba, K. B.) (I94I) 49 Man. R. I02. 
Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text of I889, art. 62; text 
of I940, art. 59· · 
France: (if there is no domicil abroad) Trib. civ. Seine (June I7> I927) 
Revue I928, 332; Trib. civ. Seine (April 3, I930) Revue I930, 46o. 
Germany: C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. I; cf. KG. (June 4, I934) IPRspr. I934> 
no. I4I; same for a declaratory statement that the marriage is non-existent: 
RG. (Jan. s, I925) Io9 RGZ. 384. 
Switzerland: The domicil of the plaintiff spouse is considered decisive by 
BEcK, NAG. 252 no. uJ. 
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As the matrimonial domicil is normally at the husband's 
domicil, the latter is usually regarded as decisive. There are 
exceptions not unlike those for granting divorce; 21 they cannot 
be discussed here. 
In contrast with divorce, which is refused to foreigners in 
a number of states when the jurisdiction of the forum is not 
recognized by the homeland,22 jurisdiction for annulment is 
not made dependent on such considerations, except perhaps 
in Switzerland. 23 
(c) Court of the national country. Consistently with the 
nationality principle, in practically all Continental countries 
nationals of the forum may sue for annulment irrespective of 
their domicil. 24 In a few countries this jurisdiction is exclusive 
of foreign courts. 2:; Sometimes a court defies its own general 
principle of domicil in order to help a national of the forum. 26 
Moreover, for a wife who had belonged to the forum up to 
the time of her marriage, jurisdiction is assumed without 
difficulty on the consideration that a void marriage did not 
actually change her nationality. 
21 Restatement § I I 5 and about eleven state statutes allow suit to be brought 
in the country where either party resides; see I VERNIER§ sz. 
212 German C. Civ. Proc. ~ 6o6 par. I is limited by par. 4 only with respect 
to divorce; see KG. (Nov. 7, I935) z7 Warn. Rspr. 19z; 3 FRANKENSTEIN zo3 
n. 85. 
23 OG. Zurich (Oct. Io, I928) Bl. f. Ziirch. Rspr. (I929) 139, no. 66, Clunet 
19301 SZ4· To the contrary effect, App. Bern (Oct. z7, I9z7) 1.4 SJZ. (I9Z7-
I9z8) ZJ5 no. 54 assumes that the legislator forgot the case, and that the Ger-
man provisions furnish the best solution; in the instant case jurisdiction is granted 
to a former Swiss woman who married an Italian in Switzerland. 
24 Cf. for instance France: Cour Paris (May z8, 188o) Clunet I88o, 3oo; 
GouLE., 9 Repert. So nos. 403ff. 
Germany: C. Civ. Proc. § 6o6 par. z sentences 1 and :z.; ibid. par. 31 sentence 
z, extensively interpreted by STEIN-JONAS, z ZPO. § 6o6 V. 
Switzerland: App. Bern (Oct. 1.7, 19z7) 1.4 SJZ. (197.7-19Z8) Z37· 
25 Supra pp. 397-398. 
In the Netherlands, art. 154a of the BW. has been interpreted as requiring a 
petition of the Dutch State Attorney and annulment by a. Dutch court; see 
Rb. s'Gravenhage (August ::.6, 1938) W. I939, no. 36. 
· 
26 See, for instance, Denmark: Ostre Landsrets Domme (May u, I9zo) 
U.f.R. I9zo, 6z8, z Z.ausl.Pr. (I9z8) 866, applying, moreover, the Danish law 
instead of that of the domicil. 
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The provisions of the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction are 
not applicable to annulment. 27 
2. Applicable Law 
(a) Rule. It has been explained above 28 that the rule 
embodied in section 136 of the Restatement is universally 
adopted. A court will apply the sanctions of the same law 
that is applied in ascertaining whether a marriage has been 
validly celebrated.29 While in the United States this means 
that generally the law of the place of celebration alone is con-
sulted, with the sole exception of certain absolute prohibitions 
of the law of the domicil of either party, in most countries for-
malities and intrinsic validity are tested by different .criteria. 
The law of the forum, so significant for divorce, in principle is 
immaterial for annulment. 30 
In consequence, the judgment usually pronounces the kind 
of nullity provided for by the applicable law rather than that 
of the lex fori. The German Supreme Court, for instance, in 
a case where a Swiss national obtained an annulment on the 
ground of having been deceitfully induced to enter into the 
marriage, adopted the sanctions of the Swiss Civil Code rather 
than those of the German law, and declared the marriage void 
ex nunc only, with the effects ordained by Swiss law. 31 The 
Swiss Federal Tribunal declared a marriage void under the 
Austrian law of the parties whereby the marriage was retro-
actively destroyed ( Allg. BGB., § I 6o ), holding no support 
for the time previous to the judgment to be due, contrary to 
Swiss law (C. C. art. 132, par. 2).32 
27 KG. (June 14, 1913) 27 ROLG. 108; RG. (May 7, 1936) 151 RGZ. 226. 
28 Supra pp. 229, 286. 
29 See LASALA LLANAS I 30, I 33; TRiAS DE BEs 83, Ioo. In Spain the juris-
diction of state courts applies to few nullity cases only for which the writers 
seem to favor the lex fori. 
30 This has been confirmed, against contrary opinions in Switzerland, by BG. 
(Dec. 2, I943) 69 BGE. II 342, 344· 
31 RG. (May 7, I936) 15I RGZ. 226; cf. MASSFELLER, JW. 1936, I949; 
LoRENZ and ECKSTEIN, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 54· 
32 BG. (Feb. 22, I934) 6o BGE. II 75 no. 2. 
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(b) Policy of the forum in favor of marriage. The principle 
described above has been limited by special clauses in favor 
of the marriage in Sweden and Switzerland. The Swedish 
statute provides that a marriage between two foreigners, 
formally valid but void because of an intrinsic defect under 
the national law of one or both of the parties, should not be 
annulled in Sweden, unless it is also void under Swedish law 
or unless the King orders the foreign law to be applied. 33 
The Swiss statute contains another clause; a marriage cele-
brated abroad, invalid according to the laws of the place of 
celebration, cannot be declared invalid in Switzerland, unless 
it is also invalid according to Swiss law.34 Hence, no marriage 
is annulled for formal defects. The Federal Tribunal, in a 
recent decision, restricts this provision to Swiss citizens. 35 
Both provisions give substance to the otherwise very obscure 
rule that traditionally goe.s through the Continental literature 
-that, even in the field of conflicts law, public policy of the 
forum is more favorable to the marriage after its celebration 
than when its celebration is still pending. In general, the 
difference between curable and nullifying defects is taken care 
of by the private law distinction between directory and manda-
tory prohibitions of marriage, and there is usually no question 
but that this distinction is observed in accordance with the law 
governing marriage requirements, without consulting the laws 
of the forum. 
(c) Policy of the forum against the marriage. The forum 
may nevertheless impose its own grounds for impeaching a 
marriage. American courts, exercising jurisdiction for annul-
33 Sweden: Int. Fam. L. of I 904, c. z § I. 
Chile: C. Sup. (Sept. z6, I939) Gac. Trib. I939 II I8z, likewise refused 
annulment of a German marriage on a ground of German law unknown to 
the forum .. 
34 NAG. art. 7£ par. 2. 
35 BG. (Dec. z, I943) 69 BGE. II 341., 345· Many other doubts exist. 
GAUTSCHI, "Uber die Anerkennung auslandischer Eheschliessungen" 1.7 SJZ. 
32I, 31.3 explained that foreign marriages may be simply contested by collateral 
attack so long as they have not been recorded in the Swiss register. 
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ment, are inclined to consider nullity on the ground of bigamy 
or incest without regard to the law of the place of celebration 
or that of the domicil. 36 Moreover, in particularly shocking 
cases, public policy will be affirmed. 37 In Europe, the best 
formulation of prohibitive public policy seems to agree with 
the result attained in practice in this country and in England 
with respect to polygamous marriages. A marriage valid under 
the law applicable according to the ordinary rule of conflicts 
will be regarded as valid at the forum, provided not only its 
celebration but also its existence within the forum does not 
offend the local public order. 38 In this field, it may happen that 
any law may be applied in order to help a deceived woman. 39 
(d) Adjustment of the applicable law. We may recall here 
the conflicts arising out of the varied scope of annulment of 
marriage in the national laws. While under Soviet Russian 
law a marriage may 'be very simply dissolved but cannot be 
annulled, some German writers suggest either that a Soviet 
marriage may nevertheless be annulled 40 or that it may be 
dissolved, 41 on the assumption that the Russian institution of 
divorce also covers the ground of the German annulment. 
Analogous cases may occur everywhere. 
But where divorce is forbidden and annulment allowed on 
an abnormal scale, especially by a broad construction of error 
36 See STUMBERG 2.66. 
37Jn Cunningham v. Cunningham (1912) :z.o6 N.Y. 341,99 N. E. 845, Clu-
net 1913, 663, an 18-year-old girl married the valet of her parents secretly in 
New Jersey; the Court annulled the marriage on the ground of nonage and lack 
of parental consent according to the principles of discretion prevailing in New 
York irrespective of the unsettled question whether the marriage was valid in 
New Jersey. 
38 See, for instance, RAAPE 8o2; M. WoLFF, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 
402, 
39Brazil, Sup. Trib. Fed. (April :z.o, 1932) App. Civ. no. 3533, 23 
Arch. Jud. 421 applied the New York law to the marriage of a German wife 
with a husband, native of Austria and naturalized United States citizen, in view 
of the fact that under German law, applicable to a deceived party, her action 
was lost by limitation. 
40 3 FRANKENSTEIN 196. 
41 RAAPE, 2 D. IPR. 177. 
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in marrying, neither divorce nor annulment will be granted 
to foreigners against their personal law. 
III. REcOGNITION oF FoREIGN ANNULMENTS 
In the recognition of foreign annulments, reference may be 
made in every respect to the principles governing the recog-
nition of foreign divorce decrees. The Restatement, § 115, 
even considers the matter identical with dissolution of marriage 
by divorce. 
Thus, it has been decided according to this principle in 
England that a nullity decree pronounced by the court of the 
foreign matrimonial domicil is entitled to universal recog-
nition; while this was first settled only with respect to a mar-
riage celebrated abroad, 42 it has now been declared also in the 
case of an English marriage. 43 
In France, it has been held that in the event one party is 
of French nationality, French law must be applied and a decree 
of exequatur is indispensable for recognition. 44 
In Italy, jurisdiction of the state courts is not exclusive,45 
but a canonical marriage with civil effect celebrated in Italy 
after the effective date of the Concordat cannot be annulled by 
any temporal tribunal.46 A fraudulent, i.e., not serious and 
42 Salvesen v. Adm'r of Austrian Property [1927] A. C. (H. L.) 641. 
43 This point, left open by the House of Lords in the Salvesen case, was 
decided more definitely than in De Massa v. De Massa [1939] 2 All E. R. 150 
(Note, 48 Law Q. Rev. (1932) 13; CHESHIRE 352), in Galene v. Galene [1939] 
P. 237, [1939] 2 All E. R. 148 (English marriage, French domicil of the hus-
band, French decree of nullity on the ground of want of the father's consent; 
the decree was recognized irrespective of the choice of law). 
44 See VALERY 838 no. 594, and 1074 no. '749, and the French diplomatic 
note in RG. (March 19, 1936) 150 RGZ. 374· 
4ll Cass. (July 22, 1930) Testa v. Rosasco, Giur. Ital. 1930, I, 1041; see Swiss 
Federal Tribunal (June 17, 1932) 58 BGE. II 190. On the requisite of domi-
cil for recognizing a Swiss decree of annulment see PERASSI, 25 Rivista (1933) 
473· 
46 App. Milano (June 27, 1933) Giur. Ital. 1933, IV, 222, 25 Rivista (1933) 
260; cf. FEDOZZI 456; App. Torino (March r, 1937) Giur. Ital. 1937, I, :z, 
212, Clunet 1938, 929; Cass. (June ll, 1934) Foro Ital. 1934, I, 1061; App. 
Trieste (Nov. 29, 1934) Clunet 1937, 165. An ecclesiastical tribunal is a 
court: RG. (Dec. 161 1920) Warn. Rspr. 1921 1 no. 35· 
544 DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 
effective, change of domicil by the parties does not create 
international jurisdiction for annulment. 47 
Where a foreign annulment based on the incapacity of a 
party has applied a law other than the national law of the 
party, the court of the national country, following the principle;: 
of nationality, will not recognize the decree. 48 But it will, if 
the legal provisions are fairly similar.49 
A curious combination of recognition and exclusive juris-
diction is illustrated by an Austrian case of 1937.50 The mar-
riage of an Austrian-with a Yugoslav woman was annulled by 
the competent ecclesiastical court in Yugoslavia. The Austrian 
court found that the decree was to be recognized under the 
treaty existing between the two countries. But to satisfy 
formally the constant axiom that the Austrian courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the status of nationals, the marriage 
was again annulled. This recalls certain duplications of divorce, 
such as in Michigan. 51 
IV. EFFECTS OF ANNULMENT 
I. Partly Effectual Void Marriage · 
A delicate question concerns the phenomenon that a void 
or annulled marriage may nevertheless produce legal conse-
47 App. Genova (Aug. II, 1936) Monitore 1937, 237, Clunet 1937, 910. 
48 Italy: Cass. (June u, 1937) F_oro ltal. 1937, I, 1371. 
49 App. Trieste (Sept. 17, 1936) Monitore 1937, 17, Clunet 1937, 389 (de-
cree of Lima, Peru, annulling the Italian marriage of two Italians on the ground 
of impotence according to the Peruvian C. C. (1851) art. 167, art. 107 of the 
Italian C. C. being similar "in substance"). While Swiss nullity decrees based 
on impotence are also generally recognized, in the case of App. Milano (May 
28, 1936) Monitore 1936, 456, Clunet 1937, 164, recognition was refused for 
other reasons, among which was the fact that the allegedly incapable woman 
had a living child; in this respect an element of re-trial entered under the guise 
of public policy. Contra: Cass. civ. (June II, 1937) Giur. Ital. 1937, I, r, 
762; and see on the problems involved, PAGANo, Note to Cass. civ. (April 17, 
1939) Giur. Ital. 193.9, I, 1, 705; App. Bologna (Jan. r6, 1939) Giur. Ital. 
1939, I, 2, 309. 
w OLG. Graz (March 31, 1937) 55 Zentralblatt (1937) 437 no. 248, 
51 See supra pp. 404, 52o, n. 16. 
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quences. There are institutions marking a middle ground be-
tween valid and invalid marriages; the most widely known 
and; indeed, the most benevolent 52 of them is the French 
mariage putatif, which has its roots in the canon law and its 
ramifications in numerous jurisdictions including Louisiana, 53 
Quebec, 54 and Latin America. 55 Yet French writers and courts 
disagree hopelessly on the proper conflicts rule. 
Illustration: In the case of Stephens v. Falchi, which came 
up in Quebec, 56 the parties were domiciled and married in 
Montreal and divorced in a French court. The woman then 
married in Paris an Italian, Falchi, who was domiciled in 
Italy. A marriage settlement was expressly made subject to 
Italian law. The Stephen divorce was invalid under the law 
of Quebec (and, hence, also in Italy). Therefore, the second 
52 French C. C. art. 20I declares that marriage that has been declared null 
produces nevertheless civil effects as regards both the spouses and their children 
when contracted in good faith. According to art. 202, if only one of the spouses 
acted in good faith, the marriage produces its civil effects only in favor of this 
spouse and the children born of the marriage. This provision goes so far as to 
treat the protected persons as though the marriage were valid. Furthermore, 
it includes all possible defects of marriage and even non-existent marriages; see 
Cass. (req.) (March 14, 1933) D.I933.1.28, Gaz.Pal.t933·1.966; cf. for an in-
valid ceremony before an English consul, Cour Paris (Jan. I 6, I 895) Clunet 
I895, I057, and for bigamy, Trib. civ. Seine (May II, I933) Gaz. Pal.I933· 
2.202; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 25, I936) Nouv. Revue I937> 85; Cour Paris 
(March 30, I938) Nouv. Revue I938, 353· In the case of a marriage of Cana-
dians from Quebec before a Catholic priest in France, see Berthiaume v. Dastous 
[I 930] A. C. 79, supra p. 2 r 2; cf. LEE, "Cases on the Conflict of Laws from the 
Law Reports of the British Dominions (I9JS-I937)," 2I Journ. Camp. Leg. 
(I939) 28. Finally, good faith is presumed; cf. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, 
I Precis 229 No. 478; BINET on Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 5, I9I3) D.I9I4.1.28I. To 
contrary effect, e.g., the Belgian Rb. Antwerp (Oct. 28, I939) Rechtsk. Wkbl. 
889 no. I46, declares that a non-recorded religious marriage between Polish 
Jews in Warsaw is non-existent and does not produce the protection under C. C. 
art. 2.01. 
53 La. Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (I 9 32) arts. I I 7, II 8 identical with French C. C. 
arts. ·2oi, 2.02. 
54 C. C. Lower Canada: arts. I 6 3, I 64, 
55 See on the law of Chile, with comparative notes, R. M. ECHAVARRiA, 
"Apuntes sabre el matrimonio putativo y la bigamia," 34 Revista Der. Jur. y 
Ciencias Soc. (I 93 7) part I, 3 7· 
56 Stephens v. Falchi (Queb. K. B.) [1937] 3D. L. R. 6os, aff'd by Sqp. Ct. 
of Canada [I938] S. C. R .. 354; cf. LEE, :n Journ. Camp. Leg. (I939) 28, 
supra n. 52.. 
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marriage was "annullable." 57 Suppose it was annulled. Should 
the provisions of the French, the Italian, or the Quebec statutes 
be applied to determine whether the second husband married 
in good faith, and whether he could sue for the usufruct aris-
ing from the settlement? 
Are there no such questions in the common Jaw countries? 
In England, in fact, there are none, since an annulment of a 
marriage seems to annihilate all its effects. The courts of many 
of the states of the United States, however, have the power, 
by or without a statute, to grant alimony or compensation in 
the decree of annulment and to dispose of the property of the 
spouses "as in divorce." 58 It has probably never been doubted 
that such powers are to be exercised exclusively in accordance 
with the rules of the forum, even when the voidness of the 
marriage was based on the fact that the parties had gone 
through a formally defective marriage ceremony in Louisiana 
or that one of them had been incapable of marrying as a 
domiciliary of Louisiana. 
In both England and the United States, however, problems 
of conflicts law have arisen with respect to the legitimacy of 
children born of void marriages. 59 
On the effects which a putative marriage exercises on the 
personal rights and duties of husband and wife, the following 
theories have been advanced by writers and adopted by courts 
on the Continent and especially in France: 
(a) The personal law should govern, a theory that com-
prises several propositions: 
(i) If both parties are nationals of the forum, the law of 
the forum should be applied under all circumstances. 60 The 
57 Because the marriage never was annulled, the court awarded the usufruct 
flowing from the marriage settlement according to Italian law, upon a 
complete, though unconvincing, reasoning under the French law of the place 
of celebration. It is not clear why the doctrine of putative marriage is also 
mentioned. 
58 See 1 VERNIER§ 53• 
59 See infra n. 73· 
80 Cass. (civ.) (March zs, x889) Clunet x889, 64z and other decisions; see 
VALERY 1076 no. 750. 
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE 547 
same should be done, if the personal law of both spouses con-
tains rules approximately similar to the lex fori. 61 
(ii) In mixed marriages, the old rule that the law of the 
husband governs the personal marital relations has been ex-
tended to questions of what effects of marriage survive an 
annulment. 62 
(iii) According to another opinion, where one party is a 
French national, this party should always enjoy the far-
reaching benefit of the French Civil Code, article 299· 63 In a 
generalized and now widely adopted version, a party having 
married in good faith enjoys the benefit which may be granted 
to him by his national law. 64 
(b) Some courts have applied the law of the forum "for 
reasons of justice and good morals" 65 or without any justifi-
cation.66 
61 App. Alger (June z8, 1887) Clunet 1889, 616; Trib. civ. Seine (June 
x6, I9o6) Clunet I9o7, I42; App. Agen (July 29,'I936) Revue Crit. I937, 
721. 
62 App. Alger (May z6, I879) D.x88o.2.I6I; App. Orleans (Jan. xo, 1894) 
Clunet !894, 536; Cour Paris (Aug. 3, I898) Clunet I898, Io8o; PILLET, 
1 Traite 566 no. 2681 NIBOYET 73 7 no. 627; CuNHA GoNc;;ALVES, I Direito 
Civil 687. Contra: 2 ARMINJON 460 reproaches the writers that they forget that 
the existence of a marriage is precisely in question. But see the text against this 
pseudo-logic. 
63 VALERY I076 no. 750; AuorNET, Clunet I93o, 322; NIBOYET, Revue 
Crit. 1 9 34, I 34· 
64 W.AIHL, Note to Cass. (civ.) (July 30, 19oo) S.1902.1.225; cf. App. Alger 
(May z6, 1879) S.1879·2.28I; Trib. civ. Seine (May n, I933) Revue Crit. 
1934, I29; Trib. civ. Seine (Nov. 25, I936) Revue Crit. I938, 84 (ex-
pressly against the lex fori and the lex loci celebrationis and for the personal 
law); BARTIN, 2 Principes 2I 2 § 29 I; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 389 no. 33 I; 
in Italy, FEDOZZI 455· 
65 App. Aix (Feb. I3, I9I2) Clunet I9I3, I229; Trib. civ. Tunis (June 14, 
1906) Clunet I907, 439; and a general trend described by BATIFFOL, Revue 
1937> 433· 
66 Trib. civ. Seine (June 28, 1913) Clunet I916, 170; Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 
xo, 1912) Clunet 1916, 178; Cour Paris (Nov. 12, 1913) Clunet 1916, 178; 
Trib. civ. Seine (Feb. 22, I937) Revue Crit. I937> 65o (Orthodox Serb and 
French woman married in Serbia by Catholic priest; on the lack of motivation 
see BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 432); Cour Paris (March 30, 1938) Revue 
Crit. I939> 119 (Italian wife, later of French nationality). 
Belgium: Trib. civ. Antwerp (July 7, 1932) 19 Bull. Inst. Beige (1933) 
1 7 4 (lack of consent by the English father of the bride). 
Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (April 12, 1933) 28 Arch. Jud. 456 in the case of a 
Brazilian woman separated by judicial decree, marrying in New York an Eng-
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(c) A theory allegedly flowing from general principles, and 
for this reason preferred by recent German writers, considers 
that the law violated by the attempted marriage is the naturally 
competent law to determine what legal effects are left to the 
apparent conclusion of the marriage. 67 
As a matter of fact, the French courts have always found 
a ground for applying the French provision in favor of a 
French party, unless his or her bad faith was proved or both 
parties had fraudulently evaded the French marriage require-
ments, in which case good faith was considered absent. 68 This 
practice involves exaggerated protection of nationals and 
is a measurably excessive extension of public policy to an 
ordinary rule of private law, as Battifol has pointed out. 69 
A suitable theory may perhaps be derived from the opinion 
described under (a), (ii), referring to the law of the husband. 
We &hould, however, consider on the one hand that the 
conflicts rules by no .means have to be identical for personal 
relations between husband and wife (maintenance, name of the 
wife, alimony), property relations, custody of children, and 
succession on death. 70 On the other hand, the protection which 
the French, German, Swiss, and other systems in varying de-
gree grant to an innocent pseudo-spouse should be technically 
lishman, held that she and her issue were not entitled to any rights of putative 
marriage, because she must have known her disability to remarry (this result 
could be reached in several ways). An analogous case of a Brazilian woman 
was decided to the same effect by Trib. civ. Seine (June 28, I913) Clunet I916, 
I70· 
67 CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue I 91 o, 56; 2 ARMINJON 460; AUDINET, I 1 
Recueil I926 I 175 at 2IO and in Clunet I93o, 322; Cass. (civ.) (July 30, 
I900) D.I901.I.3I7, S.I902.I.225. 
Germany: KIPP-WoLFF, Familienrecht (1928) § 39 A III at 144, and M. 
WoLFF, IPR. I22; RAAPE 339, 45I; rejected by the Reichsgericht (Nov. 11, 
I937) JW. I938, Io8 infran. 73· 
65 Cour Paris (Aug. 3, I898) Clunet 1898, Io8o. 
:
69 BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 432. To the opposite effect,§ 1344 of the 
German BGB. is believed of public order by RAAPE 340; WIERUSZOWSKI in 4 
Leske-Loewenfeld I 55; M. WoLFF, IPR. I22. 
• 
70 See 2 ZITELMANN 7 5 I and 3 FRANKENSTEIN 2 I 7 (not one but several dif-
ferent "statutes"). But for property relations, the latter (3 FRANKENSTEIN 
396), like his adversary, RAAPE, 340, applies a separate personal law of the 
wife in contradiction to the German Code, EG. art. 15. 
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construed as a residuum from the parties' attempted marriage, 
some shelter left in the ruins of the house. The benefit to that 
party is not so much an effect of the violation of prescriptions, 
as suggested in connection with the opinion tinder (c), as it 
is an effect of the marriage despite its "nullity." We may ob-
serve generally that what in legal terminology is called void 
may nevertheless have some effects. Such rudimentary conse-
quences, however, must lie within the framework of the normal 
effects which the transaction would have had if it had been 
valid.71 
Hence, it is submitted that all relations between the parties 
should be determined by the law that would have been ap-
plied to the respective kind of relation, had the marriage been 
valid. 72 Consequently, in common law countries the personal 
relations of the parties should be treated according to the law 
of the domicil on the ground of which jurisdiction has been 
assumed. Suppose a party to a marriage celebrated in Louisiana 
was under age and the marriage therefore void, either because 
the party was domiciled at the time in Louisiana or because 
of the law of his or her domicil applied by Louisiana according 
to its domiciliary principle. The personal relations of the 
parties have to be treated without regard to the Louisiana 
doctrine of putative marriage, if the marriage is annulled in a 
common law state where the parties are now domiciled. This 
solution agrees with the result of a lex fori theory but is based 
upon the lex domicilii as governing the personal effects of mar-
riage. With respect to movables, the law obtaining at the 
domicil when the movables were acquired governs, as it would 
if the marriage were valid, in favor of the party acting in good 
faith, etcetera. 
71 See my construction of "damages from reliance": RABEL, "Der so gen. 
Vertrauensschaden im schweizerischen Recht," 27 Z. Schweiz. R., N. F. (1908) 
291ff. ' 
112 This suggestion seems to agree with some remarks of DIENA, 2 Prine. 156 
and UDINA, Elementi I 8o no. qo. 
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The status of children born of void marriages must certainly 
be treated under the law governing legitimacy 73 (unless a 
special rule is devised as in the C6digo Bustamante ),14 and the 
share which a pseudo-spouse may be allotted in the distribution 
of assets of the other party is governed by the rules on inheri-
rance. 75 Whether an innocent wife may also acquire the nation-
ality of the husband by a putative marriage is a matter of public 
law, but in France it seems by prevailing opinion to be included 
in the "civil effects" of marriage. 76 
2. Protection of Third Parties 
Under a probably general American rule, a man is liable for 
necessaries furnished to a wife to whom he is not legally mar-
ried, if he lived with her and held her out to the world as his 
wife. 77 The conflicts rule on necessaries, as stated in section 
459 of the Restatement, recognizes an implied authorization 
by the husband, either as part of the law of the man's domicil 
or under circumstances defined by the law of the state where 
the necessaries are furnished. Is this rule applicable also if 
73The United States: Restatement § 137 and comment; Moore v. Saxton 
(I9I6) 90 Conn. I64, 96 Atl. 96o; Green v. Kelley (I9I7) 228 Mass. 6o2, 
II 8 N. E. 235; McNamara v. McNamara ( I922) 303 Ill. I 9I, I 35 N. E. 4Io. 
Cf. on the statutory provisions declaring legitimate the issue of prohibited 
marriages 1 VERNIER § 48; 4 ibid. § 24 7. . 
England: The rule would be the same if Shaw v. Gould (In re Wilson's 
Trusts) (I 865) L. R. I Eq. 247 had not partly disturbed the doctrine; CHESHIRE 
387 asks for overruling and FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of 
Conflict of Laws," I 6 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I 9 3 5) 84, 89 for a reform law. 
Germany: RG. (Nov. II, I937) JW. I938, Io8 (against RAAPE 45I); KG. 
(July 9, I937) JW. I937, 2526, Clunet 1938, J4I; also KG. (Dec. 9, I92I) 
42 ROLG. 97i KG. (Feb. 27, 193I) IPRspr. I9JI, no. 83: they apply the law 
governing filiation, i.e., EG. arts. I 8 and I 9· 
14 C6digo Bustamante art. 49 as compared with art. 57. 
75 See supra p. 376. 
16 A contrary decision of Trib. civ. Boulogne (Dec. 20, I935) Clunet I936, 
375 was reversed by App. Douai (April I, I936) D.1936.2.7o, with note by 
RoUAST; Revue Crit. I937, 75, with note by CALEB at 78; see also VALERY 237 
no. zoo; NIBOYET I94 no. I47; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE I24 no. 104. 
77 Frank v. Carter (I9I6) 2.I9 N.Y. 35, I13 N. E. 549; Jordan Marsh Co. 
v. Hedtler (I921) 238 Mass. 43, 130 N. E. 78. 
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the man is not a husband legally? No reason seems to exist 
why the answer should not be in the affirmative. 
A related question was prompted by the provision of the 
German Civil Code protecting a third person who has entered 
into a transaction with, or obtained a judgment against, a 
spouse of a void marriage. The nullity cannot be set up to 
defeat his rights, if it was not pronounced in a judgment and 
was unknown to him (BGB. § 1344, German Marriage Law of 
1938, § 32). It has been suggested in Germany that this 
domestic provision be extended by analogy to international 
situations, i.e., where German spouses have celebrated an in-
valid marriage abroad and live in the forum, or foreign 
spouses whose marriage is void under their national law are 
domiciled in the forum. 78 Third parties should be protected 
against the effects of a nullity not stated in a judgment and 
unknown to them. 




Parent and Child~ 
I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
I. Subject Matter 
TER dealing with marriage and divorce rules, Ameri-
can case books on conflict law and the Restatement 
finish the chapter on family or status law with the 
four topics of legitimacy, adoption, custodianship of parents, 
and guardianship. We shall see, as we have seen in consider-
ing the subject of marriage relations, that the relationships 
created by legitimate birth, legitimation, and adoption have 
a broader scope in the civil than in the common law. For in-
stance, under the civil law, support is an important incident 
of legitimate as well as of illegitimate relationship and is gov-
erned in principle by the personal law, while in the Restate-
ment it is treated separately and left to the law of the forum. 
To do justice to all legislations, we have to divide the matter 
into smaller topics, viz., in the first place, (i) legitimate birth, 
(ii) legitimation, (iii) rights and duties of legitimate parents, 
(iv) adoption, and ( v) illegitimacy. On the other hand, cus-
todianship, which in the common law is the inclusive and es-
sentially homogeneous repository of all rules concerning in-
fants, must, for the purposes of our survey, be subdivided into 
two different parts. Family law principles are embodied in 
1 Among the special articles on the subject reference will be made more 
particularly to RAAPE, "Rapports juridiques entre parents et enfants," so Recueil 
1934 IV 405, and to TAINTOR, "Legitimation, Legitimacy, and Recognition in 
the Conflict of Laws," 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) 589, 691. 
For a comparative survey of the municipal laws, see VEITH, Kindschaftsrecht, 
4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 770; for materials, vols. 1 and z of BERGMANN'S 
work .. 
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the rules that determine the rights and duties of parents as 
such, while the constitution of other guardians and the man-
agement and supervision of the estate of a child or any other 
ward may be better treated in connection with the administra-
tion of other estates. Our discussion, therefore, will be limited 
to the matters more closely allied with the special consider-
ation of family law. 
The existing written conflict rules differ, as in other respects, 
also with respect to their subject matter. While, for instance, 
the recent Italian code contains one provision on the relation-
ship between parent and child, 2 the German Introductory 
Law 3 has different provisions relating to' (I) legitimacy as 
the origin of legitimate relationships, ( 2) the relationship be-
tween parents and a legitimate child, (3) the relationship 
between an illegitimate child and his mother, (4) the duties of 
support of the illegitimate father, ( 5) legitimation and adop-
tion, and ( 6) custodianship of all kinds. And, whereas Ger-
many treats legitimation and adoption together,4 Poland joins 
legitimation and recognition/ Switzerland legitimation, 
recognition, and adoption,6 and the C6digo Bustamante/ as 
well as the recent Greek code, 8 have one rule on legitimation 
alone. 
2. Institutions Involving an Act of a Party 
(a) In some statutes of this country, the term, adoption, 
is given to the institution otherwise known as legitimation by 
voluntary declaration. Moreover, legitimation in the proper 
sense is often confused with the qualified recognition by a 
parent through which an illegitimate child obtains an ameli-
2 C. C. (1942.) Disp. Prel. art. 2.0 par. 1. 
3 EG. arts. r8-zJ. 
4 EG; art. 2.2.. 
5 Law of 192.6 on international private law, art. u; cf, China: Law of 1918, 
.art. 13; Japan: Law of 1898, art. 18. 
6 NAG. art. 8. 
7 Arts. 6o-62.. 
8 C. C. (1940) art. 22.. 
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orated position, although remaining illegitimate. Also, in some 
other countries, the terminology oscillates. In fact, there are 
in this field many institutions of mixed character existing in 
the world. For the purpose of the law of conflicts, however, 
it is of primary importance to distinguish the following groups 
of institutions: 
(i) Acts through which an illegitimate child receives the 
full status of legitimacy (legitimation in the ordinary sense). 
(ii) Acknowledgment of paternity or maternity whereby 
(as by certain other circumstances) an illegitimate child may 
receive an improved position without r~aching the full position 
of a legitimate child. This group includes very different de-
grees of position. The child may be assimilated to a legitimate 
child in most respects, or it may, on the contrary, be granted 
only particular prerogatives, as under those numerous stat-
utes of the United States which confer nothing but rights of 
inheritance upon a recognized child. 9 
(iii) Recognition as a condition for any effect of illegitimate 
filiation as required in the French and in the other legislations 
following the French system. 
(iv) Institutions of a still more restricted nature such a::; 
the faculty of the husband to give his name to an illegitimate 
child of his wife under Austrian and German laws.10 
(b) The broad distinction between legitimate and illegiti-
mate children is considered fundamental, legally as well as 
socially, except in a few countries. It would seem natural, 
therefore, that the same conflicts rules should govern legiti-
macy by birth, legitimation, and adoption, insofar as by these 
institutions the full degree of legitimacy is reached. On the 
other hand, we can understand that conflict rules with respect 
to illegitimacy are different from those governing legitimacy 
9 See, for instance, Pfeifer v. Wright (I 930) 4I F. (2d) 464; cf. Note, 29 
Mich. L. Rev. (I93o) 258. 
10 Austria: Allg. BGB. § I65 par. 2; Germany: BGB. § I7o6 par. 2; see 
infra p. 612, n. I I. 
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by birth. However, existing rules do not altogether agree with 
these simple distinctions. 
(c) Recognition of foreign institutions has been strongly 
influenced by some aprioristic doctrines: 
(j) The influential English doctrine that a status unknown 
to the forum cannot be recognized has considerably impeded 
the progress of reciprocal recognition of institutions regarding 
parent and child. As stated in our general discussion in Chap-
ter 5, the hope is justified that this doctrine may be con-
sidered overruled.11 
(ii) American courts are inclined to recognize foreign acts 
but to give them the same effect as ascribed to the most nearly 
related domestic institutions. This doctrine is preferable to 
the English rule just mentioned, but it too is unsatisfactory. 
By such an approach, e.g., a child, illegitimate abroad, has 
been treated as legitimate at the forum for purposes of inherit-
ance. 
(iii) The idea mentioned under ( ii), inexact in application 
to illegitimacy, is perfectly right with respect to legitimacy. 
In the various countries, the status of legitimate children, 
though qualified by different minor features, is regulated in 
an essentially similar manner so far as the personal relations 
between parent and child are concerned. Hence, recognition of 
a foreign created legitimacy means that a child born or legiti-
mated or adopted in one country will be treated as legitimate 
in another, with the incidents determined by the law of the 
forum. This means also that, if the domicil or the nationality 
determinative of personal status is changed, the rights of legiti-
mate parents and children are transformed accordingly. This 
mutability of parental relations is a phenomenon that has only 
begun to attract some attention. 12 
11 Supra pp. 175-178. 
12 RAAPE 464 III 1. Application to English law has been attempted by MANN, 
"Legitimation and Adoption in Private International Law," 57 Law Q. Rev. 
(1941) uz, 126. 
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Recently, some well-meaning courts and writers have tried 
to counteract the narrowness of traditional doctrines. Thus, it 
has been postulated that the personal law of the child should 
govern rather than that of the parent, 13 or that public policy 
should override any conflicts rule referring to a foreign law 
less favorable to legitimacy than the domestic law.14 But the 
advantage of the child can only be secured by a conflicts rule 
that directly refers to that law most favorable to the child in 
each particular case. Conflicts rules formulated in this man-
ner 15 have proved to be of difficult application in German 
law.16 Moreover, consideration of family policy should be 
left to substantive legislation, except in a very restricted do-
main of public policy, where courts consider foreign bastardy 
statutes as plainly backward and a disgrace to the law. 
II. LEGITIMATE BIRTH 
A. RULES 
I. Personal Law of the Parent 
Common law and civil law agree in submitting the question 
of birth in lawful wedlock to the personal law of the parent. 
The tests are domicil or nationality respectively. American 
law, however, disagrees with all others by the distinctly pro-
claimed principle of determining the child's legitimate re-
lationship to each parent separately.17 In fact such an equal 
position of men and women, although apt to create compli-
cated situations with respect to the child, may be considered 
fair to all parties. In other countries, however, the law of the 
male parent is applied to determine the legitimate relation-
13 See infra p. 56 I. 
14 TAINTOR, IS Can. Bar Rev. (I940) at 7oo, 7oi, supra n. I; cf. ibid. 7I5. 
15 Poland: Law of I926 on international private law, art. 2I par. 2. 
16 See RAAPE 2 I df., 359ff. on EG. arts. 12, I 6, par. 2. 
17 Restatement § I 3 7, cj. ibid. § 13 8. 
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ship also between mother and child in order to maintain the 
unity of the family and particularly in view of the consequences 
for the nationality of the issue. 
The head of the family whose law governs legitimacy is, 
in the German law, correctly characterized as ''the husband 
of the mother." To say that legitimacy is predicated on the 
personal law of the ''child's father" is a tautology that has 
caused confusion to English writers.18 
Hence, under American law, if the parents are domiciled in 
different states at the time of the birth of the child, the law of 
each party's domicil decides his relationship to the child. 
Where, for instance, the marriage of the parents is recognized 
as valid in Iowa and considered invalid in New Y ark, the 
child is legitimate as to the mother, domiciled in the first 
state, and illegitimate as to the father, domiciled in the second 
state. Under English law, the child would be illegitimate with 
regard to both parents. 
Contacts: domicil or nationality. The domicil of the father 
or mother is the test in the United States. The domicil of the 
father, as head of the family, is the test in England and the 
other countries generally following the domiciliary prin-
ciple.19 
Nationality of the mother's husband is decisive almost 
everywhere in the rest of the world. 20 The personal law has 
18 CHESHIRE 380; caught in that tautology which he believes to be a "theory," 
feels compelled to state that "practicability must not be sacrificed to theory." 
19 England: CHESHIRE 376. 
Argentina: 2. Vtco no. I 40. 
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 220 no. 52. 
Nicaragua: C. C. Tit. Prel. art. VI (9). 
The Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law starts pronouncing in 
art. I 6, unchanged by the text of I 940, art. 2o, that "the law that governs the 
celebration of the marriage determines legitimate birth and the legitimation by 
subsequent marriage." However, the next section (art. 17, text of I 940: art. 2 I) 
submits "the questions of legitimacy other than those concerning the validity or 
nullity of the marriage" to the domiciliary law. This means probably that art. 
1 6 is corrected by art. I 7; the special rule on marriage, as in the other countries, 
governs only the question whether the marriage, or subsequent marriage, is valid. 
- This seems to be the opinion also of 2. VI co, no. I 7 4· But why has art. I 6 not 
been cancelled at least in 1 940? 
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to govern because the stability of the family, the honor of the 
married woman, and her marital rights stand upon this mat-
ter.21 An exorbitant exception in favor of the lex fori is made 
by a National Socialist law of 19 3 8 that extends the appli-
cation of the German laws to the contestation of legitimacy 
in the case where only the mother is of German nationality at 
a certain date. 22 
Renvoi is applied according to general rules. 23 
2. Personal Law of the Child 
The personal law of the child has been advocated by a few 
writers/4 although sparsely applied in actuallaws.25 Accord-
ing to this opinion, it would be material in this country whether 
the child's domicil at birth is with the father or the mother.26 
In a country 'following the principle of nationality, the child's 
20 Austria, prevailing opinion, WALKER 782 n. 11 (the Austrian law of parent 
and child seems to have stayed in force). 
Belgium: POULLET 506 no. 387. 
Belgian Congo: C. C. (1895) book 1, art. 12. 
Finland: Law of 1929, § 18. 
France: prevailing opinion. 
Germany: EG. art. 18. 
Greece: C. C. (1940) art. I7 par. 1. 
Italy: C. C. (1942) Disp. Prel. art. 20 par. I. 
Switzerland: NAG. arts. 8 and 32. (for Swiss domiciliaries). 
China: Law of 1918, art. 12. 
Japan: Law of 1898, art. 17; 
Poland: Law of 192.6 on international private law, art. I8. 
21 LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 4IO no. 346. 
22 Cf. EG. art. I 8 par. z, added by art. 2. § 8 of the Law of April I z, I 9 3 8, 
to modify and complete family law provisions and on the condition of apatrides 
(RGBl. I, 38o). 
23 Germany: RAAPE 487 whose illustration however is questionable; M. 
WoLFF, IPR. 135 no. 6. 
24 France: WEISS, 4 Traite 27; AUDINET no. 62.5; see contm: SURVILLE 447 
no. 305; DUGUIT, Clunet, I885, 353, 359; CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue 1910, 
. 57> 6I, . . 
Belgium: see RoLIN, 2 Principes 137 no. 613; PouLLET so6, no. 387; 
Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ. 618 no. 581. 
25 C6digo Bustamante art. 57· Art. 8 sentence 2 of the French law of July 
24, 1921 concerning the conflicts law of Alsace-Lorraine, refers to the law of 
the child the "proof of filiation," whatever that means. Two decisions of the 
court of Bucharest to this effect, conflicting with others, are cited by PLASTARA, 
7 Repert. 68 no. 198. 
26 TAINTOR, I 8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) at 597, supra n. I; cf. ibid. 6o2. 
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national law ~annat be found without knowing whether it is 
legitimate; thus nationality would depend upon legitimacy, 
and this again upon nationality. Such a vicious circle, it is true, 
may be avoided by legislation on nationality whereby the 
child acquires a nationality of its own on the ground of jus 
soli or a temporary nationality which may suffice for pro-
visional legal situations. It must be conceded, furthermore, 
that the traditional system based on nationality is weakened 
to the extent that separate nationality of wife and child has 
been recognized. But the idea of applying the child's law in-
stead of that of the parent seems to come simply from the 
desire to employ in the forum of the child once more the law 
of the forum. 27 It is still the dominant opinion that the child's 
domicil or nationality is perfectly immaterial, 28 the reason 
still proclaimed being that the existence and unity of the 
family is at stake. 29 
Indeed, if the state of the child's domicil is said to have a 
concurrent interest in its status, 30 this interest is negligible 
compared with the interest of the fa~ily. Moreover, the in-
terests of the child are not, and certainly should not be, more 
protected by the court of his domicil than by any other. And 
the law of his domicil may as well be unfavorable to the child 
as favorable. 
3· Time Governing Ascertainment of Applicable Law 
The decisive and natural time for determining the applic-
able law is considered to be the moment when the child is 
born. In the German and other enactments, it is added that, if 
the child is born after the death of the mother's husband, the 
personal law of the husband at the time of his death gov-
.
27 See e.g., LEREBOURS-PIGEONNLERE 4I5 no. 349 (B). 
28 Germany: unanimous opinion, see RAAPE 447; Bay. ObLG. (March zz, 
I9z4) 23 Bay. ObLGZ. 56. 
Switzerland: BG. (June 29, I928) 54 BGE. I 230. 
29 DrENA, 2 Prine. I 79; RAAPE 447· 
80 TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 6o3, supra n. I. 
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erns; 31 in a generalized version, the same rule applies in the 
case of any dissolution of the marriage occurring before birth. 32 
It follows that the law determining whether a child is 
legitimate is immutable; no change of status of parent or child 
after this date alters the result. This is in sharp contrast to the 
fact that a voluntary change of status elected by the husband 
before the child's birth may influence its legitimacy. 
Precisely in view of this liberty of the father, occasionally 
the decisive time has been assumed to be that of the conception 
rather than that of the birth, 33 a solution generally held im-
practical, because birth can be ascertained much more easily 
than conception. 34 But an American author 35 has recently 
suggested that "the rule should be stated in terms of the 
creation of legitimacy by the law of the domicile of the parents 
either at conception or birth of the child." He thinks that the 
writers and the courts have been wrong in regarding only 
the time of birth or have overlooked the possibility of the 
parents' change of domicil between conception and birth of 
the child. Yet, no mistake has occurred in the formation of 
the rules. The purpose of conflicts law is not the same as that 
of substantive private laws. These may consider a child born 
during the time of wedlock as legitimate (as common law 
does) or declare a child en vmtre sa mere as already born 
inasmuch as this fiction is advantageous to the child (as Roman 
law does). Conflicts law refers to one legislation and leaves 
it to this legislation whether to go back from birth to con-
3! Germany: EG. art. I 8. 
Poland: Law of I 9::6 on international private law, art. 18 par. z. 
China: Law of I9I8, art. u, znd sentence. 
Japan: Law of I 898, art. I 7, znd sentence. 
32 Greece: C. C. (I940) art. I7 par. z, in agreement with the German inter-
pretation of EG. art. 18; cf. RAAPE 449· 
33 Denmark: App. Copenhagen (July 17, I9I6) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (19::8) 866 
no. 7· SURVILLE 447 no. 305 advocates a fiction of earlier birth where it would 
be more favorable to the child; RAAPE 448 would like an exception to the rule 
in the case of a fraudulent change of nationality. 
34 SCHNITZER 203, concerning Swiss law. 
35 TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 597, supra n. I. 
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ception. The suggested terms would essentially modify the 
rule; this seems inadvisable, if for no other reason than be-
cause of the wide uniformity already reached. Moreover, the 
law of the time of birth has been adopted in the different legis-
lations, because this is a fact that can be ascertained without 
any fiction. 
4· Soviet Russia 
The law of Soviet Russia knows only one category of parent-
child relations: it does not admit any difference between 
legitimate and illegitimate children. 36 How, therefore, ought 
we to classify in a Western court children whose parents were 
domiciled in or nationals of, Soviet Russia? Are they to be 
regarded without distinction as legitimate or illegitimate? 37 
The second answer is absurd, and, since the Russian law in-
tends to abolish the category of illegitimate children, the 
solution must be the same as in the case of the statutes of 
Arizona and North Dakota which declare all children the 
legitimate offspring of their natural parents. 38 In the latter 
case, indeed, there is no doubt regaraing the effects in a foreign 
court. 
36 Soviet Russian Code of family law of I9z6, art. z5. 
37 The question has been discussed with reference to legitimation by the writers 
cited infra p. 57 8, ns. I I3, I I4· 
38 Arizona: Ariz. Code Ann. ( I939) § z7-40I; North Dakota: Comp. 
Laws Ann. (Supp. 19z5) § ro5oobi (Laws I9I7, Ch. 70 §I). See comment to 
the first in Fladung v. Sanford (I938) SI Ariz. zii, 75 P. (zd) 685; Hazelett 
v. State (I94o) 55 Ariz. I4I, 99 P. (zd) IOI. The authors of the official 
Supplement to the I9I3 Comp. Laws of North Dakota, I9IJ-I9Z5, vol. III 
p. I496, assert that Chapter 5B consisting of Laws I9I7, Ch. 70 "was evidently 
intended to be repealed" by the Uniform Illegitimacy Act, consisting of Laws 
I9Z3, ch. 165 (§:§ Io5ooai-I05ooa37 of the Compiled Laws I925). This 
change would be exactly inverse to the Arizona legislation having adopted first 
the Uniform Illegitimacy Act and then replaced it by the acknowledgment of 
all illegitimate children. This mystery should be removed by the legislature of 
North Dakota. 
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B. SCOPE OF THE RULES 
I. Validity of Marriage as Condition 
The first condition for legitimacy by birth is normally a 
valid marriage between the mother and the man alleged to 
be the father. Validity of the marriage, therefore, is a "pre-
liminary question" in examining legitimacy according to the 
law governing lawful birth. But this law does not extend 
to the validity of the marriage. It is universally agreed that 
the law governing the formal and the intrinsic validity of mar-
riage according to the rules discussed above in Chapters 7 
and 8 are applicable also to this question. Even the writers 
who regularly assign preliminary questions to the law gov-
erning the principal question agree that marriage is always, 
without exception, tested according to its own particular rule 
of conflicts. 39 
A remarkable consequence occurs where a foreign marriage 
is regarded as valid under the main conflicts rule of the forum. 
Children born of such a marriage are considered legitimate, 
even if the personal law of the parents at the time of the birth 
considers the marriage invalid. 4° For illustration, if two 
Greeks, being of Orthodox faith and domiciled in Greece at 
the birth of a child, had gone through a temporal marriage 
ceremony in Paris, the marriage, though considered invalid in 
Greece, is recognized as valid in most countries; in the latter 
countries, the children must, therefore, be considered legiti-
mate, provided that they would be so under Greek family law 
if the marriage had been celebrated by a Greek Orthodox 
priest. 
There are complications also on the opposite side of the 
pro~lem. The forum may regard a marriage as invalid either 
39 MELCHIOR 2.59 § 173; WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 148, 2.06 {with 
different explanations). 
40 WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) i48, 2.14. 
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in accordance with the law governing marriage, for instance 
because formalities are lacking, 41 or despite this law for rea-
sons of public policy respecting polygamy, incest, or adultery. 
We might well question the wisdom of holding a Chinese mar-
riage of Chinese domiciled persons invalid for local purposes 
as being polygamous; but if we do so, the marriage cannot be 
regarded as valid for the purpose of personal relations. Even 
if the law governing legitimacy (for instance the law of the 
parent's domicil at the time of the birth) recognizes such a 
marriage, the special conflict rules on marriage prevail. 
The situation is different, of course, where the law govern-
ing the problem of legitimacy accords legitimacy without a 
valid marriage.42 This situation will be considered later.u 
2. Presumptions of Legitimacy 
The well-known .presumptions for establishing birth in 
lawful wedlock, which form the main body of the municipal 
regulations of legitimacy, are not mere rules of evidence; they 
are substantive law.44 This may safely be alleged with respect 
to any present legislation and seems to be acknowledged al-
most everywhere. Hence, the law applicable to legitimacy 
governs the questions at what time, and under what circum-
stances, the presumption of legitimate birth arises, on what 
ground the presumption may be rebutted, 411 within what 
41 A religious ceremony without civil marriage is non-existent in Germany, 
under EG. art. 13 par. 3· Is the father's national law recognizing the marriage 
applicable to the parental relations? No: OLG. Miinchen (March xo, 192.1) 42 
ROLG. 98; Yes: KG. (July 9, 1937) HRR. 1937 no. 1446. 
42 For this reason only, the criticism by 1 FRANKENSTEIN :136 on the decision of 
OLG. Miinchen (precedent note) is justified. 
43 See infra pp. s681f. 
44 France: WEISS, 4 Traite 25; LEREBOURs-PIGEONNIERE 412 no. 348; 
BATIFFOL, 8 Repert. 412 no. 52. 
Germany: RAAPE 460; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 22. 
Quebec: Lefebvre v. Digman (x 894) 3 Rev. de J ur. 194 and others; see 
I }OHNSON 339• 
45 E.g. OLG. Miinchen (May 151 1933) 29 Z.Rechtspflege Bayern (1933) 
278; 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 135 no. 48 (the Austrian law of father allows proof 
of the impossibility of cohabitation, even though he was at the same place as 
the mother) • . 
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period, by whom, 46 and against whom, legitimacy may be 
contested or action for a declaratory statement denying legiti-
macy may be brought; what events terminate the right to 
disown the child, whether alleged recognition of paternity 
may be revoked, under what conditions and in what time,47 
and similar problems. In particular, European courts apply 
the provision of a foreign personal law to determine the time 
within which an action for contesting paternity must be 
brought; for instance, an Austrian 48 or a Swiss 49 husband is 
given a period of three months for this action. . 
3· Public Policy 
Public policy is not interested in regard to the problems 
just mentioned. 
However, as usual, French courts reserve many provisions 
of their code for imperative application, irrespective of the 
nationality of the parties. This is done, for instance, with 
that French rule, which exists also in Louisiana, 50 that a hus-
band is not allowed to disown a child by alleging and proving 
his own impotence; such a source of scandal must be closed, 
the French courts think. 51 
46 E.g., Swiss BG. (June zo, I9z3) 49 BGE. II 3I7 (children born in Switzer-
land during the formal existence of their mother's marriage with a German 
are not entitled to contest their legitimacy, according to the German law of the 
time). 
47 One year in Germany (BGB. § I594 par. I); six months in Sweden {law 
concerning legitimate birth of June I 4, I 9 I 7, § z) ; one or two months in 
Louisiana (Rev. Civ. C. Ann. (I93z) art. I9I); one month in Turkey (C. C. 
of Feb. I7, I9z6, art. z.p); etc. 
48 Austria: Allg. BGB. §I 58; RG. (Jan. u, I939) HRR. I939, no. 376 (4); 
OLG. Naumburg (Dec. 3, I936) HRR. I937• no. II46. 
49 Swiss C. C, art. z53; LG. Mainz (June 6, I9z6) 4I Z.int.R. (I9Z9) 4I5, 
IPRspr. I9z9, no. So. See also KG. (Feb. z8, I93I) JW. I9JZ, zz96, IPRspr. 
I93z, no. 89 (father a national of the former Kingdom of Poland). Trib. civ. 
Bruxelles (April z8, I9IO) Pasicrisie I9IO. III. I95· Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Feb. 
6, I9I4) Clunet I9I4, 993 (Bavarian, became father in I893). Contra: OLG. 
Frankfurt (Dec. 3-I7, I9Z5) JW. I9z6, z858, IPRspr. I9z6-I9z7, no. 77· 
50 La: Rev. Civ. Code Ann (I93z) art. 185. 
61 Even in France: WEiss, 4 Traite z3; PoULLET 504 no. 386. Many French 
decisions deal with the .form necessary for foreign documents of birth, see J. 
DONNEDIEU DE VABllES 385. 
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C. CHILDREN OF INVALID MARRIAGES 
(a) United States: general rule. Many statutes in the 
United States legitimize the issue of certain or of all pro-
hibited marriages. 52 Marriage, in this case, is not a condition 
precedent to legitimacy. The comments on these statutory 
provisions have made it perfectly clear that legitimacy is not 
an incident of marriage, but an independent subject. Hence, 
the law of the domicil of the parents, whose relationship to 
the child is in question at the time of birth, determines legiti-
macy or illegitimacy. 53 It is the same conflicts rule as though 
the marriage were valid. 
Sometimes this conflicts solution has been explained as due 
to the policy of favoring the innocent issue, 54 which naturally 
forms the reason of the statutory provisions. This is an er-
roneous transplantation of social purposes from the substantive 
law into international private law. The law of the domicil 
of the parents applicable under our rule may be decidedly 
more favorable to the child than the law governing the mar-
nage. 
(b) England. The rule is the same in England with the 
exception that the House of Lords' decision in Shaw v. 
Gould 55 has disturbed the problem in the case where a child 
is born to a marriage not recognized in England, because a 
previous divorce of one parent is not recognized there. In the 
52 See 1 VERNIER § 48, 4 VERNIER § 247• 
53 Restatement § 13 7 and comment. Moore v. Saxton (I 9 I 6) 90 Conn. I 64, 
96 Atl. 96o (bigamous marriage, birth in California); Green v. Kelley (I9I7) 
228 Mass. 6oz, liS N. E. 235 (bigamy); Harding v. Townsend (I932) z8o 
Mass. 256, I8z N. E. 369 (bigamy); apart from the special rules of New York 
(discussed below on p. 569) exceptions for public policy are rare; see Greenhow 
et al. v. James, Executor (I 8 8 5) 8 o Va. 6 3 6, 5 6 Am. Rep. 6 o 3 ( miscegenous 
marriage). 
As to polygamy see TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 594, 7II supra 
n. x. 
54 Cf. cases cited by TAINTOR, r 8 Can. Bar Rev. (I 940) at 595, 697, supra 
n. I. 
55 In re Wilson's Trusts, Shaw v. Gould [I86s] L. R. I Eq. 247, aff'd I868 
L. R. 3 H. L. 55· 
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case mentioned, the child was declared illegitimate, although 
the father was domiciled in Scotland at the time of the birth 
and Scotch law had no objection to legitimacy. This decision 
has been sharply disapproved by recent English writers. In 
their opinion, the court should have recognized the legitimacy 
of the children under Scotch law, while appropriately refus-
ing to recognize the validity of the marriage. Cheshire 56 
suggests that the case should be overruled, while Foster 57 
thinks a statutory enactment is necessary. Against this criti-
cism, American writers have emphasized the interest of the 
English law in the matter because of the English domicil of 
the mother. 58 But under English as well as generally under 
Continental conflicts rules, the child's relations to both parents 
are governed by the personal law of the father alone, that of 
the mother being entirely immaterial. 
Also, New York courts have declined to recognize legiti-
macy under similar circumstances, viz., when, according to the 
New York "special rule," a foreign divorce and, in consequence 
thereof, a remarriage was invalid and the child was born dur-
ing the second marriage. 59 This evidently must be taken as a 
part of the general policy of New York courts against mar-
riages that are "polygamous, incestuous, or prohibited by 
law," 60 the New York courts resolving for ·themselves what 
marriages are to be so qualified. In the leading case, Olmsted 
v. Olmsted, the Supreme Court of the United States decided 
that by such an attitude the Full Faith and Credit Clause was 
56 CHESHIRE 387. 
57 FosTER, "Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," 16 Brit. 
Year Book Int. Law (1935) 84, 89. 
58 z BEALE 706; TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. ( 1940) at 6oo, supra n. 1. 
59 Olmsted v. Olmsted (1908) 190 N.Y. 458, 467, 83 N. E. 569, 571, aff'd 
zr6 U.S. 386, see infra n. 61 (bigamous subsequent marriage with following 
divorce from first wife); In re Thomann's Estate (193z) 144 N.Y. Misc. 497, 
z58 N.Y. Supp. 838 (divorce not recognized in New York for lack of personal 
service, remarriage in Russia). 
60 See In re Bruington's Estate (1936) r6o N.Y. Misc. 34 at 37, z89 N.Y. 
Supp. 7Z5 at 7z9 (children of bigamous marriage). 
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not violated, 61 but it remains uncertain whether the indepen-
dence of state doctrines would likewise be maintained in cases 
other than those where inheritance of real estate or a re-
mainder under a will is at issue and only immovables in the 
state are involved.62 However this may be, the peculiar policy 
of the courts of New York has been severely and convincingly 
criticized, in particular with respect to a repetition of the doc-
trine in the Bruington case of 1936 63 after the legislature of 
New York had begun to follow the trend of courts and statutes 
benevolent to children. 64 
(c) Germany. The prevailing American rule has its exact 
counterpart in the German practice. 65 The national law of the 
pseudo-husband is applied in determining legitimacy, whether 
this law acknowledges legitimacy irrespective of the good 
faith of the parties 06 or conditionally upon the good faith of 
one party (putative marriage). 67 The Reichsgericht has ex-
pressly rejected the theory that the law governing the null-
ity of the marriage should determine also whether or not the 
children are to be considered legitimate. 68 
(d) 0 ther countries. The policy practiced in other countries 
probably runs along similar lines. French writers, it is true, 
advocate again the exclusion of children born in adultery, 
from any recognized legitimacy/9 but even this restriction is 
not certain. 70 
61 (1910) 216 u.s. 386. 
62 See TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 691 1 692, supra n. 1. 
63 Supra n. 6o. 
MNote, 46 Yale L. J. (1937) 10491 1054; TAINTOR, 18 Can. Bar Rev. 
(1940) at 7101 supra n. 1. 
65 RG. (Nov. u, 1937) JW. 1938, 1o8; KG. (Dec. 9, 1921) 42 ROLG. 97; 
KG. (Feb. 27, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 83; KG. (July 91 1937) JW. 19371 
2526, Clunet 1938, 341. 
66 E.g., Swiss C. C. art. 133. 
67 E.g., French C. C. arts. 201 1 202; Ital. C. C. (1865) art. u6; C. C. 
(1942) art. 128; German BGB. § 1699. 
66 RG. (Nov. ll, 1937) JW. 1938, 108 rejecting RAAPE 499· 
69 See especially LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 41 I no. 347· 
7° Compare the practice whereby the spouse in good faith and his or her 
children of the bigamous marriage enjoy the benefit of putative marriage. See 
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III. LEGITIMATION BY SuBsEQUENT MARRIAGE 
An old institution of civil law but unknown to the British 
common law and expressly rejected by the Statute of Merton, 
legitimation by the marriage of the child's natural parents, 
has been introduced by statute in all but three jurisdictions 
in this country, 71 in all of the common law provinces of Canada 
during 1920 to 1928,72 and in England by the Legitimacy 
Act, I 926.73 
An important difference exists on the question whether in 
addition to the marriage some recognition of the child is re-
quired. This requirement, in contrast to the German tradition, 
exists in the Latin systems and in almost half of the American 
statutes, a fact regretted by Vernier 74 as inconsistent with the 
purpose to improve the status of children born out of wedlock. 
It ensues from this system that a child may be considered 
legitimate only in relation to one parent. Moreover, the 
French system take's into account which parent is first to 
recognize the child. 
A. RULES 
I. Decisive Time 
English courts, starting from ·the thesis that legitimacy is· 
determined by the law of the child's domicil of origin, viz., 
his father's domicil at the time of his birth, regarded it es-
sential that this law recognize the possibility of legitimation 
by a later marriage. 75 This artificial theory, already rejected 
supra pp. 545-550 and particularly Cour Paris (March 30, 1938) Nouv. Revue 
1938, 353· 
71 4 VERNIER § 243· 
72 1 JoHNSON 344 n. 1; for Ontario see Ontario Legitimation Act, 1921, 11 
Geo. V, c. 53, as amended 1927, Rev. Stat. Ontario, c. 187 s. x, same in Rev. 
Stat. Ontario 1937, c. 216. 
13 16 & 17 Geo. V, c. 6o. 
14 4 VERNIER § 243· 
75 In re Wright's Trusts (1856) 2 K. & ]. 595, 6o4; In re Goodman's Trusts 
(188J) 17 Ch. D.' 266; In re Andros (1883) 24 Ch. D. 637; In re Grove, 
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by Savigny, 76 has been eradicated in England by the Legiti-
macy Act of I 926 77 but has nevertheless been adopted as a 
common law rule by Beale 78 and the Restatement. 79 The 
ancient basis for this rule, namely, that birth may give the child 
a certain faculty to be legitimized, 80 appears in the older Eng-
lish doctrine and also in Beale's theory in the form of a sup-
posed logical necessity that the child must have a "potential 
legitimacy" by the law of the father's domicil. Probably no 
American decision of actual importance reflects this precon-
ceived idea.81 However, under the circumstances, Scott, L. J., 
in In re Luck (I 940 ),82 was justified in thinking the theory to 
be connected with the American law, although eliminated 
from the English. He stated: 
"The very idea of attributing to a newly-born child, to a 
filius- nullius, a sort of latent capacity for legitimation at the 
hands of the natural father to whom he is denied any legal 
relation, seems to me an even more absurd legal fiction and 
even less convincing than that mythical contract of marriage 
supposed by the canonists to have been entered into at the 
moment of procreation." 
In England, 83 as well as in the United States, 84 it has be-
come perfectly certain that, in the case of a subsequent mar-
Vaucher v. Treasury Solicitor (I888) 40 Ch. D. 2I6. For history and criticism 
see MANN, "Legitimation and Adoption in Private International Law," 57 
Law Q. Rev. (I94I) IIZ, ll5-I2Z. 
76 SAVIGNY 338 § 380, tr. by GUTHRIE 302. 
77 Legitimacy Act, I 9 2 6 § I (I) for English and § 8 (I) for foreign 
domiciliaries. 
78 2 BEALE 706-709 § § 139.1 and 139.2. 
79 Restatement § I3 7. 
8° Cf. SCHAEFFNER, Entwickelung des Internationalen Privatrechts (Frank-
furt, 184I) 49 § 37, tr. in GUTHRIE'S translation of SAVIGNY 308. 
81 See cases in 73 A. L. R. 94I, 952ff. and cf. MINOR 2I6ff.; Notes, 20 Harv. 
L. Rev. (1907) 400; 46 Yale L. J. (1937) 1051 n. 15; also STUMBERG 305 
n. 30, although he surprisingly acknowledges the "logic of the English point 
of view"; TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) at 6I9, 62o, 628, supra n. 1. 
82 /n re Luck's Settlement Trusts [1940] Ch. D. 864, 9I2. 
83 /n re Askew [1930] 2 Ch. D. 259. 
84 Stack v. Stack (I887) 6 Dem. Sur. (N.Y.) 28o, I5 N.Y. St. Rep. 416; 
Dayton v. Adkisson (I889) 45 N. J. Eq. 6o3, I7 Atl. 964; De Wolf v. 
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riage, the time when the child was born is of no importance. 
Also in other legislations, although some provisions contain 
obscure elements,85 as a rule the applicable law is simply that 
of the time of legitimation. In some texts, this is emphasized 
with the express statement that the status of the parent at the 
time of the conception and of the birth are immaterial. 86 Such 
a statement corresponds in the broader field of legitimacy in 
general with the idea that legitimacy is acquired or denied 
by the law of the time when it originates, whether by birth or 
by marriage or by decree or "any other cause," as is the 
formula of the recent Finnish law. 87 
We may take it that where, under the legislation thus gov-
erning, an act of legitimation is void, it cannot be helped by 
later events. This is also the general proposition of the Ameri-
can cases. 88 The status created at the time of a subsequent 
marriage (or any other act of legitimation) is permanent. 
Adequate application of this principle to the legislations 
of the French system (where a formal acknowledgment of 
paternity or maternity is an essential part of legitimation by 
subsequent marriage) depends upon the question whether 
recognition is allowed after the marriage. In the older style 
of these enactments, the recognition had to take place before 
or as part of the act of celebrating the marriage, 89 so that the 
status was fixed at the moment of the marriage. 90 Now the 
Middleton (I893) I8 R.I. 8Io, 31 Atl. 2.71; c/. Note, 46 Yale L. J. (1937) 
1049, 1051 n. IS. 
85 Especially art. 315 (new 349) of the Argentine Civil Code is defectively 
drafted . 
.86 E.g., Argentina: C. C. art. 315 (new 349). 
Portugal, Law for the Protection of Children of Dec. 2.5, 1910, art. 2., 
87 Finland: Law of I 929, § 22; cf. Poland: Law of I 926, § 22. 
88 Smith v. Kelly (1851) 23 Miss. I67 (subsequent marriage during domicil 
in South Carolina does not legitimate an issue previously born; the later domicil 
of the family in Mississippi was of no avail). For the general rule see In re 
Presley's Estate (1925) 113 Okla. x6o, 164, 240 Pac. 89, 93; TAINTOR, 18 
Can. Bar Rev. ( 1940) at 617, supra p. 555, n. 1, and infra p. 587, n. 169. 
89 Code Napoleon art. 33I, widely copied. 
90 WEISS, 4 Traite 90. 
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French and some other municipal laws permit recognition of 
paternity or maternity after a subsequent marriage, 91 and 
either postpone the effect of legitimation until the later 
event 92 or make it retroactive to the time of marriage.93 It 
may well be concluded that the decisive moment for the choice 
of law also is deferred to the time of recognition. The personal 
law of this later moment decides on the question of retroactiv-
ity. Such a view might be suitable also to this country, where 
in many jurisdictions acknowledgment must be added to a 
subsequent marriage in order to complete legitimation and is 
generally permitted after the marriage.94 
Such a supplement to a previous act of legitimation may 
likewise be accomplished in the case when the parent has ac-
quired a new personal law. The provisions of this new law de-
termine the decision without regard to any former personal 
law. Suppose the parents have married after the birth of the 
child, when they were domiciliaries or nationals of a country 
whose law does not know legitimation by marriage. If they 
change their personal status afterward and their new personal 
law allows legitimation and considers a belated recognition 
sufficient, such recognition can be effected accordingly.95 
2. Contacts: Usual Rules 
(a) Law of Domicil. The law of the domicil of the parents 
at the time of marriage governs legitimation by subsequent 
marriage in England and in the United States. It is quite 
possible that a child, in view of its illegitimacy, has a separate 
91 Spain: C. C. art. 12.1; France: C. C. art. 331 as amended by Laws of Dec. 
30, 1915 and of Aprilzs, 1924. 
92 Bulgaria: Law of Dec. 17, 1889 as amended by Decree of Oct. zz, 1935, 
art. r8; Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 2.83 "or from the day of a recognition posterior 
to the (subsequent) marriage." 
93 Spain: C. C. art. r 2 3. The preliminary draft of the Italian Civil Code 
(1930) art. 320 followed this rule; cf. Relazione sul progetto (1931) 167. 
94 In the case of Smith v. Kelly, supra n. 88, at r 70, the father would have been 
able, according to the said view, to add to the ineffective South Carolinian mar-
riage an acknowledgment in Mississippi. 
95 See RAAPE, so Recueil 1934 IV 405, 441. 
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domicil at that time, but this does not count. 96 Analogous 
rules obtain in Argentina/7 Switzerland (with respect to 
foreign legitimations by foreigners), 98 and the other countries 
following the domiciliary principles. 99 
(b) Law of Nationality. The national law of the father at 
the time of marriage or recognition governs the problem under 
most European conflicts laws.100 
3· Personal Law of the Child 
Under some of the more recent conflicts legislations, how-
ever, the personal law of the child is observed in determining 
the question whether legitimation requires certain conditions 
96 Restatement § 140, comment b adds, it is true, a caveat that the law of the 
child's domicil might be sufficient to grant legitimation; but the basis for this 
allegation is not apparent. 
97 Argentina: C. C. arts. 313-315 (new 347-349), very difficult to understand. 
RoMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int. Priv. 330, calls these articles manifestly con-
tradictory; V1co does not attempt any comment. Such an attempt was risked by 
the Berlin KG. (Feb. s, 1932.) IPRspr. 1932., no, 96. 
98 Switzerland, NAG. art. 28. In the case of a husband of Swiss nationality, 
the application of Swiss law is provided by the Federal Constitution, art. 54· 
See BuRCKHARDT, Kommentar der Schweizerischen Bundesverfassung 5 r 3ff.; 
BECK, NAG. 2.46 no. ro6. 
99 Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 22.1 no. 53· 
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 576 no. 12.6. 
Uruguay: Ap. Montevideo (April 27, 19Io) Clunet I9I4, 674. 
Brazil: Introductory Law (I 942) art. 7> apparently covering the problem. 
100 Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June I9, I907) Clunet I 907, 462., PoULLET 
5I4 no. 395· 
Finland: Law of I929, § z.z.. 
France: prevailing opinion, see PILLET, I Traite 644 no. 3I3· SuRVILLE 459 
no. 3I3; NIBOYET 770 no. 65I (z). 
Germany: EG. art. z.z par. I. 
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. z.z.. 
Guatemala: see MATOS no. 2.74 (except where the child is not under parental 
power) but, under the actual laws, it would be more consistent to apply the 
domiciliary test. 
"Italy: C. C. ( I942) Disp. Prel. art. z.o par. 1. 
Japan: Law of 1898, art. I 8. 
Poland: Law of 1926, art. 2.2 . 
.Switzerland: NAG. art. 8; where the marriage is celebrated in Switzerland, 
see BG. (May 3 I, I9I9) 45 BGE. I 155, r 63; BG. (Jan. 28 and May zo, 1914) 
40 BGE. II 295, 302. BECK, NAG. 171 no. 64. If the father is a German or an 
Italian, authorization by the court is needed, Just. Dept., Bundesblatt 1941, 
11 OJ no. 8, 1 I 04 no. 9· 
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to be fulfilled in the person of the child, such as consent by 
the child or its guardian.101 
Occasionally the national law of the child has been claimed 
to govern legitimation as a whole.102 This opinion has been 
generally rejected, however. 103 The contrary view prevails 
for the good reasons that legitimation is an effect of marriage, 
that one law should govern the family as a unit, and that the 
child's entrance into this family should not be prescribed 
by another legislation. The English Act of 1926 refers dis-
tinctly to the law of the father's domicil, because otherwise 
a domiciled Englishman could. be burdened with a child legiti-
mized abroad. 104 It is equally certain in the United States that 
neither the law of the domicil of the child nor that of the 
mother controls any acts of legitimation by the father. 105 
Moreover, if the child's own law is adverse to the legitimizing 
effect of marriage, the child should not suffer therefor .106 
In a third opinion, the law of both parent and child must 
concur for every requisite in allowing legitimation.107 As usual, 
101 GEBHARD, Draft I (1881) § 22, Gebhardsche Materialien 7· 
China: Law of I9I8, art. 13. 
Japan: Law of I898, art. I8. 
Codigo Bustamante art. 6o, but see infra n. 109. Cf. BAR§ 102, n. 4· However, 
what conditions of such kind are provided for in actual legislations? RAAPE 
559 deals with the requisite of consent by a child of full age. 
102 In France a few decisions about 1926-1927 were to this effect; also BARTIN 
in 9 AUBRY et RAU § 546, 8I, n.8 ter; see also for the Netherlands, MuLDER 
I 2Q-I 22, 
103 For France, see BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 19 35, 6z 3 no. I 4; J. DoNNED lEU 
DE VABRES 497• 
104 See Note, 7 Cambr. L. J. (194I) 405. 
105 Blythe v. Ayres (1892) 96 Cal. 532, 572, 31 Pac. 915; In re Presley's 
Estate (1925) II3 Okla. I6o, 240 Pac. 89. 
106 PILLET, I Traite 647 no. 3I5; PoULLET 514 no. 395; Novelles Belges, 
2. D. Civ. 62.0 no. 591; RAAPE '551 (b), 558 (b); Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. zi, 
19I6) Clunet I917, I419; Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 23, I857) D.I857.L423, S.I858 •. 
1.294· . 
107 France : Isolated decisions. 
Italy: DIENA, 2 Prine. I83. 
The Netherlands: KosTERS 550; VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 635 no. 200, Codigo 
Bustamante art. 6o in fine. 
Brazil (under the former law): BEVILAQUA, I Codigo Civil (ed. 6, I940) 
In trod. art. 8 no. I 8. 
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such a doctrinary cumulation of laws is a very inconvenient 
solution. 
4· Rules on Effects of Legitimation 
Most of the rules mentioned determine both the act of 
legitimation and the effect of this act. In some codifications, 
however, special rules have been provided with respect to 
the effects of legitimation.108 The C6digo Bustamante, in par-
ticular, states that: 
"The effects of legitimation and the action for contesting a 
legitimation are governed by the personal law of the 
child." 109 
It seems that this rule is destined in the first place to take 
care of the case where the 'legitimated person has retained 
his separate nationality and under his national law becomes of 
full age earlier than under that of the parent, 110 but the 
fact that by such an event parental power is terminated rests 
upon the nationality law and upon the law of status and is 
not an incident of the parent-child relation. 
5· Renvoi 
As is their wont, French and German courts apply renvoi/11 
and English courts follow in applying any law that is ap-
plied at the domicil of the parent. It was in fact a case of 
108 Japan: Law of 1898, art. 18 par. 2. 
China: Law of 1918, art. 13 par. 2. 
109 Art. 62. 
110 See BusTAMANTE, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 74· 
lil France: Cour Paris (March 23, x888) S.x888.2.IJI, Clunet 1889, 638 
(Irishman); Trib. civ. Seine (Dec. 21, 1916) Clunet 1917, 1419 (Englishman 
from Mauritius). 
Germany: KG. (Nov. 21, 1930) IPRspr. 1931, no. 88; and in the same case, 
KG. (Feb. 5, 19 32) IPRspr. I 932, no. 96 (marriage of an Argentinian domiciled 
in Florida, law of Florida applied); LG. Wiesbaden (Oct. xo, 1932) JW. 1933, 
193 (Englishman if domiciled in the Netherlands, Dutch law applied). 
Italy: a decision of App. Firenze (Jan. 23, 1919) 12 Rivista (1918) 288, 
against t~e current Italian doctrine. 
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legitimation that gave rise to the celebrated judgment upon 
renvoi of Lord Maugham in In re Askew.112 
6. Soviet Russia 
The problem offered by the Soviet Russian law and those 
American statutes which make no distinction between legiti-
macy and illegitimacy has been more discussed in connection 
with the subject of legitimation than with that of legitimate 
birth. A German court has held that the child of a Russian 
who married the German mother after the birth was illegiti-
mate, because the Russian law does not know legitimation.113 
However, as the Russian law does not discriminate and as 
under German law the child who was, before the marriage, an 
illegitimate relative of the mother, would become by the mar-
riage a fully recognized child of both parents, legitimacy 
agrees with the spirit of both legislations involved.114 An 
analogous view is certainly appropriate in this country where 
the parents of a previously born child marry in Arizona or 
North Dakota.115 
B. SCOPE 
I. Validity of the Marriage 
Conforming to principles mentioned before, the validity of 
the marriage is to be determined under the ordinary rules 
concerning the formalities, on one hand, and the intrinsic 
validity of marriage, on the other. 
Illustration: The parents, Frenchmen, having lived in con-
cubinage in France, went to New York and continued there to 
live together. French courts made the recognition of the mar-
112 In re Askew [1930] 2 Ch. 259, Clunet 1931, 175, followed in Collins v. 
Att. Gen. (1931) 47 T. L. R. 484, 145 L. T. 551. Cf. 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 62o. 
113 StAZ. 1930, 44, cited with apparent approval by NussBAUM, IPR. 172 
n. 6. 
114 This solution was foreseen by RAAPE 568, 569; and RAAPE, so Recueil 
1934 IV at sos. 
115 See supra n. 3 8. 
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riage dependent upon the question whether their relation had 
assumed at some time the character of a common law marriage 
under New York law, and this is pertinent also to legiti-
mation.116 
2. Conditions and Effects of Legitimation 
Where the marriage is valid under all laws concerned, the 
conflicts rule is applicable to. the questions: 
(i) Whether legitimation follows from the marriage al-
ways, or never, or not for the issue from adulterous or in-
cestuous cohabitations, 117 or only for certain privileged classes 
of children, for instance the issue of a couple engaged to 
marry; 118 
Whether legitimation is invalid where it is proved that the 
child has not actually been begotten by the husband or borne 
by the wife of the marriage; 
Whether consent of the child is required, 119 et cetera. 
( ii) Regarding the acts sometimes required in addition to 
the marriage ceremony, particularly the formal acknowledg-
ment of paternity or maternity as required by the French 
Civil Code, art. 331, and its many followers. 120 This pro-
vision has been applied by the French courts as an incident of 
the personal law to Frenchmen at the forum and abroad.121 
Likewise, where the man is of Bulgarian nationality, a court 
in Germany (where no such requisites exist) requires recog-
nition by both parents according to the Bulgarian provision.122 
ll6See the case of Trib. civ. Havre (Feb. 14, 1907) and App. Rouen (Feb. 
26, 1908) Clunet 1909, 1057; the question was left open only because the 
recognition of maternity was missing in any case. 
117 France, England, Italy, the Netherlands, etc. 
us E.g., Sweden: Law of June 14, 1917 on Illegitimate Children, cj. Law of 
June 27, 1924. 
ll9 Chile: C. C. art. 210 (adult child); art. 211 (child with tutor or curator). 
120 La. Rev. Civ. Code Ann. (1932) art. 198. Belgium: C. C. art. 331, cj. 
342 (b). The Netherlands, Rumania, Sweden, Brazil. 
121 Cass. (req.) {Jan. 2o, 1879) 8.1879·1.417; Cass. (civ.) (April 20, 1885) 
D.1886.1.23; Cass. (req.) (July 8, 1886) Clunet 1886, 585. 
122 KG. (Nov. 29, 1929) HRR. 1930, no. 882, IPRspr. 1930, no. 85 (on the 
ground that the Bulgarian provision requiring recognition is not meant for 
evidence of the procreation only). 
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Conversely, where foreigners marry in the Netherlands, the 
Dutch requisite of recognition is released in favor of the na-
tional law not requiring recognition.123 
Since in the new text of the French Civil Code, art. 2 3 r, 
postnuptial recognition is allowed but must be effectuated by 
court proceedings, this requirement, too, is to be considered 
a part of the substantive personal law 124 rather than a formal-
ity with territorial effect.125 · 
(iii) Respecting the effect attached to legitimation: 
Whether legitimation is effective from the time of marriage 
or retroactively from the birth or from the date of recognition 
(Anglo-Canadian laws, for instance, prefer the effect from 
birth); 126 
Whether already existing children born in wedlock retain 
rights of "primogeniture"; 127 
Whether rights normally included in legitimacy are de-
nied; 128 
Whether in particular the child receives the name of the 
father. 129 
3· Invalid Subsequent Marriage 
A delicate question arises, if the subsequent marriage is 
considered invalid at the forum; under what law should we 
determine whether, nevertheless, the child is legitimized? 
Express municipal provisions are made in the Ger,man and 
Swiss Civil Codes/30 whereby the rules of putative marriage 
123 VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 635 no. 201. 
124 BATIFFOL, 8 Repert. 424 no. 124; a strange case of application: Trib. civ. 
Rochelle (May 29, 1934) Clunet I935 1 370. 
125 SURVILLE, Clunet I9I6, 769, 780. 
126 See Ontario Legitimation Act, I92I, II ·Geo. V, c. 53, as amended I927, 
Rev. Stat. Ontario, c. I87 s. I, also in Rev. Stat. Ontario I937• c. 2I6 and I 
JoHNSON 344 n. I. The time of the marriage is maintained as date of effectiveness 
of the legitimation 'in Quebec, C. C. art. 2 3 9· 
127 Cf. Austrian Allg. BGB. § I6I. 
128 Germany:·cf. Bay. ObLG. (June 8, I92I) 42 ROLG. HiS (Czecho-
slovakian decree of legitimation withholding rights of inheritance). 
I29 See E. H. PERROUD, Clunet I91 I, 503; 4 FRANKENSTEIN I6I n. 40. 
130 BGB. § I 72 I; Switzerland: EGGER, 2 Kommentar zum Schweizerischen 
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should be applied by analogy. Such an analogy is convenient 
also in the field of the law of conflicts. In the same way that the 
personal law of the parent at the time of the marriage de-
termines whether legitimacy is dependent or not upon a valid 
marriage, the law governing legitimation by subsequent mar-
riage should determine also the effect of an invalid subsequent 
marriage.131 
In the United States it has been contended, however, that 
where the marriage was void no effect could be recognized with 
respect to the children.132 As a matter of fact, the statutes 
conferring legitimacy on children, irrespective of the intrinsic 
validity of the marriage, have overlooked the case of a subse-
quent marriage, but it may be asked whether courts should not 
grant analogous application 133 by virtue of the liberal con-
struction generally given these beneficial statutes. Were this 
done by the domiciliary law, no other jurisdiction would have 
any reason to refuse recognition. 
The inverse case that the marriage is considered invalid 
under the per;onal law but valid under the internal rules, 
has been discussed in Germany; the father's personal law was 
said to determine the parent-child relationship in this case 
also.134 
4· Acquisition of Nationality 
Nationality of the parent is regularly transferred by legiti-
mation to the child in the Continental European laws. This 
Zivilgesetzbuch art. 2 58 (I) (b). In France, the construction of C. C. arts. 
20I and 202 is in controversy; see PLANIOL, I Traite elementaire de droit civil 
(ed. 8, I920-I92I) 362 no. II09. 
131 In this sense also 4 FRANKENSTEIN I 53 (d), while RAAPE 570 follows 
his theory referred to, supra p. 570, n. 68. 
132 2 BEALE 708 n. 5· The decision in the Matter of Look Wong (I9I5) 4 
U.S. Dist. Haw. 568, cited by BEALE, does not seem to support this view, but it 
has been expressed in Adams v. Adams (I89I) I54 Mass. 290, 28 N. E. 260 
even with respect to the liberal California legislation. 
133 Cf. Note, 46 Yale L. J. (I937) I049, IOSI n. I6. 
134 RAAPE, JW. I934> 295I; same in 50 Recueil I934 IV 405, 487 no. 63 
against other opinions. 
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raises peculiar problems, particularly in France.135 English 
law excludes this acquisition of nationality.136 
S· Prohibitive Public Policy of the Forum 
Much thought has been given to those municipal pro-
visions which prevent legitimation of the children conceived 
or born in polygamous, incestuous, or bigamous relations. 
There is no such provision in most American jurisdictions nor 
in Germany, the Scandinavian countries, nor Switzerland. The 
Venezuelan Civil Code expressly permits legitimation by sub-
sequent marriage even though the parents were incapable of 
marrying at the time of the conception. 137 The former text 
was similar, but it prohibited the recognition of children born 
to such marriages.138 Yet British and French influence has 
prompted a great number of provisions against such a legiti-
mation. Recent French reforms modifying the famous article 
335 of the Code Napoleon brought only partial relief. 139 
(a) United States. The courts of New York persist in 
their general policy of outlawing the children of "prohibited" 
marriages.140 In the other states, the weight of authority rec-
ognizes the domiciliary law without objection stemming from 
an opposed local policy.141 
135 Law on Nationality of August 10, I 92 7> art. 1 (4) ; ANCEL "La nationalite 
de !'enfant legitime," Clunet I 9 3 3, 5. 
136 Abrahamv.Att.Gen. [1934] P. 17. 
137 Venezuela, C. C. (1942) art. 227 par. 2. 
136 Venezuela, C. C. (1922) art. 248 par. 2, cf. art. 233· 
139 Amended by Law of Dec. 30, 1915; c/. I tal. C. C. ( 1942) arts. 251, 281. 
140 See Olmsted v. Olmsted (1908) 190 N.Y. 458, 83 N. E. 569, aff'd 216 
U.S. 386 and In re Bruington's Estate (1936) 160 N, Y. Misc. 34, 289 N. Y. 
Supp. 725, cited supra notes 59 and 6o respectively. 
141 M und v. Rehaume ( 1 9 1 1 ) 51 Colo. u 9, 1 1 7 Pac. 1 59 (near relationship) ; 
Moore v. Saxton (1916) 90 Conn. 1641 96 Atl. 960 (bigamy); Succession of 
Caballero (1872) 24La.Ann. 572 (miscegenation); Green v. Kelley (I917) 
228 Mass. 6o2, u8 N.E. 235 (bigamy); Ng. Suey Hi v. Weedin, Commissioner 
of Immigration (1927) 21 F. (2d) 8o1 (polygamy); see also Holloway v. 
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore (1926) 151 Md. 321, 134 Atl. 497 at 499· 
The case of Matter of Look Wong (1915) 4 U. S. Dist. Haw. 568, where 
recognition of children of a Chinese marriage was withheld, has been called 
unfortunate and unsound, Note, 3 I Harv. L. Rev. (I 9 I 7) 892. See also 
McNamara, v. McNamara (I922) 303 Ill. I91 1 IJS N. E. 410 (legitimation 
by conduct). 
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(b) England. According to the British Legitimacy Act of 
I 926, the offspring of an adulterous union cannot be legiti-
mated when the parents are domiciled in England, but no 
such express clause has been added in section 8 (I) dealing 
with marriages celebrated while the spouses are domiciled 
abroad. By reasonable interpretation, it has been held that a 
child born of a father with a foreign domicil is legitimated ac-
cording to the domiciliary l~w without interference by English 
public policy.142 
(c) Continent. Similarly, legitimation is recognized in 
France when foreign nationals marry abroad, 143 except in 
the case where the parents, both formerly French, have 
abandoned their nationality for the purpose of evading the 
French provision against legitimation of adulterines.144 How-
ever, the problem has been much discussed, 145 and an in-
creasingly nationalistic attitude of the Court of Cassation has 
made from what is left of article 335 of the Civil Code, after 
repeated modifications, a rule of "ordre public inter-
national." 146 This possibly means that adulterine children 
142 /n re Collins v. Att. Gen. ( 1931) 47 T.L.R.486, 145 L. T. 551. CHESHIRE 
391 n. z, raising a formalistic doubt, is too much impressed by the opinion of a 
Chancery official. 
143 Cour Paris (Aug. z, 1866) S.1866.z.34z; Cour Paris (July z, 19z6) 
Clunet I9Z7, 77· Belgium: App. Bruxelles (June I9, I907) Clunet I907, II54· 
144 Cour Paris (July I 6, I9oz) Clunet I9o3, 39z (French parties had become 
Swiss citizens). 
145 On the different opinions and the stages of development of the cases see 
WEISS, 4 Traite 94; VALERY 1147 no. l. 8o8; NIBOYET 77I no. 6sz; LERE· 
BOURS-PIGEONNIERE 318 no. Z79> ibid. 4II no. 347; BARTIN, z Principes 359 
§ 3Z4 (critical); Notes to Cass. (civ.) (March 311 1930) by SAVATIER, D.1930. 
1,113 and BATIFFOL, 8 Repert. 4z5 nos. I34ff. and Revue Crit. 1934, 615. 
146 Cass. (civ.) (March 31, 1930) D.1930.I.113 at uS, S.I9JI.I.9 and ibid. 
at 177, Case Note by GENY; Clunet 1930, 6so, Revue Crit. 1934, 615 (a 
Russian, Reweliotty, married and being father of children by this marriage, had 
an illegitimate child in France by one Struve, whom he married after having been 
divorced from his first wife. Both parents had acknowledged the child. The 
Czarist law admitted legitimacy, and the Soviet Russian law ignores any qualifi-
cations of children. The Appeal Court refused recognition for the double reason 
that the child, being of French nationality, was subject to French law. LERE· 
BOUR5-PIGEONNIERE 412. n. 1, and 415 n. I stresses the point that the Supreme 
Court did not disapprove of the second ground, although it did not examine it. 
Similar in Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (March 27, I930) Pasicrisie 1930·3·173 
and Trib. civ. Liege (Nov. 13, I93o), both in Revue 1933,358, even for the case 
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cannot be legitimated where any one of the three persons in-
volved is of French nationality or a part of the facts happened 
in France. The courts are apprehensive that the people may 
become accustomed to polygamy! 
Where all three persons are of foreign nationality, how-
ever, the objection of public policy is unlikely to be raised 
in a European court. 147 But renvoi may have an influence on 
these considerations. For instance, where an Englishman was 
domiciled and married in the Netherlands, a German court, 
by renvoi from the national English law, applied Dutch law 
in determining that the premarital issue was not legitimized 
because born in adultery.148 
Also on the grounds of public policy, the Appeal Court of 
Hamburg 149 refused to recognize a legitimation valid under 
Dutch law, where an unmarried woman of German national-
ity, mother of a German child, married a Dutchman and both 
parties recognized the child as their own. The German courts, 
like those of some American jurisdictions/50 regard as neces-
sary for legitimation that the man marrying the mother shall 
in fact be the father. The Court extended this requirement 
to the foreign legitimation of a German child, on the ground 
that, if the child is not actually an offspring of the married 
couple, its interest ought to be protected as is done through 
the other form of legitimation, viz., in the course of legiti-
mation by state authority. This reasoning results, however, in 
creating a double status of the child as legitimate abroad and 
where recognition was made abroad, on the worn authority of 5 LAURENT 554 
no. z66. 
147 Cj. KosTERS 538, 554· 
148 LG. Wiesbaden (Oct. 1o, 1932.) JW. 1933, 193, IPRspr. 1933, no. 51. 
149 OLG. Hamburg (Aug. 16, 1935) Hans. RGZ. 1935, B 495 no. 135. 
150 Pike v. Standage (1919) 187 Iowa 1Ij2, 175 N. W. u; Helm v. Goin 
(192.9) 2.2.7 Ky. 773 at 778, 14 S. W. (zd) 183; Eichorn v. Zedaker (192.4) 
109 Ohio St. 6o9, 144 N. E. zs8; Harper v. Harper (1932.) 159 Va. ZIO, 165 
S. E. 490; Mooney v. Mooney (19IZ) 2.44 Mo. 372., 148 S. W. 896. 
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illegitimate at the forum, 151 and should not be followed in the 
jurisdictions mentioned above. 
6. Permissive Public Policy of the Forum 
Occasionally, the father's law prohibiting legitimation has 
been disregarded for reasons of a benevolent local policy.152 
French courts affirmed the effect of legitimation under French 
law where an Englishman married a French woman, although 
legitimation was not yet recognized by English law.153 This 
may be the right decision, provided the couple is domiciled 
in France.154 
7. Law of Situs 
The famous English case of Birtwhistle v. Vardillm has 
retained authority, inasmuch as a state where land is situated 
may require birth in lawful wedlock for the capacity of in-
heriting land, although in other respects foreign legitimation 
by subsequent marriage is recognized, and certainly in England 
it has been recognized in all respects by the law of r 926.156 
Very few American cases have followed this doctrine, 157 more 
suitable, indeed, to old feudal institutions. 
151 Cf. EcKSTEIN and LoRENZ, notes to the decision in 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 
no. I32. 
152 RAAPE 562 (a), 563 in· the case of a Belgian domiciled in Germany who in 
adultery had a child by a German woman, later married the mother of the child 
in Germany. 
153 Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 231 I857) S.I858.I.293 (sounding as though French 
law were always applicable); Cour Bourges (May 26, I858) S.I858.2.5321 
D.I 858.2.I 78; App. Rouen (Jan. 5, I 887) Clunet I 887, I 83; Cour Paris 
(March 23, 1888) Clunet 18891 638, approved by VALERY 1148 no. II. 8o2; 
but disapproved by most writers, see WErss, 4 Traite 96ff.; DESPAGNET 8 3 8 no. 
277; SURVILLE 461 no. 313. 
154 NJBOYET 734 no. 6:1.5 II. 
155 (I826) 5 Barn. & C. 438; (I835) 2 Cl. & F. 57 I; (I84o) 7 Cl. & F. 895. 
156 See F ALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws: Characterization," I 5 Can. Bar 
Rev. (1937) us at 242 (giving information on the Canadian legislation). 
157 Alabama: Lingen v. Lingen (I87I) 45 Ala. 4IO (no recognition of any 
status created by foreign legitimation); Florida: Statutes (I94I) § 731.23 (7); 
Williams v. Kimball (I895) 35 Fla. 491 16 So. 783; Pennsylvania: 48 Pa. 
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IV. LEGITIMATION BY OTHER AcTs 
ccLegitimatio per rescriptum principis," by which the em-
peror in the Roman imperial epoch elevated a child to the 
status of legitimacy, has been preserved in numerous civil law 
countries. The state's chief acted on the instance of the father, 
or of both parents, or upon the father's wish expressed in a 
will.158 In some countries, the legislature 159 or the mon-
arch or state president was replaced by courts. 160 This method 
has been followed in a few common law jurisdictions of the 
United States.161 
Moreover, legitimation may be effected by parental ac-
knowledgment or by conduct of public repute, so as to place 
the child upon the footing of a legitimate child. Thus, in 
eight states of the Union by oral or written, and in Michigan, 
by written acknowledgment, 162 legitimation is performed for 
all intents and purposes.163 We are not dealing_now with in-
stitutions conferring limited rights upon an illegitimate child. 
The subject includes, however, those kinds of legitimation 
which give the child a full position of legitimacy minus the 
right of inheritance, as in Delaware and Czechoslovakia.164 
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) § 167 (Act of May 14, 1857, P. L. 507, § 1); 
Smith v. Derr's Adm'rs (r859) 34 Pa. 126. Contra: see Note, 46 Yale L. J. 
(r937) 1049 and cf. on the cases TAINTOR, r8 Can. Bar Rev. (1940) at 715, 
supra n. r. 
158 E.g., Austria: All g. BGB. § r6z. 
Germany: BGB. § 1723. 
Italy: C. C. (r865) art. 198ft., C. C. (1942) art. 284ff. 
The Netherlands: BW arts. 329, 330. 
Spain: C. C. art. no. 
159 See, e.g., the Arkansas special statute of Oct. 2 7, 18 3 5, referred to in 
Scott v. Key (r8s6) rr La. Ann. 232. 
160 Peru: C. C. ( 19 3 6) arts. 3 14, 3 1 9 ; Venezuela: C. C. ( 1 9 1 6) art. 2 5 I, 
C. C. (1942) art. 230. See also Switzerland: C. C. art. 260. 
161 Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee; 4 VERNIER 181 § 245· 
162 4 VERNIER § 244· 
163 4 VERNIER 1 8 3 § 246. 
164 4 VERNIER § 245. Allg. BGB. § r62. In fact, faced with a Czechoslovakian 
decree of legitimation, the Bay. ObLG. (June 8, 1921) 42 ROLG. 105 held 
that the status was concerned and the act should be recorded at the civil status 
register. 
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I. United States 
The conflicts rule of the United States, in the evidently 
prevailing opinion, 165 is the same as that concerning subse-
quent marriage; the law of the domicil at the time of the 
act governs. It does not matter whether the foreign legiti-
mation has been executed in a form not known at the forum, 
as for instance by a special statute, nor whether the child would 
have been barred from legitimation by the policy of the forum. 
These principles have been very clearly expressed.166 Also, 
the child's domicil is not taken into consideration; a legiti-
mation by acknowledgment has been upheld in California de-
spite the English domicil of the child, 167 quite as, conversely, 
the Virginia statute of I 866, legitimating colored children, 
was refused application in Massachusetts in respect to a father 
who was domiciled there, although the child resided in Vir-
ginia.168 A domicil of the father or even of all parties at a time 
posterior to the legitimating act is without importance.169 
2. England 
No case had occurred in England before the Legitimacy 
Act of I 926, where a foreign legitimation other than by sub-
sequent marriage was in question, 170 and the Act likewise 
limited itself to recognizing English and foreign legitimations 
by marriage. Soon afterwards, however, in the case of In re 
165 Restatement § 140; STUMBERG 303, 304. The author of the Note in 46 
Yale L. J. ( 1 9 3 7) 1046, 1 o 53 thinks that the doctrine is in a "chaotic condition," 
but this contention is not well supported by the few deviating cases and the 
absence of authority as to certain details. 
166 See e.g., Adkins, J. in Holloway v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore 
(1926) 151 Md. 321, 134 Atl. 497; Buchanan, J. in Scott v. Key (1856) 11 
La. Ann. 2 3 z {legitimation by special statute of Arkansas legislature) quotes with 
STORY§ 51 from BouLLENOIS: "Habilis vel inhabilis in loco domicili est habilis 
vel inhabilis in omni loco." 
167 Blythe v. Ayres (1892.) 96 Cal. 532., 31 Pac. 915. 
168 Irving v. Ford (1903) 183 Mass. 448, 67 N. E. 366. 
169 Eddie v. Eddie (1899) 8 N.D. 376, 79 N. W. 856; In re Presley's Estate, 
Anderson v. Presley (192.4) 113 Okla. 16o, 2.40 Pac. 89, supra p. 573, n. 88. 
170 Supra p. 57 1 • 
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Luck, it happened that an Englishman, when domiciled in 
England, procreated an illegitimate son and, while domiciled 
in California, acknowledged him pursuant to the California 
Civil Code, section 230, by receiving the child into his family 
with the consent of his wife and by obtaining a decree of legiti-
mation from the time of birth. It would have been a reasonable 
expectation that the legitimation should simply be recognized 
under the law of the father's domicil at the time of the act, by 
analogy to the rule laid down in the law of 1926. The father's 
domicil at the time of the birth should be of no significance. 
However, the Chancery judge reached this result by resorting 
to the child's law/ 71 which was an unwarranted breach with 
the principles in force. Two of the three Lords of Appeal Were 
apparently so strongly under the spell of the dogma abolished 
by the Legitimacy Act, that they refused recognition because 
of the father's English law as of the time of the birth of the 
child.l12 The resulting decision is obviously regrettable.173 
3· National Law of Parent 
In the countries following the nationality principle, the rules 
are the same as in the case of a subsequent marriage. Hence, 
a foreign legitimation agreeing with the national law of all 
parties is recognized; even though the specific procedure is un-
known to the forum. For example, French courts respect a 
foreign legitimation by state authority although unknown to 
French municipallaw.174 
Where the parties are of different nationality, usually the 
father's law alone is applied.175 
171 In re Luck's Settlement Trusts [I940] Ch. D. 323 at 329. 
112 In re Luck's Settlement Trusts [I940] Ch. D. 864 at 890. 
173 See TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) at 62I-627, supra n. I; MANN, 
"Legitimation and Adoption in Private International Law," 57 Law Q. Rev. 
(I94I) IIZ, II8-I22; FALCONBRIDGE, Comment in I9 Can. Bar Rev. (I941) 
37, 42, also criticizes the dissenting vote of Scott, L. J. 
174 See Cour Paris (April IJ, I 893) Clunet I 893, ssn WEISS, 4 Traite IOI; 
VALERY II 50; POULLET 5I4 no. 395· 
175 See for instance -!\.pp. Bern (May II, I939) 36 S]Z. (I940-I94I) 128 
no. 23. Swiss C. C. arts. 26off. applied although the woman and the child were 
PARENT AND CHILD 
But with respect to legitimation by acts other than marriage, 
it is convenient to require the consent of the child or of some 
competent agent on its behalf, as municipal legislations fre-
quently provide/ 76 and there is a tendency to apply such 
provisions of the child's law as an exception to the rule refer-
ring to the father's law. The German statute (EG. art. 22, 
par. 2) directly provides that in the case of a German child 
the consent of the child or of the persons and courts charged 
with the care of it should be secured in accordance with the 
German rules.177 French courts and certain writers require 
application of French law every time that any party is of 
French nationality. 178 
4· Argentine Doctrine 
Another application of local public policy, enunciated in 
Argentina, is that a legitimation by act of a foreign state should 
not be recognized because "it presents a privilege." 179 
V. REcOGNITION oF FoREIGN LEGITIMATION 
Much discussion has been devoted to the relations existing 
between the above-mentioned rules and the conflicts rules 
concerning succession upon death. 
I. Validity of Legitimation as a Preliminary Question 
There is a general problem respecting the law applicable 
to legitimation or adoption, when either one is a condition for 
Germans. For an opposite view requiring that the parties and the authority 
rendering the decree belong to the same state, see WEiss, 4 Traite I 04; contra: 
ROLIN, z Principes I 58 no. 6z8. 
176 Cj., for instance, German BGB. § I p6 in contrast to § I 7 I 9 (legitimation 
by subsequent marriage) ; Peru: C. C. (I 9 3 6) art. 3 zo; Venezuela: C. C. (I 942) 
art. 233· 
177 It is controversial whether this rule is applicable to foreign children. The 
prevailing answer is in the negative. See RG. {July II, 19z9) IZ5 RGZ. z66; 
RAAPE 549; NussBAUM, IPR. I73, n. 3· 
178 See the criticism by CHAMPCOMMUNAL, Revue I9IO, 57, 73· 
179 z V1co no. I 7I at u7. 
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an individual's sharing in a succession upon death.180 Where 
a claim to participate in a distribution of assets, governed by 
the inheritance law of state X, is based on a legitimation created 
in state Y, should the validity of the legitimation be adjudi-
cated under the law of X or Y? This question occurs in its 
purest forp1 in third states; should a court in state Z apply 
its ordinary conflicts rule concerning legitimation or does ap-
plication by such court of the inheritance law of X by impli-
cation include the conflicts rule of X regarding legitimation? 
(There is, of course, nothing to recommend the lex fori of 
Z, or the substantive legitimation law of X as such.) The 
problem is significant only where the conflict rules on inherit-
ance and those on legitimation or adoption result in contrast-
ing solutions. No case in the English or American practice to 
illustrate this contrast has been found by Robertson, 181 and 
only one German decision of the kind has been found. In this 
case, an Alsatian in adultery had a child by a woman whom 
he afterwards married. He acquired French nationality by 
the Treaty of Versailles but died in Germany. As well known, 
Frenchmen cannot legitimize adulterine children, but Ger-
mans are allowed to do so. As the man's succession under the 
German conflicts rule was governed by French law, the court 
decided to apply French rules of conflicts. Under the French 
conflicts rule concerning legitimation, as the court understood 
it, the legitimation operated in favor of the child in spite of 
its adulterine position, because the parties were German at 
the time of their subsequent marriage. Acknowledging the 
legitimacy of the child, the court therefore ordered that it 
share in the succession.182 
The case is instructive in two respects and helps us to dis-
tinguish two problems. 
180 The logical necessity- of applying the law of the state of inheritance to the 
preliminary question has been expounded by MELCHIOR § 1 7 5; WENGLER, 
8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 148 at x66; also RoBERTSON, Characterization IJtff. 
lSlRoBERTSON, ibid. 135, 151, 
182 OLG. Karlsruhe (March :zo, 1931) IPRspr. 1931, no. 96, Revue 1932, 702.. 
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One of these problems, neglected in Europe, holds an 
interest in this country, in view of the persistent effort to 
separate statutes of legitimacy (or status) from statutes of 
distribution. In the French law, the statute of distribution 
furnishes only the words: "enfants et descendants" (C.C. art. 
73 r ). Legitimacy, of course, is presupposed, but an adulterine 
child is only indirectly excluded by reason of its incapacity to 
be iegitimized. And only the conflicts rule on legitimation 
prescribes that the ban on adulterine children ceases where all 
facts happened abroad and at the time did not concern a 
French national. This seems, in fact, to be the averred doc-
trine; 183 at least the German court was entitled to assume its 
correctness. 
We may conclude that, if recognized at all, the foreign act 
is valid in our jurisdiction as measured by its own law. It 
cannot be recognized for the purpose of family law and elimi-
nated for the purpose of distribution. 
What the European literature discusses, however, concerns 
the other problem, namely, ~hether the German court should 
have decided the validity of the legitimation according to its 
own Germ;m conflicts rule on legitimation, 184 instead of fol-
lowing the provisions of French law because it governs the suc-
cession.185 The individual case gives no solid basis. for arguing 
this question, since the legitimation could not be denied valid-
ity in any event; it had been effectuated in Germany by parties 
then of German nationality. Arguments of practical conven-
ience may be considered. If such preliminary questions are 
subjected to the statutes regulating inheritance, consistent ap-
plication of these statutes may be facilitated. On the other 
hand, by applying const_antly the law l.ndicated by the forum's 
special conflicts rules on legitimation or adoption, consistency 
in deciding the effects of the same marriage or adoption is 
promoted. The latter consideration appears preferable. 
183 SAVATJER, D.x 930.I.II6; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 318 no, 279• 
184 RAAPE, 50 Recueil 1934 IV 494· 
185 LEWALD, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 454· 
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2. Effect of Foreign Legitimation on Inheritance Rights 
Where a child has been legitimized under the law of state 
X and an inheritance is governed by the laws of state Y, 
should the effect of the legitimation on the inheritance be de-
termined under the inheritance law of X or Y? This much 
discussed question has no serious significance, if we under-
stand legitimation to mean an act elevating the illegitimate 
child to full legitimacy. The analogous question concerning 
foreign adoption is less simple, because an adoption may pro- · 
duce various degrees of rights. It is obvious that full recog-
nition of a foreign legitimation assi~ilates the child to legiti-
mates in the sense of any statute of distribution which does not 
except legitimized children, an exception practically occurring 
only in anachronistic applications of the Statute of Merton.186 
VI. RELATIONS BETWEEN LEGITIMATE PARENTS AND CHILD 
A. RULES 
A comparative survey of this topic has to face a situation 
similar to that encountered with respect to the effects of mar-
riage. The Continental systems start from a comprehensive 
notion of parental power, historically derived partly from 
the Roman patria potestas, partly from the Germanic munt, 
and result in the recognition of a status governed by the per-
sonal law of the parent. In common law, much is left to the 
rules concerning contract, tort, and support; the remaining 
small domain of domiciliary law is difficult to define. 
Even so, we may be astonished at the scarcity of conflicts 
rules that are discussed in this country with respect to parental 
rights and duties. The Restatement(§§ 144-148) devotes to 
parental power as a status only one conflicts rule, subjecting 
"custodianship" of a legitimate child to the law of the father's 
domicil at the time of birth, and treats jurisdiction for modify-
186 See cases cited supra p. 58 5, n. I 57. 
PARENT AND CHILD 593 
ing custody in a few sections. Support and domicil are dealt 
with separately, but neither personal property of a child nor 
the authority of a parent to act for the child are expressly 
mentioned in the chapters on property and contracts, respec-
tively. Such subjects as personal services and earnings of chil-
dren do not seem to fit under any rule of the 'Restatement. 
This neglect, of course, is not accidental. Whereas Wharton 
and Story dedicated some space to the differences of civil and 
common law conceptions about this matter, subsequent writers 
seem to reduce the "status" of legitimacy to custodianship, 
which word, used in this connection, probably means no more 
than personal care and education, excluding maintenance 
(which otherwise may be included in the term). Exactly as 
with respect to matrimonial rules, the methods of civil law 
and common law are divergent; concentration of the effects 
of legitimacy under the aspect of family law in the Continental 
conception contrasts with dispersal into several topics in the 
American system. To account for all implications of the per-
sonal law, we have to base our survey upon the broader scope 
of the civil law doctrines. 
I. Personal Law of Father 
Wherever the unity of the family law is in the foreground 
of thought~ the personal law of the father is deemed to de-
termine the relation between both parents and the child, even 
when, as today, wife and child may have separate personal 
laws. This has remained the rule especially in Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, Japan/ 87 and in the French dominant opinion/88 
187 Nationality: 
Germany: EG. art. 19 sentence r. 
Italy: C. C. (1942.) Disp. Pre!. art. 2.0 par. 1. 
Belgium: RoLIN, 2. Principes 100 no. 587, 646; POULLET 482. no. 374; 
Novelles Belges, 2. D. Civ. 7 59· 
Japan: Law of I 898, art. zo. 
China: Law of 1918, art. IS. 
188 France: Cass. (civ.) (Jan. IJ, I873) S.I87J.x.q, Clunet 1874, 2.45; Cass. 
(civ.) (March I4, 1877) S.x878.I.2.5, Clunet 18781 167 (in this case the 
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where the national law of the father governs the entire com-
plex of relations, as well as in other countries, including 
Switzerland, 189 where the law of the father's domicil governs. 
Correspondingly, in this country, "custody" is governed by 
the domiciliary law of the father, 190 although sometimes the 
opinion is expressed that parental power should always be 
subject to the local policy of the parties' momentary resi-
dence.191 The only exception to the rule of the foreign domicil 
should be urgent public policy, and this not so often as is 
generally claimed. 
2. Cases of Different Nationalities 
The now frequent cases where the parties have different 
personal laws are treated variously. 
(a) Certain writers of the civil law countries, now followed 
by some legislations and courts, suggest that a personal law 
of the child different from that of his father should prevail.192 
The favorite argument for this view is that paternal power in 
modern law serves only the welfare of the child; this is true, 
but it is no argument for the national or domiciliary law of the 
child. 
parents were Frenchmen and the child a foreigner). See NIBOYET 784 no. 6741 
and for cases ibid. 7841 no. 67 5; SUR VILLE 47z n. I; PILLET, 1 Traite 659 no. 
328. 
189 Domicil: Switzerland: (for Swiss citizens abroad) NAG. art. 9· Treaty of 
Montevideo on international civil law, text of 19401 art. 1 81 correcting the 
existing art. 14. 
190 Restatement § 144 combines this rule with § 30 deClaring that the child 
normally shar~s the father's domicil; thus no change of award of custody would 
occur regularly against the law of the father's domicil under§ 145. 
191 See especially 1 WHARTON § § 2531 254· For England, WESTLAKE 
§ 4 infers from the old case of Johnstone v. Beattie (1843) 10 Cl. & F. 421 1131 
114 that the authority of a foreign parent over his child living in England is 
recognized to the extent to which an English parent would have similar 
authority, whatever that means. 
192 Finland: Law of 19291 § 19. 
Codigo Bustamante art. 69 (with broad exceptions on which later). 
Austria: see WALKER 786. 
France: SURVILLE 468 no. 3191 ibid. 472 no. 320 n. 2; DESPAGNET 8zx no. 
269 II; CHAMPCOMMUNAL1 Revue 19101 7161 718; WEISS1 4 Traite 271 1461 
164; Cour Paris (Aug. 51 1908) Clunet 19091 173. 
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The problems of the common law lie on another plane. 
British law, followed in this instance in Scotland,193 recognizes 
the jurisdiction of the child's domicil as competent, although 
not exclusive. Likewise in this country," the state of domicil 
of the child can change the custody of the child from one 
parent to the other, or to, or from both." 194 The courts apply 
their own substantive laws, but the doctrine of the child's 
domicil by operation of law corrects this apparent rupture 
of the system.195 So long as the family lives together, there 
is no question at all; even if the community is disrupted by 
one parent abandoning the child or by separation or divorce 
of the parents, the child is considered domiciled with one of 
the parents. 
(b) The Polish law has adopted the last national law 
common to both parties, as in conjugal matters.196 
(c) The recent Greek Code, elaborating the subject mat-
ter, makes the relation between legitimate parents and their 
child dependent: (i) upon the national law that was last com-
mon to the father and the child; (ii) in absence of such, upon 
the law of the father at the birth of the child; (iii) if the 
father is dead, upon the last law common to the mother and 
the child; and (iv) in absence of such, upon the law of the 
mother at the death of the father. This symmetrical solution 
solves all possible cases but is arbitrarily chosen. Moreover, in 
both this and the Polish regulations, paternal rights and duties 
are determined by a law that may be alien to both parties for 
the time being.197 
Brazil: 2 PoNTES DE MIRP.NDA. uo. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (May 18, 1934) W. 12791 (authority of the 
father, a foreigner, over a Dutch child, determined by Dutch law). 
193 Ponder v. Ponder [1932] Session Cases 233,4 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. u3. 
194 Restatement § 14 5. 
195 Restatement § 3 3. 
196 Poland: Law of I 926 on international private law, art. I9; criticized by 
SCHNITZER 209 n. I. 
197 Greece C. C. I 940, art. I 8. See also infra p. 6o 8. 
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(d) In another opinion, both laws are to be cumulatively 
applied.198 
(e) Also the law more favorable to the person sued on ac-
count of an obligation of parent-child relationship has been 
advocated.199 
(f) The law of the forum has been applied, where one 
party was a national of the forum, sometimes as an expedient 
because of the unsettled conflict laws, but in France as a 
declared policy where either the father or the mother is of 
French nationality, even though the child be a foreigner. 200 
3· Renvoi 
Where the rule refers to foreign law, renvoi may be ap-
plied .. 2ol 
B. ScoPE OF THE RuLES 
I. Maternal Rights 
The rules outlined above determine what rights the mother 
has during the father's lifetime and after his death. 
Illustration: After the death of his German father, a son 
was entrusted to an uncle in Italy and later was released from 
his German nationality. It was held that, under German con-
flicts law, the mother, being of German nationality, retained 
1~8 z ZITELMANN 889; 4 FRANKENSTEIN 70, n. 161; CAVAGLIERI Z4Zj FE-
DOZZI soz; Trib. Venezia (Jan. 30, 19JZ) Z4 Rivista (193Z) 106; see contra: 
RAAPE 464. 
199 E.g., Cass. ltal. (July 31, 1930) Monitore 1931, IJZ. 
200 Cass. (civ.) (Jan. q, 1873) 8.1873·1.13, D.1873.I.Z97· Cf. RoLIN, z 
Principes 187 no. 649. Cass. (civ.) (March 14, 1877) S.1878.1.z5, D.1877.1. 
385; cf. Clunet 1878, 167. App. Bordeaux (July z3, 1897) Clunet 1897, 10z8. 
Germany: German law applied where the mother is of German nationality and 
the child stayed with the mother in Germany, see RG. (Feb. zo, 1913) 81 RGZ. 
373; OLG. Miinchen (Aug. z4, 1938) HRR. 1938, no. 1463. 
201 Germany: (although EG. art. z7 does not expressly order renvoi in this 
case), RG. (Dec. z9, 1910) JW. 1911, zo8, ZJ Z.int.R. (1913) 336 (Australian 
party); Bay. ObLG. (March q, 19t'z) 13 Bay. ObLGZ. 136, z6 ROLG. z57; 
Bay. ObLG. (April u, 19u) 4z ROLG. u6 (New York parties); KG. (April 
17, 1914) Jz ROLG. 31 (Russian from Baltic province); Bay. ObLG. (Oct. 
16, 19z5) Z4 Bay. ObLGZ. z7o. 
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her maternal powers, so that no guardian was to be ap-
pointed. 202 
2. Personal Care 
The content of paternal or maternal rights embraces "care, 
advice and affection," 203 in other words, personal care and 
education. Religious education is included, insofar as it is con-
sidered of private concern 204 and the foreign law does not 
offend public policy by compromising religious freedom. 205 
The law governing parental relations extends to the action 
by which a parent entitled to custody sues the other parent for 
restitution of the child; 206 in the prevailing opinion, also 
after a divorce, this law excludes the law under which the 
divorce has been granted. 207 
The French decisions are divided; the majority apply 
French law under the color of public policy/08 and an English 
court is likely to follow the same method in the case of a 
ward of the court. 209 In the United States, it seems difficult 
to tell in what cases a cour~ may be inclined to apply a foreign 
law. Correction and chastisement have always been indicated 
as an example of parental power limited by the territorial 
habits of the place where they are exercised.210 Probably a 
202 OLG. Dr~sden (Jan. 16, 19oo) 21 Ann. Sachs. OLG. 309 no. 15. Similar: 
. A Dutch widow has no maternal power and therefore cannot be authorized by 
the court like a German mother to alienate her child's immovables, KG. (Oct. 
10, 1907) 35 Jahrb. FG. A 15. 
203 Simonds, J., In re Frame [1939] Ch. D. 7oo, 704. 
204 KG. (July 26, 1904) 15 Z.int.R. (1905) 325. 
205 DIENA, 2 Prine. 191; RAAPE 476. 
206 RG. (Nov. 14, 1912) 68 Seuff. Arch. 163, 23 Z.int.R. (1913) 316 
(Austrian law); RG. (May 23, 1927) IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 79 (Bulgarian 
law; the form of procedure, however, is subject to the law of the forum). 
207 Supra p. 533; Bay. ObLG. (Oct. 8, 193o) IPRspr. 1931, no. 84. 
208 See Trib. civ. Seine (June 18, 1934} D. H. 1934· 471, Clunet 1935, 619 
and the practice reviewed by BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 427ff. who wishes 
that a foreign personal law be observed with vigilant criticism rather than to 
be neglected. 
209 See In reB-'s Settlement, B- v. B- [1940] Ch. 54· 
210 1 WHARTON § 254; Codigo Bustamante art. 72. 
PARENTAL RELATIONS 
parent's renunciation of his right to visit would be held con-
trary to public order, as has been held in Germany.211 
The requirement of parental consent to the child's mar-
riage, as discussed earlier, is included in parental rights under 
civil law, while it is categorized with formalities according to 
the traditional British view and is, without qualification, sub-
ject to the law of the place of celebration under the American 
conflicts rules. 
3· Duty of Providing a Dowry 
Whether a parent has a duty to settle property as a dowry 
for his daughter, as he has under the German law but not 
under Dutch law, is a question determinable under the rules 
outlined above. 212 
4· Protecting Interference by Courts 
Many cases have dealt with the power of courts to protect 
children who are resident at the forum, against parents who 
are foreigners. German courts are ready to recognize that it 
is primarily a matter of the personal law of the parent, 
whether and under what conditions parental rights can be 
abridged or terminated. Such remedies as are provided in the 
Italian or the Dutch civil codes have been found sufficient.213 
Where the national law did not offer an adequate basis for 
intervention of the German court, temporary measures were 
always permitted. 214 Incidentally, where the welfare of a 
211 KG. (Nov. 14, 1930) IPRspr. 1931, no. 8. 
212 RG. (April u, 1923) Leipz. Z. 1923, 449· 
213 KG. {June 5, 1921) 53 Jahrb. FG. A 56 {Italian law); KG. {Nov. 28, 
1913) 45 Jahrb. FG. A 18 (Dutch law). See also KG. (Sept. 6, 1935) JW. 
1935, 3483 {applying Austrian law); Bay. ObLG. (Dec. 6, 1933) JW. 1934, 
699 and Bay. ObLG. (Feb. 14, 1934) JW. 19341 1369, IPRspr. 1934, nos. 63, 
64 (Lebanon law). 
214 RG. {May 23, 1927) IPRspr. 1926-1927, no. 79 and cited writers. In a 
constant practice sec. 63 par. 1 (2) of the Law on Youth Welfare of July 9, 
1922, providing for emergency education of depraved children, is applied to 
foreigners. See RG. (June 30, 1927) 117 RGZ. 376; RG. (May 22, 1933) JW. 
19331 45,5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 137 no. 51. 
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child resident within the country appeared to be menaced, 
public policy was often invoked in favor of the local remedies, 
but this view has been challenged recently. 215 
A similar practice in favor of the personal law exists, for 
instance, in the Netherlands.216 In Switzerland parents domi-
ciled within the country are subject to Swiss law under the 
domiciliary principle itself. 217 
The lex fori at the domicil of the child simply is applied in 
the United States 218 for controlling and transferring custody. 
The Bustamante Code expressly reserves the law of the 
forum, depriving the parents of their power "by reason of in-
capacity or absence, or by judgment of a court." 219 To justify 
the similar practice of the French 220 and the Belgian 221 
courts, an author who is otherwise not favorable to extending 
public policy has adduced that mistreatment of a child arouses 
public indignation and harms morals. 222 
Also in the countries prepared to observe foreign law, tem-
porary residence is sufficient not only to bring provisional 
legal aid to the child so long as the national country does 
1215 KG. (Jan. u, I934) IPRspr. I934, no. 62 denies jurisdiction as to 
foreigners if any one of the parties interested in an order regulating custody or 
right of visitation is not to be found within the territory of the state. OLG. 
Miinchen (May I8, I938) HRR. I938, no. u8I, (although the child was at 
the forum, depriving the Bulgarian father of his powers was held excluded be-
cause the Bulgarian law did not recognize such a measure). 
216 The Netherlands: Rb. den Haag (Jan. I3, I939) W. I939> no. 2.86 
(although the wife was Dutch and the parties lived in the Netherlands, Austrian 
and German laws were applied as the child's national law, the mother was 
entrusted with the personal care, and the father excluded from visiting the child). 
217 BG. (Sept. 29, I 927) Praxis I927, 456. The powers of a Dutch father 
(domiciled in the Netherlands) are characterized under Dutch law: BG. (Feb. 3, 
1939) 6s BGE. 1 I 3• 
218 Restatement § I 48. 
219 Art. 72.· 
22° France: Law of July 2.4, 1889 as amended Nov. 15, I92.I; on the applica-
tion to foreigners see PILLET, Clunet 1892., -5, and I Traite 66o no. 32.8; WEiss, 
4 Traite I57; App. Colmar (March 2.8, 1935) Clunet 1936, 642.. 
221 Belgium: Law of May 15, I912 on Protection of Minors; for application 
of provisions on the forfeiture of parental power to foreigners see App. Liege 
(July Io, I917) Pasicrisie 1917.2..2.54; Trib. Liege (Nov. 2.3, 19I7) Pasicrisie 
I9I8.3.82.. 
222 BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. I937> 418, 42.9. 
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not assume its care, 223 but also to assist a father or mother in 
coercitive actions against a child, according to the locallaw.224 
5. Parental Interest in Child's Property 
The Roman paternal cc dominium'' in all family property 
had given way in the imperial period to a right of "adminis-
tration and enjoyment" upon property acquired by the chil-
dren and not excepted from this right. Property either of in-
fants or of children less than eighteen years old is still 
subject to such paternal encroachment in many civil law coun-
tries,225 including Louisiana.226 By some American stat-
utes,227 a parent has control of the property given by him to 
the child, although only as an administrator. Such control in 
the predominant interest of the child, with or without 228 duty 
to account for the revenue, is frequent in modern legisla-
tions. 229 Common law and the legislations of Sweden and 
Czarist and Soviet Russia do not contain any such legal powers 
of parents, but at common law parents have a right to the 
earnings of the child, which right affects the property as 
well as produces obligations. In other countries, on the con-
223 For this situation see Bay. ObLG. (Feb. I4, I934) IPRspr. I934, no. 64; 
Swiss BG. (Feb. 3, I 9 3 9) 6 5 BGE. I I 3 (where it is stated that art. 7 of the 
Hague Convention on custody does not cover the case). 
224 Italy: Cass. Torino (April I3, I9o9) Clunet I9Io, 673 (Spanish parties). 
Germany: KG. (Dec. I6, I9J8) JW. I939> 350 (Danish mother and daugh-
ter). 
225 E.g., France: C. C. art. 3 84. 
Germany: BGB. § § I649, I6p. 
Switzerland: C. C. art. 2.92.. 
Italy: C. C. (x865) art. 22.8, C. C. (I942.) art. 3Z4· 
Argentina: C. C. art. 287 (new pi). 
Brazil: C. C. art. 389. 
Mexico: C. C. art. 43o. 
Peru: C. C. (I936) art. 398, 8. 
Japan: C. C. arts. 89o, 89I. 
China: C. C. art. Io88 par. 2.. 
226 La. Civ. Code Ann. (Dart. I932) art. 22.3. 
227 Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri; see 4 VERNIER 23 § 232. 
228 E. g., Austrian Allg. BGB. § x so. 
229 See VEITH, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. 782. 
PARENT AND CHILD 6o1 
trary, earnings are a favorite exception to the management or 
usufruct of the parents. 
In the law of conflicts, immovables must be treated sepa-
rately, because of their particular position at common law. 
(a) That immovables are governed by the lex situs also 
in regard to the paternal rights, 230 was a doctrine shared by 
many statutists and older French authors. 231 In more recent 
times, no civil law text has followed this doctrine, 232 except 
the Montevideo Treaty of 1889; 233 its new draft of 1940 
joins the general doctrine of the civil law, that the entire as-
sets of the child are governed uniformly by the personal 
law. 234 This is the domiciliary or national law, ordinarily of 
the parent, while in the C6digo Bustamante it is again the law 
of the child.235 For instance, the usufructuary interest allowed 
to a parent by the French Civil Code (art. 3 84) is said to 
depend upon the personal law of the parties. 236 
But how is this mutual recognition among the countries 
adhering to the personal law to be effectuated? For illustra-
tion, the French and German paternal rights in the real 
property of a legitimate child are of different nature. The 
French right is an ordinary usufruct; the German one has a 
special character and is not recorded in the land register; they 
230 STORY § 463; WESTLAKE§ 166. 
231 See COLMET-DAAGE, Revue de droit fran~ais et etranger I 844> 401, 406; 
TROPLONG, z Droit civil explique, privileges et hypotheques, no. 429 (the legal 
·hypothec upon French immovables of a guardianship has been established abroad, 
since the "statute" is a "real one") . 
232 Legal provisions in Germany: EG. art. 19 ; Poland: Law of 19 2 6 on 
international private law, art. 19; Italy: C. C. ( 1942) Disp. Pre!. art. 20 par. 1; 
C6digo Bustamante art. 70. 
Doctrine and practice in Belgium and France: see 6 LAURENT 3 6 § 15; ROLIN, 
2 Principes 183 no. 646; WEISS, 4 Traite rso, 151; Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 13, I87J) 
D.1873·1.297; Cass. (civ.) (March 14, 1877) S.r878.r.25, D.r8n.r.385, 
Clunet 1878, 167. 
For the provisions of German EG. art. 28 and Polish Law of 1926, art. 19 
par. 3 respecting the Anglo-American treatment of immovables, see supra p. 342. 
233 Treaty on international civillaw (1889) art. 15. 
234 Treaty on international civil law (1940) art. 19. 
235 Art. 70. 
236 SURVILLE 469 no. 319. 
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differ also as to the periods of duration. If the father is of 
French nationality, should his right be transformed with 
respect to German immovables into a German ccNutznies-
sung;"? 237 This suggestion would amount to applying the law 
of the situs as at common law. The system of personal law re-
quires rather that the French type of right be recognized in , 
its true nature in Germany; 238 consequently it should be 
recorded in the German public register to satisfy the re-
quirement of the law of situs for creating an ordinary usu-
fruct.239 
(b) Personal property of the child is submitted every-
where to the personal law, i.e., the domiciliary law 240 or the 
national law 241 of the parent. 
The C6digo Bustamante limits the domain of the personal 
law, by the proviso that no prejudice shall arise in. foreign 
countries "to the rights of third parties which may be granted 
by local law and the local provisions in respect to publicity and 
specialty of mortgage securities." 242 In the other countries 
this limitation is included in the rules on property themselves. 
6. Authority of Parent 
A parent generally is entitled to represent his child i:n pri-
vate transactions or court proceedings dealing with its per-
sonality as well as its property. The system of personal law 
embraces all connected problems, such as the question whether 
the parent is able to act on behalf of the child by force of law, 
or must be appointed guardian, or needs authorization by a 
court or a family council for the special purpose. 
Illustration: A German prince had a minor son who was a 
British subject. The question for what transactions on behalf 
of the son's property the father needed the consent of the 
237 This was suggested by RAAPE 463, 476, 487. 
138 RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) z41, z78. · 
239 4 FRANKENSTEIN 49•· 240 1 WHAR.'J'ON § zss {adhering to German writers). 
241 Seee. g., German EG. art. 13; NIBOYET 785 no. 675. 
142 Art. 71· 
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court controlling guardianship was decided by a German 
court in accordance with the father's German law. (EG. art. 
19; BGB. § 1643).243 To the same effect, an English 
father, 244 a Dutch mother, 245 and an American father 246 
were deemed, according to their respective laws, to be without 
authority to represent their children, so that temporary trustees 
had to be locally appointed. 
The practical difficulties and great costs involved in pro-
curing sufficient authority in some states of this country have 
thus come to be noticed in German courts. In one case, for 
this reason, the American father preferred to let the child's 
property remain in Europe. 241 
It is doubtful, however, whether such observance of foreign 
law is usual in many countries. Common law conceptions are 
opposed to subjecting dealings with immovables to the per-
sonal law, and this view is shared in certain civil law coun-
tries. 248 As to movables, the law governing contracts enters 
into competition. Finally, peculiar considerations of conven-
ience have a strong influence upon all rules respecting ad-
ministration of estates. For these reasons, the subject ought 
not to be discussed further at this place. 
7. Duties of Support 
Support due to children by parents and to parents by chil-
dren is in most countries the subject of specific obligations de-
243 KG (March 141 1910) 39 Jahrb. FG. A 198 (expressly rejecting the 
application of the child's law). 
2uLG. Darmstadt (Sept. 91 1907) 9 Hessische Rechtsprechung (1909) 13 
~~ . 
245 KG. (Dec. 19, 1907) 35 Jahrb. FG. A 151 19 Z.int.R. (1909) 2391 242. 
Hs AG. Tauberbischofsheim (June 14, 1910) zo Z.int.R. (1910) 545· Other 
German cases: RG. (Feb. 9> 1925) 110 RGZ. 173 (a Polish father needed 
authorization by the Polish court for disposing of a German immovable under 
the Polish law). RG. (March 28, 1931) JW. 1932, 588 (an Italian mother, 
living with the child in Germany, needed authorization by an Italian court). KG. 
(AprilS, 1914) Recht 1914, no. 2691 (an Austrian father must have the consent 
of court for repudiating the child's share in a succession on death, etc.). 
247 0LG. Dresden (March 4, 1913) 35 Ann. Sachs. OLG. 63,13 Z.int.R. 
(1903) 467. 
248 In the Netherlands the personal law of the parent governs also in respect 
to immovables; see for cases VAN HASSELT 91 § 9· 
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pendent on legitimacy. 249 There is the same contrast as in 
matrimonial matters, 250 between the rule asserted by the Re-
statement (§ 458) m of applying the law of the forum and 
the systems established upon the assumption of familial duties 
to support. 252 In such countries as France, the law of the forum 
is applied only as a check upon the foreign national law under 
the theory of public policy, but it operates on a large scale.253 
Also in England, it has been considered a common law rule 
that "liability of a father to maintain his son must be de-
termined by the law of the place of the father's domicil." 254 
It has been inferred from this rule that generally any ali-
mentary liability is governed by the law of the domicil of the 
person against whom a claim is made. 255 This seems a doubt-
ful conclusion. Should not the law of the head of the family 
govern? 
8. Determination of Domicil of the Child 
The old rule of private law confers upon the child the 
domicil of his father by operation of the law, irrespective of 
the factual circumstances. 256 This is still so much a normal 
249 In the United States, most statutes provide maintenance for natural children 
while in twenty jurisdictions only legitimate or legitimized children have the 
right to support, see 4 VERNIER § z 34· 
250 Supra pp. 31.4-325· 
251 For important complements, see Restatement, New York Annotations 
306 § 457· 
252 Germany: According to the dominant opinion, EG. art. 19 is applied (law 
of the parent); see LG. Frankfurt (Oct. z9, 1931) JW. 1931., 1.307, IPRspr. 
193z, no. 91. Italy: Cass. (July 31, 1930) Monitore 1931.1.qz n. 10 (prefers 
the personalla w more favorable to the debtor! ) 
253 NAsT, 1 Repert. 400 no. 38. In Belgium: the same trend of the courts is 
noticed by PouLLET 481 no. 373, who advocates the standard of the forum only 
as minimum award; cf. supra p. 31.4· 
254 Salter, J., in Coldingham Parish Council v. Smith [1918] z K. B. 90, 96. 
255 DICEY 551 Rule 143 (i) (z), 550 n. i. 
256 Thus the German BGB. § 11 says simply: A legitimate child shares .the 
father's domicil. Restatement§ 30. Swiss BG. (June 6, 1907) 33 BGE. I 371, 
378. The English cases have not properly decided whether a child really retains 
its father's domicil as of the birth invariably throughout minor age; see FosTER, 
"Some Defects in the English Rules of Conflict of Laws," 16 Brit. Year Book 
Int. Law (1935) 84 at 87. 
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conception that in interpreting the Treaty of Versailles a minor 
has been considered resident at the place where his father or 
guardian was residing. 257 Modern conceptions, however, have 
established exceptions to the rule in more and more coun-
tries. 258 Moreover, the cases in which the child shares in the 
domicil of the mother are not identical in the various juris-
dictions. 
Of general interest is the case where the husband of the 
mother contests the child's legitimacy by a suit at the court of 
his own domicil on the ground that this is the legal domicil 
of the child. It has been objected that the law there in force 
is operative only when the child is born in lawful wedlock, 
which the plaintiff denies. However, the German Reichsge-
richt encounters this argument of a vicious circle (unduly 
popular in the law of conflicts) by the consideration that a 
child is to be regarded as legitimate so long as its position is 
not destroyed by judgment.259 
Characterization. But the main question is, which law, the 
personal law or the law of the forum, should operate in de-
termining domicil by force of "law"? The general idea pre-
vailing in this and other countries has been that, for the 
purposes of jurisdiction and venue, "domicil" has to be charac- · 
terized according to the local law of the forum. 260 The Reichs-
gericht, however, declares that the foreign family law, as the 
personal law of the father, is applicable even though the prob-
lem is of a procedural character. 261 Jurisdiction in particular 
for disputing legitimacy, thus, becomes a privilege of the court 
at a domicil recognized by the country of the parent, a limi-
257 Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (Oct. 19/Dec. 14, 1927, Feb.r, 
1928) 7 Recueil des decisions des tribunaux arbitraux mixtes 502, commenting 
on art. 296 of the Treaty of Versailles. 
258 C/. Restatement § § 3 r ff. 
259 RG. {Jan. u, 1939) HRR. 1939, no. 376. 
~France: App. Toulouse (May 22, r88o) Clunet, r88r, 6r. 
261 RG. decision, n. 259 supra, and former decisions. 
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tation of jurisdiction highly desirable in matters of status re-
garding the entire family. 
Other difficulties have been realized in practice, where a 
parent having custody deserts the child. To impose upon a 
child the domicil of an emigrated father, as a German court 
believed to be the law/62 is indefensible. The Restators have 
found a better answer, but they maintain a fictitious domicil 
of the child at the place of the parent who last abandoned 
it.268 A wholly satisfactory solution would probably be found, 
if the habitual residence of the child were substituted for the 
legal domicil, whenever the family life is definitively dis-
rupted. 
9· Tort 
It may be briefly noted in recalling the analogy of marital 
relations that in this country actions for tort between parents 
and child as well as responsibility of a parent for wrongful 
acts of a child are purely tort matters, while in civil law they 
are primarily incidents of the family law. 
C. CHANGE OF STATUS 
I. Mutability of Incidents of the Child's Status 
As we have seen, legitimacy once created under the personal 
law of the parent, either by the birth of the child or by legit-
imation, is a permanent status. However, the content of the 
rights and duties flowing as incidents from this status is, in 
the dominant opinion, modified by a change of the personal 
law deemed to be decisive for the child's status. 264 The same 
is true where custody has been awarded or transferred by 
court order; the meaning of this custody is altered, if parent 
and child (at common law) move to another jurisdiction or 
(in most civil law countries) change their nationality, even 
262 Bay. ObLG. (Feb. 14, 1934) JW. 1934, 1369, IPRspr. 1934, no. 64. 
263 Restatement§ 33, to be read with Restatement§§ :1.1, 54 and 109. 
264 The subject is treated principally by RAAPE 464. 
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though the decree regularly will be recognized until re-
examination of the situation of the child at the new forum of 
the parties. 
This phenomenon is the same as the better known change of 
incidents of personal property rights where a movable is 
transferred to another state. We have encountered a third in-
stance in the transformation of non-pecuniary matrimonial 
relations. 265 Such mutability is a general feature of rights of 
an absolute character. 
Illustrations: (i) An American citizen and his fourteen-
year-old daughter, a rich heiress from her mother, move to 
France. Hereby the father acquires (by change of domicil 
and renvoi) a usufruct upon the movables and French im-
movables belonging to the daughter and not subject to a trust. 
The usufruct is recognized in all other countries. 
( ii) An Italian married couple went to Hungary and ac-
quired Hungarian nationality in order to obtain divorce. 
Afterwards both were restored to Italian citizenship. By this 
fact, Hungarian law lost any influence upon further decisions 
concerning the custody over the children. 266 
2. Different Personal Laws 
In the case where only one of the two parties, either the 
parent or the child, changes his status, the decision depends 
on the person whose law governs under the conflicts rule. 
Illustration: A minor German girl, by her marriage to a 
Greek national, lost German and acquired Greek nationality. 
But under her new Greek status, she neither became of age 
nor subject to a guardianship of her husband. A German court 
held that as article 1 9 of the Introductory Law to the Civil 
Code considered only the national law of the parent, the 
change of nationality did not affect the father's authority to 
act on her behalf. 26r 
265 Supra p. 302.. 
266 Trib. Napoli (July q, 1932.) 2.5 Rivista (1933) 2.81. 
267 OLG. Dresden (June 2.8, 192.6) IPRspr. 192.6-192.7, no. 78, cf. BGB. 
§ 1630 par. I and§ 1633. 
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This rule, however, has been replaced in the Polish and 
Greek Codes by rules referring to the last national law com-
mon to both parties. 268 
Illustration: In the example just given, the result in a 
Greek court would be the same. But if the father alone changed 
to American nationality and not his daughter, their relations 
. would under the Greek rule remain governed by German law, 
both before and after her marriage to the Greek national. 
This imitation of a rule good for protecting a wife against 
her husband's arbitrary change of status is questionable. The 
father is free to take minor children into a new citizenship 
without their consent. Why then, should he be bound by their 
unchanged nationality? Nevertheless, German law has a 
similar rule, which forms an exception in favor of the lex fori; 
if a German parent changes nationality while the child retains 
German nationality, German law governs. 269 
3· Non-retroactivity 
By reasonable interpretation of the conflicts rule, a change 
of status does not operate with retroactive effect upon the in-
cidents of parental relations. The name of the child, an eman-
cipation performed under the former law, income from 
the child's property once devolved to the parent/70 remain 
unaffected. For instance, under the German Civil Code 
(§ 1620 ), a daughter has a right to a trousseau in the case of 
marriage. The Italian Supreme Court granted a suit of a girl, 
formerly of German nationality but Italian by marriage, 
against her German mother, on the ground that the marriage 
only perfected the mother's pre-existent obligation.271 The 
German Reichsgericht decided to the same effect in a case 
268 Supra p. 595· 
269 EG. art. 19 sentence 2. No analogous application to foreign children is 
permitted in the prevailing opinion, see LEWALD 132 no. 183; RAAPE 469. 
270 STAUFFER, NAG. 62 no. 2. · 
271 Cass. Ital. (July 31, 1930) 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 844. 
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where a German ·father had acquired Swiss nationality. 272 
Such interpretations, restricting' the impact of the change of 
status, are certainly more valuable than anytheory of vested 
rights of parents and children. 
No American doctrine on this subject seems to exist. Re-
sults similar to those described could be reached by an analogy 
to the doctrine obtaining in the case of matrimonial property. 
Thus each single incident would be governed by the law of the 
parent's domicil at the time of the incident. 
272 RG. (April u, 1923) Leipz. Z. 1923, 449· 
A 
CHAPTER 16 
Illegitimate Children 1 
I. MoTHER AND CHILD 
WOMAN and her child born out of wedlock are con-
sidered to be in blood relationship; in the legislations 
of the French type, however, no claim can be based 
upon it before the mother recognizes the child. The relation-
ship is characterized either as "illegitimate" and of a special 
nature or assimilated to the regular mother-child relation 
constituted by wedlock. Differences exist also in almost every 
particular. They are mirrored by the multiformity of the con-
flicts rules. 
1. Contacts 
The law of the forum is applied in the United States 2 and 
under the present Montevideo Treaty.3 
1 Comparative substantive law: 
RoBBINS and DEAK, "The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate Children: 
A Comparative Study," 30 Col. L. Rev. (1930) 308-329 ( a historical sum-
mary). 
FREUND, Illegitimacy Laws of the United States and Certain Foreign Countries, 
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Children's Bureau, Publ. No. 42 (1919). 
Illegitimacy, Standards of Legal Protection for Children Born out of Wedlock, 
Report of Regional Conferences, U. S. Dep't of Labor, Children's Bureau, Publ. 
No. 77 (1921). 
LUNDBERG, Children of Illegitimate Birth and Measures for their Protection, 
U.S. Dep't. of Labor, Children's Bureau, Publ. No. 166 (1926). 
TOMFORDE, DIEFENBACH, WEBLER, Das Recht des unehelichen Kindes und 
seiner Mutter im ln-und Ausland (ed. 4, 1935). 
REXROTH, Uneheliche Kinder, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterb. (1938) 633-676. 
2 U. S. Restatement § 454· 
3 Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law (1889), art. 18: The 
rights and duties resulting from illegitimacy are governed by the law of the state 
in which they are claimed to be exercised. 
Nicaragua: C. C. Tit. Prel. art. VI (1o). 
Codigo Bustamante art. 63 as to the declarations of maternity. 
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Most countries refer to the personal law of the mother, 
tested by her domicil 4 or nationality. 5 
Minority solutions refer to the child's personal law 6 or 
resort to the so-called distributive application of both parties' 
laws, so as to determine the duties of either party by his qr 
her law.7 
The English law is sui generis. Only English law is applied, 
and then only if the child is born in England or, if born 
abroad, of English parents. 8 
2. Scope 
The applicable law covers the questions: 
Whether the mother enjoys a power analogous to that of a 
legitimate father; 
What other rights she may have over the child's person 
and property; 9 
Whether the child bears the name of the mother, 10 and 
4 Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. uo no. 53· Also BAR1 § 204 was 
of this opinion. 
5 Austria: 1 EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ § z8 n. 38; WALKER 814 n. 42.. 
Germany: EG. art. 20 with regard to Germans but generally extended to 
foreigners. RG. (May 13, 1911) 76 RGZ. 2.83; KG. (July 9> I92.4) so Z. 
Ziv. Proz. (192.6) 337; OLG. Karlsruhe (Nov. z6, 1926) 37 Z.int.R. (I927) 
J88. 
Greece: C. C. (I 940) art. I 9: last common national law; in absence of such 
the national law of the mother at birth. 
Italy: C. C. (I942) Disp. Prel. art. :zo par. I. 
Poland: Law of I926, art. :zo: Where the laws of mother and child di:ffer, 
the last common national law. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (April I 7, I9J6) W. I936, no. 72.I (speak-
ing of a case where both parties were of the same foreign nationality at the 
time of birth of the child). 
6 Finland: Law of December s, I 92.9, § zo. 
Codigo Bustamante: art. 64 as to the name of the child. · 
7 Japan: Law of June IS, I8981 art. 18; China: Law of Aug. 51 I9181 arts. 
I 6, I 7· For details see infra p. 6 r 5· 
8 2 HALSBURY (I9J8) 583 no. 804. 
9 Rb. Haag (Nov. z9, 1934) W. 1936, no. 652. (authority of the mother to 
act knowledged under German law, while under Dutch law a guardian ought to 
have been appointed). 
1° C6digo Bustamante art. 64 (law of child). 
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whether the mother's husband may give his name to the 
·child; 11 
Whether it shares her domicil by force of law; 12 and 
The question of alimentary duties of each party. 
As the above mentioned conflicts rules differ greatly from 
those on legitimacy, a court may have to consider a person 
an illegitimate child of his mother under one law and a legiti-
mate child of his father under another law, as, for instance, 
by German conflicts rules, where the father is of Finnish na-
tionality and the mother a German.13 This split result ap-
proaches American principles.14 Equally surprising is the out-
come in a French case where a Polish man and an Italian 
woman both recognized their child. By the father's recognition 
t~e child acquired Polish nationality, and consequently Polish 
law was applied; under Polish municipal law the mother had 
authority to act in the name of the child, while under her own 
Italian law this authority would have belonged to the father. 15 
The inclination of French courts to apply French law 
against all their own principles has inspired one of the most 
objectionable decisions of the Court of Cassation. A French 
mother recognized her illegitimate daughter, after the latter's 
marriage to an Englishman had made her a British subject, 
and sued for support. Although a reciprocal action of the 
daughter would have been determined (and denied) by Eng-
lish law, the mother's claim for aliments was granted under 
French law, which, in the court's conception, conferred upon 
the mother "an imprescriptible right of recognizing the 
child." 16 The fact that the affection of this mother for her 
11 German courts and prevailing doctrine, see RG. (Nov. 23, 1927) 119 RGZ. 
44; NussBAUM, IPR. r"7 5; RAAPE 49 7ff. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (April 25, 1923) W. II072. 
12 HABICHT 158. 
13 RAAPE -,500. 
14 Supra pp. 559-56o. 
15
.Triv. civ. Nice (Feb. z, 1903) Clunet 1903, 859. Cf. Italian C. C. (1865) 
art. 184 par. z. . 
16 Cass. {civ.) (March 8, 1938) Revue Crit. 1938, 653, Nouv. Revue 1938, 
no, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 124, criticized by BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1938, 655. 
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daughter was evidently discovered only after about twenty 
years when wealth had come to the latter should exclude any 
equitable considerations that might otherwise move a court. 
Change of Status. As a rule, a change of the personal law 
on which the choice of law depends is determinative, the re-
lationship between mother and child, of course, being de-
termined originally according to the law applicable at the 
time of the birth. Yet, the German Code (EG. article 20) 
reserves application of German law in the case where the 
mother becomes a foreigner and the child remains a German. 
This contrasts unfavorably with the Dutch conceptions under 
which a foreign child retains what rights it acquired by birth, 
although the mother may acquire Dutch nationality and not 
recognize her child according to Dutch law. 17 
II. FATHER AND CHILD 
1. Classification 
Today in the domestic laws, some right of a child to support 
by his illegitimate father is universally known. The nature 
of the claim varies greatly, however; it may be based on a 
natural obligation, a liability to exonerate the public relief 
organizations from avoidable charges, tortious acts accompany-
ing the cohabitation (rape, seduction, etcetera), the simple fact 
of cohabitation itself, or the fact of impregnation. In Norway 
and Finland, an obligation to pay alimony is imposed on any 
man who has cohabited with the mother during the critical 
period (so-called pay-father), the liability being entirely 
severed from any presumption of paternity. 
In addition to the support for the child, if a man is assumed 
to be the true father, other incidents may be included in the 
relationship between the parties, such as those concerning the 
name of the child, care and education, marriage impediments, 
inheritance rights of the child, alimentary rights of the father, 
17 VAN HASSELT1 Supplement 3z. 
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et cetera. The municipal laws acknowledge more or fewer 
of such incidents, and some of them establish a gradation ac-
cording to different situations. For instance, the Swiss Civil 
Code includes, besides the ordinary protection of children 
born out of wedlock, the award of "status" to a child either 
by recognition or, in certain cases such as seduction, by judg-
ment (art. 323). A special kind of "illegitimate relationship" 
is created with effects on name, care and education, and na-
tionality; courts may even confer parental power on the 
father. Also, the ordinary lawsuit for support may vary in 
correspondence with the varying structure of the rights al-
lotted. The child may be provided with a simple action for 
payment of money, or with an action seeking a formal decla-
ration of paternity, or, combining these two types of remedy, 
with a petition for incidental declaration of paternity con-
stituting res judicata and for adjudication of payments. 
Many other differences of the municipal regulations have 
made the corresponding conflicts rules a field of utter con-
fusion, often deplored; public policy, playing a dominant 
role adds complication. 
In most countries, the conflicts rule is unsettled. Where 
statutory provisions exist, they are imperfect or need con-
struction. As a typical example, article 2 1 of the German Intro-
ductory Law refers to the mother's national law only for the 
purpose of dete.rmining the support duty of the father. Ex-
tension of this rule to the entire relation between father and 
child was assumed for a time and embodied in the Polish 
Law of 1926 (article 21, paragraph 1). Opinion prevailing 
now prefers for substantial reasons, to take the limitation of 
the rule literally and to reserve all problems other than those 
related to support to the father's personal law.18 An action 
18 See LEWALD 145 no. 2031 RAAPE 529ff.; M. WoLFF, IPR. 137; LG. 
Konigsberg (May 30, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 66. Contra: NussBAUM, D.IPR. 
176 n. 4> against whom 4 FRANKENSTEIN 108 n. 2.. 
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for support, however, although combined with a demand for 
a preliminary declaratory statement of paternity, is considered 
to fall under the enacted rule.19 
Recent legislators are aware of the broader sphere of the 
p-roblem. The Finnish Law of 1929 establishes different rules, 
the mother's personal law governing generally, while the il-
legitimate father's law determines inheritance rights. 20 Th~ 
C6digo Bustamante assigns to the personal law of the child 
the rules concerning its right to a name, determining the proofs 
of filiation, and regulating the child's inheritance (article 57), 
but applies the lex fori to the right of maintenance (article 
59). 21 Also, a draft of the Greek Civil Code made similar 
distinctions; the Code rejecting them is clearly intended to 
cover the entire ground, like the Polish law.22 A similar dis-
tinction follows from the Swiss statute, which subjects status 
questions, especially of domiciled foreigners, to the national 
law (NAG. article 8), but purely alimentary suits, according 
to general principles, to the law of the defendant's domiciJ.23 
The courts classify the above mentioned action for declaration 
of "status" as a status in the sense of the first group, and they 
therefore treat it as belonging to exclusive Swiss jurisdiction.24 
The Dutch Hof den Haag recognized in 1937 an ordinary 
Swiss judgment condemning a Dutchman as illegitimate 
19 LG. Frankfurt a.M. (Aug. 171 193z) JW. 19331 191 1 IPRspr. 19331 no. 48. 
20 HERNBERG, 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 107. 
21 In the French and English translations, 86 League of Nations Treaty Series 
(19z9) No. 1950, pp. 137, z7o, article 59 is incorrectly restricted to legitimate 
children. The French translation of article 57 is mistaken in rendering "legiti-
midad" by "paternite," 86 ibid. p. 137. 
22 Draft, art. zs par. z (Revue Crit. 1938, 348); see MARIDAKIS, 11 
Z.ausl.PR. (1938) 124; C. C. (1940) art. 20. 
23 BG. (Oct. zz, 1919) 45 BGE. II 503; BG. (May 15, 1925) 51 BGE. 
I xos; BG. (March 24, 1927) 53 BGE. II 89, 92. 
24 The action is available only against Swiss nationals before Swiss courts; see 
BG. (July 6, 1916) 42 BGE. II 332; BG. (Oct. 22, 1919) 45 BGE. II 5031 BG. 
(Nov. 22, 1934) 6o BGE. II 338. Where the defendant is an Italian, Italian 
law governs, and an action for declaration of status, if any, must be instituted 
in Italian courts, Cour de Justice, Geneve (June 21 1 1928) 36 SJZ. (1939-1940) 
2.03 no. 141. 
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father to pay alimony, although he would have been able to 
prove the defense of plurium concumbentium (several cohabit-
ants), exonerating him under Dutch, though not under Swiss 
law; the problem was thought to concern the status of the 
child, determinative in the opinion of the Court. 25 The Dutch 
Supreme Court, however, subsequently held that support is 
not relative to status, because a preliminary declaration of 
paternity is no more than a mere fact; hence, the law of the 
defendant Dutchman was applied. 26 
Without doubt, a conflicts rule limited to the duty of sup-
port is insufficient to cover the field, and it may well be that 
the contacts should be chosen differently for support and the 
other incidents of illegitimate parenthood. 
2. Contacts 
The rule applying the law of the place of conception was 
originated by the tort idea in European common law practice 27 
and is still applied in Sweden.28 Sometimes, the birthplace 
replaces the less practical place of conception. 29 
Numerous rules subject the entire matter to the law of the 
forum,30 either because the matter is regarded as of imperative 
policy or becau?e it lacks a convincing classification. 
2.'; Hof den Haag (April 26, 1937) W. 1937, no. 538. 
26 H. R. (Aprilr, 1938) W. 1938, no. 989. For criticism see VANDER FLIER, 
Grotius 1939, 190 and citations. An analogous decision: Hof Arnhem (Nov. 15, 
1938) W. 1939 no. 299 (illegitimate child born in Czechoslovakia, and of 
Czech nationality, defendant of Dutch nationality; the alimentary duty belongs 
to the patrimonial law; the personal law includes, at the most, the declaration 
of paternity) . 
27 Former German common law: LG. Frankfurt a.M. (Jan. 25, 1893) 3 
Z.int.R. (1893) SII. 
~8 Swedish Sup. Ct. (Hogsta Domstol) {Aug. 18, 1915) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 
871 (Swedish defendant, cohabitation in Hamburg; exceptio plurium con-
cumbentium admitted according to German law). 
29 The Netherlands: H. R. (Feb. 7, 1919) W. 10393, N.J. 1919, 322. Italy, 
interprovincial law: Cass. (April 30, 1926) Giur. ltal. 1926, I, r, 1055. 
~ SAVIGNY § 3 74 at p. 279; tr. by GUTHRIE p. 254. 
United States: Restatement§ 454: "No action can be maintained on a foreign 
bastardy statute." C6digo Bustamante art. 59 (for aliments). 
Austria: OGH. (Feb. 19, 1924) 6 SZ. no. 66; OGH. (March 4, 1937) 19 
SZ. no. 70; WALKER 815 and in I KLANG'S Kommentar 328. But see infra n. 38. 
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Personal law is applied in very different conceptions, as 
determined by: 
The domicil of the mother at the time of the conception 
or birth; 31 the domicil of the man 32 at the time of the con-
ception or the birth; 33 the domicil of the man as defendant 
at the time of the commencement of the action; 34 the national 
law of the mother; 35 of the child; 36 of both cumulatively; 37 
Denmark: Sup. Ct. (Hojesteret) (June 22, 1915) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (I928) 865; 
CriminalandPoliceCourtCopenhague (May4, I897) IoZ.int.R. (I9oo) 293· 
Finland: Law of 1929, § 21 sentence 1 (for aliments); § 2I sentence 2 (for 
all claims against Finns). 
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (June 29, I925) W. II424; but contra 
Hof den Haag (May 2o, I927) W. 1I814; Rb. Maastricht (April 28, I932) 
W. I 2684 and almost all other decisions. 
The Treaty of Montevideo (I889) art. I8, Treaty of Montevideo (I94o) 
art. 22 provide that the rights and duties concerning illegitimate filiation are 
governed by the law of the state in which they ought to be "effective." 
Similar, Nicaragua C. C. Tit. Pre!. art. VI (I o). It is highly obscure as to 
what this means. 
31 Domicil of the mother: 
(a) At the time of birth; older Prussian practice, see Gebhardsche Materialien 
2I 6. 
(b) At the time of the conception: last Prussian practice before 1900 following 
the thoroughly considered Plenary decision of the Obertribunal (Feb. I, x 8 51) 
37 Entsch. no. I; FoERSTER-Eccws x Theorie und Praxis des Preussischen 
Privatrechts (ed. 5, x 887) 64; alleged Norwegian practice, but controversial, 
see CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 576 no. 128. 
32 Domicil of the man : 
England: Coldingham Parish Council v. Smith [I9I8] 2 K. B. 90, per Salter, 
}.; WESTLAKE 105 § 58a concludes convincingly that "the liability of·a father 
to maintain his son is determined solely by the law of the father's domicile." 
But BEALE I433 § 457.2 infers the primary importance of the place "where 
support is needed," meaning probably the domicil of the child. 
Norway: Sup. Ct. (x9I8) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 873 no. 52. 
33 Switzerland: BG., Civ. Div. (March 24, I927) 53 BGE. II 89, 92, follow-
ing BG., Constitutional Division (May 15, 1925) 51 BGE. I 105; Bern 47 
ZBJV. 663, no. 43; see ScHNITZER 213. 
34 France: NIBOYET, Notions Sommaires ( I93 7) 192 no. 320. Former obiter 
dictum of the Swiss BG. (Oct. 2, I 913) 39 BGE. II 495, 499; BG. (Oct. 22, 
I919) 45 BGE. II 503. 
35 National law of mother: 
Germany: EG. art. 2I. 
Czechoslovakia: Draft of Code on International Private Law, § 36 (1), 
adopted by Sup. Ct. Briinn (Dec. 9, 1927) JW. I928, 1476. 
36 National law of the child: 
Brazil: Sup. Trib. (Aug. 29, I9oo) 84 0 Direito 547 (inheritance by 
will). 
Finland: Law of I929, § 21 in fine (claims other than for aliments against 
foreigners). -
France: some decisions before the first world war following 5 LAURENT 5 I 5, 
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the national law of the man; 88 of the man and of the child, 
cumulatively. 811 
3. Public Policy 
(a) After having produced every possible opinion on the 
subject, the French doctrine now struggles to keep a balance 
between the personal (national) law of the child, which is ap-
plicable in theory, and the French law which is applied on 
many grounds. In the first place, French law prevails where 
French nationality depends on filiation, since it ought never 
52.31!. and other writers; again in increasing consistency: Cass. (req.) (June 8, 
192.1) Mihaesco, Revue 192.4, 73; Cass. (civ.) {Jan. zo, 192.5) Tomatis, 
S.192.5.1·49, D.192.5.1.177, Clunet 192.5, 709, Revue 192.5, 532.; Cass. (civ.) 
(April1, 1930) D.1930.1.89, Clunet 1930,973, Revue 1930,2.931 Cass. (req.) 
(March s, 1935) Fernandez, D.1935•1•57• Revue Crit. I935, 775, Nouv. 
Revue I935• s8; Cass. (civ.) {July zo, I936) Revue Crit. I937, 694. 
Similar for foreign children: Cass. (civ.) {June 2.I, I935) Gaz. Pal. 1935. 
2..348; App. Colmar (June IS, 1934) Nouv. Revue I934> 8o9. 
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (May 2., I9I3) W. 9557, Clunet I92.o, 
765 (child born in the Portuguese colony of Loanda, Dutch father, Portuguese 
law); Rb. Rotterdam (June 2.5, I934) N. ]. I935• 960 ("constant practice"); 
Rb. Haarlem (Nov. z, I92.6) W. u697 {termination of alimentary right). 
Cj. also I VAN HASSELT 78; VANDER FLIER, Grotius I9J7> I66; VANDER FLIER, 
Grotius I939, I9o. 
C6digo Bustamante art. 57 (c/. art. 59). 
37 National law of mother and child cumulatively: 
Polaqd: Law of 192.6, art. 2.I (except where both father and mother are 
domiciled in Poland, art. 2.I par. z). 
Writers, especially in Italy, see MoRELLI, 9 Annuario Dir. Comp. (I934) 
III I42. no. 476. 
38 National law of defendant: 
Austria OGH. (Feb. 8, I9J8) 2.0 SZ. 64, no. 34· Cj. ibid. 2.65, no. uS; but 
see for public policy, infra n. 44· 
France: Courts in former periods, see J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 381 n. z, 
and still App. Poitiers (Jan. 2.9, I92.9) Clunet 192.9, 1046; SURVILLE 448 no. 
306; NIBOYET 7 57 no. 645, 763 no. 649, and NIBOYET, Note S.I92.5.I.J05. 
Germany: for problems other than alimentary, see supra n. 18. 
Greece: C. C. (I 940) art. 2.0. 
Italy: Cass. (Oct. 2.1, 192.5) 17 Rivista (I92.6) 515; App. Milano (May u, 
I9JI) Monitore I93I, 612.. 
Siam: Act on Conflicts Laws, Sect. 36, cf. LEWALD, Regles generales des 
confiits de lois (1941) 36 n. 10. 
ae National law of father and child: 
France: a few decisions after the war, see J. DoNNED!EU DE VABRES 494 n. 5· 
Italy: Cass. {April 7, 1932.) Foro ltal. Rep. 1932., Filiazione 686 nos. 38, 
39; Cass. {July Io, 1936) 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 145 no. 75· 
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to be based on a foreign law. 40 "The question of filiation is ab-
sorbed by the higher one of nationality." 41 Only once, in a 
decision of the Court of Paris, does the private law question 
seem to have been duly isolated.42 Where a child is born in 
France, it is thought invested with a provisional French na-
tionality and, for this reason, subject to French law; moreover, 
it cannot lose this provisional nationality except by French 
law or a foreign law similar to the French. 43 
(b) In an analogous way the law of the forum prevails 
in some other countries, when one party 44 or the defendant 4 ;; 
is a subject of the forum, or both parties 46 dwell within the 
forum. The Polish law declares Polish law applicable (instead 
of the common nationality of mother and child at the time of 
birth), if both father and mother are domiciled in Poland at 
the time of birth and Polish law is more favorable to the 
child.47 German law refuses to impose upon a German defend-
ant a duty of support beyond what the internal law grants. 48 
4
°Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 30, 192.0) D.I9ZI.I.177, S.I921.1.24I, Clunet 1923, 
89; Cass. (civ.) (Feb. zs, and March 3I, 1930) D.I9JO.I.IIJ, S.I930.I.32I. 
Cf. GAUDEMET, Rev. Trim. D. Civ. 19:1.1, 218; see ~upra p. 138. 
41 Trib. Nancy (Feb. 13, 1904) D.I904.2.249· 
~ Cour Paris (Nov. 4, 1932); cf. Cass. (civ.) (July :u, 1933) Revue Crit. 
1934, 405ff., criticized by LEREBOUllS-PtGEONNIERE 414 n. I, 
43 Cour Paris (July 2, 1926) D. H. 1926. 441, Clunet 19%7, 77· 
"Austria: OGH. (I938) 20 SZ. 265, no. u8 (dictum). 
Denmark: Sup. Ct. (Hojesteret) (June u, 19I5) 2 Z.ausl.PR. (I928) 865 
and Western Court (Vestre Landsret) (Oct. 4, I928) 7 Z.ausl.PR. (I933) 
924 (mere residence of the father at the commencement of the action suffices for 
application of Danish law). . 
The Netherlands: often, although not consistently, see I VAN HASSELT 79 
and Supplement 3 Iff. 
45 Switzerland: OG. Zurich (Oct. IJ, 1936) Bl.f.Ziirch. Rspr. 1938, 39, no. 2I. 
46 Germany: LG. Hamburg (Oct. 13, 1932.) IPRspr. 1932, no. 94; LG. 
Frankfurt (July 30, 1934) IPRspr. 1934, no. 7; RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. 210 (con-
troversial) • 
47 Poland: Law of 1926, art. 21 par. 2. 
~Germany: EG. att. 2I last clause: "No greater claims, however, can be 
enforced than what have been constituted by German law." Understood as 
merely protecting Germans, RGR. Kom., n. 2 before§ 1705; LG. Hartenstein 
(Nov. 18, 1929) IPRspr. 1930, no. 79· What is the equivalent of an award 
under the German law? See for illustration cases in IPRspr. 1930, nos. So-83. 
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These exceptions to the personal law do not leave much space 
to the pretended principle. There are yet others. 
(c) Where, as between foreign parties, their national law 
excludes suits involving the question of paternity, the action is 
dismissed as a rule by courts following the nationality prin-
ciple. Thus, the Italian provision before I 9 3 9, that no actions 
lay on the ground of paternity except in the cases of abduction 
or rape, was observed in Germany,49 France, et cetera. On 
the other hand, the action is also rejected where the national 
law allows but the municipal law of the forum refuses the 
claim. So long as the famous maxim of the Code Napoleon 
(article 340) was in full sway that "la recherche de la pater-
nite est interdite," foreign children were unable to sue their 
foreign parents in France/0 and the same prohibitive policy 
operated in Italy/1 the Netherlands, 5 2 Guatemala, 53 etcetera. 
The French courts have transferred this doctrine to their 
mitigated provision, as it has stood since I 9 I 2. No action is 
admitted, unless the precautions and conditions precedent pro-
vided in the present article 340 are fulfilled, i.e., unless pater-
nity appears manifest by written evidence or recognition. In 
this opinion, foreign laws more liberal than the French offend 
the public order aiming at "the honor and peace of families." 54 
Laws which render paternity actions still more difficult than 
the French have free play. 55 
48 LG. Stuttgart (Dec. 31, 1931) JW. 1932., 14.15, IPRspr. 1932., no. 93, 
against RAAPE 52.1. Dutch parties: no action according to BW. arts. 338, 342. 
par. 1, 343 par. 1, 344, LG. Leipzig (Sept. 2.3, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, no. 49· 
But see below n. 63. The new Italian C. C. (1938) art. 2.67, C. C. (1942.) art. 
2.69, recognizes four grounds for action. 
60 Contra, 2. FIORE 2.72. no. 733, 2.79 no. 739, 2.83 no. 741. 
61 FEDOZZI 496. 
52 BW. art. 342. par. 1. 
53 MATOS 32.4ff. nos. 2.71, 2.72.. 
54 Cass. (civ.) (Jan. zo, 192.5) S.192.5.1.49; and in most definite manner 
Cass. (civ.) Rohmann c. Kellerhals es-qual (March z6, 1935) S.1936.t.89, 
D.I9J5.1.61, Nouv. Revue 1935, 58, Revue Crit. 1935, 768; Cass. (civ.) 
(Nov. 30, 1938) Gaz. Pal. 1939·1.2.03, Nouv. Revue 1938, 838. 
65 See the criticism of BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 19 34, 61 8; ibid. 1 9'3 5, 61 7. 
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To illustrate special points, domestic provisions respecting 
the time limit within which the child's conception is presumed 
are often held to be imperative. The old Prussian practice did 
not follow this view; whether the European common law, de-
termining the time as running from the 300th to the I 82nd 
day, or the Prussian Landrecht, fixing it from the 2 85th to the 
2IOth day should be applied, was determined according to the 
domicil of the mother. 56 But the courts of Austria 51 and 
France 58 refused to deviate from their own rules. Also, 
whether a defendant whose cohabitation is proved may raise 
the defense of several cohabitants is decided by contradictory 
rules, according to the personal law or the lex fori, 59 etcetera. 
Reasonably, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has stated that the 
exception allowed the defendant cohabitant under article 3 I 5 
of the Swiss Code, that the child's mother led a frivolous life, 
does not imperatively operate against a foreign national law, 
since such dissimilarities are to be borne under the principle 
of territorialism (meaning domicil) dominating the Swiss in-
ternational private law.60 
Finally, the award of alimony often is either simply con-
trolled by the law of the forum, 61 or, even if the personal law 
56 Prussian Obertribunal, 54 Striethorst 471 no. I 2. 
57 OGH. (March 4, I937) I9 SZ. no. 70, applying Allg. BGB. § I6J. 
58 France: after the time determined in C. C. art. 340, a suit is not taken in 
hand, even though the child acquired French nationality only after the end of 
it; Cass. (req.) (July I51 I936) Revue Crit. I9371 I5I; Cass. (civ.) (May 271 
I937) Revue Crit. I938, 82. Cj. NIBOYET, Revue Crit. I934> IJS; BATIFFOL, 
Revue Crit. ·I935> 622; ibid. I938, 83; see also the criticism by CosTE-FLORET, 
7 Giur. Comp. DIP. I29 no. 64. 
59 Personal Law: Also on this point the Prussian courts constantly applied the 
domiciliary law of the mother; see I REHBEIN 84, no. 23. Germany: personal 
law of the mother against foreign defendants, see LEWALD I 44, I 46ff.; RAAPE 
513· Lex fori: Austria: OGH. (Feb. I91 I924) 6 SZ. I 52 no. 66, and WALKER 
8 I 8 n. 59, declaring the rejection of exceptio plurium concumbentium ( Allg. 
BGB. § I6J) as imperative. 
On the Dutch controversy, supra pp. 6 I s-6 I 6. 
60 BG. (March 24, I927) 53 BGE. II 89, 94· 
61 The lower Dutch courts applied the personal law of a natural father or of 
the minor child to the question who had to sue for the child; but the Supreme 
Court, H. R. (June q, I924) W. 11295 declared the appointment of a special 
curator under art. 344h of the Dutch BW. indispensable. 
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is primarily applied, the usual amounts of support are con-
sidered as the maximum 62 or, conversely, the minimum. 63 
By the latter consideration, a foreign law granting little or 
no support is eliminated as inhuman or scandalous. 
What persons may be liable to support the child,64 or in 
what circumstances the right to institute the action is forfeited 
or lost by limitation,65 has been held subject to the personal 
law. 
4· Time Element 
If the law of the place of birth or the mother's personal law 
at this date obtains, it is implied that a pregnant girl who, be-
fore confinement, changes her nationality by marriage or 
otherwise, or changes her domicil, respectively, will thereby 
affect the fate of the child she gives birth to afterwards, un-
less the child acquires a nationality of its own by jus soli. On 
the other hand, a change in the local connections of the person 
whose personal law at birth is decisive does not affect ali-
mentary duties as once established or denied. 66 The Polish 
62 France: Most decisions take it for granted that French law is applicable; 
Trib. Seine (June 18, 1934) Clunet 1935, 619. BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 
431 praises the prudence of Cass. (civ.) {July 2o, 1936) Gaz.Pal.I936.2.696, 
7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 135 no. 65, Revue Crit. 1937, 694 because the court spec-
ifies the characteristics of § 1708 of the German BGB. which make the section 
inapplicable in France. 
Germany: RAAPE 521 contends that an award under foreign law which would 
ruin the defendant should not be given. Contra: Italy: FEDOZZI 496. 
63 Germany: LG. Hamburg (Oct. 13, 1932) IPRspr. 1932, no. 94; LG. 
Frankfurt (July 30, 1934) JW. 1934, 2644, IPRspr. 1934, no. 7 (English 
mother and child); AG. Kehl (Sept. 22, 1935) 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 298 no. 
242 (Luxemburg); LG. Hamburg (Sept. 2, 1936) JW. 1936, 3492 (Old 
Rumania). 
Contra: Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (March II, 1933) Clunet 1933, 
1041 (Belgian public order not interested). Germany: LG. Stuttgart (Dec. 
31, 1931) JW. 1932, 3831. , 
64 German LG. Hartenstein (Nov. 18, 1929) IPRspr. 1930, no. 79 (paternal 
grandfather liable under Swiss law). 
65 Swiss BG. (Oct. 22, 1919) 45 BGE. II 503, sos. 
66 SwissBG. (March 24, 1927) 53 BGE. II 89. 
Germany: RAAPE 514; same, so Recueil 1934 IV 405, 454ff. 
Italy: Cass. (Dec. 2, 1933) Foro ltal.I934·I.683. 
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law generalizes this rule so as to include all relations between 
father and child. 67 
French courts followed this rule until the first World 
War 68 and occasionally later up to 1920.69 As, however, the 
cases became more frequent where a child changed its nation-
ality between its birth and a judgment for alimentation, the 
highest Court developed a peculiar doctrine amounting to the 
following rules: A foreign child acquiring French nationality 
is subjected to French law.70 A child of French nationality 
changing to foreign citizenship is also subject to French law on 
the ground of the theory of vested rights. 71 This theory "turns 
so as only to protect the lex fori," 72 a purpose which seems 
disproportional to the fact that the French law is backward 
on this point and puts the child at a disadvantage. 
No such questions arise in this country, as each court ap-
plies its own state statute. 
S· Renvoi 
In this particular field, the German statute has omitted to 
provide for renvoi. It has been applied nevertheless, 73 against 
some opposition. 74 
67 Poland: Law of 19::6, art. ::1. 
66 VALERY 1145 no. 807; BATIFFOL, 8 Repert. 410 no. 35; 3 ARMINJON 50 
no. 47• Cf. }. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 381. 
69 Cour Paris (Dec. ::2, 1920) S.1921.2.97· 
7
°Cass. (req.) (June 8, 19::1) Mihaesco, Revue 1924, 73; CourParis (March 
27, 1933) Contardo, Revue Crit. 1934, 135; Cass. (req.) {July 1 s, 1936) Con-
tardo c. Chaffy, Revue Crit. 1937, 152; Cass. (civ.) (May 27, 1937) Roure c. 
Maumy, Revue Crit. 1938, 82. I 
71 Cass. (civ.) {June 28, 193::) Revue 1932, 685 at 688, Clunet 1933, 368; 
Cass. (civ.) (May 27, 1937) Revue Crit. 1938, 82. 
72 }. DoNNED!EU DE VABRES 499· 
73 AG. Stuttgart (Oct. 22, 1930) JW. 1931, 157, IPRspr. 1931, no. 87 
(American mother: the American courts, applying the law of the forum, are 
deemed to approve of the domiciliary court doing the same, following an opinion 
of the writer). Also the French App. Rennes {July 24, 1923) Clunet 1924. 
410 seems to apply New York law because the father still was domiciled in New 
York. 
74 See RAAPE, 2 D.IPR. 209; EcKSTEIN, 6 Giur. Comp. DIP. 298 no. 242. 
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III. RECOGNITION OF A CHILD 
In the French system, adopted in many countries, acknowl-
edgment of a child by father or mother must precede any 
claim of rights on the ground of illegitimate relationship and 
moreover is a condition of legitimation. In another phase, 
recognition may improve the situation of an illegitimate child 
without reaching full legitimation (Greece, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, and others) or only exclude the exceptio plurium 
concumbentium (Germany). We are dealing therefore not 
with one but several distinguishable institutions of private 
law. 
I. Formalities 
Formalities, which greatly differ, 75 would be expected to 
suffice if complying with the place where the act of recognition 
occurs. 76 But the rule "locus regit actum" is challenged by 
the personal law. Dominant opinion in France, in particular, 
requires a formal "authentic" declaration such as is usual 
in France when a Frenchman recognizes a child abroad and 
lets the local regulation determine only what solemnity "au-
thentic" documents ought to have. 77 
In the Restatement, § I 40, the law of the parent's domicil 
seems to extend to all questions including formalities. Prob-
ably, this is the actual law. 78 
75 F.or the United States see 4 VERNIER § 244· 
76 Swiss BG. (Dec. 19, 1940) Praxis 1941 1 no. 9 at 23ff. 
77 Trib. civ. Pau (May q, 1888) Clunet 1893, 858. Less clear Cass. (req.) 
(Aug. 21 1897) D.1898.1.377> S.1900.1.283, Clunet 1898, 127 (Frenchman 
recognizing his child in Singapore by a "testamentary letter," a kind of will 
unknown to and invalid under English local law). 
Contra: LEREBOURS-P!GEONNIERE 413 no. 348. 
Germany: RAAPE po advocates the local form, but at 522 the personal law 
respecting the question whether recognition can be made in a private will. 
18 Cf. Richmond v. Taylor (1913) 151 Wis. 633, 139 N. W. 435, and z 
BEALE 711 1 § 140.1. 
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2. Substantive Requirements 
The personal law seems to be universally applied. It does 
not have to be the same Jaw, however, that governs the ali-
mentary obligation. Prevailingly, the domicil 79 or the na-
tionality 80 of the recognizing parent is determinative, since 
the conditions of an act burdening its author and particularly 
his capacity should depend upon his law. Hence, even courts 
which subject the alimentary action to the law of the child or 
consider this law cumulatively proclaim the rule. Neverthe-
less, sometimes the law of the child, 81 or the cumulated laws 
79 U. S. Restatement § 140; Pfeifer v. Wright (I930) 4I F. (:zd) 464; In 
re Forney (I9I9) 43 Nev. 227, I84 Pac. 206, I86 Pac. 678; Eddie v. Eddie 
(I899) 8 N.D. 376,79 N.W. 856; 2 BEALE 7II § I40.I. (the laws of mother 
and child are not to be consulted, because the act is beneficial for the status of 
the child). 
Former Prussian law: Prussian Obertribunal (April II, I856) 32 Entsch. 
kg!. Ob. Trib. 40I no. 5 I (recognition by a minor domiciled at a 
place under Prussian law executed in a territory of French-Rhenish law 
was invalid according to Prussian law. The court notes, at 406, as singular 
that the recognition would have been valid according to Rhenish law, and 
would have bound the minor as a confession of impregnation under Prus-
sian law, if executed in a territory of the latter law; it regrets a hardship caused 
"by the conflict of heterogeneous legal systems." This adds an argument to the 
adoption of the lex loci actus. But, today a court would establish an extrater-
ritorial confession, although the declaration was made abroad). 
80 Brazil (former law): Sup. Trib. Fed. (Feb. 8, I896) Clunet I896, IORo, 
70 0 Direito IJ, Ap. Civ. no. I4I. 
France: dominant practice from I892 on, see]. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 495; 
Cass. (civ.) (Jan. I7, I899) S. I899·I.I77> D.I899.I.329i Cour Paris (April 
30, 1935) Nouv. Revue 1935, 7o; BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1935, 623 no. I4i 
and now confirmed by Cass. (civ.) (March 8, 1938) Fontaine c. Pulteney, 
Nouv. Revue 1938, 120, Revue Crit. 1938, 653. The Swiss Federal Trib. (BG.) 
(June 2o, 1929) 55 BGE. I 147, I49 remarks that this theory is necessitated by 
the effect of the recognition on procuring the child French nationality. 
Germany: RAAPE 523, III 3 (a). 
Greece: App. Athens no. 445 (I896) Clunet I897, 621. 
Italy: Cass. (April 7, 1932) Foro Ital. Rep. 1932, 686 nos. 36 and 39; Cass. 
(July 10, I936) 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 145, no. 75· 
Switzerland: BG. (Dec. :z:z, I909) 35 BGE. I 668, 675; Just. Dep., BBl. 
I939, II 283 no. xI (a former Swiss national, naturalized in Canada, cannot 
adopt children in Switzerland complying with Swiss law only). Correspondingly, 
the BG. (Dec. 19, 1940) Praxis I94I, no. 9 at 23 has applied NAG. art. 28 
to the recognition by a Swiss father domiciled in France, thus determining the 
effects by renvoi under Swiss law. 
8! C6digo Bustamante art. 57· 
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of the parent and child, 82 or the child's law limited to the 
capacity and consent of the child, 83 have been adopted or ad-
vocated. In the only American case that is known to be in 
point, 84 Italian law, being that of the child's domicil, was ap-
plied, and on this basis the court held it sufficient that the 
father, newly immigrated, had executed a power of attorney 
in Philadelphia and sent it to Italy, whereupon his agent recog-
nized the child formally in Italy. The fact that the man had 
been domiciled in Italy, at least until a short time before, 
and for the time being perhaps was merely resident in this 
country, may have influenced the decision. But it would be 
reasonable to recognize the validity of a recognition sufficient 
by the child's law where, as in this case, the parent practically 
makes an appearance in the child's country. Still more can be 
said in favor of giving the child those remedies for opposing 
a recognition, or for contesting its validity, which the child's 
own law provides. 85 
3· Scope 
The personal law determines: 
Who may recognize, e.g. after the parent's death; 
Under what conditions; 86 
Among French writers, recently, NIBOYET 769 no. 65o; LEREBOUR.s-
PIGEONNIERE 4I8 no. 350; BATIFFOL1 Revue Crit. I9381 655 (insists on this 
opinion even after the decision of the court of cassation of March 8, I 9 3 8). 
82 United States: TAINTOR, "Legitimatioil, Legitimacy and Recognition in the 
Conflict of Laws," I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I940) 589 at 612. 
France: Some decisions and writers, see WEISS, 4 Traite 461 3 AR.MINJON 47 
no. 44££., AuoiNET1 Note S.I9zo.z.65. 
Belgium: PouLLET su no. 391.; Novelles Belges, z D. C\v. 6I91 no. 587. 
Italy: ANZILOTTI1 1. Rivista (I907) IIS; DIENA1 1. Prine. I8I; CAVAGLIERI 
'-44ff. 
83 Japan: Law of June IS, I 8981 art. I 8. 
China: Law of Aug. 51 I9I81 art. I3 (speaking of "recognition"). 
84 In re Moretti's Estate (I9JZ) I6 D.&C. (Pa.) 7I5 1 commented on by 
TAINTOR, I8 Can. Bar Rev. (I94o), supra n. 8z1 at 6u. 85 Italy: Cass. (April 71 I93z) Foro ltal. Rep. (I9Jz) 686 nos. 38 and 39· 
The Netherlands: VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 634 no. I95· 
86 The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (Jan. '-7• I9I3) W.9438 and (May :z, 
I913) W. 9557 (paternal recognition under foreign law during the lifetime of 
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Whether before the child's birth, and whether after its 
birth; 
Whether the child must have reached a certain age; 
Whether the child's consent is required; 
Whether adulterine children can be recognized and under 
what conditions; 87 
Under what conditions and by whom a recognition may be 
contested; 88 
And, as submitted earlier, all effects of recognition. 89 
The effect of acknowledgment or recognition on the prob-
lems of succession upon death, in any consistent rule, should 
be determined by the same rule as that governing the for-
mation of the act, 90 unless the inheritance statute either rejects 
children born out of wedlock or admits illegitimate children 
the mother without her consent recognized, although prohibited by BW. art. 
]]g). . 
87 Bruxelles (July 151 1904) 17 Pand. Per. (Belg.) 1904, no. 859, Novelles 
Belges, 2 D. Civ. 619 no. 586 (recognition abroad under foreign laws valid); 
public order is advanced by AUDINET, Revue 1917, 516 at SZ7i PoULLET 509 
no. 390. 
88 France: Trib. Seine (Dec. 241 1926) Clunet 19281 710 (Russian recognizing 
Italian child, Soviet Russian law); App. Colmar (Nov. 28, 1930) Clunet 19321 
470 (German law; on the person entitled to contest); Cass. (civ.) (Jan. 171 
x8gg) S.18gg.1.t771 8 D.H.x8gg.I.]Z91 Clunet 18991 546, and Cass. (req.) 
(Jan. g, 1906) Revue 19071 154 (case of Bourbon de Bari, I.talian law); much 
criticized by the critics, ANZILOTTI, 3 Rivista (1908) 171, Note, and WEISS 4 
Traite 73, 75; PILLET, Note, S.18gg.x.177 and BARTIN, Note, D.H.1899·1.334, 
among others, were of different opinions). 
Germany: LG. Frankfurt a.M. (Aug. I71 I932) JW. I9331 I9I 1 IPRspr. 
I 9 3 ] 1 no. 48 (in application of EG. art. 2 I, sentences I and 2 hold that the 
recognition cannot be anulled but recovered as undue enrichment). 
89 The Netherlands: Arbitration Court for maritime accident insurance (Feb. 
26, I938) 42 Bull. lnst. Int. (I940) 69 no. I0992 (recognition under German 
BGB. § I 7 I 8 does not constitute a relationship of the character required for a 
right for damages by law on maritime accidents). 
France: in the case of Cass. (civ.) (March u, I936) Revue Crit. I9]61 7I4 
with Note by NIBOYET (1), 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. I]I no. 66 with Note by 
CosTE-FLORET, recognition made in Saigon, Indo-China, by an English father 
was considered invalid on the ground of English law, but treated as a confir-
mation of the natural obligation imposed on the illegitimate father in French 
conception. The court applied French law without considering the con.fticts 
problems involved which are new and doubtful. 
90 See mpra p. 592 and infra pp. 654-658. 
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irrespective of recognition 91 or irrespective of a recognition 
other than as specified by the statute itself.92 
IV. MoTHER AND FATHER 
Modern statutes determine expressly the law under which 
an illegitimate mother may sue the procreator or cohabitant 
for the costs of pregnancy, delivery, and support. Again, they 
may variously refer to the laws of the mother, 93 the mother 
and child, 94 or the defendant. 95 Courts without express stat-
utory provisions will incline to the law of the forum. 96 
A problem of classification ought to be reported in this 
connection. French practice gives the mother an action against 
the father, ostensibly on the ground of a tort consisting in the 
illegitimate intercourse, but actually as a substitute for the 
remedies of support missing in the written law. The courts 
award the woman, together with her own damages, alimony 
on behalf of the child. Under which conflicts rule should such 
a claim be subordinated in a non-French jurisdiction whose 
municipal law establishes for the analogous purpose specific 
family obligations? A reasonable answer should eliminate all 
technical legal constructions and envisage the social purpose 
of the claim. The adequate conflicts rule to deal with these 
institutions is evidently bound to be independent from tort 
91 United States: Moen v. Moen (I9oz) I6 S.D. zio, 9z N. W. I3 (since 
under the South Dakota law every illegitimate child inherits, it is entirely im-
material what right Norwegian law attached to the recognition). 
92 Van Horn v. Van Horn (I899) Io7 Iowa Z47> 77 N. W. 846 (a notorious 
recognition suffices under the Iowa inheritance law, irrespective of the signifi-
cance given the recognition in New Jersey). 
93 Germany: EG. art. zr. 
Greece: C. C. (I940) art. ZI; MARIDAKIS, Revue Crit. I938, 347 indicates 
as motive of the draft, that the mother needed protection. 
94 Poland: Law of I 9z6, art. z I. 
95 Japan: Law of June IS, 1898, art. Z1, 
:China: Law of Aug. s, 1918, art. 16. 
96 E.g., the Netherlands: Law of the mother: Amsterdam (Dec. 13, 1929) 
W. u193 Rb. Groningen (May ZI, 193z) W. 193z, 12479 (law of the place of 
cohabitation-in the Netherlands). Rb. den Haag (Nov. z9, I934) W. I936, 
no. 6sz. Fo~ former views see KosTERS 54z. 
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considerations as well as from a narrow meaning of "family" 
law, going directly to the question of what an illegitimate 
mother is entitled to demand from her cohabitant. 97 It fol-
lows that, if the cohabitation took place in France, French 
and German courts should apply to a French mother the 
French remedy, and if the facts occurred in Germany? the 
German family law.98 
The French courts, however, oppose to the German law 
their "ordre public." 99 
V. CoNCLUSIONS 
The state of chaosreported in this part could easily be re-
duced by a simpler, if not uniform, approach. The legiti-
mate family ought not to be denied a unified legal regulation; 
it was an entirely sound idea that the law of its head should 
govern all relations of the family. The two main objections 
to this axiom raised in the last decades are unconvincing. One 
of these objections is associated with the nationality principle 
in Continental Europe. In view of the modern trend toward 
granting separate nationalities to married women and chil-
dren, the conclusion is popular that the national law of the 
father must yield its dominant role; that it must either con-
cur with the children's laws or even give way to them com-
pletely. ~his may be logical, but it amounts to a new in-
road upon the nationality principle itself. This principle, then, 
is no longer, if it ever was, suitable as the main vehicle of 
conflicts law. It will be abolished some day. So long as it is 
maintained, however, the objection should be disregarded. 
The only practical method consists in determining the events 
affecting the life of the family according to the national law of 
97 To this extent the theory of the writer, 5 Z.ausl.PR. ( I9 3 I) 26 5 has been 
approximately allowed by NEUNER, Der Sinn IIO and RAAPE, so Recueili934 
IV 528 to 533· 
98 NEUNER and RAAPE (precedent note) seem to draw more radical con-
clusions. 
99 App.Douai (March I, I939) Bull. Inst. Int. 1940,81 no. I1032. 
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the father and, after his death, that of the mother. The other 
reason for opposing the rule of the parent's law has been 
derived from the need of the child to be protected. We have 
tried to show that the benefit of the child ought to be pro-
tected by all legislatures and all courts rather than exclu.:.. 
sively by the law and the jurisdiction to which the child be-
longs, often only accidentally. Conflicts law must presuppose 
equality among the particular national laws, statutes, and 
tribunals. 
Consequently, it is natural that in the countries devoted to 
the principle of domicil the law of the domicil of the family 
head at the birth of the child determines the latter's legiti-
macy; furthermore, his law at the time of a legitimation or 
adoption governs the conditions and effects of such acts, as 
at later dates it indicates the rights and duties following from 
legitimate father-child relations. The inheritance law of a 
domicil acquired after legitimate birth, legitimation, or adop-
tion ought not to change any of their effects, unless there 
is a distinct, exceptional public policy, either prohibitive or 
permissive, at the forum of inheritance. 
The only question less definitely answerable by theoretical 
and practical considerations is concerned with the American 
peculiarity of ascribing different positions to a child with re-
spect to his father and his mother. The ideas and consequences 
of this peculiarity have not been fully explained, to the knowl-
edge of the writer. 
Entirely different is the nature of the problems arising from 
illegitimate filiation; French and other conflicts laws should 
not have formed a category of "filiation" comprehending 
all children. Of course, any act of acknowledgment or recogni-
tion by a parent is governed simply by the law of this parent. 
Moreover, something can be said for the personal law of the 
mother with respect to her relationship to the child. But the 
relations to the procreator which are derived from conception, 
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birth, or cohabitation cannot be referred, without artifices, to 
the place where any one of the three persons involved was 
domiciled, or was a national, and still less to the contacts at 
the time of the action. As it is very important for the purpose 
of a serviceable conflicts rule not to base it on any special do-
mestic construction of the liabilities or the rights of the parties, 
the simplest contact, viz., with the place of the birth, is the 
most commendable. The danger that, before giving birth, 
the mother may move to a locality where the law is unfavor-
able to her or the child, is negligible; an improvement for the 
child is welcome. 
These suggestions are not meant, however, to supersede the 
system under which bastardy proceedings are now authorized 
in this country. Support is awarded under similar consider-
ations throughout the country, and interstate relations are the 
only ones to be considered. Hence, the chief concern is with 
jurisdiction, which naturally is found at the father's domicil 
as well as where personal jurisdiction over him is obtained at 
the mother's domicil. Every court applies its own law. 
Lex fori, as a matter of fact, can be defended in this doctrine 
with comparatively better justification than anywhere else. 
In international matters, however, it should be avoided. 
CHAPTER 17 
Adoption 
I. PRELI~fiNARY OBSERVATIONS 
I. Definition of Adoption 
I N some archaic civilizations, including the Greek, Roman, and Japanese, adoption has been the means of continu-ing a house and ancestor cult threatened with extinction. 
Hence, the original type of this institution implies that the 
adoptive son be considered exactly in the position of a veri-
table legitimate male issue (Greek: vlos fJETos, made son). In 
much later periods, adoption was used with the primary object 
of securing the welfare of a child. In this application, the class 
of persons capable of participating in the transaction was con-
siderably enlarged (e.g., to include female adopters), and 
new varieties of adoption were introduced, with restricted 
effects, particularly in that the rights to be acquired by the 
adopter would be limited to care and education. 
As a result, the national legislations present a much varied 
picture. In a number of countries, such as Scotland, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay, 
adoption has never been introduced. The recent Civil Code of 
Guatemala abolished the formerly existing institution of 
adoption, because it had led to misuse by despoiling the assets 
and exploiting the labor of minors.1 In most of the world, 
however, adoption in one form or another has been recognized 
by statute. The common law countries, including England, 
finally have followed this trend. However, many legislators 
have thought that they had to surround the institution with 
1 MATOS 394 no. Z77· 
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formidable obstacles, while a strong modern current favors 
adoption as. the best means of caring for destitute children. 
New adoption laws in France 2 and many other countries/1 
which facilitate adoption through careful investigations by 
advisory offices, evidence this tendency .. 
The variety of policy considerations behind the national 
legislations is amazing. The Roman requirements implied by 
the saying, ((adoptio imitatur naturam," have suggested many 
rules regarding age and family conditions of the parties, but 
these rules often also have been rejected, as for instance in 
the Code Napoleon which prohibited any adoption of minors 
in order to protect infants against exploitation. This rule, 
recently repealed in France and Belgium, still exists in other 
countries. On the other hand, only infants may be adopted 
in England, Sweden, and some of the United States. South-
west Africa requires that the sixteenth year be not completed. 
Other fundamental differences characterize the effects of 
"adoption." In this country, some statutes declare that the 
adopted person is to be considered a legitimate child to all 
legal intents and purposes, but others follow the French 
method of enumerating the specific rights and duties affected. 
Although the latter method. is generally accompanied by 
broad construction of the statutory texts, 4 the results are not 
necessarily in favor of a standard of full legitimacy. Contrary 
to general custom, by some laws the natural father retains 
parental power, and by American and some foreign statutes 
adoption does not preclude marriage with the adopter. The 
child's name is subject to many variations. The statutes also 
exhibit the greatest diversity with respect to the rights of in-
2 France: Law of June 19, 1923. 
3 Belgium: Law of March 22, I 940. 
Chile: Laws No. 5,343 of 1934, and No. 7,613 of 1943. 
Italy: C. C. (1942) arts. 291ff.; etc. 
4 4 VERNIER 406, §§ 261ff. 
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terstate inheritance from and by the adopted parent, the child, 
and the natural family. 
An important difference consists in the fact that in many 
laws the private contract effecting an adoption is construed as 
the very core of the transaction, the state acting only to 
authorize the agreement, while in other statutes the official 
decree ordering adoption on a party's application constitutes 
the essence of the act. In the latter case, the decree may be 
granted either as an act of discretionary power or as cor-
responding to a right of the parties who have complied with 
the legal conditions of adoption. Validity and revocability of 
the transaction depend largely upon these premises. 
Finally, the state agencies intervening differ, and official 
action either precedes or follows the private agreement. 
Thus, adoption forms an exemplar of the difficulties that 
may present themselves in formulating a U;niform definition. 
As a matter of fact, the description of adoption given in the 
Restatement as a "relation of the parent and child created by 
law between persons who are not in fact parent and child," 5 
is certainly too narrow, since in a number of legislations 
parents may adopt their natural children. If taken literally, 
this definition seems also to exclude all those institutions bear-
ing the name of adoption that do not grant as respects both 
parties the full status of parent and child. Is this the real 
meaning, and, if so, is it right? 
A clear answer to these questions would facilitate the dis-
cussion of certain problems concerning succession upon death 
by and from foreign adopted children. In the midst of this 
confused discussion, a well elaborated American decision 
ventured to proclaim that "A person is either adopted or not; 
a woman is either married or not .... there is no such thing 
as a limited status of adoption." 6 This is manifest error and~ 
5 Restatement § I 42 comment a. 
8 /nreRiemann'sEstate (I927) 124 Kan. 539 at 542,545,262 Pac. I6-IS, 
confumin~ the view held in Bilderback v. Clark (1920) 106 Kan. 737 at 742, 
I 89 Pac. 977, 98o. 
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a very prejudicial one. A woman is indeed either married or 
unmarried, and, likewise, a child is legitimate or illegitimate, 
but there are adopted children of totally different kinds. It is 
of primary importance that each type should be understood 
and recognized according to its merits. 
No wonder that it is hard to know what is meant by adop-
tion in every one of the national conflicts rules. At any rate, 
the concept of adoption held in the municipal law of the forum 
is of no direct avail. Instead, a sound construction of the 
existing rules depends to some extent upon their own charac-
ter. Where a conflicts rule emerges from the patriarchal think-
ing still characteristic of most family laws and therefore 
simply refers to the law of the adopter, especially the father, 
it is logical to assume that this rule is to be applied only to 
transactions creating a rather complete parent-child relation 
and not to an act exclusively conferring a right of inheritance 
upon the child. Again, if a conflicts rule calls for the law of 
the child only, this rule may embrace those kinds of adoption 
that contemplate only quasi-familial care and education. 
Quite reasonably, a German draft of I 929 provided for the 
application of the national law of the child to govern foster 
parenthood, 7 though the primary German rule determines 
adoption according to the national law of the parent. Thus, 
the scope of conflicts rules dealing with "adoption" may vary. 
One limit, however, exists; no institution can be designated 
as adoption, unless it makes the child legitimate in relation 
to the adopting parent. An "adoption by the Nation" of 
French war orphans is, of course, not recorded in a Swiss 
register of civil status. 8 
2. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law 
American writers and the Restatement speak of the ((law 
governing adoption as a status"; 9 they probably mean the 
1 See RAAPE 601 VIII no. 4· 
8 SwissBB1. 19:z4 II, :z9 no. 15. 
o Restatement § 14:z (within "status," not "juriadiction"). Similar MINOJ. 
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law of the forum at the domicil of a party. However, in his 
treatise, Beale exclusively discusses jurisdiction for adoption. 
American and English courts, in fact, appear not to be con-
cerned with choice of law problems but only with the question 
what courts have the power to create adoptions with extra-
territorial effect. If so, common law is again in opposition to 
civil law, which sharply distinguishes between jurisdictional 
and conflicts rules and in principle applies foreign statutes. 
In the civil law countries, jurisdiction for adoption does 
not offer much of a problem, since for this purpose foreigners 
usually enjoy the "hospitality" of the courts. It is true that 
access of foreigners to the courts for the purpose of adoption 
was questioned in France/0 but it now seems assured every-
where. A number of countries, however, refrain from taking 
jurisdiction, if the homeland does not approve of it. 
The main question in these countries is concerned with 
choice of law, that is, primarily with selecting the law ap-
plicable to adoption of or by foreigners in the forum, but 
regularly the same conflicts rule suffices to determine recog-
nition of foreign adoptions. 
The difference of method between reference to a foreign 
personal law and simple application of the law of the forum 
seems fundamental. It is tempting to think that the personal 
law is more obviously to be complied with when the whole act 
is thought to be chiefly founded upon the contract of the 
parties. On the other hand, if the act of a governmental agency 
or court is the essentially constitutive part within the structure 
of adoption, the personal law of the parties may be neglected. 
However, distinctions are not so neat in actual practice. In this 
country, the personal law is never considered, although the 
civil law view emphasizing the significance of the private con-
tract of adoption has left deep traces in many statutes. 
221, 222 § ror; STUMBERG 307; Note, "Descent of Foreign Lands to Child 
Legitimated by Adoption," 36 Harv. L. Rev. (1922) 85. 
10 The controversy on which see WEiss, 2 Traite, 234 was ended by the Law 
'of June 191 19231 amending C. C. art. 345 par. r. 
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II. AnoPTION oF oR BY FoREIGNERs WITHIN THE FoRuM 
I. Law of the Forum 
(a) United States. Although the cases are known to be 
rather scarce and confused and certainly are contradictory, a 
prevailing opinion seems to be forming to the effect that two 
different grounds for assuming jurisdiction are open to elec-
tion. 
In the first place, it is agreed that a child can be adopted in 
the state of its domicil, irrespective of the domicil and residence 
of the adopting parents.11 In the second place, th,ere is in-
creasing authority for concurrent j~risdiction of the state 
where the adopting parents are domiciled. The Restatement 
does not approve of this view, except when this state has 
jurisdiction over the person having legal custody of the 
child or when the child is a waif and subject to the jurisdiction 
of the state. 12 But the consent of the natural parents or the 
guardian, wherever they may live, should suffice. 13 The few 
cases which may be looked to as authority seem to justify the 
unconditional jurisdiction of the adopter's domicil.14 
The domicil of the child as a basis of jurisdiction 15 has, 
however, been questioned. Sometimes, a mere domicil'by 
operation of law, locating the child with its natural father or 
guardian, has been held insufficient without actual residence at 
the same place.16 Moreover, actual residence, particularly if 
habitual, has been preferred to a merely formal domicil, since 
the state where the child is dwelling is believed to have more 
ability to control the person of the child and to be more 
interested in its welfare.17 In reality, neither domicil nor 
11 GooDRICH 383 § 142 n. so, 51; Restatement § 142 (a). 
12 Restatement § 142 (b); cj. 2 BEALE 713 § 142.2. 
13 LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 349 no. 341. . 
14 GooDRICH 383 § 142 n. 53· 
1$ Strictly required by 2. BEALE 713 § 142.2 and Restatement§ 142. 
16 Blanchard v. State ex rel. Wallace (1925) 30 N.Mex. 459, 238 Pac. 1004. 
17 See esp. STUMBERG 3o8ff., who invokes Stearns v. Allen (1903) 183 Mass. 
404, 407, 67 N. E. 349 (child in Massachusetts with technical domicil in Scot-
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residence, especially in large cities, guarantees that a court will 
be able to exercise effective supervision. On the other hand, 
every court, not excluding that of the adopter, will ordinarily 
be eager to safeguard the well-being of the chi1d.18 The 
modern means of communication and the social relief agencies 
facilitate obtaining information. The interest of the child's 
consanguineous family will be better cared for by the court of 
the formal domicil of the child.19 
These principles determine equally the granting of an 
adoption and the recognition of a foreign adoption. 
(b) British Law. Under the British Adoption of Children 
Act, 1926/0 an adoption order is not granted, unless the ap-
plicant is domiciled and resident in England and the infant 
is a British subject and resident in England. No provision is 
made regarding adoptions by British subjects domiciled 
abroad nor for children of foreign nationality, except that 
they are excluded from adoption proceedings in England. It 
is difficult to believe that no foreign adoption would be recog-
nized with respect to British subjects, as has been suggested.21 
The implication seems rather to be "that the domicile of the 
adopter at the time of the adoption is alone material." 22 But 
certainly hardships are caused by the tenacious reluctance of 
English courts to acknowledge that the adopter has trans-
ferred his domicil from England to a foreign country. 23 
land); Rizo v. Burruel (1921) 23 Ariz. 137, 202 Pac. 234; Taylor v. Collins 
(1927) 172 Ark. 541,289 S. W. 466. 
18 See GOODRICH 383 § 142 n. 54· 
l9 C/. the propositions as to choice of law in England by MANN, "Legitima-
tion and Adoption in Private International Law," 57 Law Q. Rev. (1941) 112, 
123 n. 44· 
20 16 & 17 Geo. V, c. 29 (1926). 
21 DICEY 535 n. u; 2 BEALE§ I4J.I. 
22 FALCONBRIDGE, "Conflict of Laws-Legitimation by Adoption or Recog-
nition," 19 Can. Bar Rev. (1941) 37, at 39· 
23 KEITH, "Some Problems in the Conflict of Laws," 16 Bell Yard (1935) 
4, 6 (a Scotchman resident but not considered "domiciled" in England cannot 
adopt the daughter of his deceased brother, even though the brother was domi-
ciled in England and the daughter is resident there) , 
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In Canada similar restrictions obtain. Indeed, a Canadian 
court has held that the adoption of a child domiciled with its 
natural parents in Alberta and adopted by order of an Alberta 
court, while the adoptive parents were domiciled in Saskatche-
wan, was invalid in the latter province. 24 Must all parties be 
domiciled in the same province? Falconbridge sees a solution 
of this strange conflict only in uniform and reciprocal legisla-
tion by the provinces grounded on the principle of the child's 
domicil. 25 But we may infer that the system of exclusive ap-
plication of the law of the forum tends to absurd results, 
notably in the case where the different jurisdictions of the 
parties do not recognize each other's decrees. In Quebec, juris-
diction is granted, if one party is domiciled there.26 
(c) Scandinavian Countries. The domicil of the adopter 
determines the state where adoption must be sought under the 
Scandinavian Convention on Family Law (art. u), which 
also decides expressly that the law of the forum is applicable 
(art. I 2). With respect to adoptions in other foreign countries, 
the law of the forum governs under the Danish adoption law 
of I 923, with certain exceptions for Danes adopting abroad 
and foreign children adopted in Denmark. 27 More considera-
tion is given to foreign law by the conflicts rules of Norway 28 
and Sweden. 29 
(d) Law of the forum governing formalities everywhere. 
It is in the nature of a state act, necessary in all countries to 
some extent to effect adoption, that all formalities required 
by the municipal law of the court (or other acting agency) 
must be observed. Also, recognition in another country de-
24 Culver v. Culver and Gammie [1933] 2 D. L. R. 5381 with reference to 
Haultain, C. J. S., in Burnfiel v. Burnfiel (Sask.) [1926] 2 D. L. R. 129. 
25 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 85 p. 171. 
26 Quebec: Adoption Act, R. s. Q. I94I, c. 324, s. s; cf. I JoHNSON 349· 
27 BORUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 221 no. 54· 
28 Law of April 2 1 1 9 I 7 as amended by laws of September 2 3, I 9 2 I 1 and May 
24, 1935, §§ 29, 30. 
25 Law of June 141 I9I7 with amendments,§§ 261 27. 
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pends on compliance with the formalities prescribed by the 
law under which the act is alleged to have been performed. 30 
Illustration: An oral adoption agreement, completely per-
formed by the adopted person and concluded within the 
state, 31 will be given effect as creating a status by a Missouri 
court of equity, but is regarded as ineffective by a Missouri 
court, if concluded in Rhode Island and invalid according to 
the laws of such state. 32 
Courts are naturally inclined to apply this principle with 
enhanced rigor when it comes to determining their own judi-
cial procedure. Under the duty of applying foreign personal 
law, conflicts arise. Thus, German courts, in the case of a Soviet 
Russian adopter, refuse to confirm the contract because under 
the Soviet law adoption is created by mere state act.33 In ap-
plying a foreign law requiring that the court examine the 
social advantages enuring to the child by the adoption, Ger-
man courts even took it for granted that they were unable to 
intervene, because under the German Civil Code the courts 
(other than the court of custody) had only to inquire into the 
fulfillment of certain legal conditions. They refused, there-
fore, to authorize adoptions by French, Rumanian, and all 
other adopters whose personal law requires a substantive in-. 
vestigation of the child's benefit by the court.34 If, however, 
a foreign personal law is to be applied at all, as prescribed by 
the German conflicts law, and jurisdiction is not doubtful, the 
30 It is sometimes asserted that the parties may constitute an adoption in any 
country according to their personal law, since the maxim loctts regit actum is 
only of optional application. But there is no proof of actual force of this as-
sumption which overlooks the significance of the administrative act. 
31 Buck v. Meyer (1916) 195 Mo. App. 287, 190 S. W. 997· 
32 Mutual Life of New York v. Benson (1940) 34 F. Supp. 859. 
33 KG. (April 7, 1933) IPRspr. 1934, no. 67; Bay. ObLG. (Oct. 3'' 1934) 
JW. 1935> II90· 
34 KG. (June 30, 1922) 42. ROLG. 188; KG. (Jan. 15, 1932.) 6 Z.ausl.PR. 
(1932) 3II, IPRspr. 1932, no. 98; KG. (March 10, 1933) IPRspr. 1933, no. 
53, and still after a fundamental change of the adoption law by a law of No-
vember 23, 1933, see decision KG. (Sept. 6, 1935) 13 Jahrb. FG. '75· This 
practice was abandoned however by KG. (Nov. 8, 1935) JW. 1936, 53· 
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procedure should be adjusted so as not to frustrate the 
purpose of the institution. 35 This cooperative attitude has been 
recommended in France.36 Remarkably, the Finnish statute 
directly provides that formalities essential under the national 
law of both parties should be observed so far as possible.37 
2. Systems of Personal Law 
(a) Law of the adopter. Still starting from the postulate 
that one sole law should govern a family, many conflicts rules 
determine the substantive requisites of adoption exclusively 
according to the personal law of the adopter.38 As, according 
to the municipal laws, a married person generally needs some 
joint action or consent of the other spouse for adopting a child, 
the situation where the spouses have different personal laws 
raises difficulties. The principle of personal law is best applied 
to this case, each spouse being distinctively subjected to his or 
her own law. 39 
In this system, the child's interests are protected just as 
well or badly as the personal law of the adopter provides. In 
the prevailing construction of the German statutory rules, for 
instance, the personal law of the adopted person is not con-
35 See RAAPE 597i RABEL, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 310. 
36 NIBOYET 776 no. 662, , 
37 Finnish Law of Dec. s, 1929, § 25. 
38 Germany: EG. art. 2 2 par. 1 (the father) • 
Poland: Law of 1926, art. 23 (the adopter); cf. SuLKOWSKI, "Conception 
du droit international prive d'apres la doctrine et la pratique en Pologne," 41 
Recueil1932 III 696ff. 
Italy: C. C. (1938) Disp. Prel. art. ro par. 2 and C. C. (1942) Disp. Prel. 
art. 20 par. 2, adding to the text of the final draft-"national law of the 
adopter"-the words: "at the time of the adoption." 
Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Dec. 21, 1926) Clunet 1928, 479 (a minor 
child of Belgian nationality adopted in France, where the prohibition in C. C. 
art. 346 of adoption of minors was abolished by a law of 1923 while it con-
tinued in Belgium). 
France: App. d'Aix {March r6, 1909) Revue 1909, i42; SURVILLE 464 no. 
3 1 6; 3 ARMIN JON 55 nos. 53, 54· 
Brazil (former law): Sup. Trib. Fed. {Jan. 16, 1940) 56 Arch. Jud. 421 
{adoption made in Brazil; Italian law applied to capacity and consent of adop-
tive parent and natural mother of Italian nationality), 
39 See RAAPE s8o, but also 589 (par. 4). 
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. sidered, unless he be a German/0 but it follows only that 
the provisions of the internal law of the forum, requiring the 
consent of the child or otherwise protecting it, are applicable. 
Illustrations: (i) Where a German adopts a Danish child, 
the contract of adoption can be made, according to § 1 7 so, 
par. I of the German Civil Code, by the child's guardian with 
authcJrization of the court. As the Danish principle of domicil 
refers to the local German law, the German court has juris-
diction. (KG. (June 7, 1929) IPRspr. I929, no. 88.) 
(ii) Adoption of a Swedish illegitimate child by a German 
depends on the consent of the illegitimate mother, according 
to § I747 of the German Civil Code, but not subject to 
authorization of the Swedish king as required by Swedish law. 
(RG. (July I I, 1929) I25 RGZ. 265, IPRspr. 1929, no. 89.) 
(b) Consideration of the child's law. In opposition to ex-
clusive control of the law of the adopter, it has been postulated 
that the law of the child should govern those requirements 
which may be established for the protection of the child's status 
against hasty or dangerous alterations. 41 This category was 
understood to include those provisions that require a certain 
age 42 or full age 43 of the adopted person, or his consent or 
that of the persons and authorities charged with his personal 
care.44 To the law of the adoptive parent are left the require-
ments concerning the adopter's age, any requisite difference in 
age between the parties, the absence of legitimate issue, or 
other interests of the family into which the adopted person is 
40 See the decision following in the text; and KG. (June 30, I 922) 42 ROLG. 
I88, I89; KG. (Oct. z9, I9z6) IPRspr. I9Z6-I9Z7, no. 8I; LG. Dresden 
(Dec. zo, I9z9) and OLG. Dresden (Feb. I8, I930) IPRspr. I93I, nos. ·9o, 
91. Contra: most writers, see RAAPE 550, 4 FRANKENSTEIN I74• 
41 This theory was prominently developed by BAR 547 § I99 and NIBOYET 
775, 776 no. 659· In different manner: BATIFFOL, I Repert. zsz nos. 3, 5; 
4 FRANKENSTEIN I7I• 
42 WEISS, 4 Traite 113. 
43 When minora could not be adopted in France, before the Law of June 19, 
I9z3, adoption abroad was considered void; see Trib. Valenciennes (infra n. 47). 
«RoLIN, z Principes I 67, I 68 nos. 634, 635; PILLET, I Traite Pratique 
65I, 65z no. 319.; Greece: C. C. (I940) art. z3 par. I; Germany: EG. art. 22 
par. z (as to German children). 
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to enter. For instance, adoption of natural children by their 
parents was forbidden by the Italian Civil Code of 1865 (art. 
205) but permitted by French practice.45 As this matter con-
cerns the adopter's family, under this principle, an Italian 
could not adopt his own illegitimate child in France. A 
Frenchman would be permitted adoption of his natural child 
in Italy, if it were not considered contrary to public policy.46 
(c) Exclusive application of the child's personal law. In 
some recent opinions, the law of the child governs exclusively 
all conditions of adoption.47 This thesis is based on the un-
warranted identification of the child's law with the law best 
securing its welfare. 
(d) Both laws cumulatively applied. Finally, in one of 
those well-known attempts to cumulate the laws where a 
choice between them seems hard, adoption is said to depend 
on all the requirements stipulated in each law of both the 
parties. 48 Such a mechanical addition results in not applying 
any one of the statutes and in impeding a transaction that all 
students of juvenile welfare wish greatly to foster. 
Consideration of the law of a foreign party is accomplished 
45 Cass. (May IJ1 I868) D.I868.I.249· 
46 2 FIORE 3Ioff. no. 76x; SURVILLE 464ff. no. 3I6. 
47 France: Trib. civ. Valenciennes (June I8, I9I4) Clunet I9I91 242 (a 
minor girl of French nationality adopted by German parents; the decision may 
have rested also upon French public policy); Cour Paris (Jan. I41 I926) Clunet 
I927, 64I. Writers limit themselves generally to the application of French 
law to French children. 
Italy: App. Milano (May 91 I91o) Clunet 19131 243. 
Egypt: Trib. Alexandria (I926 no. I84) Clunet 1928, II12 (American 
woman adopting a Greek child; Novella I 7 of Emperor Leo applied) • 
Soviet Russia: Law of January 41 1928, art. 6 (see MAKAROV 421): where 
adopting and adopted parties belong to different Soviet Republics, the consul 
shall apply the law l;)f the child, if known, otherwise the law of the adopter, or, 
last, what law the adopter demands. 
48 Austrian OGH. (April I 51 I930) Zentralblatt I93I 1 I30 no. 331 Clunet 
I932, I98. Probably of this type Japan, Law of I898, art. I9; China, Law of 
Aug. 51 I9I8, art. I4l Treaty of Montevideo on international civil law, text 
of I94o, art. 23 (difficult to understand). Advocated by BROCHER 333, DEs-
PAGNET 848, 849 no. 284;, BAR TIN in 9 Aubry et Rau § 55 5 at I 76, and n. 2; 
BAR TIN, 2 Principes § 276 at I66; DIENA, 2 Prine. I 86; CAVAGLIERI 2471 2 
ZITELMANN 8831 4 FRANKENSTEIN I7I n. 41 LEWALD 1531 contra: RAAPE 549• 
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in a much sounder way in those statutes that prohibit authori-
zation of adoptions, unless these are recognized as valid by the 
laws of both parties. 49 That is, this rule has a proper place, 
provided that recognition is granted in the foreign country in 
a broad-minded spirit without insisting on the fulfillment of 
peculiar domestic requirements. 
In the Finnish enactment, it is added that the adoptive re-
lationship, if the adopter is a foreigner, cannot be rescinded in 
Finland, except if the adopter is there domiciled and the re-
scission is recognized in his national country. 50 
(e) Special rules on the effect of adoption. In those juris-
dictions where the personal law of the adoptive father governs 
the act creating adoption, the same law of the adoptive parent 
may govern the effect of adoption 51 at any later moment, in 
the same way as a parent's law governs creation and effect of a 
legitimate parent-child relation. This means that, in the case 
of a change of personal law, later events are governed by the 
personal law of the time being. \Vhere, however, the law of 
the child is influential in the constitution of the family relation-
ship, this law is not appropriate to regulate the ensuing re-
lationship within the adoptive family. 52 Therefore, the statutes 
involved have mostly restricted the child's law to the creation 
of adoption and applied the parent's law to its effects. 53 In 
another, not more attractive, opinion advocated by Italian and 
49 Finland: Law of Dec. 5, I 929, § 24 par. 2. 
Norway: Law of April 2, I9I7 with amendments of September 23, I9ZI, and 
May 24, I935> § 29 par. I. 
Sweden: Law of June I4, 19I7 with amendments,§ 2.6 par. I. 
Switzerland: Just. Dept. June 30, 1928, 25 SJZ. 8o. 
60 Finland: Law of I929, § 24 par. 2. 
~1 See for example, Germany: EG. arts. 22. and I9; Italy: C. C. (I942.) Disp. 
Prel. art. 20 par. 2. 
62 This however has been proposed by WEISS, 4 Traite I2.6; BATIFFOL, I 
Repert. 2.55 no. 2.3. 
63 Japan: Law of I898, art. I9 par. 2; China: Law of I9I8, art. I4 par. 2; 
Finland: Law of 1929, § 26; France: 6 LAURENT 77 no. 39; SURVILLE 464ff. 
no. 316; PrLLJ!:T, 1 Traite Pratique 6sz no. 320. Poland: Law of 1926, art. 
I9 par. 2, and Greece: C. C. (1940) art. 23 par. 2, extend their reference to 
the last common nationality to the effects of adoption. 
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French writers, the law of the child governs the child's posi-
tion in its natural family, including reciprocal inheritance 
rights, while the adoptive relationship is determined by the 
parent's law. 54 Pillet has, in despair, suggested that the judge 
be allowed free choice of law. 55 
III. REcoGNITION oF FoREIGN AooPTION 
I. Conditions of Recognition 
The above described English and American jurisdictional 
rules seem to imply that a foreign adoption will be recognized, 
if the jurisdiction assumed by the foreign state is based either 
on the adopter's domicil or, in the American view, on the 
domicil of the child. It is true that, not even among the sister 
states, does this principle appear clearly settled. The Supreme 
Court of the United States has had occasion to proclaim that 
the Federal Constitution did not oblige a state to recognize 
legitimations and adoptions made in another state. 56 The 
underlying doubts are connected, however, with the specific 
effect of adoption upon inheritance rather than with the 
principles of recognition. It seems that there is no serious ques-
tion respecting recognition in general. 
Whether in addition to the two grounds for jurisdiction 
mentioned above, adoptions occurring in the national state of 
the adopter are to be recognized, may be questioned. There 
is no compelling reason for recognition, for instance, where an 
American child resident in the United States is adopted in a 
54 2 FIORE 296, 297,298 no. 752; DESPAGNET 850 no. 286; VALERY 1153 
no. 814; NIBOYET 778 no. 665. This solution has been reproduced in Codigo 
Bustamante art. 74 with the modification that the adopter's law governs "in so 
far as his estate is concerned," and that of the adopted person "in respect to the 
name, the rights and duties which he retains regarding his natural family, as 
well as to his own estate in regard to the adopting person," while the right to 
maintenance is left to public policy (art. 7 6) • 
Contra: see RAAPE 594· . 
55 PILLET, Principes 324 no. 154, renouncing any rule. 
56Hoodv.McGehee (1915) 237U.S.6u. 
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German court 117 pursuant to German law by a German domi-
ciled and resident in the United States. 58 
Exclusive jurisdiction is claimed over nationals by the fre-
quently cited Austrian and Hungarian traditions 59 and by the 
Scandinavian states. Swedes and Norwegians cannot be adopted 
abroad without permission of the king. 6° Finns need the per-
mission of their Minister of Justice.61 Otli.er states generally 
reserve judicial activity in status matters of nationals to their 
own tribunals. France and Belgium require that nationals 
should seek supplementary authorization at their home 
court. 62 Italy subjects recognition even to the procedure of 
exequatur.63 Recently the National Socialist innovations in 
German adoption law have inspired the view that a foreign 
adoption of a German always needs confirmation by a German 
court in order to have effect in that country.64 
Opposition of public policy to foreign adoptions has formed 
a natural problem in countries in which no form of adoption 
has been instituted. In England, which until recently be-
longed in this category, no case has occurred, but Dicey pro-
nounced his decided opposition to the recognition of any 
foreign adoption and impressed Beale and the American Re-
statement with this theory. This il).fiuence, together with the 
common law tradition, repugnant to adoption, was strong 
enough to prevent recognition of an American adoption in 
Canada even after the Canadian reform laws, on the ground 
~7 § 66 par. 2 of the German Law on Voluntary Jurisdiction. 
~ KIPP, in KIPP-WOLFF, Familienrecht § 99 n. I :z. 
59 Austria: supra p. 398; Hungary: ScHWARTZ, 41 Z.int.R. (1929) 107 at 
182. · 
60 Sweden: Law on Adoption of June 14, 1917 with amendments, §26 par. 
:1.; Norway: Law on Adoption of April 2, I 9 1 7 as amended by laws of Sept. 2 3, 
1921, and May 24, 1935, § 29 par. 2. 
61 Finland: Law of 1929, § 24 par. 1 sentence 2. 
62 RoLIN, 2 Principes 171 no. 63 71 Novelles Belges, 2 D. Civ. 659 no. 149. 
63 Cass. civ. (June 24, 1932) Monitore 1932, 929, Clunet 1933, 454; cf. 
App. Genova (Dec. x6, 1932) Monitore 1933, 225. 
Contra for France, WEiss, 4 Traite 130. 
64-RAA.PE, 2 D. IPR. :uo. 
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that this legislation had no retroactive effect. 65 The court, 
using this argument, over looked that not the reform law but 
the strength of the present public policy was in question. In 
the Netherlands, foreign adoptions seem to be recognized 
when the national laws of both parties permit it, but naturally 
not when one party is of Dutch nationality.88 
Remarkably, the opposite liberal view has been taken in 
Portugal, 67 Argentina, 68 and Guatemala. 69 
In countries with adoption, the domestic law is frequently 
applied to a foreign adoption to which a subject of the forum 
is a party, at least insofar as it is thought that this individual 
must be protected. In France and in Latin countries, 70 public 
policy is invoked in such cases for almost all internal condi-
tions of adoption as being of "international public order." 
Adoption between foreigners in their own national states 
should be and is regularly recognized without any such limita-
tions. 71 But a French decision was concerned with the follow-
ing case: A Russian married couple, the husband forty-nine, 
the wife forty-five years old, adopted in I 9 I 2 in Russia a child 
of twelve years. The transaction was perfectly valid under 
Russian law; it would not have been allowed under article 
343 of the French code, as it stood at that time, requiring a 
fifty-year age of the adopter and full age of the adopted per-
65 Burnfiel v. Burnfiel [I 9z6] z D• L. R. u9; Haultain, C. ]. S., in this 
strange decision acknowledged that the case was absolutely similar to that con-
trarily decided in In re Throssel [I9Io] u W. L. R. 683. In both cases the 
adoption had been made by decree in Iowa. 
66 VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 635 no. Z03· 
67 See Sup. Trib. Lisbonne (May IS, I934) Nouv. Revue I935> 4z4; supra 
pp. I 77-I 78. 
68 See z V1co uS, no. 17z. 
69 MATOS 394 no. Z77· 
7° France: Trib. civ. Valenciennes (June 18, 19I4) Clunet 1919, z4z. Italy: 
App. Palermo (June u, 1931) Z4 Rivista (193z) 563, Clunet 1933, 1091. 
VALERY II51 no. 8u. 
71 Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. zz 1 no. 56. 
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (April 7, 19zo) W. I06Jz (child of for-
eign nationality born in the Netherlands). 
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son. Instead of simply recognizing the foreign act, the court 
of Paris declared it effective only because in the meantime the 
' French provision had been changed so as to require forty years 
of the adopter and fifteen years of age difference. 72 The im-
plied claim to control an entirely foreign act by the municipal 
law of the forum is absurd. 
2. Effects of Recognition 
Where no obstacle arises from jurisdictional considera-
tions or public policy of the forum, it may yet be dubious to 
what extent the foreign created adoption is effective at the 
forum. The only consistent solution of this question is given 
in such statutes as that of Quebec: 
"A person resident outside of the Province who has been 
adopted according to the laws of the United Kingdom or any 
part of the British possessions other than the Province of 
Quebec or of any foreign country, shall possess in this Pro-
vince the same rights of succession that he would have had 
in the said United Kingdom or part of the British possessions 
or in the said foreign country in which he was adopted." 73 
The French-Belgian doctrine has always supported the 
clear principle that the effect of adoption is governed by the 
applicable foreign law. 74 
The Swiss Federal Tribunal in a quite recent case has left 
no doubt on the application of the Swiss intestate portion for 
legitimate children (including adopted children), to a girl 
adopted in Moscow in 1912. It expressly states that her adop-
tion had taken place according to the then Russian law "not 
72 Cour Paris (Jan. :z., 1936) Gaz.Pal.x936.1.55I, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 159 
no. 83, criticized by BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 42.7, but apparently approved 
by CosTE-FLORET, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. x6o. 
73 Quebec: 14 Geo. V, c. 75 s. 14 (192.4) as amended by 25-26 Geo. V, c. 
67 s. 2. (1935), R, s. 1941, c. 324 s. :u. 
Similar, Alberta, Infants Act, 1913 (:z.), c. 13, s. 33, and Domestic Relations 
Act. R. S. A. 1942., c. 3 oo, s. 49; unification proposed by 1 JOHNSON 3 53. 
14 WEISS, 4 Traite 118; 6 LAURENT 7 5 no. 3 7; ROLIN, 2 Principes 172 no. 
638. ' 
ADOPTION 
only as a so-called contractual adoption without inheritance 
right, but as a fully operating one conferring rights equal to 
those of a legitimate child." 75 
Indeed, foreign adoptions should be recognized, if at all, 
to exactly the extent to which they have been created as 
measured by the entire legislation of the state of adoption; 
they should not be given either more or less effect. One would 
think that in th~ United States the same solution must 
smoothly flow from the recognition of adoption orders ren-
dered by the domiciliary court either of the parent or the 
child, but things have taken another course. The question has 
been much discussed in this country and recently also a little 
in German literature. 
Before entering into the main subject of the controversy 
regarding inheritance rights, it may be permissible to indicate 
the points where disturbances seem to have set in. 
(a) General attention has been devoted to the problems of 
recognition arising in the succession upon death to the adopted 
parents or sometimes to the adopted child, or to property of 
the natural parents. It should be noticed, however, that stat-
utes on adoption differ widely also on other points such as ali-
mentary support quoad the child's consanguineous family, the 
paternal power of the natural father, the name of the child, 
et cetera. In the United States, many statutes terminate the 
effects of the natural parent-child relation in the case of adop-
tion, while others make it "exceedingly difficult to find in 
the legislative pronouncements any intent to work a complete 
severance of parental relationship and substitution of 
parent." 76 
Again, the effect of adoption between the adoptive parties 
seems reduced in South Carolina to property rights,77 and 
75 BG. (Oct. :u, 1943) 69 BGE. II 357, 363. 
76 4 VERNIER § 261 at 406; cf. Suppl. I 27ff. 
77 South Carolina: Code of Laws 1942, C. C.§ 8679. 
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courts in Mississippi may limit the right of the adopted child 
to certain benefits. 78 
If we face this broad field, recognition of the foreign act 
with its proper effects appears to be the only suitable maxim. 
Certain countries, of course, headed by France, will indulge 
in large exceptions, also in this respect, on the ground of pub-
lic policy. 79 
(b) The reluctance of the Dutch and English jurists in 
earlier periods to conceive an extraterritorial effect of judicial 
acts and to acknowledge a "status unknown to the forum," as 
we have seen, finally resulted in the similarity doctrine, ex-
pressed by the Restatement in§ 143: 
"The status of adoption, created by the law of a state having 
jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in an-
other state as is given by the latter state to the status of 
adoption when created by its own law." 80 
The foregoing section probably was exclusively influenced by 
consideration of inheritance problems. Another section,§ 305, 
expresses a second time the same idea in application to distri-
bution; the adopted person shall be treated "as if he. were a 
natural-born legitimate child of his adoptive parent if the 
law that regulates distribution gives such effect to adoption." 
Even in limitation to the problems of distribution, it is amaz-
ing, not only that no foreign adoption should be recognized 
in a country not knowing adoption, but also that every foreign 
adoption of whatever extent should be treated like a full 
adoption, if the law governing inheritance does so with respect 
to adoptions performed within the state. 81 This unexpected 
78 Miss.: Code Ann. (I942) § 1269, cf. 4 VERNIER§ z6I at 406. 
79 Cf., for instance, on aliments: WEiss, 4 Traite I zo; BATIFFOL, I Repert. 
2.56 no. 2.5; prohibition to marry (C. C. art. 354): z FIORE 39 no. 539; BATIF-
FOL, I Repert. zs6 no. z6; on C. C. arts. 343-346 (before reform): VALERY 
II5I no. 812; BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. I937, 427. 
80 2 BEALE § I43·I classifies, correspondingly, the cases along the distinction 
whether or not the adopted foreign child is treated like a child adopted at the 
forum. 
81 See the critical analysis by YNTEMA, "The Restatement of the Law of Con-
flict of Laws," 36 Col. L. Rev. (I936) 2.12. 
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dogma has certainly not found favor with American courts, but 
it does contribute to obscure the picture. It has caused, at 
least, more readiness to recognize an adoption similar to the 
domestic type than a ~issimilar one, which is an unfortunate 
starting point. 
Certain Canadian statutes avoid enlarging the rights created 
by foreign adoption, but they share the main rule of the Re-
statement. For instance, the Ontario statute provides that: 
"A person ... adopted in accordance with the laws of the 
province where he is domiciled, shall be entitled to the same 
rights of succession as to property in Ontario as he would have 
had in the province in which he was adopted but not exceeding 
the right he would have had if adopted under this Act." 82 
(c) Faced with their usual topic, viz., the share to which 
foreign adopted children are. entitled in a succession, American 
courts have decided from case to case, as results seemed war-
ranted by the circumstances, although in some instances they 
have been influenced by the formalistic arguments frequent 
in English and Canadian courts. Unfortunately, a theoretical 
point has been introduced. The courts and their annotators usu-
ally distinguish whether a right to inherit by or from an 
adopted person has been established by the state where the 
adoption has been performed and, if so, whether the statute 
giving the right is an adoption statute or an inheritance statute. 
To illustrate, it has been said in a remarkably explicit note that, 
if the right of inheritance has been limited in the state of 
adoption, the restriction may be imposed either upon the status 
or upon the right to succession. The first is to be presumed, if 
the child, by the statute of the state of adoption, has been 
granted the full position of a natural child in relation to the 
82 Ontario {I917) I7 Geo. V, c. 53 s. I31 re-enacted R. S. 0, I9371 c. 1I8 s. I3. 
Similar, British Columbia, Adoption Act. R.S.B.C. I936, c. 6 s. II; Prince-
Edward Island, Adoption Act, I9 3 o, c. I 2. s. I 5 and Children's Act {I 940) c. u, 
8, U4o 
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adopter, but not to his collateral relatives; this limitation, then, 
has to be recognized in the state of inheritance. Where, how-
ever, adopted children are placed in second rank, to favor 
the legitimate issue primarily entitled, the limitation con-
cerns the hereditary right. 83 
It is submitted that the courts are facing an impossible task 
with this method. It suffices to observe what distinctions, 
verbal interpretations, and inferences a modern author has felt 
obligated to propose, "in order to decide whether a right as-
serted by a claimant should be treated as one which flows from 
status, if at all, or as one which is given irrespective of the exist-
ence or non-existence of ·status." 84 More appropriately, it 
has been repeatedly asserted that statutes of adoption and stat-
utes of inheritance of the same state must be read together. 
In fact, the entire effect of adoption is either defined at one 
. place in the laws, namely, in the chapter on adoption, or has 
to be deduced from both categories of statutory provisions 
taken together. Usually, there is neither any legislative in-
tention nor any sound reason for presuming by interpretation, 
that one group of provisions should govern only domestic 
adoptions and the other foreign adoptions, or that one group 
should prevail in the domestic courts only and the other have 
extraterritorial effect. Nor is it the task of these internal pro-
visions to make such distinctions. It is up to the law of conflicts 
to find the solution. As has been contended above, the entire 
legislation of the state of adoption defines the effects to be 
recognized. 
(d) Two practical considerations may guide us. On the one 
hand, it is inadmissible that an adopter could change the effect 
of an adoption by changing his domicil. He would be able to 
do just that, if the statute of distribution at his last domicil 
83 L. R. A. 1916 A 668; similar for legitimation 73 A. L. R. 958. 
84 TAINTOR,1 "Legitimation, Legitimacy and Recognition ill the Conflict of 
Laws," 18 Can. Bar Rev, (1940) 589, 691, at 703. RAAPE 592. attempts 
similar distinctions. 
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were given predominance in construing the previously made 
adoption. On the other hand, an adopter who has not by the 
adoption created inheritance rights is free to maintain the 
effects of the transaction or to supplement them by gift or by 
will, so far as the statute of distributions allows him. It is no 
natural task of conflicts law to demolish these results of 
private law. 
3· Effect on Inheritance Rights in Particular 
In order to distinguish the scope of the conflicts rule on 
adoption from those concerning succession upon death, it is 
justly said that the law governing succession determines 
whether adopted children as a class are competent to succeed, 
and the law governing the creation of adoption determines 
whether a certain person is an adopted child.85 This, however, 
does not answer all questions. 
(a) Construction of language. Where a testator has de-
vised or bequeathed property to his or other people's "chil-
dren" or "issue," it was argued, especially in Canadian cases, 
that children or issue born in wedlock are meant. This was 
contended even after the introduction of adoption into the 
legislation, at least in construing older wills. 86 The traditional 
opposition of the common law to adoption was still effective, 
though in British Columbia the contrary opinion was followed 
even where a will used the term "heirs." 87 It may now be 
assumed that the intention underlying a will or deed is to be 
85 See for instance GooDRICH, "Legitimation and Adoption in the Conflict of 
Laws," zz Mich. L. Rev. (19z4) 637 and Handbook 384 ff.; LoRENZEN, 6 
Repert. 349 no. 34z; Notes, L. R. A. 1916 A 666 and 65 L. R. A, 186. 
Germany: RAAPE 591 H. and RAAPE, "Les rapports juridiques entre parents 
et enfants," so Recueil1934 IV 401, so8 no. 81. 
86 Supreme Court of Canada: Donald, Baldwin & Mooney [19z9] z D. L. R. 
Z44 (Washington adoption). 
Qntario Supreme Court: Re Skinner (19z9) 64 0. L. R. 245, [1929] 4 D. L. 
R. 427 (Ohio adoption). See FALCONBRIDGE, Cases on the Conflict of Laws (ed. 
4> 1938) 170. 
87 In re McGillivray, Purcell v. Hendricks [1925] 3D. L. R. 854. 
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construed according to the mere factual circumstances, and 
statutes are not to be deemed any longer to demand legitimate 
birth or blood relationship. 
(b) Major rights acquired by foreign act.88 A group of 
cases is characterized by larger rights granted in the state of 
adoption than in the state of distribution. In particular, the 
statute applicable. to the succession may be wholly ignorant of 
the kind of adoption accomplished abroad. We have to distin-
guish as follows: 
(i) Law of situs of immovables. A social and ethical back-
ground such as lay behind the famous Statute of Merton (A.D. 
1236) 89 and still continued at the time of the English case 
of Birtwhistle v. Vardill (A.D. I 840) 90 may well have re-
quired birth in lawful wedlock as the sole title to succession to 
land. This conception, however, seems finally to have lost 
its hold in the English land law. But it survives strangely in 
the Alabama courts,91 while in Florida foreign adopted chil-
dren are excluded unless they become citizens of the state. 92 
The Supreme Court of Mississippi overruled its former ac-
ceptance of this conception in I 9 I 7 with the express denial of a 
public policy preventing the adopted child from inheriting. 93 
Surprisingly in one decision, the French Court of Cassation also 
applied the law of the situs rather than that governing adop-
tion, as a pretext for sticking to French law. 9' 
88 See YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 358 sub (C). 
89 20 Henry III, c. 9 (u36). 
90 7 Cl. and F. 895. 
11 Brown v. Finley (x9o8) 157 Ala. 424, 47 So. 577; cf. on legitimation 
the Lingen case (x871) 45 Ala. 410, supra p. 5851 n. 157· 
9ZTankersley v. Davis (1937) u8 Fla. 507, 175 So. sox. 
93 Brewer v. Browning (1917) II5 Miss. 3581 76 So. 267, overruling 
Fisher v. Browning (1914) 107 Miss. 729, 66 So. 132. 
94 Cass. (req.) (April 21, 1931) D.19JI.x.sz, S.I9JI.I.J77> Clunet 1932, 
142, Revue 1932· j26; Contra: BAR TIN, "Adoption et transmission hereditaire," 
Clunet 1932, 5; NrBOYET, Decision note, Revue 1932, 541, Favorable to the 
decision, however, WENGLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 167 n. 1; LEWALD, Regles 
generales des conB.its de lois ( x 941) 1 3 7. 
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(ii) Local policy. Apart from such peculiar prohibitive 
policy claimed for the laws of succession and leaving aside the 
bulk of the cases, which offer no problem because both states 
involved grant similar positions to adopted children, 95 there. 
is authority denying that local policy should normally inter-
vene.96 
This view was applied to the problem of inheritance from 
natural parents. In Slattery v. The Hartford Connecticut 
Trust Company,91 an individual adopted in Michigan claimed 
his share in his natural father's estate and was successful in 
Connecticut. The statute of Michigan maintains, that of Con-
necticut terminates, the right of inheritance of an adoptee 
from his native parents. The Supreme Court of Errors of 
Connecticut held that, as the right of inheritance of the child 
was not lost by the statute of Michigan, he could claim it; the 
legislature of Connecticut debarring a child from such a right 
"has not attempted to lay down any rule applicable in the 
case of children coming here from another state where they 
have been adopted under laws which do not take away that 
right." 98 This argument is equivalent to saying, as we did, 
that the extension of the inheritance rule to foreign cases with 
foreign elements is up to the conflicts rule, and that, under 
this rule, adoptions made in the domiciliary state must be 
recognized with their own effects. The restriction imposed on 
the statute by this conception is not only equitable and justified 
by the anomalous structure of the Connecticut type of adop-
tion, 99 but consistent with the advisable general postulates. 
95 See YNTEMA, z Giur. Comp. DIP. 357 sub (A). 
96 For this opinion also FALCONBRIDGE, 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. no. 85 p. 171. 
In re Finkenzeller's Estate (1929) 105 N.J. Eq. 44, 146 Atl. 656; Keegan v. 
Geraghty (1881) 101 Ill. z6. 
97 Slattery v. The Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. (1932) 115 Conn. 163, 
161 Atl. 79, commented by YNTEMA and DE NovA in 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 
352 ff. no. 169. 
95 There follow excellent explanations why public policy is not contrary to 
recognizing such a provision "dissimilar" to the domestic regulation. 
99 See YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 359, against criticism of the decision in 
81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1932) zq. 
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The case demonstrates with particular clarity the necessity of 
protecting by adequate conflicts rules those legal effects which 
the parties to a transaction were entitled to foresee. 
Yet the contrary view was recently taken by the Superior 
Court of Pennsylvania 100 refusing intestate succession to 
grandchildren from their natural grandmother through their 
mother adopted by unrelated persons in Ohio. The Court 
construed section I 6 (b) of the intestate statute of Pennsyl-
vania, excluding adopted children from taking from or 
through their natural parents, to the effect of including all 
foreign adopted children and their issue. This thesis is not 
justified by the argument that "to hold otherwise would 
create a power in another state to limit and nullify the author-
ity of this state to determine for itself how property shall 
descend on intestacy." The intention of the Pennsylvania 
statute cannot be changed by another state, but why should a 
statute intend implicitly to exclude foreign adopted children 
whose adoption did not abolish their status in their natural 
families where it was done? The only sound method is to leave 
the application of the intestate statute to the conflicts rule 
which should not be dubious. 
The climax, so to speak, of incomity seems reached by Frey 
v. Nielson/01 where an inheritance statute of New Jersey 
admitting adopted children was construed to be restricted to 
children adopted in New Jersey. Also, in the Netherlands, 
where a foreign party has acquired Dutch nationality, a former 
adoption of or by this party will not be recognized.102 This 
refusal, however, is not ascribed to the Dutch statute of distri-
bution; it denies the entire family law relationship by adop-
tion and is based on public policy regarding Dutch nationals. 
100 In re Crossley's Estate (1939) 135 Pa. Super. Ct. p4, 7 Atl. (zd) 539J 
noted Z4 Minn. L. Rev. (1940) z68. 
101 Freyv.Nielson (1916) 99 N.J. Eq. 135,131 Atl. 765; the Note, "Conflict 
of Laws-Inheritance by Adopted Child," zs Mich. L. Rev. (19z6) 189 is un-
critical. 
102 VAN HASSELT, 6 Repert. 636 no. Z03• 
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Another outstanding case, Brown v. Finley,108 has been 
sharply criticized by European writers.104 The Alabama court 
refused a right of distribution to a person adopted in Georgia, 
because the adoption had not been registered at the probate 
court as required in Alabama, though not in Georgia. The 
refusal has been called a denial of international private law. 
(c) Major rights granted by the statute of distribution. 
Where inheritance rights are conferred by the law of succession 
and denied by the law presiding over adoption, in a logical 
solu~ion the original effect of the act cannot be enlarged by the 
law of another state. This some American cases state.105 
Opposition, in part, is based again on the formal argument 
that a foreign statute depriving an adopted child of inherit-
ance is a statute of distribution and as such not susceptible of 
extraterritorial application.106 There is no proof for that as-
sumption, and the result comes as a startling surprise to the 
parties. Where an English woman has adopted an English 
child in England, all parties, at least their solicitors, have 
understood that no right upon death was implied; why should 
the legal situation be reversed by the woman's moving to New 
Hampshire and dying ~here? 107 
Some decisions, however, are based on quite different con-
siderations that :flow from a sound policy. The statute of 
103 Brown v. Finley (I9o8) I 57 Ala. 4241 47 So. 5771 reproduced in 22 
Z.int.R. (I9I'2) I64. 
104 LEWALD, "Question de droit international des successions," 9 Recueil I925 
IV 7 5 n. 3; RAAPE, "Les rapports juridiques entre parents et enfants," so Re-
cueil I934 IV 509 n. I. 
105 Estate of Sunderland (I882) 6o Iowa 7321 13 N. W. 665; Meader v. 
Archer (I889) 65 N.H. 2I4; Shaver v. Nash (I93o) I8I Ark. 1112, 29 S. W. 
(zd) 298; Shick v. Howe (I9o8) I37 Iowa 249, II4 N. W. 9I6; Ross. v. Ross 
(I878) 129 Mass. 243 1 37 Am. Rep. 321; Boaz v. Swinney (I909) 79 Kan. 
332,99 Pac. 6zi, overruled in In re Riemann's Estate (I927) 124 Kan. 539, 
262 Pac. I6, infra n. II o. 
See Note, 73 A. L. R. 96I 1 97 3; YNTEMA, 2 Giur. Comp. DIP. 35 7; WENGLER, 
8 Z.ausl.PR. (I934) I63 n. 2. 
I06 This argument is invoked by STUMBERG1 3I o; also RAAPE, so Recueil 
I934• IV 509 no. 82. 
107 Thus far of the same opinion RAAPE, so Recueili9341 IV, 5II no. 85. 
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distribution may allow a share to all children, inclusive of 
illegitimates, so as to eliminate any discrimination among 
children.108 Furthermore, courts have resorted to a permissive 
public policy in cases in which adoptive children were a 
class of persons entitled in the forum; explanation of the 
child's unfavorable treatment by the statute creating adoption 
is found in an antiquated prejudice against bastards.109 Thus, 
in In re Riemann's Estate, the Illinois statutory provision, 
denying the child's relationship with the relatives of the 
adopter, was considered a "peculiar discrimination," repugnant 
to the "generous spirit" underlying the law of Kansas.110 In 
Pfeifer v. Wright,111 the progressive view was expressly di-
rected against the tradition extending from the Statute of 
Merton to such cases as Keegan v. Geraghty and Frey v. Niel-
son. 
But public policy should not be overdone. The Mississippi 
court says poignantly: 
"It would be unjust to both parent and child, to hold that 
the mere fact of moving to another state would upset and un-
settle this relationship. It is of the utmost importance that the 
status of this character should be maintained so far as it is 
possible. . . ." 112 
108 In re Crowell's Estate (1924) 124 Me. 71, 126 Atl. 178 (an "adoption 
into the family" in Nova Scotia had no legal significance in this province, but 
fulfilled the conditions for inheritance in Maine). 
109 Anderson v. French (1915) 77 N.H. 509, 93 Atl. 1042 (estate of adop-
ter); Calhoun v. Bryant (1911) 28 S. D. 2661 133 N. W. 266 (estate of 
adoptive child) . 
110 In re Riemann's Estate (1927) 124 Kan. 539, 262 Pac. 16, 
111 Pfeifer v. Wright (1930) 41 F. (zd) 464. 
112 Brewer v. Browning (1917) 115 Miss. 358 at 369, 76 So. 2671 overruling 
Fisher v. Browning, supra n. 93· 
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municipal laws, 632-635. 
public policy, 64-6-64-8. 
unknown to the forum, I 76-178, 
64-6-64-7· 
Adultery (Remarriage), 2 7o-2 7 I. 
Ago, 57· 
Alcorta, I 7. 
Alimony, 324--326, 525-529, 
6o3-60.f.,62I-622,628-629. 
Americans Abroad 
breach of promise, 202-203. 
consular marriages, 238. 
divorce, 4-06,4-37, 4-4-7-44-9• 4-50, 
4-72-4-73, 4-77, 492,n . .f.O, 
495,n.Ip, 512-5I3. 
domicil, I H· 
full age, I.f-7, 193· 
marital property, 3.f.I,n.35, 34-2, 
352-353, 359,n.IZ2, 362, 
372. 
· marriage, 220,n.77, 263. 
parental rights, 607. 
renvoi, general concept, 1 29, 
IH-135, 263. 
Anknupfungspunkt, 4-3· 
Annulment of Marriage, 53 5-5 5 I. 
Antonescu, 1 7· · 
Anzilotti, 16, 17, 62, 72. 
Apatrides, 122-IZ.f.. 
Aprioristic Theories, 9, 68. 
Arbitration 
· Geneva Conventions, 35· See 
also Table of Statutes sub Con-
ventions. 
Argentina 
domiciliary principle, .f.OD-.f-02, 
4-2 5- 426, 448. 
foreign legitimation by state act, 
589. 
marital property, 34-0, 34-6, 34-8, 
351, 356. 
marriage requirements, 24-7. 
prohibition of divorce, 222,n. I 68, 
406, 4-26-4-27> 431, 4-32,-
n.I78, 4-80, 4-98-4-99. 
d'Argentre, 14-, 15, 61. 
Arminjon,. 14-, 15. 
Asser, I 7. 
Austria 
capacity of Austrian abroad, I 1 6-
117. 
foreign divorce, 497, 509-510. 
foreign marriage of Austrians, 
117, 283. 
Austrian Draft 
of 1913 of an international pri-
vate law, 26. 
Authorization of Domicil 
France, 77,n.30, J • .p. 
Autonomy 
of the parties, 83. 
Babinski, 23. 
Balladore-Pallieri, z 3· 
Bar, 8, 18. 
Barbey, 24. 





Beale, I2-I4, 6I, 62. 
Beauffremont Case, 507. 
Beck, I9. 
Beckett, 2 3. 
Belgium 
literature, ],n.II, J4.;n.36. 
Beseler, I 8. 
Bevilaqua, I 7. 
Bigamy, 502. 
Bills of Exchange 
capacity to make binding, I 8?-
I88. See also Capacity. 
Birth 
beginning of personality, legal 
status, I63-I64. 
Bohlau, Helene, Case, 49I,n.IJ4.. 
Bohm, I8. 
Brazil 
foreign divorce, 496-497, SOI, 
52Q-52I. 
marital property, 348, 361. 
marital relations, 305-307. 
marriage requirements, 249· 
nationality law, I 3 7. 
renvoi, So. 
separation, 435· 
Brocher, I 8. 
Burge, I2. 
Bustamante, I], 32. 
Calandrelli, I 7. 
Capacity 
general concept, what law gov-
erns, 94, I79-I96. 
classification, I 79-I 8 2. 
infants, I]2-I74· 
special, I62-I63. 
to carry on business, I 7 I, 3 I6. 
to contract, I87-188, 3I4. 
to have rights and duties, I02, 
I6I-I62, 3IS. 
to have "standing in court", I62, 
I 8 I. 
to marry, 243· 
Case Law 
national and international signif-
icance, 38-39. 
Cavaglieri, 16 •. 
Change of Legislation 
effect on marital relations, 354-
364. 
Change of Personal Law, I47-I49, 
354-364,449-458,sos,s62~ 
564, 574· See also Status; 
Domicil. 
Characterization. See also Classi-
fication. 
general concept, 44, 45· 
adoption, 634, 648-658. 
capacity of married women, 3 I I-
3 I4. 
claims for support, 53. 
community property, 373-374· 
connecting factors, 60. 
domicil, I42-I47· 
domicil by operation of law,. I 4 I,-
n.I59, 3IO, 6os-6o6. 
engagement to marry, 20I-204· 
formalities of marriage, 208-2 IO. 
inheritance, 374-384, 59I-592, 
648-658. 
legitimation, 59I-592. 
marital property law, 333-334, 
342, 374-382. 
marriage settlements, 364. 
mutability of marital law, 36I-
362. 
parental consent, 209, 266-268. 
primary and secondary, 65. 
religious marriage rites, 2 I 4-2 I 6. 
statute of frauds, so-s2. 




Children. See also Divorce; Par-
ent and Child. 
action for contesting paternity, 
567, 6os. 
action for declaration of paternity, 
6I4. 




exceptio plurium, 6 1 6-6 2 1. 
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Children (continued) 
illegitimate, 6Io-63 I. 
father and child, 6I 3-628. 
father and mother, 628-629. 
mother and child, 6I0-6I2. 
intere~t, 559> 562. 
legitimate, 55 7. 
nationality, 6I8-6I9, 622. 
of invalid marriage; 568-570. 
personal law, 559> 56I-562, 575-
577> 594> 6I I, 642-644• 
presumptions as to conception, 
566, 621. 
recognition, 612-6 I 3, 624-628. 
support, 603-604, 621-622. 
Chile 
capacity, I I 7. 
foreign divorce, 499-500. 
substantive requirements for mar-
riage, 248. 
China 
conflicts law, origin, 26. 
Choice of Law by the Parties, 8 3-8 7. 
Civil Procedure. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
Hague Convention of July I 7, 
1905, 31. 
Classification. See also Character-
ization. 
concept, 44-45. 
adoption and inheritance, 648-
658. 
alimony and torts, 628-629. 
capacity, I 7<J-I8o. 
community property, 373-374. 
legitimation and inheritance, 
591-592. 
marital and tort laws, 322. 
marital law and inheritance, 374-
382. 
marriage settlements, 364. 
married women's capacity, 3 I I-
314-· 
parental relations and torts, 6o6. 
recognition and inheritance, 627. 
relations of illegitimate children, 
613-616. 
Clunet, 15. 
Codifications of Conflicts Law, 26-
28. See also Table of Statutes. 
C6digo Bustamante, 32-33, 37-38. 
See also Table of Statutes. 
"on personal law," 1 I 5· 
Collusion, 397, 47 5· 
Colonies 
marriage, 2 I 9· 
Comitas Gentium, 6I-63. See also 
Territorialism. 
Commercial Acts, Capacity for, I 72. 
Commercial N arne, 170. 
Common Law Marriage, 2 I o, 2 I 9, 
223-224· 
Community Property Systems, 332-
333, 336, 339> 357> 362. 
composition, 373-374. 
Comparative Method, I I, s8-S9· 
Composite National Laws 
differentsystems, I24-137· 





interpretation, 44, 47-60. 
parts and structure, 42-67. 




action for restitution of, 307-309. 
Connecting Factor, 43· 
Consent by Husband. See Married 
Women. · · 
Consent to Marriage, 265. 
of parents, 266-269, 598. 
Consular Marriages, 22o-222, 236-
240. See also Americans 
Abroad. 
Contact, 43· 
Contracts, Types of, 93· 
Contrat de Mariage, 294-· 
Conventions, 29-36. See also Table 
of Statutes. 
Cook, Walter Wheeler, I3, 20, 23, 




Customary Law, 38-.. p. 
Czechoslovakia. See also Table of 
Statutes. 
drafts of I924 and I.93I, 27. 
Damages for Breach of Promise, zoo. 
Darras, I 5· 
DarJis Case, 469, 5I3, 5I5. 
Death 
in common disaster, legal pre· 
sumption, I67-I68. 
legalpresumption, I64-I67. See 
also Absentees. 
Declaration of Death 
bythecourts, I64-I67, I76. 
restricted to domestic assets, I 6 5. 
Deductive Methods, 68. 
Defective Formalities, 23o-23I. 
marriage celebration, 2 29-2 3 I. 
Delibazione, 474· 
Denmark. See also Table of Statutes. 
domicil, concept, I 39· 
marriage formalities, substantive 
requirements, 249, 2 56. 
·renvoi, 79· 
Depe(age, 93· 
Deserters. See also Marriage, in-
trinsic requirements. 
ability · to procure marriage li-
censes, 28 I. 
Despagnet, 48 
Dicey, I I, 23, 61. 
Diena, I6. 
Directive Marriage Requirements, 
288. 
Dispensation to Marry, 276, 286. 
Divorce. See also Americans Abroad, 
divorce; Judicial Separation. 
concepts, historical, 396, 426. 
alimony, 325-326, 525-529. 
based on foreign law, 428-429. 
cause having arisen outside state of 
domicil, 408,452-458. 
change of domicil or nationality, 
449-458. 
collusion, 397, 475· 
consular, 4I9. 
cumulative application of national 
laws, 429-439, 44I,n.230, 
455· 
custody of children, 53 I -5 34· 
decrees, 4 I 7-4 I 9· 
different national laws involved, 
44Q-445· 
disposition of property, 5 3o-5 3 I. 
domiciliary law, 40Q-402, 42 5-
426, 448, 456-457• 
effect on one party only, 284, 
442-445>500, 5I7-5I9· 
effects of non-recognized divorce, 
5I7-szi. 
effects of valid divorce, 52I-534· 
evasion, 453,457-458, 504-5 IO. 
ex parte proceedings, 395-396, 
403-406. 
Greek Orthodox laws, 4I 5, 4I8, 
42Q-422. 
grounds, 436-445, 45 5-456, 
465. 
Hague Convention, 3 I. See also 
Table of Statutes. 
Jewish laws, 4I4-416, 4I 8, 438, 
440. 
jurisdiction, 3 96-42 z, 49 I -494· 
at domicil, 399-416. 
at residence, 407. 
based on consent of defendant, 
397· 
exclusive, 397-399, 491-492. 
in t'em, 399, 404. 
national courts, 397-399. 
restricted by lex fOt'i, 407-410, 
458. 
restricted by national law, 4 I o-
417. 
lex fot'i applied, 391,441-445. 
lex loci celebt'ationis, 426-42 7. 
migratory, 393-395· 
mills, 388-390, 393-395, 406, 
493> 510. 
municipal laws, 387-390. 
nationality principle, 391, 427-
446. 
of foreigners, 385-387. 
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Divorce (continued) 
opportunity for defense, 494· 
permissibility, 429-43 3· 
private, 417. 
procedure, 416-417. 
prohibited, 387, 417,n.I IO, 430, 
496-502, 5I7· 






religious, 4 I 3-4 I 7 and passim, 
385-461. 
renvoi, 446-448. 
requiring valid marriage, 419-
422. 
residence requirement, 408-po, 
454. 46o-46I. 
res judicata, 484. 
similar grounds, 437-439· 502-
504. 
statistics, 3 94-3 9 5. 
without judicial litigation, 48 s-
491. 
Divorced Person, Marriage Pro-





English and American, I 49· 
authorized French view, 77,n.3o, 
I4I. 
basis for divorce, 40Q-402, 42 5-
426,448,456-457. 
by choice, I 1 o. 
by operation of law, I I I, 141, 
I6o,n.3, 309-3 IO, 406-407, 
595, 6o4-6o6, 6u~ 
change 
effect on divorce, 449-458, 
505. 
effect on marital property, 
354-364. 
e,ffect on parental relations, 
562-564, 574· 
effect on status, I48-149. 
characterization, 142-147. 
common to both spouses, 40o-
402. 
compromises between different 
systems of national laws, I 5 S-
157· 
determination, I 3 9-14 7. 
in marital relations, 300, 3 I 9· 
in parental relations, 560, 57,1-
575> 587-588, 594· 
last, I 30. 
last common, 40I-402. 
matrimonial, 261, 263-264, 345, 
347> 399-400. 
of illegitimate children, 6 I I, 6 I 7, 
625. 
of origin, I09, 13I-I32. 
of wife, 40o-403. 
principle of, I09, 25C)-26I. 
rationale, I49-I 58. 
rules in parts of the British Em-
pire, 129. 
test of effects of marriage on prop-
erty, 348-349· 
Dominion Nationality, I 29. 
Donnedieu de Vabres, H., I 5· 
Dowry, 336, 598. 
Dumoulin, I4, 85, 343· 
Dutch School, 7,n.12. 
Ecclesiastical Courts, 246-24 7, 48 5. 
E/zevertrag, 294. • 
Emancipation, I 7 4· 
Emigration, Influence on National-
ity Principle, I 53-I 54· 
Engagement to Marry, I 99-204. 
England 
literature, I I, 28. 
adoption, 638-639. 
annulment of marriage, 537-543. 
foreign, 42.1. 
capacity, 19o-19I. 
cases ex misericordia, 234, 4-2I-
422. 
consent of parents, 209, 267-268. 




foreign, 46 3-46 5, 48 I. 
grounds, 436. 
jurisdiction, 40o-402, 44-8, 
458. 
domicil, concept, I0<}-1 II, 139, 
142. 
marital property, 340, 346, 355· 
marital relations, 299· 
marital settlement, 366-368. 
marriage, substantive require-
ments, 259-261. 
personal law, 102-105, IO<J-I I I. 
renvoi, 7 5-77. 
support, 325, 611, 622. 
Espinola, I 7. 
Evasion 
of divorce laws, 453, 457-458, 
504-SIO. 
of marriage formalities, 2 3 I -2 3 2. 
of substantive requirements for 
marriage, 2 5 I -2 58. 
Expectancies, 3 77-3 79· 
Expectation of the Parties 
concerning property rights, 87. 
Extradition 
principle of double criminality, 
134-135> n.I37· 
Falconbridge, 24. 
Family Expense Statutes, 318-3 20. 
Federal Law 
of the United States, 39· 
Fedozzi, I 6, I 7. 




Foreign Corporations, 4· 
Forgo Case, 73· 
Formalities 
as distinguished from procedure, 
210. 
of marriage, 207-242. 




literature, 7,n.11, I4-I6, 25. 
adoption, 647-648. 
capacity, 188. 
colonial marriages, 219. 
consular marriages, 221-222, 
236-237· 
divorce, 406, 428; 436, 442-
443,452, 457> 460. 
domicil, authorization, 77 ,n. 30, 
I41. 
dowry, 336. 
foreign divorce, 4 7 I -4 7 5. 
fraude a la loi, 443-44-6, 507-
509· 
identification card, I41-I42, 
4IO,n.8I. 
illegitimate child, 612-613, 618-
620, 623, 629. 
immovables, 34I-342, 353, 359, 
362. 
immutability, marital property, 
355> 359· 
marital relations, 305, 3I6, 3I8, 
319-320, 322, 324. 
marriage settlement, 8 5, 366. 
implied contract theory, 343-
348. 
national interest, doctrine, 188. 
nationality laws, I 36, I 38. 
nationality principle, 1 I 2. 
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